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UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

CHARACTERIZATION THROUGH AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE

BY

Donald Peter Schopflocher

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL 1993

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FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled **Characterization through Autobiographical Narrative** submitted by Donald Peter Schopflocher in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology.

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Amedeo Giorgi

Amedeo Giorgi

September 27, 1993

How shall a psychological life history be written?
What structures must a full-bodied account
of a personality include?
How can one detect unifying threads in a life, if they exist?

- Gordon Allport

To find for each person his true character,
to differentiate him from all others,
means to know him.

- Herman Hesse

All persons are puzzles
until at last
we find in some word or act
the key to the man, to the woman:
straightway
all their past words and actions
lie in light before us.

-Ralph Waldo Emerson

It is in memory that one saves and savors
the significant experiences,
the dazzling sights,
the critical events.
In memory these precious experiences form themselves together
into a myth
which tells a story.

- Rollo May

Are not our lives too short for that full utterance
which through all our stammerings is
of course
our only and abiding intention?

- Joseph Conrad

To Marilyn

for sacrifices greater than can be voiced

Abstract

This research presents the text of an oral autobiography and a description of the personality of its author. Because it focuses upon a single individual, it can be understood as a contribution to the tradition established by Gordon Allport (1937) who argued that a science of persons must incorporate properties unique to particular individuals and who proposed a variety of methods, including the intensive study of personal documents, by which this goal might be achieved. This tradition, however, is reinterpreted as grounded in the theory of experience as lived (Erlebnis) developed in the philosophies of Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl rather than in the theory of science developed from logical positivism that dominates contemporary psychology. As a result, the theoretical foci include the prospects for, and procedures of, a systematic psychology of experience; and the nature of our lived experience of others.

Within this revised conception, meaning is pivotal and the products of analysis are conceived as meaning structures explicit and implicit within the lived experience of the autobiographer. The current investigation attempts to provide "a direct analysis of the psychological meaning of naive descriptions of personal experiences" (Giorgi, 1985, p.1) which is accessible to understanding.

While the specific techniques employed to localize meanings from free verbal report are phenomenologically and hermeneutically inspired, they may be utilized beside analytic technologies developed within psychometrics and widely employed in individual differences and personality research. Included in the current research is an analysis that illustrates this possibility.

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Dr. T. Cameron Wild, fellow traveller, who many times pointed the way through thickets and who insisted I keep on.

Dr. Leo Mos who presents a living example of what it means to remain true to self.

members of my supervisory committee, who endured, with bemused good grace

R, true friend, who understands me as little as I understand him but for whom it never matters.

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CHAPTER I

TRAIT PSYCHOLOGY AND MEANING

> Unless idiographic (particular) knowledge is fused with nomothetic (universal) knowledge, we shall not achieve the aims of science, however closely we imitate the methods of the natural and mathematical sciences. - Gordon Allport

This chapter argues that an understanding of personality requires an adequate account of meaning. The preferred methods for personality study in contemporary psychology have failed to provide such an account.

Trait Psychology. Gordon Allport was a respected pioneer of North American academic psychology and a respected personality theorist; in 1964 the American Psychological Association presented him with the Distinguished Scientific Contribution Award noting that he 'reminded us that man is neither a beast nor a statistic, except as we choose to regard him so, and that human personality finds its greatest measure in the reaches of time' (cited in Wiggins, Renner, Clone, & Rose, 1976). This humanism is strongly evident in his theory of personality (Allport, 1937, 1955, 1961) which is grounded on propositions such as 'every mental function is embedded in a personal life' (Allport, 1937, p. 18); personality is a single unity of many features, a 'unitas multiplex' (Allport, 1961, p. 376); and the study of the self (or proprium) is necessary because it 'includes all aspects of personality that make for inward unity' (Allport, 1955, p. 40). Yet very few of Allport's proposals have been adopted within academic psychology.

One proposal that has had a profound and continuing influence upon personality psychology, however, is that the appropriate unit with which to analyze personality is the trait (Allport, 1931, 1966). The basic conception of a trait is that individual behaviors are organized into equivalence classes by an underlying causal mechanism and that individual propensities to exhibit behaviors within the class are dependent on the strength of this underlying mechanism. Under this conception, the equivalence classes associated with each particular trait mechanism can be discovered by examining covariances between behaviors across a large number of individuals, and the strength of the trait within each particular individual can be assessed as a linear combination of the intensity and/or frequency of behaviors exhibited from each equivalence class. Then the relationships of traits to each other and to behavior can be further examined by, for example, jointly administering standardized tests which sample the behaviors of many equivalence classes.

This conception of the trait serves as a credo for the empirical analysis of personality, and in particular for its measurement apparatus, the technology of psychological testing. In addition, the list of words in the English language that are representative of traits that Allport compiled (Allport & Odbert, 1936) has served as a standard point of departure for the development of measurement scales for personality traits (e.g. Goldberg, 1990)[1].

Yet Allport believed that a psychology that saw persons simply as 'the point of intersection of a number of quantitative variables' (Allport, 1961, p. 8) would be incomplete. This would leave the human personality without 'internal structure, coherence, or animation' (ibid.). Considering it self-evident that each individual is both organized and unique, Allport proposed to extend the concept of trait to encompass behavioral configurations that are unique to particular individuals, thereby intending to capture individuality within the units of study appropriate to a scientific psychology. In contrast with the study of general traits in groups of persons, a study characterized as nomothetic, the study of individual traits would belong to an idiographic (later morphogenic) science, a science of the individual. Allport advocated the use of personal documents as a prime source of data for this idiographic science of personality (Allport, 1942) and presented a major case study using such documents (Allport, 1965). He also compiled an inventory of additional methods he believed to be suitable for idiographic research (Allport, 1962).

This proposal, while sporadically engendering debate, has not found wide acceptance. One prevailing opinion has been that the nomothetic/idiographic distinction is unnecessary: 'One of the hardiest perennial weeds in psychology's conceptual garden is the notion that there are nomothetic (generalizing) and idiographic (individualizing) branches, types, or emphases of science' (Holt, 1962, p.377). Another opinion has been that the distinction is incoherent: '"idiography" has only too often deserved translation as "the writings of idiots"' (Rozeboom, 1972, p.116). Where argumentation supplements rhetoric, the most telling critique of the idiographic trait is that it offers nothing beyond the existing logic of traits with which to direct or organize investigation. Even a configuration of behaviors or traits unique to a single individual can be reconceived as a trait on which all but one member of the population has a negligible score, and treated in investigation in the same way that all traits are treated. Furthermore, the argument continues, since psychological laws are the goal of scientific psychology, only traits with nonnegligible variation within the population of all individuals are deserving of study.

While the intention to capture a major component of the common sense experience of persons, the understanding that an individual is unique in systematic ways, is consistent with the humanistic flavour of Allport's theorizing, it is the framing of this notion within the logic of traits which leads to its rejection. To recapture the sense of completeness that an humanistic psychology of personality seeks will require an examination and reformulation of the concept of trait.

The Critique of Traits. Recently a major challenge to the concept of personality trait has been mounted. After reviewing evidence from personality assessment studies, Mischel (1968) concluded that there is poor evidence for the cross situational consistency of behavior that is required by a trait conception of personality. Mischel argued that the fact that the typical correlation between individual personality items (whether behavioral ratings or questionnaire responses) was 0.30 or less is not due to the (poor) state of trait measurement methodology but is rather an accurate reflection of behavioral variability. According to Mischel, behavior is situationally specific and thus poorly accounted for by traits.

A major response to this challenge has been to argue that Mischel misinterpreted the importance of the observed ceiling on the correlation between individual behaviors (or items) by ignoring the effect of aggregating many such individual measures (e.g. Rushton, Jackson & Paunonen, 1980; Epstein & O'Brien, 1985). According to classical psychometric theory, individual items are subject to a large number of influences most of which can be considered to be random error with respect to the measurement of a broad underlying trait. Aggregation of such items can result in reliable measures of traits since sources of variation specific to each item (beyond that which measures the trait) will tend to cancel each other. In this way, while individual items can be situationally specific, aggregations of items can become cross- situationally general. This response to Mischel's challenge of the trait concept now appears to be the consensus held by personality researchers, although the debate has served to sensitize researchers to situational determinants of behavior and to the importance of the interaction between the properties of the person and the situation (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). It is now widely held that when these additional factors have been properly assessed, variations in personality can be more completely explained and that the meager accomplishments of trait-based research in personality that prompted Mischel's initial critique can be improved.

Another response to Mischel's critique was the attempt to demonstrate that greater behavioral consistency and predictability could be demonstrated for traits on which individuals rated themselves as consistent (Bem & Allen, 1974) or for traits chosen as most consistent by individuals themselves (Kenrick & Springfield, 1980). This view, in asserting that some traits are relevant only to the explanation of some people, claimed to be idiographic rather than nomothetic in focus.

Defenders of the traditional nomothetic approach offer the following criticisms of these attempts (Rushton, Jackson & Paunonen, 1980; Paunonen & Jackson, 1985; Paunonen, 1988). First, they argue, there is a confound between measures of trait relevance and trait measures themselves: people at the extremes of the distribution of a trait will tend to be more consistent on that trait than people at the middle ranges. Second, since trait consistency or relevance measures are posited to serve as moderator variables to general trait measures, they are themselves nomothetic, having a value for each individual on each (nomothetic) trait. This variation of the original arguments against idiographic traits is also now the consensus position among personality researchers.

The debate, if not necessarily its outcome, attests to a certain dissatisfaction with the results of trait psychology. It was played out, however, within the context of a positivistic psychological science, a viewpoint very deeply committed to direct observation, experimentation, quantitative measurement and statistical analysis. This is a viewpoint which does not question the received conception of a trait. It remains incomplete because it does not provide an adequate account of a component critical to the measurement and understanding of any personality trait; that is, its relationship to meaning.

The Critique from Meaning[2]. The argument that meaning must play an integral part in the psychology of personality begins by questioning how an understanding of the nature of a trait actually arises, particularly when it is based upon the responses of individuals to self-report scales. It is generally assumed that responses to items from such scales, considered as behaviors or performances, provide a self-evident and unequivocal basis for interpretation, and that an understanding of the nature of the trait being assessed arises naturally for the investigator as an unmediated consequence of observation of those responses. This position is difficult to defend. Behavior, and particularly linguistic behavior, is relative and equivocal and the same behaviors may require different interpretations, or have different meanings, in different contexts.

In ability or achievement measurement, it can be argued that an acceptable context does exist which justifies treating a test response as a performance. It is supplied by the considerations that determine whether an answer provided by a test taker is accurate or inaccurate. It is this property (of incorrectness or correctness) which is then taken to be what is observed and which is essential to the specification of the ability or achievement. For self-report items used in the measurement of personality traits, however, there is no fixed external context by which the properties relevant to an investigator's interpretation can be identified. At least some of the properties relevant to an interpretation must be provided by the meaning of the items.

It is by making use of meanings that traits are actually specified, communicated, and investigated. In correlational analyses, which attempt to locate those behaviors or items which belong to the equivalence class causally determined by a single trait, an understanding of the nature of the trait depends upon an examination of, and consequent understanding of, the set of behaviors or items so localized. For example, in factor analytic studies, factors emerge which show 'high loadings' for a certain subset of items. The typical procedure for interpreting these factors consists in examining the actual items with high loadings and attempting to discern *from their meanings* why they would tend to be answered similarly or what they have in common. While the continued validation of the resulting interpretation of the factor, or the trait which is presumed to have given rise to it, may be subject to an entire network of observed empirical relationships to other behaviors or traits, it is clear that in the first instance the meanings of the items plays an important role.

A deductive approach to test construction which starts with an understanding of the trait is not immune to considerations of meaning. In the most rigorous approaches (e.g. Jackson, 1970)), a trait specification is carefully created and items are generated whose *meanings*, when answered by tested individuals, are consistent with the *meaning* of the trait as specified. The specification of a trait, then, is (at least in part and at least initially) a complexly structured aggregation of the meaning of the individual items used to measure the construct.

If processes involving the meaning of behaviors and self- report items are evident in the activities of personality psychologists, they are equally evident in the activities of test takers. In responding to a self-report item, the test taker will also be interpreting the meaning of the item. That person will respond to the item in a manner which indicates the extent to which this meaning as it is understood is consistent with an understanding of individual personal experience. The test taker will be striving to remain consistent with a self-understanding, not with a set of behaviors, since the test taker must also interpret his or her own behavior. This can also be expressed by saying that the test taker intends that a particular meaning be taken from any particular response. Under ideal circumstances, it is this meaning as intended by the test taker to which the specification of the trait being measured will refer. Ideally it should also be identically the meaning that the test author intended should have been interpreted by the test taker. Even under this idealization, a trait conception of personality and the investigations conducted under its rubric cannot successfully escape a consideration of meaning, and it is precisely a consideration of this component which is missing from the basic conception of a trait.

The simplest response, to believe that the idealization is close to the actual situation which typically obtains, is to assume that, whatever the relevant psychological processes are, meanings are transparent; that is, that each communication between investigator and the one investigated operates as a 'conduit' insuring (in the absence of, presumably easily diagnosed, gross disturbances) that meanings are always accurately shared. This conduit metaphor of communication is implicit in much of our natural language (Reddy, 1979). It is a reasonable position for a tester to hold, for if meanings are transparent, they can become the observables on which a positive science can be based.

This is the type of response that might be offered by the trait theorist. As a direct result of the statistical models used to analyze tests, and by an argument already encountered in response to Mischel, it is easy to treat any differences between an investigator's and an individual's understandings of meaning simply as contributions to error in measurement (e.g. Epstein & O'Brien, 1985). A response similar in thrust would be to argue that differences in interpretation between investigator and subject, particularly in questionnaire research, can be reduced or overcome by appropriate attention to item wording (e.g. Kuncel, 1981). Thus even if the idealization does not always hold, it can with effort be sufficiently well approximated.

But if meanings are not actually transparent nor readily made transparent, then the test taker's intended meaning might not be the same as the meaning used by the tester in forming a trait specification. As a simple constructed example: if I answer yes to the question 'Do you feel that your colleagues distrust you?' I might intend to convey that they believe me irresponsible, untrustworthy, or absent-minded; but the tester may assume that my colleagues believe me dishonest. That is, there might be a confusion of the investigator's and test taker's viewpoints which could only lead to inaccuracy.

James (1890) recognized the potential for this type of confusion, labeled it the 'Psychologist's fallacy' and issued the following warning:

> Crude as such a confusion of standpoints seems to be when abstractly stated, it is nevertheless a snare into which no psychologist has kept himself at all times from falling. We cannot be too watchful against its subtly corrupting influence (James, 1890, p. 197).

Another response to the critique from meaning is to assert that a test can measure a trait 'indirectly' (Campbell, 1957); that is, in a manner that need make no reference to the meaning of items that might have been intended by a test taker. This, too, would free the trait psychologist from the necessity of considering meaning as an essential component of the endeavour to study personality. For example, in a test designed to measure 'paranoia', a possible indirect item might be (as previously) 'Do you feel that your colleagues distrust you?' The tester might interpret a positive response as indicating that the test taker is (or more probably is) delusional or suffering from a mental disorder.

But this is a potential significance of the response. That is, while of interest to the investigator (and likely relevant to the test taker as well), that he or she may be suffering from a mental disorder is not something that the test taker is (necessarily) in a position to know and will not therefore (usually) be a part of what was intended by the test taker as the meaning of the response. It is instead a significance that can be attributed to the meaning. The meaning of a positive response is that the test taker 'feels distrusted by colleagues', that this feeling may be related to a mental disturbance is a significance of that meaning.

In any full specification of the trait paranoia, some reference to the meaning intended by the test taker will necessarily remain. Such a specification might contain statements like **IF** feels distrusted by colleagues (intended meaning), **THEN** more likely suffering delusions (significance). The accuracy of the attributed significance will depend upon the accuracy of an attribution of intended meaning. Investigations of traits are usually designed to make significances, not intended meanings, explicit. What is at issue in typical practice in validating a trait, then, is the discovery of significances rather than the accuracy of the attribution of meaning. But unless particular care is taken, meaning and significance will become conflated, the meaning intended by the test taker will remain implicit, and the 'Psychologist's Fallacy' will be committed. That is, unless the (too often implicit) assumption that a particular intended meaning was in fact intended can be justified, the conclusion that a particular significance will accrue will also not be justified.

There are important implications. If the importance of meaning is granted and the possibility that meanings are not transparent, and hence unequivocally communicable, is also acknowledged, then an interpretation of Mischel's discovery that personality items tend to be only weakly interrelated can be offered which does not yet abandon, or place limits upon, the notion of individual consistency in favour of situational determinants of behavior. Following this line Bem and Allen (1974) offer an extension of a position on trait measurement presented originally by Allport to the effect that while low correlations between behaviors within large groups of people could serve to demonstrate that individuals were not consistent in the same way, these correlations by themselves could not demonstrate that particular individuals were inconsistent with themselves (Allport, 1937).

Thus if the meaning of behavior is equivocal, if a particular behavior or test item is logically capable of bearing more than a single meaning, a specific act of interpretation is required to assign a meaning to that behavior or to assign that behavior to a particular equivalence class. Further, different interpretations might assign different meanings to the same behavior and/or the same behavior to different equivalence classes. Under these conditions, the meaning assigned to a behavior would remain relative to the interpretation under which the meaning was assigned and the assessment of consistency of behavior would also remain relative to that interpretation. A verdict of consistency would depend upon the particular interpretation under which particular equivalence classes were formed. In a traditional measurement situation in which the behaviors of a large number of persons are assessed under a single interpretation, particular behaviors might be included in error into an equivalence class with which they are not consistent and '[traditional nomothetic research would] yield a conclusion that a sample of individuals is inconsistent to the degree that their behaviors do not sort into the equivalence class that the investigator imposes.' (Bem & Allen, 1974, p.509).

Of particular importance here is the fact that an individual being assessed will also have an interpretation of his or her own behaviors. In every situation that involves a potential for measurement, there will be at least two different types of interpretation. One type will include the investigator's interpretation of an individual's behavior and will involve observation. The other type will include the individual's interpretation of his own behavior and will be based upon the individual's experience. To the extent that the investigator's interpretation differs from the individual's, there will always remain the unexplored possibility that the individual is consistent with him or herself under his or her own interpretation of his or her own behavior. As a result, Bem and Allen (1974) conclude "The traditional verdict of inconsistency... [may be] a statement about a disagreement between an investigator and a group of individuals and/or a disagreement among the individuals within the group" (1974, p. 512). In that case, the description of the individual personality will remain incomplete, and it will ignore not just random error but also what is systematic.

It is just here that the concept of the idiographic, the systematically individual in personality, reenters. For Allport this is expressed as follows: 'We must acknowledge the roughness and inadequacy of our universal [trait] dimensions. By learning to handle the individuality of motives and the uniqueness of personality, we shall become better scientists, not worse" (Allport, 1960, p. 148). For us, it is not the traits as causal mechanisms under the basic conception of traits which can be idiographic, but the meanings, assigned to the behaviors and communications by which alone these could be known, which may vary in a consistent way from individual to individual. The roughness of the 'universal dimensions' is due in part to the fact that they are based solely upon the investigator's conceptions of the organization of trait equivalence classes. Handling individuality means examining the meanings of behaviors, especially linguistic behaviors, that stem from individual's own conceptions.

There is, moreover, a formal limitation upon the basic conception of nomothetic trait which might prevent it from ever overcoming this roughness even if meanings were actually transparent. Recall that in the basic conception of traits particular formal properties are assumed that allow items or behaviors to be aggregated additively by some linear combination to estimate how much of a particular trait a particular individual possesses. This model is typically applied to trait specification as well. In formulating a specification, the meanings of all items which reflect the construct are used. In factor analysis, the meanings of all items with high loadings are included under the umbrella of the 'name' assigned to the factor. In rational scale development, the trait specification from which candidate items are generated explicitly represents an individual who would assent to all items.

This results in an aggregation of meanings, a structure, that strictly speaking can be present only in a person with an extremely high score on the trait. Intermediate scores, scores indicating that not all specific meanings were intended, are then interpreted as some intermediate degree of presence of this complete structure. There will, however, be a large set of distinctly different item patterns consistent with the same intermediate level of a construct. These will remain possible even when the degree of relationship between particular behaviors or items is empirically known through correlational research, since correlation coefficients only constrain the relative frequencies of particular patterns but do not logically exclude any such patterns. And potential differences in meaning between such patterns will have been ignored. Thus, two profiles of items representing the same intermediate level on trait will be assigned the same meaning (that is, presence of structure x to degree y) even though they *quite literally* might not share assent on even a single item.

There may yet be a further problem. The additive formal model underlying trait measurement assumes that the intended meaning of a particular item does not depend upon which other items have also been given assent. Consider the situation if the interpretation of traits needed to take account of the possibility that each pattern of responses had a different (or perhaps more than one different) possible meaning. If meanings are not transparent, then neither need be the relationships between them. The cooccurence of items might reflect more than a single type of relationship. It would become necessary to consider the possibility that items have different intended meanings when considered in relation to each other.

The conclusion seems irresistible: a role for meaning must be acknowledged in conceptions of personality and personality traits. There needs to be explicit attention given to particular communications and the meanings intended for these by test takers in order to understand their personalities.

Notes

1 Details of both the technical and substantive accomplishments of trait psychology can be obtained from, for example: Anastasi, 1968; Cattell and Dreger, 1977; Edwards, 1970; Nunnally, 1967; Rozeboom, 1966; Royce and Powell, 1983.

2 Portions of this section were presented at the Canadian Psychological Association Annual Conference, Calgary, Alberta in June of 1991 under the title *Beyond Construct Validity: A Post-Positivist Proposal* (co-authored with T. Cameron Wild and Don Kuiken).

CHAPTER II

APPROACHING MEANING AND EXPERIENCE

> ...it is the psychophysiological attitude, the prevalent orientation toward discoveries of psychophysical causations or conditionings, which for so long has caused the psychologist to give privileged status to sense-data and has kept him from inquiring into *the descriptive place of those data in the intentional framework, and into their meaning,* which can *only* be determined in this context (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 245, *Italics added*).

This chapter seeks a rigorous conception which can support an empirical psychology of personality. After briefly introducing an organizing framework, the search begins in the philosophy of psychology as a human science proposed by Wilhelm Dilthey. Then phenomenology, a philosophy articulated by Edmund Husserl that focuses on meaning, is considered. A promising framework for the analysis of personality is located within Husserl's analysis of concerns he shared with Dilthey.

An Organizing Framework. One way in which the basic thrust of trait theory has been expressed is in the form of a slogan: 'behavior is a function of stimulus and organism', often presented explicitly as an equation (e.g. Cattell, 1977):

$$\mathbf{B = f(S,O)}$$

(with B standing for behavior, S for stimulus, and O for organism). Within the philosophy of science under which this equation is proposed, all three components are assumed to be composed of real entities which could come to be unequivocally observed under appropriate conditions (of decomposition and observation). For a personality psychology, the organism O is to be decomposed into traits.

By analogy to the behavioral equation, the current development will orient towards statements of the form: an action A results from an experience of a situation S as meaning M to a person P. This statement is meant to suggest that behavior is always already saturated with meaning. It places experience at the center of inquiry designed to isolate and bring forward this meaning.

The challenge to be met by an empirical inquiry of personality represented by this alternate statement is multifaceted: it must argue that meaning is not ultimately reducible to physical properties (and hence subject to elimination from a scientific psychology); it must show that a method exists by which meaning can be reliably recovered; and it must show how this method fits within a progressive science in a way that does not diminish the accomplishments of inquiry represented by the behavioral equation. The development which follows is intended primarily to point out directions in which these arguments have been pursued, rather than to present a definitive argument. It is in the fertility and coherence of these directions which an empirical psychology of personality must invest.

The Descriptive Psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey[1]. As a philosopher, historian and literary critic, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) was well aware of the impressive successes of the Naturwissenschaften (the natural sciences). Faced with the arguments of philosophers of natural science that the humanities were complexities beyond the current scope of the natural sciences, or were merely subjective, Dilthey (1883/1989) proposed the Geisteswissenschaften (the human sciences) as a separate division of scientific activity focused upon humanity and its artifacts. The attempt to provide an epistemological basis for the human sciences became a central theme in his work.

The basis for the division began, for Dilthey, with a distinction between perception, which involves the analytic combination of separate and distinct sensations, and reflection on inner experience:

> The opposition between material and mental substances [in philosophy] was replaced by that between the external and internal worlds - the external world as given in outer perception (sensation) through the senses, and the inner world as presented originally through inner apprehension of psychic events and activities (reflection). As a first step towards the independent constitution of the human sciences, it suffices to distinguish between those processes which have as their material what is given in the senses and are produced by means of connections of thought [,] and processes that concern a range of facts which are given originally in inner experience and without the cooperation of the senses (Dilthey, 1883/1989, p. 60).

For Dilthey, the contents of reflection are 'Erlebnisse' (lived experiences), always presented as already constituted totalities by the process of living. These totalities are bound by communality of meaning:

> That which in the stream of time forms a unity in the present because it has unitary meaning is the smallest entity which we can designate as an experience (Erlebnis). Going further, one may call each encompassing unity of parts of life bound together through a common meaning for the course of life an "experience" - even when the several parts are separated from each other by interrupting events (quoted in Palmer, 1969, p. 107).

The mode of apprehension of experientially meaningful wholes in inner experience, and the nature of the relationship between parts and wholes, were themes weaving through all of Dilthey's work. They became central when Dilthey proposed a psychology focused on inner experience as the pivotal foundational discipline for the human sciences (Dilthey, 1894/1977).

To begin, Dilthey notes that data of this psychology are given in the context of a psychic system which is already formed and always already present:

> The human studies are distinguished from the sciences of nature first of all in that the latter have for their objects facts which are presented to the consciousness as from outside, as phenomena and given in isolation, while the objects of the former

> are given originaliter from within as real and as a living continuum. In the human sciences the nexus [system] of psychic life constitutes originally a primitive and fundamental datum (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 27).

He argues that this system remains forever beyond the ability of an explanatory psychology to recapture in its living reality:

> In whatever fashion one conceives the formation of objective representations and their causal relations, their totality is in no way whatever in the sensory excitations, nor in their coexistence and succession. How different is our knowledge of psychic life! Contrary to outer perception, inner perception rest on an inner awareness, a lived experience; it is immediately given (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 53).

Thus, apprehending the system of meanings itself already relies upon its constitution as a whole:

> ...apprehension originates from lived experience and remains connected with it. The processes of the whole psyche operate together in this experience. In the lived experience particular occurrence is supported by the totality of psychic life and the nexus in which it itself stands, and the whole of psychic life belongs to immediate experience (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 55).

Consequently, it is an immediately given interconnectedness within an organized mental life which characterizes lived experiences. It is already within, as a process of, and with an awareness of this full interconnectedness that meaning is to be apprehended. This immediate presence of the full psychic nexus provides the context within which apprehension can proceed to individuate particular elements:

> In understanding we proceed from the coherent whole which is livingly given to us in order to make the particular intelligible to us (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 55).

This entire process of apprehension Dilthey calls 'verstehen' (understanding) and he confidently asserts that it underlies the separation of natural and human sciences: 'We explain nature, we understand psychic life' (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 27).

The basic shape of Dilthey's proposal is evident. He has argued that the realm of inner experience, a totality within which *meanings* are immediately given as already constituted totalities, is inaccessible to a psychology modeled on natural science. He has argued that an approach to this realm is *critical to a scientific psychology* which would faithfully represent human beings as they live. He has suggested that access to this realm of meaning requires *a distinctive process of apprehension* called understanding. It now remains to demonstrate that this process can yield reliable knowledge in order to provide justification for using statements of understanding as a ground for the human sciences.

Throughout his career, Dilthey struggled with this last, and most crucial, step. His approach through descriptive psychology suggested the careful introspective analysis and description of the system of meanings in its typicality as given to investigators themselves in lived experience. Such a descriptive psychology would provide structural elements of the psychic system as facts connected to, and given in, the context of the whole psychic nexus. If presented in expression, these would, in turn, be verifiable by others through their own introspections as truly connected to the lived experience of the total psychic system. Once so verified, these facts could become elements in systems of human knowledge:

> By a descriptive psychology I understand the presentation of components and continua which one finds uniformly throughout all developed modes of human psychic life, where these components form a unique nexus which is neither added nor deduced, but rather is concretely lived. This psychology is thus the description and analysis of a nexus which is originally and continuously given as life itself. An important consequence follows. *This psychology has for its object what one regularly finds in the nexus of adult psychic life. It describes this nexus of the inner life of a typical man.* It examines, analyzes, experiments, and compares. It makes use of all the possible devices in order to resolve its problem. But its importance in the complex of sciences derives precisely from the fact that *every connection utilized by it can be verified unequivocally by inner perception, and from the fact that each such ensemble can be shown to be a member of a larger whole, not as a result of deduction, but as given originally in life* (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 35, *Italics added*).

Such verified elements would also provide a framework to which an explanatory natural science psychology could orient itself, a context upon which the processes of induction and abduction could focus:

> If we bring together all the details regarding a descriptive and analytic psychology, there finally appears the unmistakable importance which the solution of this problem would have even for explanatory psychology. The latter would there find a sound descriptive framework, a precise terminology, for exact analysis and an important means of control for its hypothetical explanations (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 37).

Dilthey also asserted that understanding must be applied first to the individual *person*. This theme is most characteristic of Dilthey's later attempts to present a hermeneutic justification for understanding as in, for example: 'At every point, understanding opens up a world' (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p. 123); and:

> The subject matter of understanding is always something individual. In its higher forms it draws its conclusions about the pattern within a work, a person , or a situation, from what is given in the book or person. Thus we are concerned with the individual not merely as an example of man in general but as a totality in himself (Dilthey, 1927/1988, p. 158).

But this theme is also present within the earlier work on descriptive psychology, particularly in relation to the nature of personality itself. Personality, conceived as the essence of individuality, is to be found by understandingly grasping the teleological purposive unity, the anticipated future world, formed by, and available to, the psychic system. This unity is the result both of individual differences in introspectively-verifiable structural characteristics of psychic systems and of the concrete particularities encountered by the individual during development:

> There is active in individuality a principle of unity which subordinates the forces to the teleological nexus. In this combination of actual foundations and a purposively fashioned structure in which they are united, *individuality is an image of the world itself*. The concept of development is here enriched for it is in development that the particular and contingent determinations of the individual disposition become under given conditions, a homogeneous, purposive nexus (Dilthey, 1894/1977, p. 112, *Italics added*).

Thus understanding of the other requires not only knowledge of a profile of elements of the other's psychic system but also knowledge of the particular history of the other; and can become complete only in grasping through these the image of the world as the totality it is, and is anticipated to be, as lived by the integrated purposive psychic system of that other.

Dilthey's Hermeneutics. In response to criticism that introspection was unreliable and that psychological descriptions and statements would always be subject to dispute (Makkreel, 1977), Dilthey turned to the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher as a methodological alternative to introspection for the human sciences. Hermeneutics was then, and remains now in certain contexts, the study of texts, often archaic, to retrieve their meanings. A successful outcome provides an interpretation, a restatement of the lost meaning, of such a text. Schleiermacher's analysis of the general methodology of hermeneutics divided interpretive activity into two types: grammatical interpretation which rested upon the detailed study of language and grammatical form; and technical or psychological interpretation which focused upon retrieving 'the unity of the work, its theme,... viewed as the dynamic principle impelling the author, and the basic features of the composition... viewed as his distinctive nature, revealing itself in that movement' (Schleiermacher, 1858/1988, p. 94). The basic cognitive operations of hermeneutics, as formulated by Schleiermacher, followed a circular movement in which an emerging apprehension of the theme of the work gave focus to further grammatical analysis which in turn brought the theme to greater clarity. The goal is clearly factual, the proper interpretation reveals as fact the lost meaning of the work and its context as the actual mental life of the author. By considering this process applicable to all of the particular expressions of lived experience of an individual, Dilthey broadened hermeneutics into both a description of the process by which all understanding of another obtains, and a method by which factual statements about mentality can come to be made.

In Dilthey's hermeneutic description of understanding, the child grows up in a world which has been constituted in part by historical and cultural sedimentations of the 'objective mind'; that is, by artifacts which both illustrate mental activities and present mental contents as objects of apprehension. Both the principle that artifacts reflect mental contents and the typical contents so reflected are incorporated as knowledge into the psychic system. In addition, exposure to the logical form of predicative knowledge gives access to established word and sentence (linguistic) meanings, meanings which, emptied of relationship to a particular individual's life experience, remain identical in every context. Knowledge of this type presents the context within which the processes of understanding can unfold:

> ...the given consists of expressions of life; they occur in the world of the senses, and are the expression of something spiritual and consequently make it possible for us to become acquainted with the latter (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p.123). Individuals do not usually apprehend life-expressions in isolation but against a background of knowledge about common features and a relation to some mental content (Dilthey, 1927/1988, p. 155).

A reflective awareness of the process of understanding can arise only in response to a failure to understand. Coherence has been lost. The experience intended through the life expression is no longer coherent as experience for the one who seeks to understand. In re-establishing understanding, additional expressions may be examined or perhaps current understandings of the nature of experience itself may be re-examined:

> When a person encounters, as a result of his understanding, an inner difficulty or a contradiction of what he already knows, he is forced to re-examine the matter So... we must consider other expressions or go back to the whole context of life in order to still our doubts (Dilthey, 1927/1988, p. 159).

An important component of this process may be to assume the position of the other who has produced these expressions, in an attempt to re-experience as coherent the original experiences of the other:

> If the point of view from which the task of understanding is undertaken implies the presence of one's own experienced psychic nexus, then this is also denoted as the transferring of one's own self into a given set of expressions of life. On the basis of this projection, this transposition, there appears now the highest form in which the totality of psychic life is effective in the understanding - re-creation or re-experiencing (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p. 132) .

It is also this possibility of successfully re-experiencing the experiences of the other, which provides such certainty as is possible:

> There is a final (though completely subjective) certainty which lies in re-experiencing, which no test of the cognitive value of the inferences in which the process of understanding can be represented can replace. These are the boundaries which are set to the logical treatment of the understanding by its very nature (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p. 137).

In accord with his earlier views, life expressions remain expressive of the whole psychic system of an individual and it remains the world of experience as originally lived by its subject which if apprehended fully by re-experiencing would reveal individuality. Dilthey also maintains the idea that differences in the general psychological system (although now available as part of the human historical-cultural heritage, the objective mind, rather than through introspection alone) combine with particular historical events in the formation of this unique world:

> Just as the objective mind contains a structured order of types, so does mankind, and this leads from the regularity and structure of general human nature to the types through which understanding grasps individuals. If we assume that these are not distinguished qualitatively, but, as it were, through emphasis on particular elements - however one may express this psychologically - then this represents the inner principle of the rise of individuality. And, if it were possible, in the act of understanding, both to grasp the changes brought about by circumstances in the life and state of the mind, as the outer principle of the rise of individuality, and the varied emphasis on the structural elements as the inner principle, then the understanding of human beings and of poetic and literary works would be a way of approaching the greatest mystery of life (Dilthey, 1927/ 1988, p. 158).

Dilthey, following Schleiermacher, continued to regard reading as a paradigm case of the process through which understanding of a set of life expressions is obtained. While understanding in reading is often unconscious and effortless, a failure of understanding can evoke conscious activities to pursue it. These may range from rereading, to conscious review and reflection, to consultation of other expressions such as dictionaries or encyclopedia. Works of literature provide a major challenge to students of the human sciences because an understanding of them is often elusive though they beckon irresistibly to the understanding and promise great profundity. 'Close reading' is a phrase often used to indicate the scholarly attempt to further an understanding of a text through multiple rereadings involving scrupulous attention to detail, demanding reflection and review, and careful attention to additional works ranging from those of the same author to interpretations of the work to biographies of the author to historical documents. 'Close reading' is thus an example of the conscious employment of hermeneutic techniques.

In characterizing the development of understandings of this type as a conscious methodology (which he called exegesis or explication), Dilthey emphasizes both its conformance to the basic logic of the hermeneutic circle, whereby the process is subject to continuing refinement through increasing understanding of both parts and whole, and its need to attend to the grammatical:

> All attempts at applying the process of understanding [must] bring the words to a sense, and the sense of particular parts of a whole to its general structure. The sequence of words is given. Each of these words is determinate-indeterminate. It contains in itself a variability of meaning. The means of syntactically relating each word to the others are also ambiguous within fixed limits; thus the sense arises, since the indeterminate is fixed by the construction. In the same way the values

> that the parts (which consist of sentences) have in their construction within the whole are ambiguous within definite bounds, and are determined by the whole (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p. 138).

The full process is thus inductive (or perhaps more accurately abductive) in nature:

> And this induction does not belong to the class in which a general law is deduced from an incomplete series of instances, but rather to that in which a structure, a system of order, is derived from the instances, and which serves to unify them as parts to a whole (Dilthey, 1927/1977, p. 138).

The expression of understanding that results from exegesis is an interpretation and forms the corpus of the human sciences:

> As the life of the mind only finds its complete, exhaustive and therefore, objectively comprehensible expression in language, explication culminates in the interpretation of the written records of human existence (Dilthey, 1927/1988, p. 161).

In summary, then, for Dilthey a connected set of life expressions created by the total psychic system of a unique other out of his or her lived experiences express the unified and meaningful unique world of that experience. Understanding is, to the extent possible, a re-experiencing of this world. Understanding is approached abductively by progressively reconstructing this world out of elements which include the determinate set of meanings conventionally assigned to words, sentences, and supersentential grammatical units; an implicit understanding of life which includes a (largely) introspective apprehension of the typical psychic system, and an emerging apprehension of that emerging world as constituted. Understanding becomes knowledge in the subjective certainty surrounding a successful re-experiencing of the other's world. Interpretations, which form the corpus of the human sciences, are descriptions of this acquired understanding and redescriptions of the set of life expressions and their individual and joint meanings in light of it. They serve to communicate this acquired understanding to others as knowledge, and to make this knowledge available to those others for incorporation into increasingly articulated understandings.

Dilthey and Allport. Gordon Allport was strongly influenced by German philosophy when he went to study in Germany in the twenties. He was undoubtedly exposed to the writings of Dilthey that anticipate in numerous particulars the distinctive humanism of Allport's theory of personality. For example, Allport's concept of idiographic traits maintained an emphasis on the individual which was characteristic of Dilthey, yet failed to influence mainstream psychological science.

This failure is likely due to two factors. The first was the widespread rejection of the concept of psychology as a human science in favor of the existing natural science conception of psychology. (For example, Dilthey's conception of descriptive psychology was the subject of a 'brilliant rebuttal' by Ebbinghaus, a pioneer in the objective study of memory, and that critique influenced Husserl to postpone his reading of Dilthey (Husserl, 1925/1954/ 1977, p. 34)). The second factor was that Allport incorporated this rejection into his conception of a trait psychology.

Typical of those who rejected understanding as a viable epistemology for psychology was the philosopher Windelband (e.g. 1912/1961). Windelband drew the distinction between the natural and human sciences at the level of culture. Only the kulturwissenschaften were genuine human sciences because they alone were founded upon the 'objective' apprehension of values. Since values are 'objects', the methods of cultural sciences show no essential differences from the methods of science generally. And because only fallible judgements of values and not values themselves are available to inner experience, Dilthey had been mistaken in emphasizing the importance of lived experience, which in the end remains subjective and ineffable. Psychology was thus a natural, and not a cultural, science.

The distinction between the general and the individual, Windelband maintained, was solely a methodological distinction within science between nomothetic (generalizing) tendencies and idiographic (particularizing) tendencies. Methodological differences stem not from whether an object is human and hence capable of apprehending meaning but from whether the initial focus of the investigator is on forming general laws applicable to all members of a class or whether the initial focus is on the developmental course of a single particular. For Windelband the progression of science is carried by the observation of facts grounded in direct perceptions and the ordering of these facts into causal theories, irrespective of whether groups or individuals are the investigator's initial focus.

It is in just the rapid move from perception to fact that Dilthey had recognized that the epistemic challenge presented by apprehending meaning is missed. Thus, for example, if the objects of investigation are other persons, then simple perception of their life expressions is insufficient to know them fully. Rather, what must be apprehended is the meaningful relationships between experiences and the whole psychic system which lived them as it is reflected in such expressions. The meanings of another are not directly and unequivocally perceived as facts. In the rush to causal explanation, what constitutes the grounds for asserting that all which is meaningfully present in such expressions has been apprehended?[2]

Allport, however, was subject to the dominant view of science. Rather than promoting a distinctive epistemology of understanding, he relied upon Windelband's distinction between nomothetic and idiographic sciences set within a conception of psychology as a natural science. Consequently his claim that the patterning of idiographic traits was capable of encompassing individuality abandons the unique lived experience of the individual and its contained meanings while remaining open to the criticism that the idiographic trait could not be logically distinguished from the nomothetic trait.

The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl[3]. Phenomenology is a philosophy which attempts to provide an epistemological basis for meaning, and provide methods by which meaning can be reliably recovered. These features attracted Dilthey but it was only after correspondence with him in 1911 (included in McCormick & Elliston, 1981) that Edmund Husserl became fully acquainted with Dilthey's work on descriptive psychology and began to consider his philosophy of phenomenology as a means of addressing psychology as an empirical human science (Husserl, 1925/1954/1977, p. 24). The results of these reflections include a series of lectures on phenomenological psychology (Husserl, 1925/1954/1977) which take Dilthey's descriptive psychology both as a point of departure and as the goal of an epistemological analysis. These lectures also foreshadow a decisive refinement of philosophical phenomenology itself which is presented in Husserl's last introduction to philosophical phenomenology (Husserl, 1954/1970). In order to appreciate the prescriptive force of these developments upon a psychology which seeks to appropriate meaning, a description of phenomenology follows.

Husserl's early philosophical work focused upon logic and one of its major themes was the attempt to constitute philosophy as a distinctive form of inquiry capable of yielding absolute and certain knowledge. Part of this task involved critiques of naturalism and historicism, positions based upon science then current in philosophical discourse, that denied that distinctively philosophical knowledge was possible. Naturalism affirms the presupposition of the natural sciences that everything is either physical and governed by scientific laws or if mental is merely dependent upon the physical and its laws. Everything which we unreflectively experience in inner experience is, according to naturalism, a natural phenomenon governed by laws which can come to be articulated by the application of scientific methods. Since logic is realized only within mental activity, a consistently applied naturalism would reduce logic to a natural phenomenon, and would make philosophical knowledge dependent upon the discoveries of a natural psychology. Historicism, on the other hand, presupposed that all philosophical judgements arise as the result of historical processes, and, remaining relative to these processes, are incapable of providing certain knowledge. Proper philosophical activity would aim at understanding the development of influential philosophical positions as examples of world-views, and philosophical knowledge would be dependent upon historical scholarship. Again, independent philosophical knowledge is denied. Both of these positions remain current today, and the trait psychology of the behavioral equation is unequivocally a form of naturalism.

Husserl's critique of these positions (e.g. Husserl, 1911/1981) consists first, in the attempt to demonstrate that there are present in human experience 'ideas' which, as ideal entities or essences, are forever beyond natural inquiry but are nevertheless always presupposed by it; and second, in the provision of a method, phenomenological reflection and intuition, by which these essences can come to be grasped within consciousness with certainty. The explication and description of essences grasped in their purity, then, would present certain philosophical knowledge particular to philosophy. The domain of phenomenological activity can be called the 'realm of the ideal' provided metaphysical connotations are not immediately attached to this terminology.

Husserl's critique begins by pointing out that science, and in particular, psychology, the science that attempts to study consciousness as a natural process, is impossible to realize as an activity unless its practitioners are conscious of an ideal of science which regulates that activity. The scientific ideal includes an orientation towards the discovery of true and genuine knowledge as well as a variety of methodological prescriptions including the presupposition that all being is physical; but, in itself, remains outside the focus of any actual science. Even to come to recognize this ideal and its components as ideals is difficult: "There is, perhaps, in all modern life no more powerfully, more irresistibly progressing *idea* than that of science (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 170)."

Husserl attributes such blind spots explicitly to the fact that: "every psychological judgement involves the existential positing of physical nature, whether expressly or not" (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 172). Even though all sciences found themselves upon experience, this experience is always already presupposed to be experience *of* an already present natural world. Naturalistic psychology overlooks what must already be true of consciousness that it could possibly *be consciousness of* such a natural world. As a result, psychology remains powerless to address any critique which questions the very nature of experience, in particular a critique which, like the philosophical theory of knowledge, introduces riddles such as how experience as consciousness might come to make contact with its objects. Again a naturalistic philosophy remains, in the face of an inability to unravel such riddles, essentially incomplete.

The constructive approach to this incompleteness was, according to Husserl, to come to recognize and explicate the ability of consciousness to make contact with the realm of the ideal, as a realm which is always already present in experience independent of any natural world but which establishes a priori certain boundaries upon the nature of any possible consciousness of a natural world. Husserl's first major work, the *Logical Investigations*, presented and demonstrated such a phenomenological method in the domain of logic.

In *Ideas* (Husserl, 1913/1962) and subsequently, phenomenology emerged as a general epistemological procedure that, beyond a commitment to the evident presence of *experience as it is lived*, neither makes assumptions nor arrives at metaphysical conclusions about the basic nature of things. The goal is rather to show how to retrieve, and subsequently present in *description*, what can come to be known with certainty, and what can therefore serve as a certain framework for all systems of knowledge.

Two insights are basic to this goal. The first is that 'seeing' is the essential epistemological process; only what can be *seen* as unequivocally evident can be knowledge. The second is that all that can be so evidently seen can be made available to consciousness from lived experience alone. That is, the ideal as a separable realm of a priori certainty is available to intuitive sight from within experience itself; it is not something foreign to experience but is instead already present within it.

These commitments, to seeing and to experience, are everywhere in Husserl's writings, for example:

> *Immediate "seeing" (Sehen)*, not merely the sensory seeing of experience, but *seeing in general as primordial dator* [data-presenting] *consciousness of any kind whatsoever*, is the ultimate source of justification for all rational statements. (Husserl, 1913/1962, section 19, par. c, p. 75)

and

> In the epoch of vigorous reaction against Scholasticism the war cry was: "Away with empty word analyses! We must question things themselves. Back to

> experience, to seeing, which alone can give to our words sense and rational justification." Very much to the point! (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 176)

It is clear from these passages that seeing, in Husserl's extended sense, must retain a content, data which is visible. The act of seeing or intuition, signals, for Husserl, a direct presence in experience, and not mere thinking alone.

In the following passage, this property is reasserted and then expanded into a characterization of experience in general as always the consciousness *of* something. Husserl calls this property intentionality (after Brentano and the Medieval Scholastics):

> If higher theoretical cognition is to begin at all, objects belonging to the sphere in question must be intuited. Natural objects, for example, must be experienced before any theorizing about them can occur. Experiencing is consciousness that intuits something and values it to be actual; experiencing is intrinsically characterized as consciousness of the natural object in question and of it as of the original: there is consciousness of the original as being there "in person". The same thing can be expressed by saying that objects would be nothing at all for the cognizing subject if they did not "appear" to him, if he had of them no "phenomenon". Here, therefore, "phenomenon" signifies a certain content that intrinsically inhabits the intuitive consciousness in question and is the substrate for its actuality variation (Husserl, 1917/1981, p. 11).

Here Husserl also distinguishes the thing announced in consciousness from its manner of appearing, that is, from a phenomenon by means of which it is seen. Phenomenology focuses precisely upon phenomena as these present themselves directly and fully in consciousness, or immanently, as detachable (but only within a reflective or inward consciousness) from the things which are cognized through them, things which present themselves as transcendent, as actual outside consciousness:

> Psychical being, being as "phenomenon", is in principle not a unity that could be experienced in several separate perceptions as individually identical, not even in perceptions of the same subject. In the psychical sphere there is, in other words, no distinction between appearance and being, and if nature is a being that appears in appearances, still appearances themselves (which the psychologist certainly looks upon as psychical) do not constitute a being which itself appears by means of appearances lying behind it. It is then clear: there is, properly speaking, only one nature, the one that appears in the appearances of things. Everything that in the broadest sense of psychology we call a psychical phenomenon, when looked at in and for itself, is precisely phenomenon and not nature (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 179).

This introduces the possibility of grasping in experience a realm of pure phenomena. For if 'We must always bear in mind that what things are, they are as things of experience (Husserl, 1913/1962, section 47, par. b, p. 133)', then there can be no independent or direct access to things themselves, all access is through phenomena in experience. No certainty about things as they might exist in themselves in transcendence of the consciousness in which they are present can ever be provided. Experience must contain its own intrinsic meaningfulness and order. Since there is nothing in experience which *necessarily* gives the world to experience as real and actual or as fact, such a transcending 'reality' could conceivably be other than we conceive it without experience being any different than it is.

A contemporary example of this argument is the 'Brain-in-a- vat' paradox (e.g. Putnam, 1981) which challenges us to discover the grounds by which we might eliminate the possibility that we are really brains in the vat of some mad scientist who has arranged that all of our sensory input be exactly what it would have been were we the beings of a natural world (as we indeed believe ourselves to be). Husserl (1913/1962, Chapter 5) argues that no such grounds present themselves in experience as necessary in evident sight. It is of the essence of our grasping of anything we regard as fact that it be contingent or conceivably other than the way it announces itself to be in our consciousness. Consequently experience must retain its basic intelligibility irrespective of what form any transcendent reality might take or even therefore, whether an object is posited as real or not. It is experience itself, given as already intelligible, which is incontestably basic.

Furthermore, since the factual is essentially contingent, possibility becomes more basic than actuality; any actual experience whatever represents or fulfills a possibility inherent in pure experience. Anything of which we are conscious as actual is, with certainty, possible as experience, and anything of which we are conscious as possible is itself possibly experienceable as actual and hence is certainly possible as experience. The contents of pure experience available to us in evident sight is consequently bounded only by that which is possible with certainty as experience. Finally, the certainly possible is available in principle to any subject. It is in the fundamental character of such certainly possible experience in which basic intelligibility resides, and upon which Husserl wishes to focus our sight. The whole of phenomenology deals with questions of access to possible experience, and description of its contents and modes of its presentation.

How, then, might the things of consciousness be characterized phenomenologically? The thing of consciousness which announces itself to consciousness as transcending it can only be an identity constituted by consciousness itself within a manifold, an infinite structured set, of possible appearances. Husserl's analysis of the essence of perception of a 'material thing' illustrates this conception. Husserl begins with the concrete example of examining a table as he walks around it. He notes that despite the unity of the table in consciousness, the flow of perception of that one table changes constantly. Never will any particular phenomenon announcing the one table be exactly identical to any other phenomenon. Nor will the one table be replaced by another if he momentarily blinks, or turns away, before resuming his gaze. The same is true of all of the various parts, aspects, and phases of the table. The color of the table will be announced as the same, despite continuous changes in colour variation within different particular phenomena announcing it. Husserl concludes that this reveals part of the essential nature of being a thing-in-perception:

> An empirical consciousness of a self-same thing that looks "all-around" its object, and in so doing is continually confirming the unity of its own nature, essentially and necessarily possesses a manifold system of continuous patterns of appearance and perspective variations, in and through which all objective phases of the bodily self given which appear in perception manifest themselves perspectively in definite continua. Every determinate feature has its own system of perspective variations; and for each of these features, as for the thing as a whole, the following holds good, namely, that it remains one and the same for the consciousness that in grasping it unites recollection and fresh perception synthetically together, despite interruption in the continuity of the course of actual perception (Husserl, 1913/1962, section 41, p. 118).

It is consciousness which unites together all of these perspectives into a single unity experienced as transcending. The thing emerges from a forging of all its perspectives and the perspectives of all of its parts into an intentional unity, a unity in and for consciousness. This intentional unity (or noema) is present over and beyond not only all perspectives which do appear or have appeared, but also all perspectives which could possibly ever appear (even though specific contents might forever remain unfulfilled for the perceiver except as indistinct anticipations) as announcing the thing as that same unity.

What has been accomplished? Husserl claims that this analysis (although incomplete) describes the a priori structure of what necessarily must be present in any experience of a transcendent thing in order that that experience be the experience *of* a transcendent thing. It references the realm of the ideal, and it does so in apparently abstract concepts. What does this imply about phenomena? How can such a description be obtained? Husserl replies:

> The answer then is that if phenomena have no nature, they still have an essence, which can be grasped and adequately determined in an immediate seeing. All the statements that describe the phenomena in direct concepts do so, to the degree that they are valid, by means of concepts of essence, that is, by conceptual significations of words that must permit of being redeemed in an essential intuition. (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 181).

It is clear that Husserl regards an essence (or eidos), as present to sight, or more generally intuitive experience; but originally only in the presence of phenomena which manifest it. While it can be expressed by a concept, that concept must be fulfilled, filled in by a presence in experience, in order to permit of a recapturing of the essence. Further and critically, if so redeemed in experience, the description of the essence will be seen to express an a priori necessity of a *kind* of intentional experience, of the experiencing *of* things of a certain kind, in order that they be experiences of that kind of thing. Essences, then, are general, rather than specific; particular things have essences, but an essence is always available to be exemplified by an infinite number of like things, like by virtue of that common essence.

A description of Husserl's conceptions of parts and wholes and of identities within manifolds (Sokolowski, 1974) as presented and exemplified in his *Logical Investigations*, but presupposed in all further works, might make the nature of essences more readily available. For Husserl, the parts of a whole can be either pieces, separately detachable wholes which in aggregation constitute that whole; or they can be moments, parts which cannot be lost from any whole in intuitive presentation without destroying absolutely the integrity of that whole. Moments cannot themselves be intuitively present (as pieces can) without also the presence of the whole of which they are moments, although they can be separately meant in language. The spatial extension of a material thing would be an example of a moment which cannot be lost from the intuition of any such thing without destroying its integrity as a whole, without transforming it into something other than a material thing. Furthermore, moments can themselves have, or be 'founded' on, other moments. Colour is a moment founded on spatial extension; in order to present colour a material thing must present spatial extension. An essence is a decomposition into essential moments, but not a decomposition into pieces. Empirical sciences decompose wholes into pieces and reconstitute them by referring to the form of necessity, causal necessity, appropriate to the presumed things themselves which these sciences seek. In contrast, phenomenology, dealing always with experience, seeks essences as compositions of moments, with their own form of necessity, eidetic necessity, necessity by virtue of which a presented whole remains an integral whole presenting that essence.

Furthermore, objects present the same essence despite infinite variation in the specific content of the moments necessary to that essence. A colored object remains colored despite infinite variability in the shade of color presented, but must always necessarily present some color in order to remain a colored object. Essences are just that which remains identical over all possible variation in things which remain of the same kind in experience. An essence is a unity of conceptually separable moments, an identity remaining within a manifold of possible appearances. Expressions of essences, like that of the material thing in perception discussed above, are expressed in terms of invariant identities appearing within varying manifolds.

It is, in part, the natural tendency to view wholes solely as aggregations of pieces which makes a description of seeing essences difficult to comprehend:

> The spell of inborn naturalism also consists in the fact that it makes it so difficult for all of us to see "essences", or "ideas" - or rather, since in fact we do, so to speak, constantly see them, for us to let them have the peculiar value which is theirs instead of absurdly naturalizing them. Intuiting essences conceals no more difficulties or "mystical" secrets than does perception (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 181).

But to see an essence does require a particular turn of mind, a mental turning away from the particular even in its presence (without in fact losing that presence) in order that the general can be seen in it, what Husserl calls a reduction or epoche and sometimes describes as a suspension or bracketing. In eidetic intuition the particular is lost: 'Intuition grasps essence as essential being, and in no way posits being-there (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 182)'.

The process of eidetic intuition has been well expressed as a 'coming to see the principle of the thing' (Kohak, 1978, Ch. 1). An essence is what makes a set of things-in-experience intuitable as identical in principle, and eidetic intuition is the process of coming to grasp the principle under which such things can be seen to be interchangeably identical.

The result of this process of seeing is ultimately unequivocal: either you see the principle or you do not. If you see, what you see is evident, certain, and hence subject to no further discussion. But if in the end you do not see, no discourse can help you. Coming to accept the inevitability of a valid logical deduction is an example of seeing an essence, the principle of syllogistic reasoning. But, as Lewis Carroll's Achilles discovered in a discussion with the tortoise who was consistently unable to see that the valid deduction from true premises must itself be true (see Hofstadter, 1979), no mere argument can be offered which will force its truth into sight. This characterization is not meant, however, to imply that seeing is either instantaneous, or that what is seen is always seen clearly in the first instance. Instead, seeing is itself a process: one can 'come to see', but only by vigilantly looking again and yet again until what is seen becomes clear and evident. Eidetic intuition, and in large part phenomenology itself, is the process of coming to see clearly what becomes evident in experience.

Husserl proposes a specific method to alleviate the difficulties in coming to see an essence. Since, in order to come to see an essence clearly and evidently, it must be detached from the contingent purely factual aspects of the experienced particular, this method requires a procedure of systematic variation by which the integrity of the particular as particular is overcome. Since an essence is also available only in a presence within experience, Husserl proposes that an initial particular be varied into other particulars in imagination. Husserl analyses imagination as a form of presentative consciousness, things are present in imagination in a manner analogous to the way they are present in perception. What reveals itself as essential to a kind in perception (or in memory as well), will remain essential to that kind in imagination. In fact Husserl would say that what a thing is is also the identity which presents itself as transcending all modes of being conscious of it (and of course would claim that this result too is the result of a systematic variation in imagination of all conceivable modes). Thus any moment of a set of experienced particulars which, when varied in imagination, does not change the type to which a particular variant belongs cannot be essential to the integrity of that type; while any moment which, when varied in imagination, does change the type to which a particular variant belongs is essential, and indicates a part of the structure of the eidos. Successive and systematic variation in imagination can come to reveal the essence, the principles by which any thing is a thing presenting that essence.

Imaginative variation depends upon the presence of a detachable moment of the essence before a particular can be (successfully or unsuccessfully) varied along it in imagination. Thus eidetic intuition can be characterized as abductive in nature, for example:

> This method is neither strictly deductive (since it is an argument on the basis of examples) nor strictly inductive (since the point is quickly reached at which "essential insight" occurs and when the multiplication of examples becomes redundant and otiose). It is closer to induction than deduction but it is an induction

> of a very special kind, for which we could perhaps as well use Peirce's term "abduction" as Husserl's *Wessenschau* [essential seeing]. (Edie, 1987, p. 17).

It is these essences, detached fully from the contingent in experience which constitute the field of phenomenological investigation:

> Pure phenomenology as science, so long as it is pure and makes no use of the existential positing of nature, can only be essence investigation, and not at all an investigation of being-there; all "introspection" and every judgement based on such "experience" falls outside its framework (Husserl, 1911/1981, p. 183).

Husserl also notes that the full attainment of a pure essence is not easy:

> But the eidos is only then actually pure whenever every restriction to the actuality given beforehand [i.e. on which free variation is based] is in fact most carefully excluded. If we vary freely but secretly stipulate that the variants must be optional tones in the world, tones heard or able to be heard by human beings on earth, then we have indeed something essentially universal or an eidos, but one related to our factually actual world and restricted to this all-inclusive fact. That is a "secret" and even unnoticed restriction, of course (Husserl, 1925/62/77, sec. 9a, p. 55).

The reason that this becomes important is that an essence, impure in this way, by virtue of a connection to an actual reality has not removed every possible manner in which it could be judged to be simply the result of the actuality in itself. That is, naturalism and psychologism cannot be completely banished; essential intuition is 'explainable' as a natural psychological process dependent upon the actuality of at least some transcendent thing in order to occur; the knowledge obtainable from eidetic intuition is not certain a priori in the sense required by Husserl if it is to be true in principle.

From the beginning of his expansion of phenomenology beyond the borders of logic, Husserl recognized that any particular individual intentional object is also always experienced as part of a coherently organized ever-present world experienced as unquestionably real:

> I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this, set in relation to a world which, through its constant changes, remains one and ever the same. It is continually present for me (Husserl, 1913/1962, section 27, par. e, p. 93)

In order to obtain full access to the ideal, then, this unquestioned belief in the world as real, which Husserl calls the 'thesis of the natural attitude', must be suspended. Husserl argues that the way in which we characteristically and automatically interpret our experience is infused with an unjustified (that is, not intuitively evident) metaphysical stance which we naturally take towards the world of our experience and its individual objects. This 'natural attitude' means that we automatically and naturally understand the objects of our experiences and the world in which they are coherently ordered as, in reality, transcending that experience and further, as causing those experiences to be what they are. This common sense realism is, however, not a necessary way of understanding experience, regardless of the degree of automaticity with which we adopt it, and regardless of any difficulty we might have in actually overcoming it.

Husserl calls the process of overcoming this characteristic way of understanding and coming to see experience purely, that is, without making any metaphysical commitments regarding the contents of that experience, variously, *phenomenological reduction*, epoche (abstention), or bracketing. To see experience under the phenomenological reduction, nothing which is transcendent (that is, experienced as 'beyond experience') must be allowed to acquire a status of actual or independently existing in our descriptions; all things as independent, real things are placed in brackets; even the 'real world' as a whole is bracketed. This is necessary because that belief in the world as a whole as real is already part of all natural experience (as in nicely captured in Carr's description):

> We need to include the whole world in the reduction because the whole world belongs to the sense of each and every perceptual act, and if we do not include it we have not understood that sense (Carr, 1987, p. 241).

It is not the case, however, that under the reduction things of experience are in any sense no longer present (they remain in experience as intentional objects); it is, instead, that their potency is left behind, given up, or cast aside. These 'things-seen' are to be regarded as no longer having the power of cause. That is, while things appear in consciousness as intentional objects, what they may be *beyond what they are in consciousness is not seen to influence (in particular, cause) them to be what they are in consciousness*. The world comes to be seen as contained in (a) consciousness (region), rather than being seen as itself containing consciousness.

An example which illustrates this type of seeing and illustrates that it too is available (at least in partial form) in everyday experience is given by Kohak (1978; see also Wilshire, 1982) as the manner in which the props for a drama are regarded. Neither we regarding the drama as drama nor the actors in the drama any longer regard the 'things' on the stage as 'causing' the behavior of those actors. While these props still appear in our and the actors' experience as things during the drama, these things appear without the potency of things-in-the-world which cause the actions of the actors. This world-of-the-drama is contained as world in consciousness. Of course, it must be remembered that this 'reduction' is partial, and not radically complete in the way that Husserl demands for the phenomenological reduction.

It is now time to bring to attention a part of the character of the realm of ideal experience that has, up to now, been underemphasized, but which is clearly revealed, according to Husserl, by the phenomenological reduction. Under that reduction, there inevitably remains a quality of 'being mine' about all of my experience. The 'sheer I-hood' (in Kohak's (1978) phrase) of experience survives any attempt at reduction, even though my body as a natural object, for example, does not. This reveals the full essence of an experience: it contains an intentional object as constituted necessarily by a subject. For every intentional object or noema constituted, there must be a noesis, an act of constituting that object in experience by a subject; consciousness in its full essence is a noesis-noema pairing. Further, as no particular subject as a natural object survives the reduction, but sheer I-hood nevertheless remains, the realm under examination must have as an essential moment a subjecthood-in-principle, or in Husserl's terms, transcendental subjectivity or transcendental ego.

This claim that pure experience 'has' a 'transcendental ego' has been widely and consistently misinterpreted. The difficulty perhaps arises in the word 'ego', which as a noun appears to carry an implication of thinghood with it; the transcendental ego becomes viewed as a 'thing' which always 'stands above' consciousness (see for example the discussion in Ihde, 1977). But if the phenomenological reduction is carried out, no thing, especially no transcendent thing, can possibly remain. The transcendental ego is meant precisely as a *moment* in the essence of every consciousness, remaining precisely because never itself present within consciousness as an intentional object (but see Heinsen, 1984 who analyzes Husserl's own consistency in this crucial regard). The transcendental ego is a description of a moment in every experience, even within reflection, in which a phenomenon as experience comes under examination. The difficulty also arises if one is lead to interpret Husserl's statements about consciousness as a 'theory' of consciousness, as an attempt to 'explain' consciousness. This it is not. Phenomenology is always precisely an attempt to escape from the natural tendency to regard explanation as ultimate, it is instead the attempt to consistently *describe* experience.

Seeing under the phenomenological reduction also allows a shift in focus regarding what experience essentially presents, over and beyond its essential character as a noema-noesis pairing. Recall that in Husserl's analysis of the experience of any material thing, it is already experienced as separate from me, as transcending me. While it is present for me as a unity in experience, it is not *of* me in the same way as a pure phenomenon such as perhaps being-in-pain is; instead, its unity is derived. In Husserl's analysis, this thing-now-experienced is a unification in consciousness of a potentially infinite number of perspectival views, one of which I may now view immanently as lived experience, but any of which I might under suitable conditions have been able to view. The thing, however, is never present fully as a thing itself, it is experienced in its unity always as the result of a constituting act of consciousness. I experience a thing because I *constitute* a thing as a unity, a synthesis of its possible views. Under the reduction, then, an act of consciousness becomes necessary for my seeing a thing, rather than my consciousness of a thing being the result of the action on me of some external thing-itself. Phenomenology becomes functional, seeking to thematize in reflection, what is necessary about the conscious experience of an I-hood in order that such transcendent unities can become possible as 'own':

> The viewpoint of Function is the central viewpoint of phenomenology; the inquiries which radiate from it cover the whole phenomenological sphere pretty nearly, and in the last resort all phenomenological analyses enter its service in one form or another as integral portions or as lower grades. Instead of the single experiences being analyzed and compared, described and classified, all treatment of detail is governed by the "teleological" view of its function in making "synthetic unity" possible. (Husserl, 1913/1962, Sec. 86, par. c, p. 231).

This notion of constitution can, as well, easily be misinterpreted in the direction of a subjective idealism in which I cause the world to come into being, rather than as an appreciation that the world is present for me through the essentially necessary acts of consciousness which constitute it for me. It is important to remember that for Husserl, all that is, is as it must be, in experience.

Another important characteristic of the realm of pure experience, especially in the context of a consideration of Dilthey's descriptive psychology, is that its individual elements are always contained as moments within a larger whole. That is, at the fringes of, or as the background to, any intentional object is a horizon which sets this intentional object within a larger unity:

> We can also draw from our reflexions the eidetically valid and self-evident proposition, that *no concrete* [i.e. particular but not natural] *experience can pass as independent in the full sense of the term*. Each "stands in need of completion" in respect of some connected whole, which in form and in kind is not something we are free to choose, but are rather bound to accept (Husserl, 1913/1962, section 83, par. d p. 221).

This is not to be misconstrued as a reassertion of the claim made within the natural attitude that all things are contained as pieces of a larger whole which is the world. While this remains true for seeing in the natural attitude, the implied nesting remains also among *moments* of pure experience, independent of the natural world:

> It is evident that even every mere fiction, a pure possibility of something real, and thus also every universal, every pure eidos which we conceive, as an eidos of a reality as such, must have an indeterminate horizon (Husserl, 1925/62/77, p. 74).

Thus, even in performing the phenomenological reduction, the whole is not lost, or fragmented into a set of independent pieces. Instead, a single whole remains, the transcendental ego constitutes for itself a 'whole world', not as, in the natural attitude, a natural world of interlocking pieces, but as a single whole, unifying nested moments.

Husserl ultimately comes to characterize the evidently seeable as pure lived experiences (Erlebnisse) which are absolute, subjective, and transcendental. That is, what is given to sight is given absolutely without any requirement of ancillary knowledge or postulation; given always and necessarily to a subject within a meaningfully ordered and unified context; but given also to a subject considered not as any particular subject, but as subject-in-principle. In summarizing the effects of the phenomenological reduction and Husserl's characterization of what remains under it, Kohak (1978) comments:

> The transcendental reduction does not alter our data: it simply presents them for study as they are lived, as they are lived as objects-in-experience of a subject-in-principle, directly given and fitting together not as an "objective world" but as an *Umwelt*, a meaningfully ordered context of consciousness. (Kohak, 1978, p. 60).

Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology. The affinity between phenomenology, articulated in this form in *Ideas* (Husserl, 1913/1962) and as work in progress at the time of Dilthey's correspondence, and the main features of Dilthey's descriptive psychology are immediately evident. The ideal, as explicated within *Ideas*, appears to provide a means to fulfill Dilthey's intuition that the psychic nexus as a whole must be made available for description as a part of a properly grounded empirical human science. But to concede that pure phenomenology itself was Dilthey's descriptive psychology, would threaten Husserl's lifelong conviction that the sciences, as intertwined irrevocably with the natural attitude, were separate from phenomenology, which alone was able to penetrate to the domain of the transcendental, the home of philosophy proper.

Already in *Ideas*, Husserl had presented a description of the structure of empirical sciences, based upon their exclusive focus upon the intentional objects populating separable regions of consciousness. Within each such region, particular objects are detachable as separate pieces under the natural attitude, but each also presents a particular essence common to all objects of that region of consciousness. The explication of this essence presents the particular science with a logic to which its factual findings must, of necessity, conform. It should be the dual goal of each of the specific empirical sciences, then, to articulate the a priori essence of the region to which it attends, and to develop and exercise methods for the accumulation of facts and generalizations about the actual objects presenting this essence. Each empirical science is therefore a unification of the a priori formal and the contingent factual:

> The fundamental meaning of "exactness" in natural science lies in its being founded on an a priori form-system - each part unfolded in a special theory - for a Nature conceivable in these terms. It is through the utilization of this a priori form-system for factual nature that the vague, inductive empirical approach attains to a share of eidetic necessity and empirical natural science itself gains a new sense - that of working out for all vague concepts and rules their indispensable basis of rational concepts and laws (Husserl, 1927/1981, p. 26).

The genesis and organization of this eidetic aspect of sciences was one of the foci of Husserl's mature phenomenological thought. For example, Husserl was to return (in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*) to his initial interests in logic and mathematics to formulate phenomenological grounds for regarding grammar and mathematics as separate eidetic sciences, and for distinguishing the study of logic proper both from these sciences, and from pure phenomenology.

Husserl's lectures on phenomenological psychology (1925/1962/ 1977) present a number of new concepts for the analysis of science which were to evolve into the concepts of his last, highly influential, attempt to introduce phenomenology (Husserl, 1954/ 1970). Perhaps most decisive is the notion of a progressive eidetic science aimed at the articulation of regional essences which can be successfully pursued from within the natural attitude:

> The a priori knowledge which we have in advance for a determinate given object, that an essence belongs to it and, explicitly, a multiplicity of essential universalities,

> is only a task for a practical effort, *it is only aim-giving*. The task can perhaps be a quite enormous one while in other cases it may also be dispatched quite easily and without further ado. Pure concepts of essence such as "color" or "tone", "brightness", "timbre" as a moment of tone, etc., we will grasp easily. But if we speak of a thing taken universally, in pure universality, of a body taken universally, an animate being, a human being taken universally, then it may be that pure universality occurs only in the word-meaning, emptily, nonintuitively. But if we want to actualize the empty meaning, solve the problem which is here posed, actually to establish the pertinent eidos which no doubt can be established, then it becomes apparent that we move forward only with difficulty. Indeed, penetrating deeper: that each of these concepts claims many dimensions of intuitions to be produced, and that *the advancing establishment of an eidos*, e.g., of a thing of nature taken universally, of a human being taken universally, and the unwrapping of its eidetic elementary necessities *demands in each case an entire infinite science*. But at the peak so to speak of every such science stands the guiding *preliminary concept* and the most universal essence to be produced through intuition and articulated only according to its most universal essential structures (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 69-70, *Italics added*).

One effect of this conception is to legitimize phenomenologically-oriented empirical psychological research by relieving it of the explicit responsibility to perform the transcendental reduction in order to obtain the essences which are, in Husserl's account, necessary to its progress as a science. These can now be obtained progressively, from within the natural attitude, provided only that a preliminary concept is acquired and a direction of gaze aimed at the phenomenological is admitted as a legitimate part of science itself. In this way, the eidetic and empirical portions of a science can fruitfully interact in the thought of particular researchers, without demanding that these researchers become pure phenomenologists, and hence philosophers. The purpose of the lectures is to demonstrate for psychology that that guiding concept is the intentionality of consciousness, and to illustrate how a progressive eidetic inquiry can proceed.

This change in the direction of his thought was motivated not only by Husserl's belief that critics of the transcendental reduction had failed to understand it, but also in part by a reflection upon the development of phenomenology in his own thought (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, Sec. 3), and by a reflection upon physics, which had successfully evolved as an empirical science presenting both an empirical, factual aspect and an eidetic, mathematical one without the benefit of a developed phenomenology (Husserl, 1954/1970, Part II & App.VI.). It was to became central to Husserl's late phenomenology that:

> Each [of us] can begin only as a natural, unphilosophical human being. Accordingly, a radical, systematic grounding of philosophy demands a priori a subjective and also a historical ascent from the natural standpoint to the philosophical (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 34).

This historical ascent follows the path of progressive eidetic analyses found within the natural sciences and culminates in the complete phenomenological (henceforth transcendental) reduction. It was later presented as a means, available to the individual philosopher, to approach the purely phenomenological, the universal a priori eidetic knowledge available from the transcendental reduction, following a stage-by-stage progression through successive partial phenomenological reductions. Pure phenomenology, the properly philosophical, is both the goal of the progression, and the sole means by which justification, as universal a priori, is to be provided for the (impure) eidetic intuitions first acquired in the partial reductions. The 'Crisis in Western Thought' that figures prominently in Husserl's last work (and is referenced in its title) refers to the abandonment in modern times of the will to travel this conscious ascent which, according to Husserl, is alone capable of realizing the internal teleology of reason inherited from Greek philosophy, and of explicating the foundations of the sciences, both as progressive eidetic and as progressive empirical.

The focus of the lectures on phenomenological psychology was, however, the problem of psychology as a science rather than pure phenomenology as a philosophy. The lectures are themselves a contribution to the psychologies which they present and as such they proceed from within the natural attitude. Starting, then, from purely natural considerations, the tasks include: securing a glimpse of the phenomenological horizon inside which a eidetic science might unfold, utilizing this horizon to secure the guiding essences for psychology, demonstrating the manner in which this eidetic science would progress while interacting with empirical psychology, and accounting for the delayed appearance of this psychology within the hierarchy of sciences. If this eidetic progressive science could be properly formed, then it would also present a contrast with pure phenomenology which, in addition, would require the transcendental reduction. Because the lectures once again present the arguments which lead to a phenomenology, albeit in a more sophisticated form, and a form specifically intended to found a psychology distinct from phenomenology purely from natural considerations, only a brief sketch of the development will be given. The purpose here is, instead, to show how this analysis opens up a new horizon for a phenomenologically-oriented empirical psychology which specifically manifests the characteristics attributed to it by Dilthey. This, I believe, is also a goal of Husserl's development, though one which is embedded within the larger concern with psychological science as a whole.

The first moment in the argument of the lectures is to search for the impetus of the progressive eidetic components of existing natural sciences, particularly those governing the concepts of 'nature', from which natural sciences had evolved, and of 'mind', from which psychology and the human sciences might have, but had not yet according to Husserl, properly evolved:

> ...every differentiation of the sciences which is clear about its origin must be carried out by a return to the experiential world; every particular scientific province must lead us back to a province in the original experiential world (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 47).

This requires a mental projection back to a point in personal or historical experience prior to the existence of science itself:

> We go from the concepts in question for us, nature and mind, as concepts defining provinces of science, back to the world which precedes all sciences and their theoretical intentions, as a world of pre-scientific intuition, indeed as a world of actual living which includes world-experiencing and world-theorizing life (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 1).

This move to a pre-scientific experience, although one in which the natural attitude remains, later becomes for Husserl, the systematic bracketing or reduction of all science in order to reveal the 'Lebenswelt' (life-world). This reduction serves as a preliminary stage in the acquisition of the transcendental reduction, but one which, with progressive eidetic analysis of the Lebenswelt itself, may come to reveal the origin of the natural attitude in prepredicative experience (Husserl, 1954/1970).

Having secured the concept of the experiential world, Husserl then performs an eidetic analysis to locate the three fundamental structural moments of objects experienced as contained as material objects within it. These moments are spatiality, temporality, and causality. The eidetic claim emerges that all material objects must necessarily share this essence; that is, they must present spatial extension, temporal persistence, and causal interconnectedness to consciousness.

But the psychic and mental are not directly experienced as material objects. This allows Husserl to distinguish between self-sufficient and non-self-sufficient wholes by distinguishing between the pieces and moments of a whole, and to argue that the psychic and the mental are also evident presences in the experiential world but only as moments. That is, the psychic, as animating a physical body, and the mental, as present within a cultural artifact, are always experienced as moments of objects, as additional layers beyond the physical, but not as self-sufficient pieces in their own right, whereas the physical objects within which the psychic and mental become manifest do themselves appear as self-sufficient.

The concept of nature is obtained by noting that while all objects are self-sufficient in this way and manifest the essence of self-sufficient objects, only some objects manifest mind. Natural sciences can thus abstractively focus upon a single system, the physical object, which appears as manifesting a single structure appropriate to all such objects. Consequently, the psychic or subjective is explicitly excluded in order that the sciences become objective, focused purely upon objects, unified as objects by their evident manifestation of a single essence. The consequence is that the subjective can itself never become thematic for a purely natural science, even though in all of that purely natural science's own productions which are themselves cultural objects, the mental is manifest.

The problem for a psychology true to the psychic and mental is to come to adequately thematize the subjective, without automatically excluding it. This Husserl conceives as the problem of showing that the subjective manifests an essence separate and separable from the purely objective; that is, to conceive of the possible detachability of an essence of the subjective from the essence of the material.

Here, then, is a critical move. Husserl argues that the apparent inseparability of the psychic from the physical is itself but an inductive (contingent, factual) generalization from experience, and as such not a logical necessity.

Once the possibility of a separable essence of the psychic is granted:

> then one must soon become aware that the psychic (disregarding what gives it unity by its connection with a physical body, that is, as the unitary animation of a body) is a self-contained unity which is subordinated to totally unique essential concepts (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 107).

Having detached consciousness for separate examination from the physical body of which it is naturally assumed to be the animating force, Husserl unfolds step by step the phenomenological domain, by expounding on the nature of what is to be found in the realm of the subjective that cannot be found by an objective focus on a nature which excludes subjectivity. This includes centrally the provisional essence of the subjective as intentionality. His exposition includes summaries of many of the eidetic analyses of consciousness which had been conducted in earlier work from the transcendental perspective, that is, after a phenomenological reduction. But, according to Husserl, these analyses have an essential difference, one which stems from the fact that they depart from and do not question the real existence of the consciousnesses so analyzed as themselves being in the natural world. This induces an apparent paradox: these essences are the essences of a natural consciousness found in the world, even while the natural world is itself to be found only within natural consciousness. That is, it is only what is contained in real experiences which have been separated fully from the objects of the natural world, the experiences themselves remain in the natural world. For Husserl, it can only be after the transcendental reduction, after all vestiges of the natural world have been bracketed, that such an apparent paradox can be resolved. It is Husserl's decision here only to allude to that move as one which will provide a solution to the paradox.

This direction of development becomes a partial reduction from the perspective of Husserl's last attempt to ascend to the transcendental reduction as a philosophical task (Husserl, 1954/1970, Part IIIB), and is given the title psychological-phenomenological reduction. It is viewed there as a preliminary stage in acquiring the transcendental reduction, and from this point of view:

> The main difference between the psychological and the phenomenological reduction lies in the fact that in the transcendental reduction not only do we place the world between brackets but also we exclude from our consideration the soul of the scientist and the community of souls, taken as the souls of human beings in the world. Psychology reduces the world of the natural attitude to a subjectivity which as soul remains part of the world it inhabits. Transcendental phenomenology goes beyond this psychologically purified ego into the realm of transcendental subjectivity (Kockelmans, 1967, p. 96).

It is this close relationship, such that these reductions can be distinguished only at the noetic pole of consciousness, that allows Husserl to assert that the findings of a pure phenomenology will always correlate with the findings of a phenomenological psychology (Husserl, 1927/1981). For what is essential to a real consciousness discovered through a phenomenological-psychological reduction is but an exemplification of what is essential to any consciousness whatever when this last link to the natural world is relinquished. The purpose, of course, of the transcendental reduction is that it attains absolute a priori necessity for its essences.

It is at this juncture in the lectures that a psychology with the character of Dilthey's descriptive psychology begins to emerge. In analyses presented to this point, Husserl's direction of regard has been towards the intentional object, the unity of phenomena constituted as an identity within a manifold of possible appearances. The analyses have been noematic. There is another possibility:

> But furthermore reflection, it should be noted, instead of passing from the object first to its appearances can also pass immediately to the I as the I which performs acts and has objects, has them as experiences (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 158).

The noetic pole of intentionality, the ego, thus comes to be regarded in reflection as the unity which unites the manifold of intentional objects presented in individual experiences, as the subjectivity which has an intentional world. In his eidetic analysis of this I, Husserl characterizes it as an active and not a dead or empty unifying pole alone:

> It is the I of affections and actions, the I which has its life in the stream of lived experiences only because it on the one hand exercises intentions in them as intentional lived experiences, toward and busied with their intentional objects, and because on the other hand it is stimulated by these objects, in feeling is touched by them, is attracted to them, is motivated by them to actions (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 159).

This I is an acting I, its experiences unfold for it as its own, and as the outcomes of decisions it experiences as radiating from itself, and not as flowing passively from it. The I becomes also, as a consequence, the pole of habitualities, communalities which run through its unfolding stream of experiences. Having acted, the I has available to itself in memory the decision it has acted upon as its own act, can recognize itself as the same I who has previously so decided and acted, and can freely decide to act again in the same way. This gives the I a history, through which it creates itself always as the same I to whom this stream of experiences belongs.

The habitualities of the I are its *convictions*. The experiences of the I come to reveal the objects of its world as similar or as identical only in relation to the unity constituted of these objects through their infinite manifolds of appearance which include essentially their unification across the manifolds of memory. But the recognition of this as the same is accompanied not only by a belief that this is indeed the same, but also by the conviction that this belief is justified. To Husserl:

> Every change of conviction is a change of the I; I do not have convictions as I have fleeting lived experiences, but I have them as properties of the I, which I have

> as the result of my own originally instituting activities or as the result of my own decisions which freely follow other I's and their decisions, but which I may lose by other activities and by being necessarily motivated by them. As long as I do not give up the conviction, it is accepted by me. I, as who and what I now am, am the one thus and thus convinced as a result of a decision originally my own. The I has no other properties at all (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 164).

The unity in these convictions each itself unified in the experiences freely constituted by the I is, for Husserl, the essence of personality and individuality:

> ...what we call the "I" in the proper sense means a personal individuality. In the way in which the I lets itself be motivated to its fluctuating decisions with reference to the surrounding world of which it is conscious, and thus in the particular character of its decisions themselves and of their connections, the I preserves an individual style which can be recognized. The I-pole has not only its fluctuating sediments but a unity constituted in this style throughout their fluctuation. The I has its individuality, its individual total character which identically permeates all its decisions and determinations (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p.164)

There is also, for Husserl, a teleological movement towards an ideal inherent in the life of the ego, which he calls self-preservation:

> Ultimately, the life of an I is pervaded by an aspiration to come to a unity and to unanimity in the multiplicity of its convictions such that the I wants to become an I that remains true to itself or can remain true to itself insofar as it is no longer inclined to abandon its convictions and, essentially connected to that, to become unhappy. This is of course an idea, but it designates the sense of the striving for self-preservation in its ideal meaning (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 164).

So far, the analysis has been eidetic, and belongs to the progressive eidetic aspect of a psychological science. (It is also natural, and has not been transformed by the transcendental reduction into absolute transcendental subjectivity). But the I and its personality, in this sense of enduring convictions revealed in the temporal unfolding of the personal intentional surrounding world, can become available for empirical research, according to Husserl, by adopting a *personal attitude*. In this attitude, the person who is an I and that I's surrounding intentional world becomes the consistent investigative interest. Such an investigation, because it accepts the I as naturally occurrent, remains within the natural attitude, but objects are present to it not as physical, but purely as belonging to the personal surrounding world:

> I direct my interest purely towards the personal, that means, purely toward how persons behave as persons and behave towards one another, how they define themselves and others, how they form friendships, marriages, unions, etc., how, busied with the things which surround them, they form them into works, and how

> they form mental meaning in a useful way, the sense of signs, of signals, of terms expressed, of trophies, treatises or of works of art, of religious symbols, of office buildings, of useful organizations, etc. If I do this, nature as nature is never my theme in all that, neither the physical not the psychophysical (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 168).

Here then is the prescription for a psychology resembling the descriptive psychology of Dilthey, a psychology which directs itself towards the I as noetic pole of the surrounding world it has as noematic correlate within an essential intentional unity, and which comes to regard this surrounding world as essentially independent of the objects-in-themselves which populate this world under the natural regard. The tasks of this science (as an empirical endeavour rather than as a phenomenological one) will thus include the reconstitution of the personal surrounding world as fact, and analyses of its actual genesis. That is, irrespective of the relationship between such a constituted personal world and an actual world of natural objects, it can nevertheless be claimed as fact that this personal world as experience alone contains such-and-such an experience. Kohak (1978) offers the following hint of the flavour of such research in considering a juvenile delinquent:

> What we need is not to explain what "made" him do it but rather to understand what, as he understood his own acts, he chose to do. We need to understand what kind of noematic world he constituted about himself so that his behavior appeared appropriate to him. We have to understand his choice (Kohak, 1978, p. 137).

Husserl's conception of a descriptive psychology required a turn from noema to noesis. This suggests two forms of empirical psychology. Both can operate within the horizon permitted by the intentionality of consciousness, but can continue to regard the individual person as natural. The personal attitude will focus upon the unity of an I, that which is the subjective unity of a surrounding intentional world, and but not upon transcendental essences of all possible intentional worlds. What might be called the psychophysical-phenomenological attitude, on the other hand, will relinquish a single I and will focus upon essences within the noematic as the unity of a manifold of possible experiences across all possible intentional worlds. In both cases, natural consciousness remains but natural objects do not.

> ...what confronts us here as extremely remarkable is this twofold manner in which subjects can become thematic, in which they can, through two different attitudes toward them display sets of properties which, though they are very different, yet essentially correspond to each other: on the one hand, a purely internal relating of the persons to things of which they are conscious, which are intentionally valid for them within the world which is intentionally valid for them; and, on the other hand, persons' real being-in-relation, as realities in the real world, to the things of this world. (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 238)

This analysis provides the basis, I believe, for a well founded distinction between the idiographic and the nomothetic focus in a phenomenologically-oriented psychology of personality. Both foci are founded on analysis of multiplicities of experience considered as essentially intentional. The idiographic focus (under the personal attitude) seeks to understand the genesis of the personal surrounding world reconstituted from the experiences of the particular individual as it has unfolded from personal convictions, each of which is itself a unity of a manifold of individual experiences of that I. A conviction is essentially intentional, and is thereby connected to a particular noematic essence, a particular meaning, which has been repeatedly intended in and fulfilled by the surrounding personal world. Each such essence is, in the first instance, an essence of that unique personal world, and can be fulfilled for an investigator only if he or she has access to that personal world.

The nomothetic focus (under the psycho-physical attitude) releases, through imaginative free variation, the dependence of the particular essence on the particular personal world (though not yet on its possession by some natural I). The noematic essence can only contain the particular essence of a personal conviction within it as an exemplification, as having made determinate some moment of the nomothetic essence which, in its broadened form, is free to vary infinitely. Thus it can never be fully accurate to characterize any particular individual as manifesting a conviction composed solely of a nomothetic essence. The precise essence of the individual conviction can always be more precisely characterized with reference to the particular personal surrounding world of that individual in its temporal unfolding.

Conclusion. Phenomenology presents a rigorous methodology for the exploration of experience which remains true to experience, and which remains perpetually open to confirmation through essential insight. It strives not to replace empirical methods in psychology but to *provide direction* for them by explicating the properties that consciousness must necessarily have and by virtue of which it is consciousness. These include meaning. If meaning has been set outside a rigorous study of the human being by the methods of natural science, then the expansion of that rigorous study to include the methods of phenomenology may allow the study of meaning to be properly embraced.

The logical pattern for the facts of such an expanded psychology might combine the schema for a psychology of the behavior equation and that for a meaning-focused psychology: 'natural behavior B (or action A) is the result of natural situation S, natural person P, and an experiencing of S as meaning M as an exemplification of conviction C of P'. The natural situation S and the natural person P can be pursued in the manner typical of current empirical psychology. The experiencing of S as meaning M as an exemplification of conviction C of P is the focus of phenomenologically oriented inquiry. Just as the natural situation S and the natural person P are contained within a natural world as pieces intertwined by causal mechanisms, the meanings and convictions of the inner experience of a person will be moments of a personal surrounding world constituted of experience. Just as there are empirical techniques which intend to make salient the objects and causal interconnections of the natural external world, there are empirical techniques to make salient the meanings and convictions of the personal surrounding world. Foreshadowed by Dilthey's hermeneutics, these will be the subject of the next chapter.

This conception is not without its own tensions. For at the same time as the person contained in a natural world contains his experiences as facts, the experiences of his personal surrounding world contain the natural surrounding world. Barring a resolution of this apparent paradox, this presents psychology as a dualism:

> And is it not the case, after all, that psychophysical or psychophysiological dualism has its *experiential legitimacy* for the world, whatever the world may signify transcendentally, and that it sets a task for the psychology of human beings and animals which is analogous to the task of natural science? (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 263, *Italics added*)

Phenomenology claims an authority from the performance of the transcendental reduction to ultimately dispel this dualism. This claim is not without its critics. On the other hand, a natural outlook dispels it through faith that it may ultimately be dispelled. Perhaps then if faith is necessary, it should be invested not solely in the natural way, but also in the phenomenological. Maybe this too is 'not something we are free to choose, but are rather bound to accept (Husserl, 1913/ 1962, p. 221).'

Notes

1 My understanding of Dilthey is at best partial having relied upon Dilthey (1894/1977), two translations of Dilthey (1927/1977, 1927/1984), Dilthey (1883/1989), and the readings selected by Rickman (Dilthey, 1962, 1976). I have also relied upon the interpretations of Palmer (1969) and Ricoeur (1981). Most important of all perhaps have been various conversations with Leo Mos, who undoubtedly should be held fully accountable for any misunderstandings which remain.

2 What is lost is a distinctive role for description. Windelband, for example, asserted that "in the strict sense of the word, there are no purely descriptive sciences" (1912/1961, p. 63). But if perceptions are equivocal then description must be viewed as a worthy scientific activity. Description might begin in the investigation of experienced similarity between objects and result in a systematic classification or categorization of these objects in terms of their shared properties as constituted in the experience of the investigator. This activity would be logically prior to any inference that such classes are caused (e.g. in personality psychology that classes of behavior are caused by a single underlying mechanism such as a trait). The movement from class to cause would not be automatic but might instead become recognized as an example of fallible abductive inference (Rozeboom, 1972). Elsewhere (Kuiken, Wild, Schopflocher, 1990), the progressive devaluation of description as a scientific enterprise within the empirical tradition from Bacon to the logical positivists, particularly in psychology, has been traced.

3 In coming to an understanding of Husserl whose writings are extremely technical and removed by history and culture, the interpretations of others have been extremely important. I have relied upon (in approximate order of importance) Kohak (1978), Sokolowski (1974), Natanson (1974), Edie (1987), Mohanty (1964, 1989), Dreyfus (1982), Giorgi (1985), Gurwitsch (1966, 1974), Carr (1987), Grossman (1984), Ihde (1977), Ingarden (1937/1973), Merleau-Ponty (1986/1945, 1966), Schutz (1970), and Ricoeur (1967, 1981) in addition to Husserl (1913/1962, 1925/1962/1977, 1954/1970, 1948/1973, 1929/1950/ 1991) and the short works contained in McCormick and Elliston (1981) and Mueller-Vollmer (1988). My conversations with colleagues and supervisors, notably T. Cameron Wild, Leo Mos, and most especially Don Kuiken (who pushed me into Husserliana kicking and screaming) have also been very important. I do not intend that it be thought that my understanding of Husserliana is as wide, deep, or ready-to-hand as I would wish.

CHAPTER III

INHABITING TEXTUAL AND PERSONAL WORLDS

> Successful realization of a project is, for the acting subject, self-evidence [Evidenz]; in this self-evidence, what has been realized is there, originaliter, as itself.
>
> But now questions arise. This process of projecting and successfully realizing occurs, after all, purely within the subject of the inventor, and thus the meaning, as present originaliter with its whole content, lies exclusively, so to speak, within his mental space. But geometrical existence is not psychic existence; it does not exist as something personal within the personal sphere of consciousness; it is existence of what is objectively there for "everyone" (for actual and possible geometers, or those who understand geometry). Indeed, it has, from its primal establishment, an existence which is peculiarly supertemporal and which - of this we are certain - is accessible to all men, first of all to the actual and possible mathematicians of all peoples, all ages; and this is true of all its particular forms. And all forms newly produced by someone on the basis of pregiven forms immediately take on the same objectivity. That is, we note, an "ideal" objectivity. It is proper to the whole class of spiritual products of the cultural world, to which not only scientific constructions and the sciences themselves belong but also, for example, the constructions of fine literature (Husserl, 1954/1970, Appendix VI "The Origin of Geometry", p. 357).

The question now arises as to how to retrieve as fact the experience of a particular individual as the basis upon which phenomenologically oriented procedures might operate to retrieve the essences of the intentional objects of that experience. This retrieval might be seen as a procedure consisting of two moments: first, the intentional objects of the natural experience of the other must be brought to intuitive presence for the investigator, and then phenomenologically oriented procedures may be used to locate their essences. What, then, is the procedure by which such a factually occurrent experience is to be initially obtained?

Husserl did recognize that a phenomenological analysis of the personal world of the other depends upon the reconstitution of that world in intuitive experience. He attempted to establish that this ability to reconstitute this world was eidetically a mode of consciousness, and that the others to whom it could be applied were themselves eidetic presences (Husserl, 1929/1950/1991, Fifth Meditation). This mode of consciousness, often called 'empathy' by both Husserl and Dilthey, must deliver the personal world of the other to the investigator for subsequent phenomenological analysis:

> Phenomenological experience in the methodical form of the phenomenological reduction is the only genuine "inner experience" in the sense meant by any

> well-grounded science of psychology. In its own nature lies manifest the possibility of being carried out continuously in infinitum with methodological purity. *The reductive method is transferred from self-experience to the experience of others insofar as there can be applied to the envisaged mental life of the Other the corresponding bracketing and description according to the* subjective "How" of its appearance and what is appearing ("noesis" and "noema") (Husserl, 1927/1981, p. 25, Italics added).

Husserl did not, however, describe the stages through which empathy as a mode of consciousness passed, as he had with painstaking thoroughness, for example, the formation of judgements (Husserl, 1948/1973). Nevertheless, many of the components which might have been used for such a description were already present in previous analyses. Husserl unquestionably regarded Dilthey's later work involving hermeneutics and interpretation not as epistemologically basic, but as itself a description, albeit incomplete, of the mode of consciousness by which the mental life of the other was to become envisaged in research activity within the personal attitude.

The Phenomenology of Expression. While the conceptions of hermeneutics and psychology under the personal attitude show many similarities (such as a shared focus on the analysis of experience as 'Erlebnisse' and congruent accounts of the horizons of such lived experience); Husserl believed that Dilthey's descriptions of experience were fatally flawed by their failure to clearly separate the phenomenological from the contingent factual. Husserl's account, therefore, separates these components in order to realize an epistemological basis for the human sciences. Thus Husserl's phenomenological psychology focuses upon the progressive eidetic component of psychology, while Dilthey's hermeneutics comes to be understood as an analysis of a mode of consciousness appropriate to an empirical methodology conducted within the natural attitude[1]. In Husserl's view, when shorn of the unrealizable attempt to derive factual certainty, hermeneutics describes the empirical apprehension of experience of the other, specifically the personal surrounding world, as coherent contingent fact. The challenge that Dilthey's analysis raised for Husserl was the challenge of a phenomenological analysis of life expressions and in particular the historicity which eidetically attends them.

According to Husserl, a second difficulty in Dilthey's account is a conflation of the life expression with the actual psychic life that produces it. While in experience the psychic is directly experienced as an animation of the physical bodies which manifest it, the life expression, while still experienced as manifesting mentality, is of a different character:

> Mentality in the form of psychic life and psychic habituality of animal subjects is a basic form, indeed so to speak the original form in which mentality has existence in the world, whether it be in the form of singularity or of community. But we must also note that things, even lifeless things, if we take them as they are experienced by us, can include or embody, as it were, a mental endowment, even though they are lifeless things and therefore not organic bodies in which the mental is embodied in the form of animation proper. Most of the things of our life-world, as the world which constantly surrounds us as our experiential world, can serve us as examples: desks and other furniture, houses, fields, gardens, tools, pictures, etc. They are

> immediately experienced by us as mentally significant things; they are not seen as merely physical, but in their sensuously experienced shape, in their spatial form and every turn of this form, and in their other sensible features, a mental sense is expressed (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, Sec. 16, p. 84).

That the experiencing of a life expression as endowed with a mental sense is indeed a basic category of experiencing, an ontological region in Husserl's terms, can be easily illustrated by the apparent paradoxicality and subsequent change in experience in regarding what appears, for example, as a caricature of Winston Churchill drawn in the sand... if it becomes known that it was traced out by an ant (Putnam, 1981). The difference in experiencing the lines as simply randomly traced in the sand (however much they might resemble Churchill), and as a caricature of Winston Churchill is the mental sense in the connected lines when constituted as a life expression. What, then, is the character of this mental sense?

Husserl emphasizes that a life expression (or more generally a cultural object) is experienced as a unity, and that its mental sense can be separated only by an act of abstraction from the physical substrate that bears it; but his principal characterizations involve the historicity and ideality of the mental sense of the cultural object. The cultural object has an eidetically historical nature: part of the essence of the cultural object is that its mental sense is experienced as having been endowed in it through an originating mental act of a subjectivity (as was, for example, Putnam's imagined drawing in the sand when constituted as a caricature):

> The genesis of such mentally endowed realities manifestly refers back to activities of a creative subjectivity. The sense refers back to sense-forming subjectivity which creates the expression as an expression of this sense, and the concrete work as a work of this form of purpose (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 85).

The heart of Husserl's description of mental sense, however, is summarized by the claim that it is 'a peculiar irreal layer of a material reality (p. 89)', an ideality without separate natural physical existence. These separate claims of historicity and ideality generate an apparent difficulty: how can an ideality be historical?

In unfolding the sense of these claims and their apparent incompatibility, two types of cultural objects need to be distinguished. In one type, mental sense is made manifest in a large number of distinct exemplars constituted as separate physical objects of a type, what Husserl calls concrete works, each of which has a separate (though related) sense. In the other type, only a single mental sense is manifest, even despite the possible existence of many physical exemplars of that one sense. This distinction is well illustrated by the different senses that can be realized in a cultural object of type 'book'. On the one hand, a book is similar to a tool in that it can be realized by many different physical things, each of which maintain a connection to a mental sense as its function or purpose. This sense is picked out in a usage such as 'Put that book on the shelf with the others'. On the other hand, however, a book can also be seen to be a singularity over against a whole series of physical exemplifications as would be the case in a usage such as 'Husserl's *Ideas* is a difficult book', where although *Ideas* as physically instantiated has the first sense, as *Ideas* it acquires a new and unique sense. This second type of cultural object is essentially associated with linguistic objects (although as Husserl points out, all objects, even purely natural ones, can come to be invested with such a singular sense). Because linguistic expression is also the primary mode of access to the personal world of the other, it will be the primary focus of the remaining explication.

The description of the second form of mental sense (or meaning, as it is known in the context of language) as a singular ideality dates back to Husserl's early work, the *Logical Investigations* (Husserl, 1901/1988; see also Sokolowski, 1974; Edie, 1987), in which linguistic expressions were first described phenomenologically. For Husserl, linguistic communication is experienced as separate mental acts of meaning-intention and of meaning-fulfillment mediated by an expression; a single meaning, apparent in each of these moments, unifies them into a single whole. In the paradigm case of linguistic communication a speaker intends an object (or configuration of objects as categorical object or fact) that comes also to be intended by a listener as that identical object, through an act of linguistic expression. The otherwise empty intention of the speaker, apparent in the meaning-intending act and apparent as the meaning of the expression, is directed towards that intended object and presupposes that, once also possessed as an empty intention by the listener, it can come to be realized in a meaning-fulfilling act in the perceptual (or more generally intuitive) presence of that intended object. For example, if a communicator were to say 'Here is a box' to a listener in the perceptual presence of a box, the sense or meaning of 'Here is a box' as possessed through the expression by the listener will be grasped and then realized for the listener in fulfilling in perceptual experience the box to which the meaning of the expression has directed his gaze.

The meaning of an expression so considered is an ideality solely of the experience of communication. It is experienced as belonging to the expression as a singular unity which spans both the original meaning-intending act and a current meaning-fulfilling act and through which these acts can come to be fulfilled by the same intentional object or configuration of intentional objects. There are, then, two correspondences in specific acts of communication (or speech acts): one is the correspondence of the transcendent objects even though realized through separate phenomenal appearances of those objects in separate acts of fulfillment; the other is the correspondence of the realizations of the single ideal meaning in meaning-intending and meaning-fulfilling acts by virtue of which the intended objects can come to be experienced as a perfect correspondence or identity in intuitive experience.

A particular communication can be successful or unsuccessful. If a communication is successful the intended objects will form an identity, if unsuccessful they will not. The realization of meaning in successful and unsuccessful communications can only be characterized, however, as better or worse. As an ideal unity, meaning persists in a particular expression even if it is not successfully fulfilled in particular acts of meaning-fulfillment. That is, my failure in a meaning-fulfilling act does not make it any less an act which aimed to fulfill the one meaning of the expression. For example, if I simply emptily understand upon hearing an incomprehensible tangle of foreign speech that it bears a meaning for an appropriately experienced listener, my act has intended that meaning, even though emptily or indistinctly, and the meaning I intend remains the one meaning of the expression. Any act of meaning-fulfillment becomes but an attempt to objectively fulfill the one ideal meaning of the expression, and consequently can only be evaluated as better or worse in relation to the coherence that this act of meaning-fulfillment gives to subsequent experience. In Husserl's terms, the meaning of the expression is always a unity standing as ideal over against the open manifold of attempts to fulfill it.

The distinction between the intentional objects that can fulfill a meaning in intuitive experience and that pure meaning in itself can be maintained. For Husserl, it becomes the distinction between the ontological (or material) domain and the apophantic domain, and comes to play an important role in his analysis of science. What is experienceable as fulfilling in intuitive experience, as having content, belongs to the ontological domain, and includes (intentional) objects, essences, and facts (as categorical organizations of intentional objects). The apophantic domain is, in contrast, a domain of idealities which, though they aim for fulfillment in the ontological domain, are present only to a reflective consciousness. This domain includes meanings, concepts (as intending essences), and judgements or propositions (as intending facts or categorical objects).

In the eidetic sciences of the ontological domain, the scientist fulfills intentional objects in intuitive presence (as perceived and then imagined) in order to make them available for intuitive free variation and the localization of essences. The focus of eidetic phenomenological investigations, essences, are also ideal entities, and these sciences therefore remain concerned with, are 'about', ideal entities. For example, Husserl (1954/1970) characterizes geometry and the allied mathematical disciplines as concerned with the essences of pure space-time. Similarly, phenomenological psychology focuses upon the essence of the psychic and mental, namely intentionality.

On the other hand, the ideal objects of the apophantic domain can come to be abstractively separated in experience through a mental act of reflection, a shifting of focus away from the objects intended through meanings, for example, towards meanings themselves by allowing the intended objects to remain present only 'as supposed' (Sokolowski, 1974). It is in reflection that their character of ideality is recognized; meanings, concepts, and judgements are seen to occupy a domain somehow different from, beyond or outside, the domain of the (natural surrounding) world. These apophantic idealities can also then be separately studied, giving rise to disciplines of eidetic science such as pure logic, or the study of grammar and pure meaning that focuses upon the pure structures of language.

By remaining in the apophantic domain, we can come to see that the idealities present in it are ideal singularities (Husserl, 1954/1970, App. VI; see also Edie, 1987, Ch. 2,3; Sokolowski, 1974). It is but a single pure deductive logic, for example, which is exemplified in all logical proofs. The elements of language and indeed language itself share this property of ideal singularity: all repetitions of a particular word are themselves realizations of a single ideal word in the single ideal language to which it belongs. Sentences, discourses, and ultimately texts are also ideal singularities in this same sense.

The meanings assigned to these linguistic objects also share this ideal singularity: there is but a single system of unique ideal meanings to be realized in the manifold of all linguistic expressions of a language, even if there is an infinity of expressions which can be formed and even if new such idealities of meaning can come to be formed. It is indeed by virtue of its ideal singular character that a meaning, now considered as independent of a particular expression which embodies it, can be seen to assume two of its most basic properties. First, the same meaning can be repeated in physically and temporally separated expressions. Second, an identity of meaning can be forged across different empirical expressions, allowing paraphrases to embody the same meaning and definitions to be given (such as, for example, 'a bachelor is an unmarried man' in which 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' share in the same meaning). Even though a material core may be identified in meaning as that which would require an experiential presence to fulfill it in experience, conventional rules which associate such cores as equivalent are grammatical (apophantic), and the meaning in a statement of equivalence or a definition can be understood as unified without the requirement of any such intuitive presence in experience. Crucially, meanings reveal themselves also as cultural objects presenting an origin in subjective production. A conventional meaning stands as the ideal unity over against all of the mental acts that realize it, however and by whomever performed; but however realized it can only have been realized in a subjective performance.

The distinction between the apophantic and the ontological in an expression is, however, a distinction between moments of a whole and as such is an abstraction from that whole. In the full and most general sense of expression, a consideration of the ontological domain will be required because each particular ideal apophantic singularity, as entering into a particular expression, intends an intuitive fulfillment in experience as having content.

This content is also an ideal singularity. Husserl contends, for example, that the Pythagorean Theorem is an ideal singularity despite the fact that it deals with the ontological domain, that it has content (Husserl, 1954/1970, App. VI, p. 358). Under the phenomenological gaze, this content consists of an essence or it consists of an apodeicitic consequent of the essence, that is, of a particular intended purely as an instance of that essence (Husserl, 1913/1962, Sec. 5). (An example of such an apodeictic individual would be the line drawing which typically accompanies a geometric proof, meant solely as an individual exemplifying the 'in general' intended by the proof. Of course, the positing of such apodeictic individuals need not, and indeed under the phenomenological reduction must not, be taken to posit a corresponding empirical reality). While essences of the ontological domain in themselves are ideal universalities, whether meant directly or apodeicticly exemplified, in the sense that they present themselves as a unity in infinite multiplicities of different singular intentional objects; when meant by a particular concept or apodeictic judgement, like the Pythagorean theorem, these essences as so identified are singular idealities, by which they can be separately identified as *just these* essences.

The phenomenological study of the ideal singularities of geometry or mathematics more generally, is not, however, simply the study of a single text (though they may be available from such a single text); but is rather the examination of the unity of these ontological objectivities as manifested through a series of expressions; in short it is the examination of an historical tradition. According to Husserl, all cultural objects are embedded within such a tradition:

> Our human existence moves within innumerable traditions. The whole cultural world, in all its forms, exists through tradition. These forms have arisen as such

> not merely causally; we also know already that tradition is precisely tradition, having arisen within our human space through human activity, i.e., spiritually, even though we generally know nothing, or as good as nothing, of the particular provenance and of the spiritual source that brought it about (Husserl, 1954/1970, App. VI, p. 354-355).

Embedded within that tradition, however, is implicit knowledge of the eidetic:

> And yet there lies in this lack of knowledge, everywhere and essentially, an implicit knowledge, which can thus also be made explicit, a knowledge of unassailable self-evidence (Husserl, 1954/1970, App. VI, p. 355).

An examination of the tradition itself, then, is an examination, at least for exact essences like those of mathematics, of the eidetic essence which was already present as a whole with its very first possession in consciousness. That is, for geometry which is possessed as a rigorously deductive essence structure, there is a sense in which the full structure of geometry was present in the very first grasping of the ideality as fulfilled in human consciousness, whatever the range of the current set of the explicit deductions unfolded from this grasping and possessed as knowledge, and whatever the factual historical process by which it was vitally handed down for such further explication and extension. In the examination of a tradition constructed around such a single historically unfolding ideality, a special place is thus preserved for the originary mental act that first made the ideality available to human consciousness, or indeed perhaps created it. For Husserl, the retrieval of the sense of this original fulfillment of the ideality is the goal of an eidetic historical investigation. This, then, will provide the means to resolve the apparent paradox of an historical ideality.

For this eidetic historical investigation, the particular facts surrounding the original fulfillment are irrelevant. That is, while recognizing the eidetically necessary relation of an original fulfillment of an ideality to the personal world of an individual subjectivity, the particular personal world of that subjectivity is important only as itself a fulfillment of the Lebenswelt or one life-world revealed in the multiplicity of all personal worlds, the world of intuitive presence existing before and as the ground of the initial fulfillment of the particular ideality.

To uncover this life-world and the sense of the original grasping of the ideality of the tradition becomes a central phenomenological task, made all the more critical, according to Husserl, by the fact that the sense of that original grasping can easily be lost. Because it is in the ability of human beings to separate the meaning of an expression from the content, the apophantic from the ontological, and to grasp meaning emptily as separated from its fulfilling content, human consciousness easily falls prey to 'the seduction of language' (Husserl, 1954/1970, App. VI, p. 362), that leads to the loss of this original fulfillment and in turn to the 'Crisis in Western Thought' that Husserl decries in his final work (Husserl, 1954/1970). The true work of an historically sensitive phenomenology of the traditions surrounding the ontological idealities of cultural objects, then, is to retrieve the eidetic essence from the life-world, the world as it was experienced prior to the first intuitive fulfillment of the ideality of the cultural object as an object in a possible cultural tradition. It can be retrieved again for the particular investigator, according to Husserl, by the epoche of all sciences, a reduction which removes from consideration the results wrought by this unfolding tradition.

Despite its focus on the exact essences of a particular mathematical science, and despite its attention to a tradition in which the essences are unfolded in a series of texts, this description is also relevant to the discussion of single expressions or literary works. Whatever additional moments a particular literary work as literary work may possess, it is still, as a linguistic cultural object, *an ideal singularity containing as separate moments, an ideal apophantic singularity aiming towards a singular ideal ontologic content*. The linguistic expression or literary work considered in this way also manifests ontological idealities around which may be formed a tradition, although one which might differ in fundamental ways from mathematics or geometry because it is concerned in the main with morphological or 'inexact' essences of experience (Husserl, 1913/1962, Sec. 74, p. 190) rather than exact essences. But as such, it also requires, according to Husserl, a regressive investigation for a clarifying originary intuition founded in the life-world. Once again, this life-world is essentially independent of details of the actual personal world which was the appearance of the life-world to the initiating subjectivity, even if this truth is obscured by the lack of a visible tradition surrounding the idealities of the expression. Where such a tradition is manifest as centred on a single literary work for example, investigation remains aimed at the apophantic and ontological moments of that single cultural object, a single object whose identity is revealed precisely as the ideality within the manifold of its immanent appearances within the tradition, even if in explicitly conflicting descriptive accounts:

> Even the universal change of interpretation of past cultural creations, a change grounded in the essence of all that is historical, is not its change in the sense of reality in which we speak of the change of a physical thing or a human being; rather, there is a series of historical declensions, in accord with which *an original work with its original sense passes over into a multiplicity not of actual works but of immanent ones, a multiplicity which exhibits a particular type of unification, that is, as a multiplicity of mutually conflicting interpretations of the same* (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 88, *Italics added*).

Recalling now that every intended particular object has as a (perhaps indefinite) horizon a possible experienceable world as a world that envelops a subjectivity-in-principle (Husserl, 1913/ 1962, section 83, par. d, p. 221, previously quoted), the full mental sense of a work rendered in language may be referred to as a textual world. *This textual world is fully detachable from the world as a factual natural world*; it is fully ideal. First, its objects are not natural objects. That is, if attention is restricted in fulfilling a single literary expression to the particular essences intended by it as the essences made manifest in particular objectivities which the work intends, taken as apodeictic[2], then those objects as particularities are ultimately left out of consideration. In particular, the textual world as an actual particular natural world of empirical objects disappears, excluded from consideration by the phenomenological reduction. Second, its subject is not its natural originating subjectivity. The particular factual personal world of that subjectivity is absorbed by an eidetic historical inquiry involving the reduction of all tradition into the life-world as but one of the manifold of appearances of the life-world available to all.

The rigorous analysis of an expression, as the phenomenology of a singular ideality, can now be summarized. Eidetically in the ontological domain, an expression is the production by an originary subjectivity of a textual world which intends a possible (with certainty) world of experience for a subjectivity-in-principle. In the apophantic domain it is eidetically an ideal singularity combining as moments an ideal apophantic singularity with an ideal ontologic singularity. The retrieval and fulfillment in lived experience of this textual world as an ontological ideality will depend upon a regression to the life-world, a retrieval of the experience which preceded and within which the ontologic ideality was first grasped by the originating subjectivity. This will be a matter at least in part of a phenomenological reduction which brackets the traditions within which this textual world and its parts are embedded.

The retrieval and fulfillment of this textual world also implies the grasping of the expression in a manner in which it could come to be made manifest in reflection as an apophantic ideality, a unity purely of meaning. Recalling that this ideal meaning is always realized in fulfillment, a better realization of it can be sought through a regressive study which treats its partial meanings as grammatical unities which are themselves cultural objects and also therefore embedded in traditions.

There are, then, two separable moments in the process of retrieving the textual world: the apprehension or understanding of the meaning as the ideal cultural object embodied in the expression, and the fulfillment of this meaning by ontological content in imaginative experience. In a rigorous analysis, both of these moments require eidetic historical investigation.

But it is a consequence of this description that, while the apodeictic textual world as fulfilled is a realization of the ideal meaning of the expression and that it may well come to reveal eidetic essences in subsequent imaginative free variation, *the claim that these are the essences of just the apodeictic textual world actually originally intended by the expression, can, at best, be a factual claim*. That is, that the apodeictic worlds of the experience of the speaker and of the auditor forge an identity is in principle possible but can never be known as a certainty in a particular case. It will always remain a possibility that an appropriate discovery can come to be made which would force a revision of any particular claim connecting these two particular natural realizations of the ideal meaning of the expression:

> If a picture, through the darkening or spoiling of its colors etc., not only changes physically, but as a consequence is experienced differently as to its sense, then the work of art as such, as this esthetic picture, has not changed; rather, a different picture is now experienced. And the experience is a false one, one which will not persist harmoniously in the event of the appropriate disclosure (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 88).

In this light, the claims of Dilthey for the hermeneutic process of understanding must be reconsidered. According to Husserl, it is true that a certainty can be experienced in the analysis of a textual expression; this certainty will pertain to the eidetic essentialities of the textual world as immanently experienced. It is also true that the analysis in which the immanent work is experienced can be known eidetically to be an analysis of that expression in its ideality, it aims precisely at that work as an ideality and its results are thus of that ideality. It is not however possible to know with certainty that any particular immanent world is just the apodeictic world originally experienced in producing the particular expression; this would be a factual claim that remains always subject to evidence. Consequently, Dilthey's hermeneutics of expression when considered as an analysis of the personal world of its author remains as a description of an empirical consciousness itself endeavouring to retrieve a textual world precisely in its contingent relationship to the textual world actually intended by a natural consciousness. As such, hermeneutics remains an important empirical endeavour which will stand or fall in the particular case on the coherence which its results can give to this aspect of our ongoing experience of the textual world as a cultural object of the natural world.

But if hermeneutics as described is the natural empirical endeavour of fulfilling a textual world concretely, it no longer remains essentially connected to fulfilling the natural experience which constituted that text, but can come to be understood as a general science of interpretation under a variety of different natural presuppositions. For phenomenological insight has separated the eidetic aspect of this general science as the phenomenological endeavour of coming to understand what is essential about the textual world per se, as an ideal object, grounded ultimately in possible experience itself.

From Textual to Personal World. A question of fundamental importance to a phenomenological psychology remains, however. It concerns the relationships between the textual world and the personal world of its author, and the accessibility of the latter from the former. How, after Husserl's analysis of expression, can the textual world be reconnected to the personal world?

Husserl's analysis of the personal world of the other rests upon his phenomenological claims that the other exists eidetically as the subjectivity of a surrounding personal world (Husserl, 1929/1950/1991; see also Ricoeur, 1967). If this is so, eidetic claims can then come to be made about the nature of the other's personal world as one of a multiplicity of exemplifications sharing the essences of any such world as world, or if a partial phenomenological reduction is performed, as one of a multiplicity of exemplifications of the one life-world. One such claim is that the personal world of the other is the originary ground of all expressions issued by that other. As such this personal world is a unity standing behind the manifold of expressions of that other.

But in order to make (even empirical) claims about the particular nature of a particular personal world, a mode of consciousness must be possible by which that personal surrounding world of the other can be given:

> Every experience of a cultural object, therefore of a reality which includes a mental state which it expresses, has its way of being endowed with open horizons, thus also its way of disclosing that sense which is expressed but which is nevertheless at first only imperfectly grasped, merely indicated. The disclosure demands a corresponding intuition; *it requires projecting oneself into the corresponding*

> *purposeful striving, the determination of purpose, and the ways of fulfilling the purpose...* (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 86, *Italics added*).

This possibility too, according to Husserl, is eidetic. Without critically examining this analysis, it can be noted that it implies that a personal world of the other can be known at least in part as a matter of an analogy with self and an understanding of the nature of signs. Intentional occurrences involving an ego's own body are immanently experienced as belonging to that ego which has an intentional life. Other intentional bodies experienced as similar but not experienced immanently are constituted, through an empathic transfer, as possessing a like intentional life. This otherwise empty intentional life of the other, experienced as transcendent in contrast with the immanence with which one's own life is experienced, becomes fulfilled, although contingently, through particular behaviors which have come to serve as indications or signs of particular psychic contents through association. That is, because the other's personal life is transcendent, it can only come to be known contingently, as a matter of a contingent unity from which this entire set of behaviors could flow.

The expressions of the other function in this way as behaviors, as *signs* of the personal world of the other. This function is, however, separate from the manner in which those expressions in themselves intend a textual world. That is, the meaning-intention embodied in an expression operates both to indicate an actual mental act embedded in the personal world of its author, and to fix an ideality separately graspable in fulfillment in the meaning-fulfilling act of a reader or auditor. Only a limited, and contingent, understanding of the personal world can be obtained by fulfilling the singular ideality meant through the expression, because in itself that singular ideality is not that personal world, it is only *of* that personal world.

This can perhaps best be understood through example. Consider the expression 'The front door of the house is brown' uttered by (to lend motivation) me. What can be known of my particular personal world through this expression? There will be contingency in retrieving the textual world. But we may choose to disregard it. Empirically there should be relatively little difficulty with the meaning of the expression (even if we must admit to some small contingency), and correspondingly little difficulty with bringing this meaning to an intuitive fulfillment in imagination. If this has been done with care (that is, under a phenomenological reduction), there may also be little difficulty in attributing the now intuitively present textual world to me as my (actual) meaning intention. But beyond these inferences, there are a wide range of possibilities, not yet narrowed, about the mode of consciousness through which I intended this textual world. Thus it might be an expression of my intuitive fulfillment of the door in direct perception, for example, as I stand before it; or, it may be an indistinct intuition dragged from memory as I sit writing this expression, or it may be fully an imagined presence, or even an emptily meant example. Further, it may have been issued with deceptive purpose, uttered in full intuitive knowledge that that door actually appears as black. Finally, though my expression does not directly express any such features, my own consciousness may have also included an intending of the carefully sculpted pattern on the door, though I chose not to express it. These factual possibilities form an infinite manifold of modes of consciousness over against which the meaning of the expression stands as an ideality. None are eliminated solely by accurately retrieving the intended meaning of the expression or by accurately fulfilling it. Consequently, any claim about the personal world of my actual experience in relation to an expression, is contingent and subject to evidence, even though we might eidetically know that one of this infinite manifold of possibilities was actualized. (It should also be again noted in passing that a natural existence of the door is also not necessary either to understanding the textual world, or to understanding the personal world as indicated by that textual world).

Once again, the process by which a personal world is obtained as the personal world of the other, though contingent, may be described as a hermeneutic circle, this time involving the progressive reconstruction of a coherent personal world as the world from which particular expressions, themselves understood as given, could coherently flow as, for example, exemplifications of personal convictions. Again, Dilthey's claims for the hermeneutic process of understanding another can be reinterpreted. It remains true that a certainty can be experienced in the analysis of a personal world; this certainty will pertain to the eidetic essentialities of the apodeictic personal world immanently experienced and retrieved through imaginative free variation. It also remains true that the analysis in which the personal world is experienced can be known eidetically to be an analysis of that world, if Husserl's phenomenological claims about the eidetic existence of the other and of the possibility of experiencing the other are correct. But it still remains an impossibility to claim with certainty that any particular personal world is just the apodeictic personal world actually experienced by the other.

On this analysis, the possibility of fulfilling a coherent personal world of the other that even remotely resembles the actual personal world of the other would seem surpassingly remote were it not for the ability of subjectivities to reflect upon their personal world, and intend that personal world in expression. Any self-referent statement, a statement that includes 'I' or 'me' not emptily intended, is an expression that means to intend a personal world, the surrounding world of that I or me. The apprehension and fulfillment of the textual world of that expression by an investigator would also then be the apprehension and fulfillment of the personal world of that I.

Understanding the textual world of a self-referent statement as the personal world of the originating other does not allow the retrieval of a certain knowledge of that personal world, however, for several reasons. First, contingency will always remain in the fulfilling of a textual world. Second, the self-referent expression will intend less than the full actuality of the personal world, conceived as the full stream of consciousness of the subjectivity. No self-referent statement is capable of expressing the occurrence in a personal life of the mental act of the I currently doing the expressing. Thus for a statement such as 'I see the bird', there will always be a mental act of the I who intended to express that I see the bird and this act as part of the personal world of that I, while indicated, is not expressed (cf. Sokolowski, 1974, p. 117ff). This is knowable by virtue of the eidetic possibility that that I may be knowingly acting deceptively, that I saw no such bird and knew it even as I uttered the statement. Finally, and as a result of this failure of full self-reference, it is also always a matter of contingency that the I of the self-referent statement is the I of the personal world of the originating subjectivity; from the point of view of a reader, a deceptive purpose is always a possibility, and as fictional first person narrative shows, the I of a first person may itself be an empathic envisagement of an imagined (or real) other[3].

The distinction, then, between an empirical hermeneutics focused on the personal world available from self-referent discourse (and fulfilling Dilthey's original aim) and a phenomenology of expression might also be rendered as the difference between, on the one hand, the empirical attempt to provide a coherent account of the one personal world (considered as natural) which resulted in this expression even in the face of an eidetic uncertainty that this personal world was in fact the personal world which is intended in this expression, and, on the other hand, what must necessarily be true as a result of phenomenological reflection of *any* personal world to which we might conceivably attach the claim that it was the one personal world intended in this expression. The first is psychological in its attempt to reconstitute a particular psychological object, the umwelt of the natural consciousness, which created this expression. The second is phenomenological in its attempt to reconstitute an ideal object, the essence of any psychological object which might have surrounded its creation, and then to describe it. And clearly, analyses in these two domains can come to be seen as symbiotic in just the way Husserl recommended for a progressive eidetic and a progressive natural psychology.

Summary. The logical pattern for the atomic fact of a psychology informed by phenomenology has been explicated as 'natural behavior B (or action A) is the result of natural situation S, natural person P, and an experiencing (of S) as meaning M as an exemplification of conviction C (of P)'. The natural situation S and the natural person P may be pursued in the manner typical of current empirical psychology. The experiencing (of S) as meaning M as an exemplification of conviction C (of P) may be the focus of a phenomenologically oriented inquiry. It is also the explication of this experiencing which reanimates a consideration of meaning, devalued by the behavioral equation, within psychology.

While these natural and phenomenological inquiries can be pursued separately or dialectically, they will ultimately, *and in the ideal limit*, be combined into a single (all-embracing) statement. The connection between these inquiries as ongoing, however, involves a factual claim that the experience explicated in the phenomenological analysis was, in fact, the experience of the natural person P. The retrieval of the actual experience of a person is itself a contingent quest, one describable by a phenomenologically-informed empirical hermeneutics.

There are two separate moments in the interpretation of an expression as revealing the particular experience of a particular person. The first is the retrieval and fulfillment of the textual world of an expression, a singular apodeictic world of a subjectivity-in-principle just sufficiently articulated in experience to make essences available in subsequent imaginative variation. This moment itself consists of two moments: the retrieval of an apophantic ideality of meaning, and its fulfillment in presentative consciousness. Both of these moments involve an eidetic historical inquiry, an attempt to return to pure acts of an originating subjectivity, by a bracketing of (natural) knowledge and (historical) tradition that have formed a sediment obscuring them. Fulfillment also involves a bracketing of naturality, a refusal to allow the fulfillment to be contaminated by the purely contingent properties associated with it as a fulfillment of a natural causal world. But this process is a contingent one, because the apodeictic world of the text which was also the apodeictic world of its (natural) originating subjectivity is an ideality, a transcendence of the manifold of all attempts to realize it. Any particular fulfillment remains open to empirical revelations which might force it to be revised or abandoned. The specific mode of consciousness in the realization of an apodeicitic world of the text is a spiral unfolding, moving repeatedly between the poles of its two moments, and moving also between the lowest embedded linguistic elements of the textual world, and the highest, the full text, which realizes the full textual subjectivity and the full textual world, even as it also progresses through a temporal unfolding in reading from the beginning of the textual world to its end.

The second moment in an interpretation of an expression as revealing the particular experience of a particular person consists in an acceptance that the textual world is self-referent, that the natural originating subjectivity is also both the subjectivity speaking and the subjectivity spoken of. In this way, the textual world can become understood as the personal world of that natural originating subjectivity. This also involves contingency because the unfolding of a self-referent subjectivity can never be complete: the intention of the originating speaking subjectivity can never be expressed, and further, the originating subjectivity's understanding of self is always itself subject to enhancement because that self lives both in and beyond the self it speaks.

The eidetically contingent character of the fulfillment of the personal world of an other is not an invitation to skepticism, however. The factual status of a particular claim in the atomic statements of a phenomenological psychology extends beyond the claim that a particular expressed world is, in actuality, the personal world of a natural subjectivity to encompass all of the implicit positing of natural objects (including persons). What is sought in the unraveling of contingent facts is ultimately a full and coherent account of experience, and the coherence of any claim can always again be judged against further unfolding experience. The *natural moment* of a psychology informed by phenomenology becomes an unraveling of the significance of experience not yet quite understood phenomenologically, and here a natural evolving account is acceptable if increasingly coherent.

Now there is a place to start. The interpretive process, applied in the reconstitution of the textual/personal world, will (in the structural or explanatory moment) reveal apophantic elements which intend parts of that world, even as they reveal themselves to be embedded as moments in a larger whole, the full text. This structure simply parallels the structure of the world ultimately to be fulfilled: those parts of the textual/ personal world intended by embedded apophantic elements will also be embedded in the textual/personal world, embedded in initial fulfillment with indefinite horizons which can come to be realized, if at all, by fulfilling the wholes of which they are part. As fulfilled these elements, from lowest to highest embedded moments, can support an essential analysis and as a result can support the development of typifications which include the personal convictions under which these elements were initially constituted as exemplifications. This is true even if the analysis must ultimately take its place in an unfolding tradition of 'mutually conflicting interpretations of the same'.

Notes

1 That this distinction is difficult for readers to maintain is attested to by commentators such as Hall (1984, p. 188):

> [Husserl] tends to give his readers credit, once he has introduced and explained the move from the natural to the philosophical, for being able to keep considerations of fact and considerations of meaning separate from that point on. So he does not remind us constantly that his theory is concerned solely with the meaning of our experience. Husserl expects us to remember initial warnings like the following.
>
> > What is essential for us here is the distinction between the two types of investigation [natural and philosophical], each regarded as a universal investigation (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 145).

2 The importance of the apodeictic judgement in the acquisition in consciousness of an essence is a matter of dispute. For contrasting views of Husserl (1913/1962, Sec. 5 & 6) in which the distinction is introduced, compare Kohak (1978, p. 15) who argues that an essence can be grasped independently of a particularity with Mohanty (1989, p. 8). As well, Sokolowski (1974, p. 79) argues that at least the initial acquisition of an essence will require particularities. As close as Husserl appears to commit himself on this issue is his insistence that the ability to imaginatively generate particularities manifesting the essence is an eidetic moment of grasping that essence.

3 It is as a result of this inability to completely express (refer to, in the natural attitude) the full contents of my current experience, especially 'something' which is the transcendent I who is having them, that various paradoxes of self-reference, often referred to as reflexivity, can be seen to arise. Lawson (1985) figures this theme and traces its influence on contemporary thought, usefully detailing its centrality to Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*. Poundstone (1988) presents versions and discussions of a paradox of autobiography attributed to Bertrand Russell. In this paradox a persistent writer takes two days to express the experiences of one day, but if given an infinite life span would eventually be able to 'catch up to

himself' (or so it is argued under current conceptions of the infinite). But something happens even before then! A variation of this paradox can be formed to illustrate reflexivity (though the importance of time should not be overlooked in it either). Consider an autobiographer who will faithfully and completely record his full stream of experience. Rather than the long and dreary days which Russell's chap must put in, allow this autobiographer to 'catch up to himself'. The paradox is generated by asking what will happen at the moment he arrives at the point at which he began his autobiography. If he faithfully records his stream of experience, he will record again at this point the book he is now writing, in toto, from the beginning. For he now recognizes that his experience must contain 'And now I wrote ...' followed by that full book to this point, and that further he can now never 'catch up to himself' because he must then again encounter a point in which he must repeat all that he has written by then. His book will never end. But if he tries to end by saying, 'And now I wrote this book', the stream of experience of writing the book will have been left out of the account. If we argue that that is not so, then we can be challenged to 'point to that experience', asked 'what was that experience?'. An infinite loop will now again occur if we are persistent in looking for the experience in the book in response to the challenge; that is, if we try to resolve all references in the book, and in all books to which it refers. Since the book now contains a reference to itself, this has simply removed the problem of the infinite loop one step, from writer to reader. How can an object contain within itself a reference to itself as a whole which contains that reference? Gabriel Garcia Marquez' masterwork *One Hundred Years of Solitude* is a literary exploration of a paradox with very similar form. Smullyan (1980) traces its effects in a post-Godel mathematics and logic through puzzles, while Hofstadder (1979) covers similar ground from the viewpoint of Computing Science and Artificial Intelligence. Literary criticism in the hermeneutic and deconstruction traditions is also sensitive to this paradox, which it explores not only as the inability to arrive at a true interpretation, but also as the inability to arrive at an ending in various post-modern novels which show an awareness of the reflexivity paradox and mimic its structure (see e.g. Martin, 1986). Transcendental phenomenology claims a response to this paradox by detaching experience from the realm of natural objects to which it refers, and obviating the need to persistently try to resolve unresolvable references. It seems clear that Heidegger, for one, didn't believe it possible.

CHAPTER IV

AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

> Autobiography is the highest and most instructive form in which the understanding of life confronts us. Here is the outward, phenomenal course of life which forms the basis for understanding what has produced it within a certain environment. The man who understands it is the same as the one who created it. A particular intimacy of understanding results from this. The person who seeks the connecting threads in the history of his life has already, from different points of view, created a coherence in that life which he is now putting into words. He has created it by experiencing values and realizing purposes in his life, making plans for it, seeing his past in terms of development and his future as the shaping of his life and of whatever he values most. He has, in his memory, singled out and accentuated the moments which he experienced as significant; others he has allowed to sink into forgetfulness. The future has corrected his illusions about the significance of certain moments. Thus, the first problem of grasping and presenting historical connections is already half solved by life. The units are formed by the conceptions of experience in which present and past events are held together by a common meaning. Among these experiences are those which have a special dignity both in themselves and for the course of his life; they have been preserved by memory and lifted out of the endless stream of what has happened and been forgotten. Constantly changing conceptions have been formed from different standpoints within life itself, so that the task of historical presentation is already half performed by life. Units, because they are experiences, have already taken shape; from the endless, countless, multiplicity, a selection of what is worth recording has been prepared. Between the parts we see a connection which neither is, nor is it intended to be, the simple likeness of the course of life of so many years, but which, because understanding is involved, expresses what the individual knows about the continuity of his life (Dilthey, 1927/1962, p. 85-86).

A full psychology of the personal attitude, in which personal worlds are envisaged and analyzed, depends upon the analysis of expressions in which that world is intended, or at least indicated. It therefore incorporates the results of a phenomenology of expression, in particular the results of analyses of apophantic moments of textual objects. One appropriate place to begin a psychology of the personal attitude is with the attempt to retrieve a personal world from self-referent discourse in its most articulated version, the autobiography. The relationship between the textual and personal worlds of the author has been the focus of considerable analysis in both the structural and phenomenological traditions, often in consideration of autobiography.

The Autobiographical Pact. The common understanding of my autobiography as "the true story of my life" directs attention to additional manifestations of the indeterminate nature of the relationship between textual and personal worlds in the concepts of truth and of narrative, and ultimately raises disturbing questions about the extent to which we can know ourselves through self-reflection.

Responding to the problem of identifying the textual world with the author's personal world as encountered by a reader, Lejeune (1975/1989) notes that the author's name on the title page of a published autobiography does, in fact, provide a textual feature that serves to distinguish it from a fictional narrative. He argues that the author's intention to write in the autobiographical genre, to tell the true story, is indicated by the act of signing the text with his name. It is the presence of this name which serves to communicate this intention to the reader allowing him to adopt an appropriate attitude towards the I of the text in reading. The reading of an autobiographical text is thus the occasion for a complex transaction between the author and the reader by which the personal world can become identified with the textual world. Lejeune calls this transaction "the autobiographical pact", and sloganizes its content as 'I, the undersigned, promise to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth'. This conception of the transaction, however, is problematic when considered from the perspective of the author who intends it.

First, the slogan is incomplete since it does not express the author's purpose in presenting the story of his/her life. This purpose proves to be more basic than the concept of truth. It is clear that the specific purpose of the I who writes can never be part of the textual world expressed, just as it is clear that there are a variety of reasons that might constitute such a specific motivation to create an autobiography (see e.g. Allport, 1942). But it is also clear that a particular abstract purpose must be involved if the autobiographical pact is to be accurately intended; that is, if no deception is, in fact, involved. This purpose can be summarized as the author's intention to allow her/himself to become truly known.

This brings to the surface an indeterminacy in the concept of truth, and in what it consists, because truth itself is an essence of the personal world of the author. For example, an autobiography may be intended to be, or be experienced to be, an aesthetic object. If aesthetic qualities of experience are to be made available to enhance the experiencing of the autobiography for the reader, the author might believe that personal truth is best conveyed through a process of artistic elaboration rather than through a naturalistic factual accuracy. But in the absence of deception, the author's intention in rendering his autobiography as an aesthetic object will remain, and will potentially be a route to, allowing self to become known. The autobiography is, then, an invitation to the reader to come to know its author on his or her own terms by entering into his or her personal world which itself includes (although perhaps not explicitly in the text) a conception of the truth under which it is presented. It is this invitation, and not a stable concept of truth, that is part of the autobiographical pact.

Lejeune's summary slogan for the autobiographical pact also masks additional difficulties that will become apparent to an author during the creation of his or her autobiography. For the author of the autobiography, in intending the autobiographical pact, must initiate processes of self-reflection. Intending to tell the truth about oneself implies not only knowing in what (personal) truth consists but, more specifically, knowing in what such truth about oneself consists. To seriously entertain the autobiographical pact, then, the author of an autobiography must examine the manner in which s/he knows him/herself.

This self-knowledge, however, cannot be obtained from the direct perception of a self contained as an intentional object in personal experience (Hume, 1739/1975); the autobiographer becomes aware of intentionality, of the fact that he or she has always been directed or oriented toward something that is not self, away from that self. Thus self-knowledge is available only indirectly through that which the self has experienced and in particular through memories of this experiencing, whether as recollection or as a reliving of the past (Locke, 1694/1975). But never completely. I now am both the same I whom I remember as the experiencer of the world then, and yet now a different I transcending that past. Equally, any self-referent expression I make can indicate but never fully intend the I who is making those statements nor the personal world of that currently speaking I. For Husserl, memory simply intensifies the mystery of the I:

> Recollection shows us everything that perception shows us - but not merely the same thing in a new color, so to speak. For, new marvelous properties come with it, as e.g., this, that starting with the recollected object two reflections are possible, one upon the recollection, the other into it; one reflection leads to the present lived experience of recollection, the other to the past perceiving of the object, so that thus recollecting contains a having perceived. As the I of the present belongs to the present recollection, so to the past perceiving belongs the I of that time (Husserl, 1925/1962/1977, p. 157).

The I of the present must forever remain indicated as a transcendence, and can never be fully intended in expression, while the I of a former time can be fully intended, even if, because of the vagaries of memory, never completely fulfilled in expression.

Dilthey clearly recognized these vagaries of memory. In remembering, I know that details of my experiencing have been lost. I discover in self-reflection that my memories are already organized meaningfully, that in reflecting I have already 'singled out and accentuated the moments... experienced as significant; others [have been] allowed to sink into forgetfulness' (Dilthey, 1927/1962, p. 86, previously quoted in full). The truth about my self that I promise to tell through my embracing of the autobiographical pact is not only incomplete but also itself inevitably a part of my experience: such truth about my self is truth already under interpretation and not truth based upon facts that I can know with certainty.

It is finally because of the impossibility of recounting an objective truth about one's self, both because truth and self are constituted anew in the task, that the autobiographical pact between author and audience needs to be understood as:

1. I, the undersigned, have faithfully related,

2. the story of my life,

3. in order that you, the reader, can come to know me as I know myself.

This pact, embraced by the author, constitutes the genre of autobiography and articulates the context in which it is created.

For the author, an internal criterion of faithfulness to experience, as a sense of felt coherence, replaces an unattainable external criterion of truth. *That I must be and what I must possess to be an I may be a matter of eidetic certainty, but who I am in fact, even to myself, is a matter of an unfolding empirical coherence in experience and memory.* Even with the desire to institute the autobiographical genre, I must successfully recognize my self in the textual world created as its expression in order to know that the pact is fulfilled ("I *have* faithfully related..."). This recognition remains an act only indicated, never expressed, by the text.

The autobiographical pact designates a particular relationship between the textual world and the personal surrounding world of its originating subjectivity. When the pact is intended by the author, the textual world intends the personal world. Accepting the autobiographical pact also has profound implications for the way in which the reader can approach autobiographical expression. This can be drawn out by comparing various stances that a reader might take towards a text in light of the possibility of the autobiographical pact, or in light of the possibility of understanding the textual world as the personal world of its author. Consider, then, a four quadrant matrix (similar to those to which readers are often subjected by psychologists as a cross-tabulation). In this case it will partition possibilities for the interpretation of a narrative depending upon whether or not an author intends the autobiographical pact and whether or not a reader accepts it.

First, the reader may choose to adopt a version of the autobiographical pact even in the absence of the author's (textual) signal that the text is autobiographical (e.g. Holland, 1980, 1988). That is, any text can be viewed as revealing truths about its author and the interpretive task can be viewed as making these truths explicit. Claims can, but need not, attempt to present the personal world of the author. Where they do, the attempt is to present a coherent world of experience sufficient to have reasonably allowed the expression to be acclaimed. This amounts to using the text in its ability to *indicate* the personal world of the originating subjectivity as it is eidetically known to have existed. It must be based upon assumptions and general factual claims about the manner in which texts are related to the authors who create them. In psychological studies (as perhaps opposed to biographical ones which may also occupy this quadrant), these assumptions are often summarized by the principle that the author 'projects' himself into the literary work. That is, the experiences of the characters of a textual world are assumed to have been experiences of the author as well. While it must be true that if the textual world is carefully fulfilled, the experiences of the characters of the textual world must have been part of the experience of the author in order that he or she can have meant them, it does not follow that these must have been fulfilled in naturally lived experience rather than imaginal experience. That is, the textual world is part of the personal world of its author, but it is contingent that that textual world must be that personal world. Nevertheless, of course, there is nothing which disallows the production of evidence for such a claim. The manner in which these types of claim can come to be known to the interpreter will be based, of necessity, upon natural knowledge brought to an experiencing of the work. Interpretation cannot be phenomenological unless this knowledge is left aside at least until the textual world is fulfilled. This form of analysis, then, even to the extent that it depends upon an understanding of the textual world, is focused upon a naturalistic relationship between the author and his text, and constitutes in completed form an empirical analysis of significance rather than an eidetic analysis of meaning.

Or, the reader can choose to ignore an autobiographical pact intended by the author. That is, any text can be fulfilled as a textual world alone, ignoring its status as a personal world. And in that state, it can be examined noematically, as a possible or even actual world, or factually according to a prior interest specific to the reader. This concern might, for example, be historical (e.g. Bruggemeier, 1986): to look through the character of the life of its subjectivity to the historical world in which it unfolded. Interpretations of this type, too, will depend upon assumptions that the reader brings to his/her experiencing of the work, especially those related to the nature of the textual world and most usually picturing it in relationship to the natural world of natural objects. This too would be an empirical analysis of significance, an analysis which sets the textual world in a particular context of assumptions (the thesis of the natural standpoint), and which examines the relationship between that world and the world posited as real in itself according to those assumptions.

In the case that an autobiographical pact is neither intended nor accepted, a fully natural standpoint is generally taken and the text becomes another natural object in a natural world. In terms of the framework developed here, this form of analysis is fully empirical and therefore does not examine meaning at all, even when the espoused interest is in the author. Alternatively, this quadrant may contain phenomenological analysis of the text as possible world of experience (i.e. a noematic analysis), or as an intended work of art (perhaps to be construed as created under an "aesthetic pact") (e.g. Ingarden, 1973/1931, 1973/1937).

It is only upon the acceptance of an intended autobiographical pact that the fulfillment of the textual world is viewed simultaneously as the fulfillment of the personal world of the originating subjectivity. In accepting the autobiographical pact, the reader accepts that the 'I' used in the narrative represents not only the protagonist who experiences the story and the narrator who tells it, but also the 'flesh and blood' author who created the text (cf. also Lejeune, 1989). The world portrayed in an autobiography is thus the world as experienced by a real author. This means that no separation is necessarily involved in the process of fulfilling the textual world and fulfilling the personal world; the mode of consciousness for the attainment of the one also attains the other (although always incompletely). It is not, of course, that the mere acceptance of the autobiographical pact, is not itself a contingency, or that the posited identity between the two worlds may not be a false one. It is however the case that no additional natural assumptions are required to realize the two worlds simultaneously. If, in fact, the reader makes no such additional natural assumptions, then he is performing the phenomenological-psychological reduction and operating in the personal attitude. For a phenomenological hermeneutics, then, accepting the autobiographical pact means understanding an autobiography by experiencing the world unfolded in the text as the world experienced by a real author and thereby coming to know its author as he/she knows self.

The Narrative Self. What then is the (empirical) self, the flesh on the transcendental I which I know survives the phenomenological reduction as a pure but skeletal subjectivity? In what form does my personal world unfold as the possession of my self? On what ground can I constitute my self as the possessor of particular convictions?

Husserl's account of the empirical I offered a preliminary answer. A farther answer, articulated initially by Ricoeur (1981, 1985, 1987; but see also Brooks, 1984; Bruner, 1987, 1990; Carr, 1986; Johnson, 1984; Kerby, 1986, 1988; Novitz, 1989; Polkinghorne, 1988, 1991), is that this self and its personal world are constituted narratively, are precisely the unities and coherences transcending and uniting *stories* I can actually faithfully tell about myself in my world. My self and all its possessions are empirical contingencies, available only through those stories as constituted in the unfolding of experience and in the telling. They remain ever again available for reconstitution into a (more) coherent first person narrative which (better) spans my life and my world:

> It seems that our life, enveloped in one single glance, appears to us as the field of a constructive activity, deriving from the narrative intelligence through which we try to recover (rather than impose from without) the narrative identity which constitutes us (Ricoeur, 1987/1991, p. 436). Our lives are ceaselessly intertwined with narrative, with the stories that we tell and hear told, those we dream or imagine or would like to tell, all of which are reworked in that story of our lives that we narrate to ourselves in an episodic, sometimes semi-conscious, but virtually uninterrupted monologue (Brooks, 1984, p. 3).

Carr (1986), following Husserl's analysis of the consciousness of time, proposes that narrative form itself is already a moment in the constitution of experience as lived. That is, meaning springs from a succession of events as they are first experienced; experiences already flow through consciousness as unfolding wholes - appearing, remaining, receding - and containing such events as moments. This is much as a melody is experienced, both as the structure in which individual tones are embedded and as a presence which begins, continues, and ends. Lived experiences already possess the structure of stories, though perhaps as the melody in the hearing, as yet unfinished.

Ricoeur emphasizes the importance of the fulfillment of the sense of cultural objects, particularly texts, as moments in the personal world of the reader, and consequently as personal experiences in the constitution of self:

> ...interpretation retains the feature of appropriation. By 'appropriation', I understand this: that the interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself (Ricoeur, 1970/1981, p. 158).

and

> Thus it must be said, with equal force, that reflection is nothing without the mediation of signs and works, and that explanation is nothing if it is not incorporated as an intermediary stage in the process of self-understanding. In short..., the constitution of the self is contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning (Ricoeur, 1970/1981, p. 159).

In particular, it is in learning to understand the stories of others, by constituting textual worlds as personal worlds of other subjectivities into whom we can insinuate ourselves empathically that:

> ...we learn to become the narrator of our own story without completely becoming the author of our life. It could be said that we appropriate in the application to ourselves the concert of narrative voices that make up the symphony of the great works, of the epics, the tragedies, dramas, and novels. The difference is that, in these works, the author has disguised himself as narrator and bears the masks of his many personae in whose midst he is the dominant narrative voice telling the story we read. We can become our own narrator, following these narrative voices, without becoming authors. That is the great difference between life and fiction. In this sense it is certainly true that life is lived and the story told. An unbridgeable distinction remains, but it is, in part, abolished through our capacity to appropriate in the application to ourselves the intrigues we receive from our culture, and our capacity of thus experimenting with the various roles that the favorite personae assume in the stories we love best. And so we try to gain by means of imaginative variation of our ego a narrative understanding of ourselves... (Ricoeur, 1987/1991, p. 437).

For Ricoeur, our selves become available to us in an act of narrating, an act of separating from self a textual world which can become available again to self in fulfillment as an own textual world, as a personal world:

> *But does the author appear otherwise than as first reader?* (Ricoeur, 1970/1981, p. 149) It is in telling our own stories that we give ourselves an identity. We *recognize ourselves* in the stories we tell about ourselves. It makes little difference whether these stories are [objectively] true or false, fiction as well as verifiable history provides us with an identity (Ricouer, 1985, p. 214, *Italics added*).

A narrative unfolding is exemplary because my self exists for me as well as for you only as the subject of a temporal unfolding of experience; as a possessor of a beginning, middle, and end. But my empirical self exists only contingently because I am always telling an unfinished story, a story whose ending I cannot have attained before I try to faithfully relate it. It is always an eidetic possibility that this story will yet unfold in a way which shatters its coherence and, in the reflection that leads to its reconstitution, changes my self (or in Dilthey's terms 'corrects illusions'). Ultimately then my self, too, is experienced by me as an ideality standing over and beyond the manifold of stories in which that self appears as I, just as the world is experienced as an ideality standing over and beyond the unfolding appearances of its world to that I in those stories. In expression, it is this transcendent intentionality of self and world that is indicated in its unfolding by a life story.

A Provisional Description of Narrative. This development amounts, as well, to the claim that narrative intends fulfillment as the personal world of a particular subjectivity under an autobiographical pact, that the essential structure of an expression which intends a particular other is narrative. This presents a specific direction for exploration in the understanding of a textual world. Where phenomenological analysis has been presented as consisting of two moments, the realization of an apodeictic world and analysis of the essences of that world, the realization of the apodeictic world has been presented as two moments as well, the grasping of an apophantic ideality and the fulfillment of this ideality of meaning into an ontological ideality. I believe that the structural analysis of narrative has contributed to the first of these latter moments.

This structure of the narrative has been a major focus of the European structuralist tradition (e.g. Barthes, 1988/1966; Genette, 1980/1972, 1988/1983; Todorov, 1977/1971, 1990/1978) and of its North American appropriation (e.g. Chatman, 1978; Bal, 1985/1980; Prince, 1982, 1987; Stewart, 1987; Young, 1982, 1984). Narrative has, in the first instance, been distinguished from scientific discourse by its focus on a temporal succession of the states of particular intended objectivities rather than upon an atemporal characterization of objectivities in general. It therefore, like experience, is essentially concerned with time.

One major set of distinctions offered by structuralists within a basic narrative is that between the tale (or fabula), the story, and the discourse (or text) of a narrative (see especially Bal, 1985/1980). The tale within a narrative is the level of events and states of the textual world as world. This is the level that individuates and intends the objects that were experienced or are experienceable (typically in the natural attitude) in the first instance by an experiencer. These objects do not yet have the qualities of connectedness and closure associated with narrative (or with experience): no significance has yet been attached to them that allows their apprehension as a unified whole; with, for example, a discernible beginning, middle, and end. They are connected simply by a spatial and/or temporal contiguity constituted by the experiencer. They are the furniture of the world removed from an intentional relationship to a subjectivity; analogous to the products of a noematic analysis.

The story, or the manner of the telling of the fabula, is the level of narrative in which meaningful connections between objects and events are established, where these events are unified. This is the level at which a consciousness has experienced the fabula and the fabula has become significant to that consciousness. At this level, an experience has been constituted for an experiencer. Intentionality presents itself, and plot appears as well as the patterning of the joint unfolding of subjectivity and world as wholes. This experience becomes understandable through a process of empathy with the experiencer by the reader; the fabula is re-experienced by the reader in its significance as story.

The level of discourse is the level at which the reader becomes aware of ('hears') a narrative voice, becomes aware of a second subjectivity present in narrative. This is the subjectivity who tells the story, who intends a textual world as the full relationship between another subjectivity and its world. This subjectivity presents its own relationship to the story it tells, but this relationship is often largely indicated and not expressed. The narrative as expression remains open, remains a cultural object, pointing to a subjectivity not fully captured by the textual world (or nested textual worlds). This formal separation remains true in self-referent communication (as Husserl noted in relation to recollection), even though in autobiography this higher subjectivity is intended to be the same as the subjectivity of the story (through an autobiographical pact). In constituting these subjectivities as identical, self-reference is created, though never with certainty, for the reader. At this level, however, generalizations may be expressed, as the enduring convictions exemplified at the level of story and fabula which constitute the self.

When the autobiographical pact is accepted, all of these narrative levels openly express the one personal world of the author. The author has selected from his or her memory the fabula or world of entities and events, he or she has recalled self as experiencing this world and thus experiencing a story, and he or she tells the story and in so doing comments upon it. At every moment, the author's understanding of his or her life is presented: in the selection of the furniture and movement of the fabula, in the recollection of the story, and in the interpretation of the story offered in its telling.

These levels provide the reader with potentially separable sources of experience for reflection, and for constitution of a unified typification of the author and its world: he or she can reflect upon the entities and events presented and upon the aspects of these chosen by the author as against all other possible entities and aspects or against those presented elsewhere, he or she can reflect upon the author's experiencing of this fabula as against other possible experiences or those related elsewhere, and he or she can reflect upon the narrator's interpretation of the significance of this experience as against other interpretations or those offered elsewhere. Fulfillments at each of these levels may be interrelated into a single typification carried forward in experiencing the autobiography.

This excursion into autobiography and narrative has added the following to the perspective of a psychology under the personal attitude: the apophantic ideality intending a particular textual world as personal is narrative, a suprasentential linguistic ideality which unifies separate moments consisting of an intended world as world, the subjectivities experiencing that world, and an additional subjectivity that originates the intentional unification of these first two moments.

In broader terms, this contributes to the claim that access to the personal world, empathy, must proceed through understanding expressions, and in turn that hermeneutics, 'close reading' of expressions, is an important component of a psychology under the personal attitude. It is this realization, perhaps, that has been slow in emerging in traditional psychologies, even those concerned with describing the individual personality.

Appropriating Trait Psychology. A commitment to the uniqueness of each individual personality was present at the very beginnings of trait psychology (Allport, 1937). But even though many psychologists, and particularly clinicians, have pursued particular techniques suitable for the intensive examination of the individual case, the distinction between idiographic analysis and nomothetic analysis has never been accepted as valid within the mainstream of 'scientific' personality psychology. Even in search of a defense of the idiographic, Allport himself was unable to effectively question the tenets of naturalism as the sole basis for a scientific psychology, despite his humanistic values, and even though he was almost certainly exposed to Dilthey's attempt to distinguish between the natural and human sciences. In the early twentieth century, the battle cry of a psychology which saw itself as liberated from a philosophical tendermindedness which included an increasingly sterile introspectionism had been too recently and too compellingly raised by the toughminded. The new horizons which became visible were then too indistinct to forsee that in that direction as well progress would eventually stall. Despite clear warnings issuing even then from philosophers, this psychology carries within itself an unacknowledged philosophy, one which is still both present and unrecognized. It is this naively accepted and unacknowledged philosophy which has been responsible for devaluing meaning and consequently consciousness within a *science* of the person.

It has been argued that to return meaning and consciousness to psychology requires an ability to set aside the natural attitude characteristic of modern science, to bring into view a world of experience uncontaminated by a prior and automatic naturalization of what is there presented. When consciousness and meaning can thereby come to be grasped, so too can the idiographic. To properly recognize the idiographic requires at least the psychological-phenomenological reduction (or personal attitude) whereby an individual is seen to live as a being conscious of a meaningful personal surrounding world. The search for the idiographic then becomes an analysis of the constituent experiences of a single personal world. In this view, a trait is transformed, from a mechanism which causes behavior of a particular type, to a possession of the I who constitutes a personal world, a conviction of the I which they have realized in the constitution of the personal world.

This should not be taken to suggest that the personal attitude precludes a concern with the general in experience. Most analyses which have adopted this attitude have, in fact, been concerned with essences of experiences which, while necessarily personal, extend beyond the individual personal world; these experiences are of the Lebenswelt, the one world of experience available to all. It does suggest, however, that the particular versus general distinction which has typically been taken to exhaust the idiographic versus nomothetic distinction actually cross-classifies analyses undertaken under the natural and under the personal attitudes.

But where the general subsumes the particular under the natural attitude and hence takes priority, the particular grounds, and takes priority over, the general under the personal attitude. No particular natural object is seeable except as an object of a particular type, whether or not further viewing overturns or refines an understanding of the type to which it belongs. The object has being by virtue of the type to which it is always already seen to belong. The particular is an exemplification of the essential. In the personal attitude, however, the noetic pole of experience, and not objects posited to be natural, is the focus. While grasping an experience means also grasping its intentional nature, what it is about; it is, in the first instance, the relationship of experiences to a single I which must be grasped. Experiences must be seen in their complexity as the particular possessions of a particular I, before they can be imaginatively varied to reveal essences, and before they can be fully seen to exemplify one or another particular essence of an I. In the personal attitude, experience is primary. The nomothetic analysis of personality can be reconstrued as the study of general characteristics of persons construed as natural, while the idiographic analysis of personality can be reconstrued as the study of the characteristics of personal worlds of experience, envisaged in their particularity through empathy.

Part of the legacy of the natural attitude in psychology is the principle that one should constraint the actions and expressions of an individual in order that these actions can be seen to be atomic, can be more easily characterized, or can be more easily decomposed into atomic constituents for (natural and nomothetic) scientific study. While this strategy of experimental control has been very successful within the natural sciences, it presents a serious challenge to research which would seek to characterize an individual's personal world. *For the more specific and constrained the expression or set of expressions, the less specific and more impoverished will be the view that can be established of the personal world from which the expressions originated.* The personal world is a whole to be grasped as the ground against which objects of relevance to the individual have been figured by them. To become concerned with the personal world is to regard these figured objects or constituents as moments of a personal world rather than as, in the natural attitude, reflections of separate pieces of a natural world.

This principle may be useful in resolving what appears as an empirical paradox in the analysis of traits. In a natural construal of traits, while particular individual expressions may be governed by a wide number of traits, they should in general be associated with traits which are most relevant to their determination; they have, after all, been constituted as the 'atomic constituents' of these traits. But Gergen, Hepburn & Fisher (1986) have demonstrated experimentally that items from a personality test assumed to be incrementally measuring a single particular trait are plausibly interpreted by responders as consistent with a wide variety of different traits (when labels of such alternative traits are supplied to them), that contradictory items can be plausibly linked to the same trait, and that multiple opposing traits can be linked to the same item. These researchers conclude that "...descriptive accounts of personality do not appear to be significantly constrained by actual patterns of behavior... each interpretive account represents a choice among an immense array of alternatives, and this choice is not grounded in the evidence itself" (Gergen, Hepburn & Fisher, 1986, p. 1269). This result is taken to cast doubt upon the viability of any incremental approach to personality assessment through self report. If meant as a rejection of trait ascription itself, however, this is clearly an overstatement. For example, Allport (1965) presented a long series of letters to judges who characterized Jenny, their writer, in freely chosen trait terms. Here there was very substantial agreement in the traits chosen as cardinal to a personality description of Jenny. In view of the conclusions of Gergen et al to the effect that the choice of trait descriptors is not 'grounded in... evidence', these results at first appear as paradoxical.

The apparent paradox can be dissolved by noting that both tasks involve, at least in part, a personal attitude towards traits. In the task of Gergen et al, the construction of rationales for relationships between items and between items and traits is a form of imaginative variation upon personal worlds which attempts to arrive at a possible variant consistent with its description in terms of particular items and trait descriptors. Since the personal world of such imaginal variation is minimally constrained by a small number of item-trait pairs, an enormous variety of particular circumstances and situations can be imagined which make a particular circumscribed habit or attitude plausible. In this sense, the rationales actually chosen are not grounded in the evidence itself. In Allport's study, however, the *scope of the personal world* expressed and fulfilled in imagination *does constrain* the nature of traits which could be imagined to fully describe it. In this case, the substantial evidence about the nature of the personal world is crucial to the range of the traits which might conceivably accurately span it. There is no paradox as long as trait ascriptions are seen as descriptive of moments of a full personal world of experience which are *multirealizable* (that is, not necessarily found in a one-to-one correspondence to) to particular properties of particular objects of a natural world posited to underlie it. Furthermore, to the extent that the personal world is already known and known to be describable by a particular set of traits, the natural measurement strategy will also become successful. The crucial issue for a phenomenologically oriented psychology which does not ignore natural description then becomes whether there might be a set of naturally describable traits which could serve to span all conceivable personal worlds. This question can never be addressed without investigation of individual personal worlds, investigation which does not impose constraints upon expressions of those personal worlds.

In order to characterize specific methods which have been proposed for, or utilized in, idiographic analyses, it will be useful to more carefully distinguish the major ways in which individuals' expressions can be constrained by an investigator. Two major dimensions of constraint have already been mentioned in suggesting that the investigator constrains the participant in order to be able to see his actions as atomic. On one major dimension, the participant is constrained by the investigator to an expression of a preconstituted type; on the other dimension, the investigator constrains their own regard of the expression that it always already be of relevance solely to one or a small number of preconstituted types.

Within the first dimension, there are two modes of constraint, a restriction of focus and a restriction of form. When focus is maximally restricted by an investigator, a specific question will generally be addressed to the participant. When form is maximally restricted by an investigator, only one of a specific small number of circumscribed expressions from the participant will be acceptable (often a binary or yes-no choice). Such a restriction of form obviates the need to examine the apophantics of the expression as a prelude to its fulfillment in imagination. These two forms of maximal constraint are combined in structured questionnaires which address specific questions to a participant and require specific responses from them (typically ones which can be easily numerically coded). Another kind of form restriction which may be imposed on an expression by the investigator involves the sorting or rating, once or repeatedly, of one or a number of objects or 'stimuli'. This type of restriction may allow the use of numerical and statistical techniques by the investigator since sortings can easily be converted into numbers, as can ratings (if not themselves originally represented as numbers). When the investigator also restricts the focus to a particular set of stimuli, the task may be construed as a 'scaling' task. The investigator may, however, attempt to minimize the focus constraint by allowing the participant to chose, within either narrow or wide boundaries, objects and/or scales upon which these objects are to be rated or according to which they are to be sorted. Form can be minimally restricted by allowing a participant to express themselves in oral or written language. When focus is restricted to a specific question, the situation can be characterized as an interview. When focus is restricted to an expression characterizing a particular presented stimulus, the situation may be regarded as a projective assessment. Finally, both form and focus are least restricted if the investigator becomes concerned with an expression freely produced by the participant, typically before or without knowledge of the possibility of its subsequent examination.

Within the second dimension of constraint which concerns the manner in which the investigator regards the expression, there are also two modes. In the more general of these, the investigator presupposes the constituent to be extracted from an individual's expression to be a natural component; this is the constraint of the natural attitude with which we are now quite familiar. In personality research it is manifest in the presupposition that an expression will reflect a natural trait (need, attitude, etc.) of the person, and is typically accompanied, although not necessarily so, by the presupposition that this trait is present to some degree in everyone. A more specific constraint is established if a pre-existing procedure (typically mechanical) can be applied to the expression to yield a specific characterization of the individual in terms of a particular presupposed natural trait. Structured questionnaires illustrate this specific constraint because they are typically scored using pre-established procedures (generally the summation of numbers previously assigned to restricted answers to specific questions) according to pre-established categories which are taken to represent natural traits. Such specific procedures, pre-established (and pre-specified to some degree or another), can also be applied to expressions which have been minimally constrained in production by the investigator. These procedures can be as varied as a mental 'checking off' of indications in the expression of component symptoms of a possible disorder by an interviewer, to the mechanical processing of written or spoken speech into pre-structured content categories according to their syntactic and semantic features.

The distinction between a natural attitude and a personal attitude should not be confused with the distinction between an inductive and a deductive focus on the part of the investigator. While an inductive focus may indicate that a particular procedure of regarding the expression of the individual has not been developed, it does not in itself indicate that presuppositions about the nature of such a yet-to-be-posited procedure have not already been made. In particular, the basic presuppositions of a natural attitude need not be forsaken in order to conduct inductive research. Thus the analysis of numerated responses to a set of specific questions may not presuppose the particular trait categories within which particular questions might ultimately be sorted, but may maintain the presupposition that such a categorization of questions into natural trait categories will result from analysis. Thus natural attitude investigations can be both deductive and inductive.

In addition, investigations conducted under the personal attitude can be either inductive (or abductive) or deductive (or confirmatory) in nature. Thus a particular investigation can begin from an experience fulfilled as belonging to a personal world, and attempt, through imaginative variation, to discern its essence. Or conversely, a particular investigation can begin from the structure of an essence as grasped and inquire whether a particular experience shows this essence as grasped. In this latter case, the critical step is, however, to attempt to insure the adequate possession of the experience being examined prior to an assessment of its relationship to a statement of essence. The fulfillment of the experience is primary.

As well, the statement of the essence cannot be phrased in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions for its occurrence *where these conditions are construed as referring to the presence or absence of particular natural objects or properties*, since the relationship between essence and natural object is *multirealizable*. At best, a statement of essence might in addition include references to particular objects-posited-as-natural *typical* of the experience, perhaps as part of the attempt to coordinate phenomenological and natural statements in a phenomenologically sensitive natural psychology. This property of phenomenological descriptions of essences should certainly *not* be construed as suggesting that they may be imprecise, or incomplete, or that they are unnecessary. Instead, it places an even more stringent requirement upon them, namely that the essence must be recognizable in experience from such a description without the possibility of a mechanical decision based upon the presence or absence of a single tangible property in an otherwise unfulfilled experience. Ultimately, however, within the phenomenological attitude as within the natural attitude, a primordial relationship exists between a description and seeing that that description applies. Coming to grasp this relationship may require a degree of connoisseurship obtained through experience (preferably, perhaps, under the tutelage of a skilled mentor).

With this prelude, the specific procedures which have been proposed as suitable for idiographic investigations can now be properly situated (and additional ones noted). For a method to be properly idiographic, then, it must allow examination under the personal attitude of the personal world of a single individual. Distinctions have been introduced between those methods which restrict the individual's expression and those which grant the individual freedom to fully express his personal world. While differences along this dimension can restrict the utility of adopting the personal attitude, they do not preclude it. Thus even the most highly constrained of personality assessment procedures, the structured questionnaire, can be examined from within the personal attitude by considering the meanings, singly and in relationship, of the particular questions to which a particular individual has given assent (Schopflocher, Wild, & Kuiken, 1991). However, as Gergen, Hepburn & Fisher (1986) note, such a list if considered alone leaves a very wide scope for the fulfillment of a personal world consistent with the list of descriptors.

Allport's (1962) list of idiographic techniques importantly includes methods with increased scope, even when expressions have been restricted. These include the Repertoire Grid technique (Kelly, 1955), and the Q-sort technique (Stephanson, 1953).

In the Repertoire Grid technique, an individual is prompted (sometimes according to a complex procedure such as that detailed by Kelly, 1955) both for a list of descriptors important to their understanding and a list of significant 'objects' or individuals understood in these ways. A rating of these objects in terms of these descriptors can then be elicited and analyzed for similarity (both between 'objects' and between 'descriptions') and hence (potentially) categories of significant descriptors and significant objects can be developed. While such a procedure has definite drawbacks when considered from the point of view of a naturalistic nomothetic personality psychology (notably a direct lack of comparability across different individuals), it is well suited to an examination of the personal world since the objects, properties, and ratings are all expressive of the personal world of the individual being assessed, and make no demands that any object or property exist naturally outside this personal world. In addition, it is easily made numerical and therefore presents an opportunity for the deployment of numerical and statistical procedures as an aid to sight. In many ways, this makes the Repertoire Grid exemplary of idiographic methods for the analysis of constrained expressions.

Q-analysis is a more general methodology which can be adapted to the idiographic analysis of a personal world. The general technique asks an individual to sort a group of statements into a fixed number of categories each with a fixed number of members. The categories are themselves ordered along a dimension (typically 'importance' or 'significance' of the statement to the individual). The descriptive statements can either be solicited from the subject or generated by the investigator. Additionally each subject may be requested to make a single Q-sort or repeated sorts (typically by varying 'the point of view' [itself a concept of the personal world] under which the sorting is done, e.g. sort these statements so that they would be true of you as how you would ideally like to be, etc.). Analysis can proceed by scoring pre-existing categories in a manner analogous to questionnaire measurement, but more typically the relationships between multiple Q-sorts are examined by factor analytic techniques. While factor analysis can be applied to the relationships between items in a Q-sort, it is more often used to factor the relationships between viewpoints (most often different subjects) for a single set of Q-sort statements. The idiographic use of the Q-sort technique is illustrated by a factor analysis of the relationships between Q-sorts of a list of self-generated descriptors under several differing points of view for a single subject (Nunnally, 1955; cf. also Tunis, Fridhandler, & Horowitz, 1990 who appear to have 'rediscovered' the basic method in apparent ignorance of predecessors). In this way a categorization of the Q-sorts unique to a single individual can be generated. (Also in this case, the prototypical pattern of a structured idiographic analysis, a matrix consisting of 'personally significant objects' each 'rated' according to multiple 'properties' may be discerned). Another specific technique in the same family is the multidimensional scaling of repeated sortings of, or similarity ratings between, objects generated as significant by individual subjects (Sixsmith & Sixsmith, 1987) (which also conforms to the prototypical pattern)[1].

Among those methods suited to the examination of (relatively more) unrestricted expressions, Allport's list of idiographic methods included the matching technique that he had previously used in studies of expressive behavior, the search for cardinal characteristics that he employed in his case study of a set of personal documents (Allport, 1965), personal structure analysis (Baldwin, 1942), and the individualized questionnaire method (Shapiro, 1961). None of these techniques are necessarily oriented solely to the description of an individual subject's personal world and could be utilized in studies which adopt the natural attitude. Thus the matching technique simply compares the varied expressions of an individual for coherence under an interpretation (independent of the source of that interpretation), the search for cardinal characteristics lists the properties of an individual that are considered most salient, personal structure analysis examines co-occurrences within verbal material, and the individualized questionnaire repeatedly administers a questionnaire, possibly as constructed by the investigator to be particularly relevant to the particular individual under investigation.

Allport (1945) also viewed unsolicited personal documents including autobiographies as a prime resource for the idiographic analysis of personality. There have been a small number of psychological analyses of autobiographical writings oriented towards the description of personality.

For example, Baldwin (1942) examined a long series of personal letters from a single individual and isolated a set of central topics addressed and central attitudes expressed about each of these central topics. Then for each letter (actually an internal subdivision of letters proved to be necessary), the co-occurrences of attitude-topic pairs were tabulated. Finally, a (primarily subjective) analysis of co-occurrence resulted in a set of 'principal ideational clusters' by which the individual's understandings could be described. In many respects, this early analysis presents a model for all similar analyses, in particular with respect to the use of topics and attitudes as seen from the point of view of the individual as properties, and the examination of patterns of cooccurence to isolate clusters or categories. It, too, can be seen to result in a matrix organization which conforms to what has been identified as the prototypical pattern of a structured idiographic analysis.

Paige (1966) analyzed the same series of letters using a computerized content analytic scheme. In this study, a computer was programmed to recognize occurrences of a particular circumscribed content category using semantic and syntactic features. Using a subset of these content categories deemed to have 'psychological relevance' as well as an additional set added by the researcher as specific to the particular series of letters, the number of occurrences within each category was tabulated for each of the letters. Then the covariances of these occurrence scores across letters were analyzed by factor analytic methods to isolate groupings of letters that were similar to each other by virtue of containing the same or similar scores for each of the computer-rated variables. Finally, the variables that were particularly salient (either by presence or absence) for each of these groupings were isolated to form categories descriptive of the individual's personality. This study is based upon naturalistic presuppositions, however, in that the variables scored for each of the letters are part of an investigator's preexisting framework, and the presence of an occurrence of the variable is assessed using a rule-governed procedure, a procedure that could only be based upon occurrences constituted as natural. The meaning of such occurrences might, but also might not, be coherent with each other, but this would require an evaluation which attempted to fulfill the personal world.

Finally, this same series of letters was published, and the previous studies were reviewed, by Allport (1965). Allport also reported the results of having a number of judges read the letters and rate the individual's personality in terms of a large set of trait adjectives. There was substantial agreement not only in the categories of trait terms judged to be descriptive but also in the ordering of these categories in terms of centrality to the characterization. In addition, Allport requested judges to characterize the central theme of the individual's life, and again there was substantial agreement (in Allport's subjective judgement). This form of analysis may well have involved the spontaneous adoption of a personal attitude by judges. No explicit attempt was made to link the assessments made by the judges to specific and particular aspects of the text in an attempt to further specify essences of the personal world, although there was judged by Allport to be encouraging overlap between this analysis and those offered by Baldwin and Paige. Allport viewed these findings as evidence for the viability of an idiographic description of personality.

A contrasting pair of studies utilizing a single published autobiography (Wright, 1945) have also been reported by White (1947) and Hannush (1985). White utilized an explicit preexisting content analytic schema for the analysis of value-orientations and analyzed the entire text for occurrences of the specific value categories contained within this scheme. Unlike Paige who, in addition, examined the covariance of occurrences within a content analytic scheme, White presented a global interpretation of the writer's value structure based upon the frequency of the different values present within the entire text. Hannush, in contrast, adopted a phenomenological approach (based upon Giorgi, 1985) to discover specific values as these occurred within successive meaning units in the text. Hannush attempted to re-express these meaning units in terms of the meanings of the text; that is, without preconceptions about which values would or should be encountered. These re-expressed meaning units were then sorted into a global hierarchical scheme according to a subjective comparison process. While there can be little doubt that White's analysis is repeatable given the precise rules specified for the recognition of occurrences for each category, Hannush's analysis as published does not contain specifications of the essences fulfilled within the text and consequently cannot provide any assurance that even a phenomenologically sensitive researcher could repeat it. These two studies, then, attempted to derive a characterization of a single individual in terms of the values he expressed in an autobiography, and they differ in terms of whether the focus was natural and content analytic (to find evidence for the presence of values presumed to be known prior to analysis) or whether the focus was phenomenological and descriptive (to describe values as these were encountered and expressed in the individual's own understandings). Neither analysis was sensitive to the apophantic moments of the textual world, and while White's study appears more likely to be independently repeatable, it also appears as less faithful to the personal world of the author than Hannush's. The challenge in an idiographic investigation is clearly to combine the rigour characteristic of White with the faithfulness to the personal world characteristic of Hannush, at least in part, I believe, by remaining sensitive to the apophantic moments of the text as expression.

Finally, a study of a fictionalized autobiography (Wolfe, 1929) has also been reported by Rosenberg (1988, 1989). In this study, explicit trait ascriptions to characters (including the author himself at several different ages) as expressed in the text were isolated. A matrix was formed by combining the list of specific characters and the presence or absence in the text of each trait ascription to that character. (This is another example of the prototypical pattern of a constrained idiographic analysis). This matrix was numerated and analyzed by a boolean factor analysis procedure to simultaneously form groupings of characters and groupings of trait ascriptions. While this study clearly does not take advantage of the full range of the (presumed to be) personal world available from a fulfillment of the textual world, and while it does not indicate the specifics of the procedure by which differing trait ascriptions might have been posited as synonymous, it does illustrate a primarily apophantic analysis of a text (which depends almost solely upon the ability to recognize the presence of a trait ascription to a posited character in written language). In a fully realized idiographic study, the interpretation of the groupings resulting from the statistical analysis of the matrix would still need to be confronted with a fulfillment of the 'characters' of the textual world in order to complete the 'hermeneutic arc' of reading (Ricouer, 1981/1970), but the study does point to a promising and relatively unexplored dimension, the apophantic properties of the expression, in any attempt to increase the rigour and precision of phenomenologically inspired descriptions of unconstrained expressions.

It is ultimately the failure to consider the character of the expression, which in its unconstrained versions present the personal world in fullest form, that has proved restrictive to the idiographic tradition in personality description. The expression and its properties have been absent because, in a misplaced commitment to a positivistic emphasis on experimental control as the only source of reliability and rigour, it has been viewed as an inessential inconvenience rather than as the means of greatest potential access to the personal world.

Farther Psychological Horizons. It would be a distortion of tradition to imply that either the general perspective developed here or its specific application to narrative and to autobiography and the description of the individual person does not have additional horizons (beyond the idiographic description of personality) within academic and applied (particularly clinical) psychology, both past and present. In this section, some of these horizons will be pointed out and briefly discussed.

One such horizonal strand has been a recent attempt to thematize narrative as a unifying concept, a 'root metaphor' (Pepper, 1961/1942), capable of refiguring large segments of what have been traditionally separate psychological specialties (e.g. perception, cognition, language, development, personality, clinical psychology, and social psychology, to name a few of those affected) by a variety of researchers and theorists, notably Sarbin (1986) who edited a collection of original papers on this theme, and Bruner (1986, 1987, 1990), Polkinghorne (1988, 1989, 1991), and Mishler (1986a,b). Sarbin is the source of the reference to root metaphor as the role of narrative in psychology. Bruner addresses this potential for unification by positing two distinguishable general cognitive functions of the mind, deductive logic and narrative. Polkinghorne constitutes this potential as a distinctively narrative 'way of knowing'. Mishler notes that narrative is descriptive of a substantial portion of the relatively unconstrained discourse addressed towards psychological and medical clinical practitioners, and towards survey researchers[2]. This is contemporary with similar unifying attempts utilizing the concept of narrative made in other disciplines of social science which show a concern for the individual person; for example, Denzin (1989a,b) in sociology, Turner (1980) in anthropology, Watson & Watson-Franke (1985) and Bruner (1986) in ethnography, Dolby-Stahl (1985) in oral history and folklore studies, and Mink (1978) in history. And, of course, there is much continuing work in disciplines traditionally associated with narrative such as literary criticism and linguistics; as well as new perspectives contributed from recently emerging disciplines which have thematized narrative as an object of study, notably semiotics which has, as a recognizable community of interest, a group of researchers who have embraced the label 'narratology' to denote this interest (e.g. Genette, 1972/1980, 1983/1988; Chatman, 1978; Bal, 1980/1985; Prince, 1982, 1987); and artificial intelligence (e.g. Bruce, 1980; Habel, 1986; Lebowitz, 1984, 1985; Ryan, 1987, 1991). There is no shortage of interest in the unifying potential of narrative.

Notable within this widening general interest within psychology are two specific strands, one with a short history centred in cognitive science and appropriating the formalist foci of analytic philosophy of language, Anglo-American linguistics, narratology, computer science and the empiricist focus of behaviourism; and the other with a long history centred in personality and clinical psychology which appropriates the anthropocentric foci of continental philosophy (phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutics), literary criticism, aesthetics, anthropology, sociology, and history. The first strand tends to constitute narrative as a natural object, the second is more willing to include the consciousness which creates, presents, or attends to narrative within its view, that is, to constitute narrative as a cultural object or lived expression.

The first strand is unrepentantly naturalistic and representational, assuming that the fundamental natural property of human beings resides in the ability to *represent information* and *transform representations* to actualize psychological abilities. It has also been almost exclusively experimental and nomothetic, focused upon highly restricted expressions of large numbers of individuals assumed to be interchangeably identical with respect to the abilities of interest. Memory and its organization have played a central role within this strand, both as an independent focus, and as a process required by virtually all cognitive functions.

A major working concept of this cognitive focus is the concept of a memory 'schema' first introduced by Bartlett (1932). A schema is generally conceived as a representation of an integrated set of organizing principles which in turn structure the representation of varied particulate information, and constrain the manner in which this information can be retrieved and transformed. In the parlance of computing science, this might be described as a data structure, capable of storing variable information of a circumscribed type for retrieval and transformation in the solution of a circumscribed set of tasks. In the parlance of linguistics, this might also be described as a grammar, or more particularly, a set of syntactic rules governing words with a variable semantic content. Within psychology, two (overlapping) foci of empirical investigation of schemata can be distinguished. In one, the task has been to determine the rules of such putative schematic organizations within human beings, and is typically based upon descriptive analysis of exemplary information, stored and later retrieved by human volunteers (reviewed by Mandler, 1984). The focus is upon the range and flexibility of schemata required to account for human performances, and in particular predictable distortions of information based upon putatively schematic constraints. In the second focus (reviewed by Alba & Hasher, 1981), the task has been to determine the manner in which such schema are implemented within human beings and is more typically concerned with profiles of reaction time in the processing of exemplary information. In computing science and artificial intelligence (reviewed by Habel, 1986 and by Ryan, 1987), the focus has been upon generating apparently intelligible cognitive performance using computer models; and parameters of human processing (beyond those very general ones involved in a judgement of intelligibility) have, in general, been ignored.

Two particular foci have emerged in this tradition which have a particular connection to narrative. The first involves a focus upon the schematic processing (memory storage and retrieval) of simple narratives (e.g. Black & Bower 1979, 1980; Bloom 1988, Brewer & Lichtenstein 1981; Gee & Grosjean, 1984; Gee, 1986; Johnson, 1985; Lehnert, 1982; Mandler, 1984, 1987; Reiser, Black & Lehnert, 1985; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977; Thorndyke, 1977; Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980; Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1978; Wilensky, 1983). The first and most prominent model of narrative schemata has been the 'story grammar' proposed initially by Rumelhart (1975) on the formal model of transformational grammar. The second involves a focus upon the representation of frequently recurring event sequences (e.g. Abbott, Black & Smith, 1985; Barsalou & Sewell,1985; Bellezza & Bower, 1982; Bower, Black & Turner, 1979; Haberlandt, & Bingham, 1984; Harris, Lee, Hensley & Schoen, 1988, Kintsch & Mannes, 1987; Lehnert, 1980; Mandler & Murphy, 1983; Nakamura, Graesser, Zimmerman & Riha, 1985; Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Walker & Yerkovich, 1984; Yerkovich & Walker, 1986). Most prominent within this research has been the 'script' model proposed initially by Schank & Abelson (1977).

Two particular foci have also emerged in this tradition which have a particular connection to the individual person. First, schematic models have generated particular interest in the domain of autobiographical memory, the storage and retrieval of information about events in which the particular individual participated (e.g. Barsalou, 1988; Fitzgerald, 1988; Neisser, 1981, 1982, 1988; Niogro & Neisser, 1983; Reiser, Black & Abelson, 1985; Robinson, 1976; Rubin & Kozin, 1984; Schank, 1982; and the volumes edited by Neisser, 1982; Neisser & Winograd, 1988 and Rubin, 1986). Second, these representational schema have also begun to displace traits as a major naturalistic category in personality description and explanation in the form of 'self-schemata' (e.g. Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Kihlstrom, Cantor, Albright, Chew, Klein, & Niedenthal, 1988; Markus, 1983; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Markus & Wurf, 1987; see also Baumeister & Tice, 1988 for a discussion which attempts to meld these two perspectives).

Despite the focus in this tradition on narrative, there has been very limited attention given to the analysis of (relatively) unconstrained expressions for narrative structure. First, both the form and the focus of most expressions have been very highly constrained by the investigator. Second, even where narratives have been relatively unconstrained with respect to form (such as in the request to summarize a presented story), the analysis of these narratives has been restricted to a content analysis tied very closely to the theoretical presuppositions of the particular schema under study. For example, Johnson (1985) presents a coding scheme for the analysis of short summaries of simple narratives based very closely on a strongly specified story grammar. This form of analysis is therefore very strongly hypothetico-deductive rather than inductive in focus. Third, virtually no attention has been given to the viability of content scoring of longer expressions for conformance to the restricted models proposed for narratives. Thus distinctions such as those developed within the structural tradition from the study of longer narratives (such as the distinction between commentary, story, and fabula) remain relatively unexplored. One exception does occur in Niogro & Neisser (1983) where the use of focalization within expressions of early autobiographical memories is examined, specifically whether the narrative voice occupies the spatial perspective of the principal subjectivity, or whether that subjectivity is seen from an external spatial position.

Finally, even in the small number of studies in which expressions have been relatively unconstrained, these expressions are unavailable. The naturalistic perspective which is presupposed by these studies places a very high value upon reliability, on the belief (which is not unchallengeable) that reliability places an upper bound upon validity. This responsibility is frequently discharged in any study in which content analytic procedures are utilized by reporting that a trained judge was independently able to rate the expressions in the same way (plus or minus some acceptable margin of error)[3]. While this may alleviate some distress which might otherwise accompany the reading of a study which does not present the expressions (and also frequently in such cases, the content analytic schema either) and assure the reader that the content schema is communicable (though perhaps not as might unthinkingly be assumed that it is communicable without mentorship), the loss of these expressions forecloses any possibility of examining them as expressions of a personal world. It also prevents an assessment of the potency of such schema as descriptive of apophantic moments of expressions. In short, it does not contribute to an openness in which inquiry might be viewed as different in any way from its nature as presupposed by the individual researcher[4].

Consequently, despite a strong family resemblance between various conceptions of schema and what might be produced by an inductive focus upon unconstrained expressions, it will prove easier for those to whom the concepts are important to translate such inductive analyses into terms current within their own language communities, especially to the extent that the expressions themselves are available, than to judge the applicability of these concepts to the analysis of unconstrained expressions in the absence of detailed consideration and exemplification of their use in this context.

Psychoanalysis. The second major strand of psychology that is horizonal to current concerns, and which includes a focus upon the individual (and also more recently upon narrative) is found within the psychoanalytic tradition. Psychoanalysis as a movement in the analysis of culture, and as a specific mode of self-exploration, has evolved in concert with the developments of European Continental Philosophy. Evaluation and adaptation of psychoanalytic insights have constituted a persistent theme of both structural and phenomenological-hermeneutic thought, though frequently with contrasting assessments (for a review see Archard, 1984).

One of the fundamental issues of this dialogue has been the relationship between the psychoanalytic and phenomenological views of consciousness. On the surface, this may seem a somewhat unlikely development. While Freud and Husserl were contemporaries, and each developed an immense corpus which evolved over a very long period, there was almost no acknowledgment of the work of the other in these corpuses. On the one hand, Freud believed himself a natural scientist, was consistently naturalistic and explanatory, and developed psychoanalysis as a factual analysis of unconscious processes. On the other hand, Husserl was a philosopher and phenomenology focuses exclusively upon the essences of consciousness, dismissing the utility in this regard of the natural attitude of science. For their successors, however, a potential overlap appears at the point where for Freud the unconscious merges with the conscious, and where for Husserl the implicit becomes explicit; and this because, at the level of the individual personal world, psychoanalysis may initially appear to offer a natural explanation of what phenomenology seeks to describe eidetically. This is not, however, the place to review or contribute to this dialogue.

If one rejects the Unconscious (as many phenomenologists do), the challenge remains to determine whether psychoanalysis' supposed facts are facts. In this task, the personal world of the individual who is conscious is at issue, for the basis of psychoanalytic claims, at least in regard to the psychoanalytic alleviation of symptoms, is the claim of the psychoanalyst to describe the actual personal world of the individual (more accurately than they can describe it themselves, at least initially), and to provide a means to, in fact, further accurate self-reflection.

This type of understanding of psychoanalysis has emerged in recent thought and has become closely connected to the task of rendering a self-narrative or autobiography (e.g. Ricoeur, 1981; Schafer, 1980; Spence, 1982). In this version of a phenomenologically sensitive psychoanalysis, what is noted is the incompleteness and perhaps inconsistency and incoherence of the account which we render about ourselves in our life story. That is, there are aspects of ourselves and our behavior for which no account has yet, as a matter of fact, been given, and there are gaps, uncertainties, and inconsistencies in the accounts of our life experience which we do give. Psychoanalysis is an attempt to progressively and faithfully develop a more consistent and complete self account under the tutelage of a mentor who may be able to make salient at least these gaps and incoherencies. (Such gaps may become especially apparent in the accounts we render of our dreams and in free associations in which we engage). The psychoanalyst-mentor can also offer coherent and possibly accurate interpretations of similarities in actions of which we have not become reflexively aware, and which we can now come to consider (as having been motivated) in reflection. Rather than understanding the resistances that may accompany our attempts at reflection as Unconscious agencies directing our behavior without our knowledge, these resistances may be viewed as self-deceptions understood as repeated decisions to leave certain horizons in experience unexplored in reflection, including this decision itself, and consequently outside the life story we constitute (e.g. Fingarette, 1969; Polonoff, 1987).

The claim to penetrate the personal world of the individual now becomes the central theoretical and empirical problem in psychoanalysis. This returns us to the problems of empathy and interpretation. There appear to be two basic alternate accounts of the supposed efficacy of psychoanalytic procedures. The first is that psychoanalytic interpretations are paraphrases of pure lived experiences that can in fact come to be recalled and reflexively judged to be accurate. In this case, it is the retrieval of lived experience that leads to an alleviation of symptoms and provides the materials for the reconstitution of a coherent life story. The challenge is to show that such accurate paraphrases can, in fact, be obtained and shown to be accurate despite resistances to them. The second basic possibility is that psychoanalytic interpretations provide an alternative context for the constitution of a more coherent understanding of the self irrespective of its actual fidelity to pure lived experiences. In this case, the alleviation of symptoms is obtained as a result of obtaining a coherent life story. The challenge is to demonstrate that it *is* coherent, to provide justification for this form of interpretation rather than an alternative (such as, for example, a religious world-view), and perhaps then also to provide moral justification for its employment.

Perhaps the only way to begin to separate this alternative and a variety of neo-Freudian ones which retain the Unconscious is to examine the justification for the particular content of psychoanalytic interpretations in particular cases. But as has been pointed out (e.g. Spence, 1982), psychoanalysis faces a problem similar to the one facing current cognitive psychology (also in part as a result of its naturalistic heritage), in attempting to closely evaluate claims about the personal world, specifically that the expressions upon which such judgements might be made are unavailable. Psychoanalysis as a research community depends, even more completely than current cognitive psychology, upon a shared connoisseurship in the analysis of expressions. Reports of the results of this research typically present the application of this connoisseurship rather than the expressions to which the connoisseurship is applied or the procedures of this connoisseurship itself. Furthermore, the means for obtaining such connoisseurship are also restricted to a self-monitoring professional group with rigorous entry criteria. As long as this situation remains, the suspicion of all clients' accounts which is natural to psychoanalytic practice will find its natural mirror in a suspicion directed against all psychoanalytic accounts of that practice, and for similar reasons. Just as the clients decline to openly reflect upon the horizons of their experience, psychoanalysts decline to openly reflect upon the horizons of their own.

Research-oriented academic psychology of personality has been deeply influenced, directly and indirectly, by psychoanalysis, although classical psychoanalysis remains now, in fact, primarily of historical interest. This influence has been exerted in three primary directions beyond the many (early and now largely abandoned) attempts to both empirically test and extend Freud's particular account of human personality.

The first major influence was upon styles and rules of psychological interpretation. One of Freud's most enduring legacies has been to make salient (to use our terms) the possibility that human actions and human expressions present unacknowledged horizons which, when explored, may result in both a coherent and a radically unfamiliar account of life experience and life expressions[5]. This was particularly evident in the Freudian radicalization of psychological accounts of dreams (see e.g. Freud, 1962/1917). A major distinction which Freud promoted was that between the manifest and latent semantic content of a life expression. The manifest content was the interpretation, according to 'common sense', of the meaning of the expression which acknowledges an incompleteness and incoherence but accepts these as characteristic of the nature of the processes underlying the creation of these expressions. The latent content, however, was the reconstructed 'causally efficacious' Unconscious contents of the expression. The relationship between these forms of content was also posited as causal, and involved the transformation of the (coherent) latent content into the (incoherent) manifest content. Freud posited two major transformational processes: condensation and displacement. In condensation, a large number of latent contents are coalesced into a single manifest element; while in displacement, a latent content is substituted in the manifest content by an element remotely associated to it, or an important element of latent content is transformed into an apparently unimportant element in manifest content.

(It should be noted that both of these processes, as specified by Freud, posit multirealizable relationships between latent and manifest content which cannot be further specified because of the unavailability of the latent content. Any validation of these processes in general or further specification of them in a particular case then depends upon an independent validation of the posited latent content. This content is posited, in the first place however, as but a coherent possibility given the particular manifest content, its place in the accumulated life expressions, interpretations, and consequent reflections of the particular individual, the general accumulated knowledge of past cases, and the (admittedly minimal) constraints placed upon the process by these posited processes. For Freud, the validating evidence of an interpretation comes from the (eventual) reflective insight of a patient (to the 'accuracy' of an accumulated series of such interpretations), and a subsequent alleviation of symptoms, and from the general coherence and efficaciousness of accounts based upon such interpretations in the past. For a natural causal account based upon a realist analytic attitude, this reasoning poses enormous difficulties since it provides few opportunities to experimentally test independent propositions separately. On the other hand, once it has been seriously proposed, its apparent coherence as a possible account makes it difficult to unequivocally reject.)

Of particular interest to the understanding of autobiographical accounts are Freud's analyses of 'screen memories' of the events of early childhood (e.g. Freud, 1962/1899) in which it was proposed that such memories are also subject to these same processes and consequently to a psychoanalytic (re)interpretation. Kris (1956) extends this analysis to regard the full account of life experiences, particularly of the years before adolescence, as a manifest narratively structured 'personal myth' forged from underlying latent contents.

The style and flexibility of psychoanalytic interpretation has also been prominent in a form of psychological assessment which makes use of the 'projective hypothesis'. In our preferred terms, the projective hypothesis proposes that an individual's freely chosen expressions in response to particular ambiguous stimuli will reflect the most general themes of their personal world, even though these general themes will, in general, be horizonal to the direct (common sense) understanding of the expression. Typically, then, these horizons will be available only in the examination of an extended set of such responses. The two most widely utilized of tests built to explore the projective hypothesis, the Rorschach Ink Blots (reviewed by Aronow & Reznikoff, 1983) and the Thematic Apperception Test (reviewed by Ryan, 1985), have been among the most intensively researched assessment devices ever created, although the amount of academic research involving them has steadily declined in the last three decades.

Clearly, as an assessment device, these tests are subject to the basic forms of interpretive stance which were proposed above in relation to trait assessment, and while it may well be that in a clinical context these tests are used idiographically (in our extended sense which aims specifically at the personal world), once again, however, the actual expressions collected in assessments using these devices have rarely been presented for examination and critique by others. Consequently, the formal properties of the expressions themselves remain unexamined. Instead, the primary validation strategy has relied upon the construction of a content categorization, the development of rules for relating the content of expressions to this categorization, and the subsequent nomothetic validation of the categorization. It may be that an apparent initial arbitrariness in the formation of such content categorizations in the eyes of a psychology relying on the natural analytic attitude is responsible for the progressive decline in research interest in the projective hypothesis.

A rare exception which does examine the specifically narrative properties of responses to the Thematic Apperception Test is presented as a scoring procedure by Arnold (1962). In addition, two contemporary examples of use of the projective hypothesis in the interpretation of freely reported memories also stand out because they present specific illustrative expressions as well as the reasoning by which interpretations are developed. The first is an application of a well developed theory of personality dynamics developed as an alternative to Freud's account (Tomkins, 1987) by Carlson (1981) in which aspects of a particular expression of an early memory are related to a clinical case history. The second is a thematic analysis of series of important memories by Bruhn (1992; see also Bruhn & Bellow, 1987).

The second major influence of psychoanalysis on psychology has been the development of a research tradition which focuses on the psychological interpretation of whole lives. The first 'psychobiography' was Freud's speculative account of the life of Leonardo da Vinci (Freud, 1963/1910) based upon the applications of psychoanalytic theory to the life expressions of the medieval artist. A detailed analysis of the concept of psychobiography and its place in contemporary personality by Runyan (1984) may well mark a re-emergence of this tradition (see for example the volumes of papers edited by McAdams & Ochberg, 1988 & Rabin, Zucker, Emmons, & Frank, 1990). This tradition, while examining self-referent expressions where available, has generally adopted what we might characterize as a form of the 'autobiographical pact' to all of the expressions of a particular individual, regarding them all as manifestations of psychological properties. In addition, this tradition has also demonstrated a sophisticated interest in the epistemological grounds of narratives offered by researchers as, or in lieu of, explanations (Sherwood, 1969; Farrell, 1964/1962, 1963; and especially Runyan, 1984, Ch. 2).

At this point, this brief consideration of the horizons of a psychology of the personal attitude is concluded. I believe that it is characteristic of an approach to experience which views it as holistic that horizons of this type will endlessly loom in the horizon, begging for exploration. Rather than continuing to adopt as my expository style an analogue of Freud's method of free association which treats these horizons directly and as they become available, I feel constrained to return to the central perspective in what amounts rather to an analogue of Jung's active imagination.

All of the inquiry that has been characterized in these last sections is horizonal rather than central to the perspective which has been developed in this and previous chapters. This is, I believe, a mark of the unfamiliarity of, and resistance to, the personal attitude, and its underlying phenomenological focus on meaning seen as holistic rather than atomistic. As a result, the reconstitution of the personal world of an individual as a necessary step in any characterization or subsequent explanation of them as fully human is a step that has never found an accepted place in psychology *as a science*. It is also the incompleteness of this step which suggests that the appropriation of these horizons into a psychology of the personal attitude is premature, and that the explanation of these horizons awaits the demonstration that such a task is not itself misguided and futile. I rather end now with a brief preview of the empirical portion of the current thesis.

Preview. The following are, in broadest terms, the goals for the specific research which, in following, will constitute the 'empirical' portion of this thesis, the attempt to realize the perspective.

First, this research will illustrate a manner of restoring the existing tradition of idiographic personality description to a place within the human sciences in the tradition of Dilthey as informed by Husserl. To accomplish this goal, it will add an additional text to the small corpus of existing personal texts on which personality research has been performed; it will extend existing forms of analysis of this corpus to include linguistic analysis of personal texts and thematic analyses of personal convictions; and it will struggle to avoid the dogmatic posture of the positivistic sciences in failing to assert that the meaning (let alone the significance) of the text has been exhausted in its analysis.

Consequently, I hope that it may contribute to restoring the text to a primary role in research involving the personality of the other; and that it may present a continuing challenge to understanding - perhaps inspiring others to follow the precedent established by that small group of researchers in the human sciences who now perpetually return to the same text (as one example, Agar 1980, 1986, Agar & Hobbes, 1982, 1985). It will at least remain a continuing challenge to me just as Jenny's letters remained a continuing challenge to Allport (1965).

Second, this research will explore the consequences of seeing the connected set of life expressions reflective of a personal world as a story, of seeing personal worlds as narratively constituted. This typification establishes a metaphorical relation, two terms of a dialectic, the continuing explication of which can potentially generate new meaning and contribute both to an enhanced understanding of narrative and to an enhanced understanding of the life world of the individual. It extends this typification to the psychological process of remembering by explicating a vision of individual significant memories as individual moments in a life narrative.

Finally, it will seek to express an emerging understanding of a particularly precious individual, my dearest friend R.

Notes

1 There are also unexplored directions within the analysis of restricted expressions which might be made salient by including an additional dimension of variation within the procedures. For example, a three dimensional matrix may be formed by repeating an object by property rating task (such as the Repertoire Grid procedure) from a number of distinct 'viewpoints' (as within the Q-sort technique).

2 I have not yet discovered anyone in psychology who has heralded narrative as a 'paradigm shift' referring (loosely) to Kuhn (1962). Perhaps this signals the beginning of the end of the almost daily scientific revolutions in psychology.

3 What does it say of psychological science that it prefers to hear that another *has* seen the same thing as the investigator has seen, rather than to be given the opportunity to come to see *for itself* the same thing as the investigator has seen, based upon a full disclosure of the seen and the basis of seeing? What does it say about responsibility when it becomes my responsibility to show that another can also be *made* to see rather than to present others with the opportunity to see for themselves?

4 Perhaps most distressing of all, this contributes to the early obsolescence of psychological 'literature' to the extent that further work within the same domain using the same techniques now depends on the longevity of the 'living' tradition of the research. One example of this is the content analytic schema developed by White (1947) which was never independently published, and though praised in a prominent text on research methods, is generally unavailable.

5 In academia, more recent attention has been given to psychoanalysis in literary and aesthetic criticism, than in psychology proper (for a review see Wright (1984)), at least in part as a result of structural reinterpretations and extensions of Freud (e.g. Lacan, 1977/1966).

CHAPTER V

CREATING A CONTEXT

For Dilthey whose academic affiliations were to history and literary studies, expressions of lived experience which have already been constituted as objects by their authors represent the traditional starting point for an analysis for understanding by the human sciences. While this has remained true in the small corpus of personal documents that have been studied within the psychology of personality, it is not a requirement of the human sciences. However, special problems arise in understanding when life expressions are directly solicited rather than analyzed as previously given. In this case, expressions may reasonably be considered to reflect the investigator's experience as well as the author's, or may be considered a special product of a dialogue between the two, potentially with unique emergent properties.

'Experiments' in Human Science. When a set of life expressions are solicited by an investigator, this solicitation will always impose restrictions on the author. As previously discussed, these will range along two major dimensions: focus and form. A restriction of focus is a restriction placed upon the content of the author's expression by the investigator, typically by asking a particular question. Because this question will reflect the investigator's intention in its own meaning, and the author will attempt to address this meaning in his expression, the investigator's intention will be reflected in some manner by the author's expression, possibly by distorting its relationship to the author's personal world. A restriction of form is a restriction placed upon the structure of the expression or on the conditions under which it is produced and will consequently constrain the author who may be unable to adequately express his or her meanings fully. Personality assessment by questionnaire is an example of the maximal restriction of both focus and form of the author's life expressions by the investigator. Here, the author is required to answer just a certain set of questions in just a certain manner, often by indicating one of a binary set of responses (typically yes or no), and often within an established time limit. At the other extreme, the decision to produce a work of art (which might subsequently become available for interpretation) would reflect no restriction of the author by the investigator, whatever the reasons that the author might have had for producing the work or whatever restrictions of other kinds he or she might have felt were present.

There are two dangers for a human science in restricting the production of a life expression. First, the restrictions may not allow sufficient scope for the full expression of meaning by the author, or may distort that meaning. An opportunity is lost. Second, the restrictions may be falsely supposed by the investigator to prestructure not only the meaning of the particular expression, but also the significance of that expression. This may result in an interpretation what is uncorrectably misleading, particularly if either the text or the context of its solicitation are not retained.

This viewpoint suggests that the following principles be recognized in performing a human science experiment. First, every effort should be made to minimize the restrictions placed upon the participant in order that a maximal freedom of expression is provided. Second, the participant's life expressions should be recognized as pivotal, and retained and presented as central to the experimental record. Third, such constraints as are unavoidable should be carefully detailed and should also form part of the record of the experiment. This is the context which would be required for another investigator to continue interpretive work on the participant's expressions. These three principles in turn emphasize that a human science experiment requires as much attention to design as an experiment in the natural sciences where a context must be established within which natural objects are manipulated and subsequently observed.

One aspect of minimizing restrictions which must not be overlooked is the activity of the investigator during the experiment. In a natural science experiment, the objects manipulated by the investigator typically do not have a point of view formed by interacting with the investigator which can influence the experiment's outcome. Even in a psychology, naturalistically conceived, where processes under investigation may be considered independent of any causal influence of point of view (e.g. 'functionally autonomous' (Pylyshyn, 1984)), the investigator is dependent upon an experiential context in which the participant's point of view is central (in agreeing to participate, attempting to follow instructions, etc.). This broader human context is also the source of the ethical considerations and established codes of conduct for research involving human subjects in a natural science context which have become increasingly refined since the Nuremburg Code (1949, reprinted in Schuler, 1982). It seems clear that psychological experimentation in the style of the natural sciences is derivative from already present understandings of the norms of interaction in the social world.

These norms must form a natural part of the context for the interaction between investigator and participant in a human science. In brief, the participant must be considered to be a co-investigator and accorded to the extent possible all of the rights and privileges that naturally accrue to the investigator, most especially those naturally due to any person in an interaction with peers. These would surely include, in the ideal case, sincerity, candour, and naturalness of manner (or in Carl Rogers' (1961) terms: genuineness, warmth, and empathy).

One of the difficulties in conducting a human science experiment may be to insure that this point of view on the basic context is shared by the participant, since in most cases it will be crucial that the participant's expressions are genuine reflections of his lived experiences and not conscious deceptions which attempt to establish a personal world not actually experienced.

While the second principle of a human science experiment, that the life expressions of the participant become an integral part of the experimental record, may appear obvious in the current context; the repeated failure to observe it has recently been a major focus of criticism in the study of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (Spence, 1982). (For distinguished exceptions see for example Farrell, 1962/1964; Labov and Fanshel, 1977; Rogers, 1951; and a recent review by Wiedemann, 1986). It is not just that connoisseurship may be or might have been required in order to see what was seen and reported by the original investigator, or that the original investigator may have been in error; it is also that the presuppositions of the investigator might have blinded him or her to other aspects of the 'text' potentially available for in-sight (see for example Wild, Kuiken, & Schopflocher, 1990). Scholarship in the human sciences depends upon the ability to re-view the text.

The third principle of a human science experiment suggests not only that a record be maintained of the interaction which actually occurred in producing the record of the participant's expressions, but also that the investigator detail his or her rationale for structuring the interaction in that manner. It is only in this record that the context immediately surrounding the participant's expressions can be retrieved, and its effect on the expressions evaluated. The statement of the investigator's rationale should include a description of the restrictions applied to the participant, and the reasons for these restrictions. This principle has also been proposed as part of an improved investigation of psychoanalysis as an accompaniment to retaining the text (Spence, 1982). If re-view is the fundamental operation of the human sciences, re-vision may only be possible if the original outlook can be re-established.

While it has only been in the past half century that technology has made available the means to faithfully record extended oral discourses, and while it remains true that the transcription of an oral record is time-consuming and theory-laden; the potential does now exist to create an experimental human science that extends beyond the traditional boundaries established by Dilthey.

Experimental Design. The dominant themes active for me in designing this experiment were: first, the methodology of protocol analysis characteristic of phenomenological psychology (Giorgi, 1985) (in which multiple protocols of written discourse are separately and jointly analyzed in order to explore the essence of a type of experience potentially reflected in these protocols); and its adaptation for use in a numerical procedure (Kuiken, Schopflocher, & Wild, 1989; Schopflocher, 1981); second, the potential application of these techniques to the idiographic description of personality and uniqueness as advocated by Gordon Allport; third, the presupposition that a general matrix structure could be utilized as a model for such an analysis wherein individual units of experience can be distinguished and the properties of these experiences can also distinguished for subsequent evaluation of presence and absence across all units; fourth, the concept of a narrative structure of experience, reflected particularly in self-reflection and in autobiography; and fifth, the potential relationship between significant individual memories and this overall narrative structure, including especially the possibility that these individual memories are themselves narratively structured[1]. The current research can thus be viewed as an exploration of the breadth and fertility of these themes for a psychology of personality.

In line with these themes, the basic form of the experiment was established as the elicitation, recording, and transcription of a large number of personal memories from a single individual and their subsequent analysis for narrative structure and for eidetic structures of experience which might represent idiographic personality traits.

Part of the solution to the challenge of minimizing restrictions upon the participant while maintaining a focus upon discrete memories and upon the completeness of report, and simultaneously part of the solution to the potential problem of sincerity of report was to invoke the participant's understanding of autobiographical genre in requesting reports of his memories. A simple example of this type of request would be: "Please consider and report episodes in your life that you would wish to put in your autobiography." This question relies strongly upon participant's understanding of the nature of autobiography to structure his responses. Some of the implications of this understanding are: first, autobiography is (in part) a literary genre and should invoke a set to respond in a considered manner and second, autobiography implies truth and honesty and hence should invoke the autobiographical pact, including especially regulation by the concept of sincerity. This form of elicitation of autobiography has the further advantage that since autobiography is generally understood to relate primarily the episodes that have had a significant impact upon the autobiographer's life as he or she understands it, the process of self-reflection required to determine which memories are significant and in what way they are significant should be primed. Finally, since autobiography is generally understood to be "the story of my life" this type of instruction should lead to a tendency to structure the chosen episodes into narrative form.

Instructions. Detailed scripts for the first two sessions, which represent a refinement of these considerations were prepared and were subsequently read to the participant in two meetings, one of which included the recording of memories. As referred to in these scripts, an Informed Consent form was also prepared and signed by the participants. The scripts follow. (The second paragraph refers to additional tasks which will be discussed in detail in Chapter X).

Session 1

The investigation that I am conducting consists of two main parts and would stretch across a number of sessions. In the first part of the investigation, I would ask you to report, for recording and subsequent transcription and analysis, memories of your life which you might wish to include in your autobiography. I anticipate that this might take between two and four sessions of up to two hours each.

In one or two subsequent sessions I would ask you to provide some general descriptions of yourself and utilize these descriptions in rating tasks involving the memories which you previously recounted. A final rating task would also ask you to rate other people who are significant to you although I would not request that you identify them specifically to me. I will describe this part of the investigation in greater detail at a later time if you decide to participate.

Right now I would like to describe in somewhat more detail what I would be requesting you to do in reporting memories of your life that you might include in your autobiography. First, I would be requesting between 25 and 50 such memories. Second, I would be requesting that you consider memories of times, occurrences or events which are self-contained rather than memories of events or sequences of events which occurred over an extended period of time. Third, I would be requesting that you reflect upon these memories in an attempt to bring them into full and vivid detail prior to reporting them. Fourth, I would be requesting that you consider, prior to reporting them, the significance that these memories have had for you and have for you now and as well the significance that they have had in your personal development. Finally, I would be requesting that you give some consideration to how you would report these memories prior to doing so, although I would not of course be expecting that you report them in a form suitable for an actual autobiography.

I realize that I would be asking you to perform a task that might become particularly involving and possibly even emotionally distressing. I want to emphasize that if you choose to participate in this investigation you would be free to withdraw from it at any time and for any reason, no questions asked; and that any information you provide will be destroyed, at any time at your request.

I also realize that your important memories might be very personal. I want to emphasize that the memories that you might choose to relate to me and the manner in which you might choose to relate them would be *strictly your own choice*. The main and important criteria which is of importance to this investigation is that any memory you choose to relate would be one that you would include if you were to write your own autobiography.

Finally I want you to be aware that, in the report of this investigation, I will want to include transcriptions of what you recount in order that the research be fully understood. Before I would do that, however, I would make sure of the following: first, that all information that might identify you specifically is removed or altered; second, that you reviewed all such transcripts and approved their publication; and third, that you could make the decision as to whether any or all such transcripts were to be included.

Until you had given me that permission, I would take steps to insure that the information that you provide is kept confidential. Only I and my immediate supervisor would have access to this information, and neither of us would discuss it outside the context of the investigation.

Finally, I would ask that you contact me at any time with questions related to your participation. Do you have any questions at this time?

[Questions answered].

Now I am going to ask you if you are willing to participate, and whether if you are, you might read and sign this form which will record what I have told you about this investigation. Are you willing to participate?

[Answer noted, Consent Form signed].

Thank you very much.

Now I want to ask you if we can set up a series of meetings of about 2 hours apiece starting in about a week during which you can relate to me those memories which you might record in your autobiography.

[Meeting times established].

OK, now between now and then I would like you to reflect in some detail upon your life in order to choose the memories that you wish to report to me and that you would wish to record if you were to write your autobiography. Please remember that I want you to consider these in vivid and complete detail and that I want you to give specific consideration to their significance to you. Consider as well how you might choose to report them, although in this I want you to feel under no particular constraints. That is, the specifics of what you choose to report is entirely up to you, you can choose to present complete detail or only sketchy detail, you can choose to discuss why a memory is important, or you can choose not to do so.

Since I am requesting at least 25 such memories, you may choose to use a memory aid such as pencil and paper to organize which memories you want to report (and in what order for that matter), but please do not attempt to actually write your autobiography.

Do you have any questions?

[Questions answered].

Session 2

The last time we met I described the nature of the investigation to you and asked you for your participation.

I want to remind you of what we discussed at that time. First, I asked you to consider memories of your life that you might wish to include in your autobiography. I stressed that the choice of which memories to include was entirely up to you, and that you could choose to report or not report any such memories. I also stressed that you could choose not to continue at any time.

Are you still willing to participate?

[Answer noted].

Let's review again the details of the first task. First, I requested that you report between 25 and 50 such memories. Second, I requested that you consider memories of times, occurrences or events which are self-contained rather than memories of events or sequences of events which occurred over an extended period of time. Third, I requested that you reflect upon these memories to bring them into full and vivid detail and to reflect on the significance that these memories had for you and have for you now. Finally, I requested that you give some general consideration to how you would report these memories.

Have you been able to do this?

[Answer noted].

Are you ready to begin ?

[Answer noted].

[Recording of memories begins].

Procedure. From the beginning of the design of the experiment, I had a particular individual in mind as a potential participant, a very close friend of almost twenty years, named (from here forward) R whom, it should also be noted, I have always had some difficulty in fully understanding. The disadvantages of choosing R include the very large shared history which would always be implicit in the reporting of the memories and in the subsequent analyses. The advantage was that because of this long history of friendship, I could be confident that R would be sincere, if he agreed to participate; and I could also be confident that an appropriately sincere relationship could be maintained during the process. R agreed to participate.

I have rejected the option of producing an autobiographical document myself to present my knowledge of R and of our friendship, although it has seemed at various times attractive. Instead, I have attempted in the analyses of R's text to avoid the use of special knowledge not also available to the reader.

All meetings took place in my home, and the actual generation and recording of memories by R were intentionally framed by informality: I offered R refreshment periodically, we chatted as close friends do both before and after the recording of memories; in short, R was treated as he always has been in my home, both as a guest and as a member of the family. During the actual recording of memories, I endeavoured to restrict my role to listener- observer, neither conversing nor prompting R in any way beyond that required to maintain an environment conducive to the task (e.g. answering any direct requests such as 'May I have a glass of water?' etc.); that is, I attempted to serve as proxy for the audience that might have been intended were R to have actually created an autobiography.

I intentionally gave control of the small tape recorder to R and through the two meetings in which memories were recorded, he increasingly came to shut it off after he judged that a particular recounting was adequately concluded. Initially, there was silence while he collected his thoughts. I had the strong impression that he regarded the recorder as an unseen audience, and his recountings as, to some extent at least, performances. Occasionally, he seemed also to be searching his memory and might exclaim something like 'Oh yah' before turning on the recorder. It seems apparent that he did not act upon the suggestion to organize his memories by listing reminders on paper, although he did offer three 'short titles' at the conclusion of the first meeting with the instruction to remind him of these at the beginning of the next. At the conclusion of the second session he also expressed surprise at how difficult the task had been, because he had initially believed that he would keep me recording for 'weeks'. During the second session during the times when he shut down the recorder, he would occasionally initiate an informal discussion of issues of mutual interest (frequently about bridge which is a hobby we share, equally frequently about hockey and his recent endeavours to beat SportSelect, a new lottery in which scores to sporting events have to be accurately predicted) to which I would respond in kind. Whenever I queried him as to whether he might like to postpone further recordings, he assured me of his desire to continue, and small talk would continue until he again initiated recording.

R spontaneously concluded the first meeting by announcing that he was tired, and spontaneously concluded the second session with a 'summary statement' for the recorder and a separate one for me: 'Well, there you have it. Anything else I might say wouldn't be of much interest'. Because a business obligation took R out of the city, the two meetings in which memories were recorded were separated by ten days. (Two further meetings, discussed in Chapter X, occurred a further fifteen days later, separated by three days.)

Notes

1 Many of these themes have been developed in greater detail earlier in this thesis, but it should be noted that at the time of the design of this experiment most of that development remained horizonal.

CHAPTER VI

FROM ORAL TO WRITTEN

In the human sciences and in phenomenological psychology, experiences to be analyzed have generally been taken as already given, or have been solicited from participants, in textual form. As well, texts from many different individuals have generally been compared to each other (e.g. Giorgi, 1985; Kuiken, Schopflocher, Wild, 1989). As a result, this research can be described as a comparison of experiences, where each experience is instantiated in a single text. Thus the entire text from a single individual has constituted a basic unit of analysis. Any further division of the text into units of meaning has been seen as the first part of an analysis that seeks to isolate properties which could be present in any or all of the separate experiences.

The current case differs in two ways. First, the text is not yet given in a form amenable to the analyses typical of phenomenological psychology. Transcription is required to produce a written text. Second, the experiences which will be analyzed and compared were produced by a single individual and have not been directly separated from each other. While instructions might have requested that R mark the divisions between particular memories (as realized as units of speech), such instructions were not given in the interests of maintaining flow and focus within the discourse. Consequently the units which will form a basis for further analysis must be isolated from a (relatively) continuous discourse. The activity of producing text and indicating units, however analytic it can be considered, is viewed as a separate phase of the research: constituting the text for presentation and for analysis.

Background. Giorgi (1985) develops a detailed methodology for the phenomenological analysis of experience as reported in language by its experiencers. The method consists of the following general steps. First, the investigator solicits a description of a particular type of experience from a subject. Second, the investigator reads an entire description of experience provided by that subject in order to get a general sense of the whole (the situation in which particular objects of consciousness were embedded). Third, the investigator rereads the description with the specific goal of discriminating specific units of meaning within it. Fourth, the investigator reviews each such meaning unit in order to re-express more directly the essence of the lived experience that it expresses (using imaginative free variation). Fifth, the investigator synthesizes the meaning units into a consistent statement of the structure of meaning of the full experience. This step can attempt to synthesize the meaning units from a single description offered by a single experiencer or may attempt to synthesize the meaning units from multiple descriptions as offered by multiple experiencers. In the latter case, the synthesis may be considered the essential structure of the experience considered as a type.

The third step in this procedure is critical. It has generally been assumed that the textual units isolated for analysis are composed of strings of meaning units. While grammatical criteria have almost surely been implicitly used for the division of text into meaning units as the first stage of analysis, investigators have justified this parsing as an act of judgement or connoisseurship without further explication. Thus Giorgi (1985) counsels:

> Since it is a psychological analysis... it seems logical that the units should be made with psychological criteria in mind. Thus, the meaning units that emerge as a consequence of the analysis are *spontaneously perceived discriminations* within the subject's description arrived at when the researcher assumes a psychological attitude toward the concrete description... (1985, p.11, *Italics added*).

No guidelines are provided about the specific character of what is indistinctly here intended as a unit (or as a psychological attitude).

In previous research which also employed tape-recorded responses (Schopflocher, 1981; Wild, 1987; Kuiken, Schopflocher, Wild, 1989), this same general attitude was adopted. Individual words were assembled into meaning units which generally appeared as extended clauses or sentences. Because of the nature of the productions analyzed (reactions in speech to a work of art to a maximum duration of four minutes), no units of an intermediate order between sentences and the full response, or of an order between the level of sentence or clause and individual word, were expected or explicitly noted (although they were at times felt to be present).

Several observations contributed to an awareness that this transcription process is overly naive. These included especially that 'sentence' isolation did not always reflect the pause structure of speech, and that oral 'sentences' were not always grammatical in the sense typically present within written discourse. This was not then considered a fatal flaw. With an increased exposure to the hermeneutic tradition and its emphasis upon 'grammatical interpretation', it did, however, lead to an active exploration of linguistic discourse analysis (e.g. Brown & Yule, 1983)[1].

My practical apprenticeship in linguistic discourse analysis began with transcription exercises under the instruction to 'transcribe this discourse *exactly* as it was presented'. This alerted me to pauses, corrections, intonational contours, and other phonetic forms of emphasis in oral speech by 'hearing through/ behind' the meaning of the utterances[2]. It also introduced me to the differences between written and oral discourse and the arbitrariness with which the existing conventions of punctuation for written discourse are typically employed in transcribing oral speech (e.g. Tannen, 1981, 1982). Finally, it made apparent to me the need for specialized transcription conventions, and to the impossibility of accurately incorporating all aspects of potential interest or importance available in an oral discourse into a written transcription (e.g. Ochs, 1979).

During this apprenticeship, I also learned of the discourse theory of Wallace Chafe (1980, 1982, 1986; Gee, 1991) which introduced the concept of a subsentential structural unit of oral speech set off by pause structures and generally marked by a single intonation contour. Chafe believes that such 'idea units' correspond to information 'chunks' as processed by short term working memory in the production of speech. In further transcription exercises, I attempted to constitute such idea units.

In addition, I learned of the theory of personal narrative in oral discourse developed by William Labov (1972, 1982, Labov & Waletsky, 1967). This model of the personal narrative as the unit by which narrative is presented in oral discourse agreed with a basic expectation with which this research began; that is, that individual memories would be distinct units, narrative in nature, the sum of which would be jointly exhaustive of the discourse. According to Labov, a narrative is a 'method of recapitulating experience by matching a verbal sequences of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred' (Labov, 1972, p. 360). For Labov, the basic structural character of narrative is presented in a sequence of two clauses whose order of presentation cannot be changed without disturbing the temporal ordering of the events of the narrative, and consequently distorting the narrative as fulfilled. The skeleton of a narrative then consists of the full set of clauses in an oral discourse for which such a definite temporal order must be maintained in fulfillment. The narrative may also contain free clauses, whose place of presentation is either completely immaterial, or immaterial within a restricted range of narrative clauses, to the fulfillment of the temporal sequencing of the events of the narrative. According to Labov, in a fully formed narrative, both free and narrative clauses are themselves organized into structural units.

A fully-formed oral narrative could have as many as six separate structural parts (though not necessarily as pieces). In canonical order these are:

abstract,	an optional set of free clauses which provide a summary or synopsis of the action of the narrative;
orientation,	which establishes the setting for the events of the narrative, introduces its participants, and may be presented within the initial narrative clauses or within a set of free clauses;
complicating action,	which establishes the initial events in the narrative action through narrative clauses;
evaluation,	an optional set of free clauses which may be distributed through the entire narrative, or which may be inserted as a single section within the narrative, typically after the complicating action, to establish the point of the narrative, the reason that the author believes it to warrant recounting;
resolution,	the narrative clauses which conclude the events of the narrative; and
coda,	an optional set of free clauses found at the end of the narrative which indicate that further events are irrelevant to the point of the telling, and which function to reorient the listener to the present time and place.

Labov analyzes linguistic properties characteristic of each of these parts of a personal narrative by which they might be identified, and presents examples of both fully-formed and skeletal personal narratives.

Several limitations of this model should be noted (for a further review see Robinson, 1981; Bennett, 1986). First, the model may provide an inaccurate structural description. Polanyi (1989), for example, challenges the conception of evaluation as a separate piece of the personal narrative, and reconceptualizes it as a functional moment of every personal narrative, fulfilled by subclausal features potentially present in every clause. Evaluation is therefore present at every point and serves to establish accent and emphasis and thereby to support the author's contention in telling it that the story warrants telling, or has 'tellability'. Second, there may also be oral narratives which do not fully conform to the structure postulated by Labov. For example, while Labov does not deny the possibility that oral discourses might contain complex multiple chainings of events (e.g. 'Meanwhile in another place...') and embedded narratives (see e.g. Ryan, 1986, 1987b), he concentrates exclusively upon the simple personal narrative in which a single chain of events is sequentially narrated. Polanyi (1982) also notes that complex literary tropes not encompassed by Labov's guiding idea of a strict sequential unfolding are also often apparent within narratives in oral discourse. These include non-sequential temporal unfoldings (flashback and foreshadowing) as well as changes in point of view. Also excluded from consideration are generalized (or iterative (Genette, 1972)) 'narratives' in which a set of events are intended in their typicality, as having occurred in the same sequence repeatedly (e.g. 'Each day I a, then b, then c ...'). Third, the relationships between personal narratives and other units of oral discourse have not been explored. It is unclear whether some or all of the pieces which Labov isolates are exclusive to personal narratives, or whether they may also combine to form non-narrative units. Finally, the relationships between multiple personal narratives contained within a single discourse have not been examined. Despite these limitations, the concept of a personal narrative conforms generally to a higher level grammatical unit of discourse which was expected to present a single concrete memory (as solicited, in this case, from R).

Finally, and with special relevance to the final limitation of Labov's model, I became aware that structural analyses have proposed that narratives are hierarchically and recursively structured (see e.g. Pavel, 1985; Prince, 1982; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977). Thus the minimal basic narrative (technically an episode) is a formal structuring of a sequence of intended events (perhaps of differing types), each (typically) expressed in a separate clause or sentence. But each such clause or sentence can itself be replaced by an episode or embedded basic narrative, or alternatively, each such episode can become embedded as a component of a larger narrative. It is this property of hierarchical nesting which can, in part, lead to a complex narrative. Extending this view, a life story might be viewed, at least initially, as the narrative unfolding of a subjectivity and its world in which all apparently separable narrative units have been embedded as episodes. This presents the narrative episode, perhaps as expressed in a single personal narrative, as a basic unit of analysis of that subjectivity and its world, and recursion as the basic means of combining units into higher level units[3].

This knowledge and experience forms the background against which the transcription/unitization for this research began. The initial model of discourse as a sequence of meaning units had been augmented to incorporate a nested hierarchical structuring of meaning elements. The goal was to isolate narrative units ('personal narratives' as corresponding to discrete individual memories), to separate within each of these higher order units a set of clauses marked by intonational and pause structure (corresponding to sentences of written discourse, though with relaxed grammatical criteria), and to separate within each of these clauses, a set of idea units.

Procedure. The actual transcription proceeded by repeated close listening. The transcription conventions of Ochs (1979) were adopted and revised where it was felt to be necessary (see below).

In general, transcription proceeded from the separation of lower order units to the separation of higher order units, except that the division into broad narrative units occurred early in transcription. In general, the division of the transcript into such units proved relatively easy because they were usually marked by very long pauses or by interruptions in the tape due to participant-controlled stops. In addition, units were also generally marked by structures readily identifiable as abstracts and codas. The isolation of idea units based upon intonational contour and pause structure and, as a result, the general division into clauses also proved to be generally unproblematic.

Over the many hours of listening, however, I became increasingly aware of what I could then only characterize as a 'poetic' quality in R's speech that I had been unable to understand or capture in the transcriptions using the elements then part of my stock of knowledge. At this time I was fortunate to read the research of Gee (1986, 1989a,b,c) and ultimately Gee (1991) and through that the previous research of Hymes (1981) which introduced the concept of a general verse structure (or in Gee's terms stanza structure) in oral speech with analogies to the verse structures found within oral songs and written poetry.

The naive conception of the general features of verses in poetry are that they have a uniform metrical structure which repeats and that each verse is semantically unified around a single theme or topic. Armed solely with this conception, then, Hymes argues that repeated examination of the text should reveal such a structure if, and to the extent that, it exists.

A description of the process of forming such a unitization of verse structure in transcription is nicely captured by Hymes:

> The interplay of the various features can be assessed only provisionally as one proceeds to come to grips with the text. The mutual structuring of the several levels of organization is found only through a painstaking process of approximation and testing... In particular, the regularity of the grouping of verses into stanzas... did not come about mechanically. The initial segmentation of the text did not show all of these groupings. Some of them came to light only in late stages of the work... In short, a satisfactory solution emerges only after several tries. One plunges *in media res*, making a trial segmentation by hand, and reconsiders and adjusts it in light of the principles of consistent structure and form-meaning covariation. As one gets more deeply into the text, one gains a

> deeper sense of inner logic and form, its particular integration of content and expression, and one's sense of inconsistency or arbitrariness of analysis grows finer (Hymes, 1976/1981, p. 150-151).

This process is, therefore, consistent with the general description of hermeneutic procedure provided by Dilthey.

If such a verse structure emerges, then according to Hymes, the course of the work should also have made apparent the features of language (phonetic, syntactic, and semantic) which internally constitute verses and which 'mark' transitions between verses. Hymes' research which was based upon an existing transcript of an American Indian narrative collected in the early part of the century presents a revised transcription which makes such a verse structure salient. He proceeds to analyze in great depth additional language features in these transcriptions which correlate with this structure (Hymes' materials did not present detailed phonetic markings, but he did have the additional goal and attendant difficulty of presenting an accurate translation of a nonliving language).

Hymes description of the process does, however, allow the possibility that constituting a narrative as composed of verses will not provide sufficient evidence that such verses have been accurately unitized in transcription, or that a strong correlation between other aspects of linguistic form and this unitization will not be present. Furthermore, even if such a structure could be generally constituted across languages and speakers, particular differences in individual languages and individual speakers might preclude definitive law-like statements which would relate a verse structure to clearly perceptible features of an (adequate) transcription. Instead, the relation between oral speech and a verse structure may remain polythetic, and seeing a verse structure may remain ultimately an act of connoisseurship.

Gee accepts this position, and simply presents his transcripts in the verse structure which he has heard, before proceeding to analyses which focus on additional aspects of the text. This is the approach that will be taken here, although a brief characterization of this structure will be attempted following presentation of the transcript.

The following chapter presents this transcript (with an initial index which presents provisional titles which I have provided, as well as word and time counts for each unit). The chapter after that begins discussion of the structure of the discourse contained in this transcript.

The transcription conventions which are in employed in rendering R's discourse are presented below:

Units/Subunits:	Arabic Numbers and (Investigator-supplied) Titles
Verses:	Roman Numerals within Unit/Subunit
Lines/Clauses:	Arabic Numbers within Unit/Subunit
Phrase Structures:	Indentation on a separate line within Line/Clause to make repetitive structure salient

Idea Units: Separated by slash ('/') within Line/Clause (but not at the end of a Line/Clause which is also taken as marking the end of an Idea Unit)

Within Idea Units:

()	momentary pause beyond normal interword break
(.)	one beat (approx. one second)
(..)	two beats etc.
-	(ending word) word broken off (generally as a prelude to a correction)
=	(between words) rapid speech with minimal pause
[]	encloses comments on special speech quality or notes extralinguistic features (for example, [laughter])

Within Words

-	indicates a word drawn out in duration relative to surrounding words
'	syllable normally present is elided
Capitals	in syllable or in word indicates extra emphasis (though intensity and pitch not distinguished)

Notes

1 I acknowledge Dr. R. Tomlin for an excellent graduate course in Linguistic Discourse Analysis and for many enlightening conversations that increased my understanding of the work done in this area and the philosophical stance which typically underlies it.

2 There is a sense in which this is a partial phenomenological reduction, a refusal to fulfill the meanings of linguistic structures.

3 It should be noted that at this time I was also reading work in the phenomenological tradition involving literature (Ingarden, 1931/1973, 1937/1973; Martinez-Bonati 1960/1981; Ricoeur, 1970/1981) and work within the structural

tradition on narrative (e.g. Barthes, 1966/1988; Genette, 1972/1980, 1983/1988; Chatman, 1978; Bal, 1980/1985; Prince, 1982, 1987; Young 1982, 1984).

CHAPTER VII

THE DISCOURSE OF R

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UNIT 1: *THE QUEEN MOTHER*

I. 1. well () let's START / with the EASiest one of all
2. ah it's-ah a SHORT STORY=
3. 'n it's a ve-ry (..)
4. it's a MEmorable THING / that I think () ANYBODY would () apPRECiate

II. 5. one time () I was working (.) on (.) a function () involving the ROYal FAMily
6. I was-s () a CAM'RAMAN on a television ah / broadcast (.) /event
7. an-nd the Royal Family came out () / to the (.) function
8. and we performed all our DUties (..)

III. 9. and then we were ALL SENT HOME
10. TOLD / that we would derig=all=the=equipment the=following= DAY

IV. 11. as we GOT / to our CAR / which was PARKED / ah-um down=the=ROAD=aways / my (.) COLLEAGUE and I / kind of () CAUGHT one another's eye
12. THERE WE WERE /
  in our tuxEdos /
  and our SILK SCARVES /
  and EVerything (.) /
for the EVENT
13. and we were going HOME?
14. ah () we didn't THINK so

V. 15. so we-e (.) / TRACKED BACK to where we ca-me from /
  BACK to the-ah / the VENue
16. sort of (.) sort of SNUCK IN is- in a way / through a DOOR 'n /
  LOOKed here 'n /
  LOOKed there= /
  couldn't SEE anything (.)
17. kind of wandered the CORridors
18. and we opened a DOOR / and went IN (.)

VI. 19. LO and behold (.) /
  CHANdeLIERS /
  smoked=salmon=caviar and chamPAGNE /
  DIAmonds and you=name=it (.) /
EVERYWHERE
20. and we were IN

VII. 21. and we were STANDing there feeling (.) / rather NAked
22. and=I=remember () feeling VERY NERvous / and very GUILty /
that I'd CRASHED / gatecrashed a PARTY as it were (.)
23. ah but rather a SPECial do (.)
24. and I was STANDing there=

VIII. 25. and (.) LOOKing around (.) the room / we saw one or two
OTHER guys / from (.) the ah crew / had had the SAME idea
26. and there WE ALL WERE / little ones and TWOS / like (.)
sticking out like (.) a SORE THUMB
27. so we all sh-shuffled toGETHer=
28. SOMEHOW we managed to all congregate into a / ah an even
MORE NOTICEABLE group / of about SIX of us ()

IX. 29. and we were (.)
just WONdering (.) / what was going to HAPpen= if anything /
and HOW long it would be / before we were THROWN
OUT / on our EAR () /
STILL taking the champagne / from the (.) BUTlers /
that were going BY /
and (.) QUAFfing down the caviar / and everything else /
when a LARGE military looking ma-an /
with a PURPLE FACE /
and a WHITE BEARD /
and a WHITE musTACHE /
with ROWS and rows and rows of military medals /
across his (.) ample CHEST /
came OVer
30. and he SAID /
[affecting rasping British accent] I saay you chaps /
he said /
would it aamusse you / to be (.) introduced /
to the queen MA-THAH
31. [drops accent] well=wel=wel=well=absoLUTely=yah=wa=we would
be HONOURED you=know /
32. we were all STAMmering 'n /
but inSIDE / the ELATION of being / kind of (.)
ACCEPTED and WELCOMED IN (.) /
was=was ONE thing /
but the PROspect of actually= / ACTUALLY ME-ETING / the
queen mother / was something that (.) /
I don't think ANY of us / could have compreHENDed (.) / before it
HAPpened /

X. 33. and in DUE course / he BROUGHT / her MAJESTY / over to MEET us
34. and we went through the form / of the bow / and the-th' proper adDRESS
35. AND / SHE TAlked TO US / for HALF an hour (..)
36. and we TALKED ABOUT (.) /
our JOBS
and our LIVES
and-
an=so=forth (..)

XI. 37. and I've never FELT
a GREATER presence
of a GREAT LADY
a great person
in my WHOLE LIFE=
38. I mean (..) it was INCREDible

XII. 39. it was-
we were feel=
we were made to feel AT EASE
we were made to feel WELcome
we were ma-made to feel VALUed=you=know (.)
here we were PEONS (.) you=know /
amongst the ar-arisTOCracy (..) /
in the EXTREME/
40. AN-ND WE WENT HOME (.) / like () on a CLOUD

XII. 41. and that was (..) thirty years ago / nearly
42. but IT'S / probably the most HONourable (.) MOment / that I
can reMEMber / that-

XIII. 43. it was NOTHING REALLY
44. I mean () so we casually MET some person (.) you know / who
HAPpened / to be ROYALTY
45. BIG DEAL
46. NO / it was MORE than a big deal / it was (.) REALLY REALLY
(.) MOMENTOUS

XIV. 47. and ANYONE / who has never MET / ANYONE of the Royal Family/
I don't think can really apPRECiate=
48. and when I say MET / I mean REALLY s- s- / really STOOD
there / and TALKED ABOUT (.) / a LOT of (.) things= / NOT
JUST how=are=you=and=how=d'you=nice=to=see=you and on to the
next person in the line /
(49.) I mean ACTually standing around / and CHITchatting for

half an hour (..) / on HER TURF not ours (.) / was- was an
experience that ah
50. I think I've said it now / 't'was really WONderful/

UNIT 2: ***HOSPITAL TIMES***

I. 1. I have a () a MEMORY of (.) / a SEVEN MONTH'S duRAtion=
2. but I won't (.) sort of (.) go through the whole SEquence /
because it (.)
3. it IS / () an EVENT unto itself (..)

II. 4. one morning I WOKE UP / having been in a COma / for SEVEN
(.) DAYS
5. and I spent the NEXT SEVEN MONTHS in hospital
6. and its NOT going to take seven months / to tell the STOry

III. 7. most people (.) / really kind of (.) FEAR hospital
disLIKE hospital /
complain about the MEALS /
the RULES
the regulAtions
the PAINS
and so forth
8. sure there's all of that ()
9. but all my memories of THAT [choking with emotion] / were
SO-O (.) WONderful=
10. I mean (.) the FACT / of being ALIVE (..)

IV. 11. I=was=a=young=MAN / about TWENTY-ONE / seeing other PEople
around-
12. we weren't SICK /
because I'd been ah injured / in a motor accident /
so most people had been BROKEN UP / rather than DISeased
13. so people had BROKEN LEGS /
and bashed-in HEADS /
and-ah EYE problems (.) /
and ar- broken arms /
or whatEVer
14. ah I had ah MOST of the above/

V. 15. but the CARE / of the nurses ()
the comPASSion / () you know () of ALL the people=
whether it were doctors (.)
interns (.)

ah cleaning staff (.)
WHAT-EVER (..)

VI. 16. but the most MEmorable PART / of the WHOLE THING is that /
we we-re ()
like THIRTY of us / in a ward= / in ONE ROOM (.) /
COOPED UP TOGETHER / all with our various PROblems (.) /
like a BUNCH of little boys in school / in a CLASSroom
17. and we made the nurses' lives [laugh] / a little HELL / now and THEN-N
we would turn TOIlet paper / into paper AEROplanes /
and we would throw ORanges / at the NURses
18. and (.) we would DO / all KINDS of things () /
to alLEViate the BOREdom= /
to MAKE a little FUN out of LIFE=
19. and by goodness you=know it WAS FUN /
and we LEARNT a lot

VII. 20. a-n-d () and I ap-pre-ciate that (.) /
MY MOTHer CAME /
VIRTUALLY EVERY DAY /
for seven MONTHS [choking with emotion]/
21. PEOPLE / I had hardly kno-wn beFORE / came to SEE me (.) /
either REgularly /
or ocCASionally () /
or even just ONCE /
22. PEOPLE / CAME /
to my twenty-first [choking with emotion] BIRTHday /
in the hospital
23. and they came from AMER-ic-A [choking with emotion] /
SCOTland /
SWITzerland /
ALL over

VIII. 24. and () it was a real fe-eling-
I mean THAT was rehabilitation in itself
25. I mean the FACT that / everyone CARED SO MUCH [choking with emotion] / was () / ah (.) just treMENdous=
26. and it's something that-ah
when I [choking with emotion] THINK about it (.) /
there's no excuse for () ah () /
for feeling BAD /
or DOWN /
or GUILty /
or (..) any negative thing=in=this=world (.)

when I can remember THAT /
27. I OWE those people [chuckles]
to go out
and do something good
and BE somebody (.)

IX. 28. so that was a wonderful time.

UNIT 3: SWISS DINNER PARTY

I. 1. I'm one of these guys=-
actually one of the things I like to DO / MORE than anything
(..) / is-is to SIT / across the TABLE
's probably why I'm here [laughs]

II. 2. i-s to sit across the table / with my DEAREST friends /
or my nearest and dearest
and family 'n loved ones (.)
people I CARE about=
people who care about ME
3. a-n-d () WINE and dine (.) /
have a DINner party
or it doesn't have to be a DINner PARty / it can be a
SIMPLE AFFAIR
like ah (..) MACaroni CHEESE
or PEAnut butter SANDwich
4. ah (.) and SHARE (.) / MY feelings
and MY comings and goings
my past present future
with-with-with them/
5. A-N-D () to reciproCATE
and SHARE THEIR FEELings er too (.)
to input what I CAN
and so forth

III. 6. SO-o-o (..) there have been THOUSands of such occasions
7. and I'm not going to recall ah / many of them

IV. 8. um TALKing about / a FORMAL dinner party= / I=mean one-who
could HELP / but remember the time / that I went to
SWITzerland / with my SISter
9. and went to ah w-was taken out / for DINner (..)

V. 10. and SIX of us / showed up / at this CASTLE (.) /

to be given a PRIVATE TOUR / of the ah WINE cellars (.) /
and shown into a BARonial HALL / where () one table for
six was SET (.) /
11. and there were about TWELVE people / WAITING on us (.) / and
s-preparing the MEAL
12. I=mean=this was like ah being treated like-ah / GENghis KHAN
(.) / or NapOLean
and indeed the Napolean BRANDy / was in a BOTTle / half
the size / that () I WAS (.) /
carried NINE-TEEN LITRES I=think=it=was / in the BRANDy /
the COGnac
13. and we had Chinese fondue and all=kinds=of=WONderful THINGS=
there (..)

VI. 14. BUT / there we WERE / the SIX of us (..)
15. a-n-d I suppose my SISter / was the only ONE / that was
vaguely FLUent / in all the LANGuages that / that everyone
SPOKE=
16. And I had to reCOUNT ah / some JOKES / in fr-in the FRENCH
language= / having only sort of about a grade (..) / grade
six or seven FRENCH or something
17. Um (..) but the interACTion amongst people you=know ()
the ah SWISS trying to speak ENGlish
the GERmans trying to speak FRENCH=
the FRENCH trying to speak [laughing] everything=
and me doing my BEST / to get alONG

VII. 18. A-n-d (..) it was-s (..) / well there=you=go
19. there we were / in this great=big=place
20. and six people came to b-toGETHer / on ONE evening / and had
a WONderful TIME
21. and we NEver MET AGAIN

22. ahh / and it was-s (..) / well (.) it's () a mem'ry.

UNIT 4 a: *LITTLE WANDERER: BUS RIDE*

I. 1. I remember when I was about SIX () / or maybe (.) seven (..)
2. I was always ah a bit of an adVENturer
bit of a LOner=
bit of an indiVIDualist I s-guess
3. used to be () MY (.) THING to
to go off on my ownio and / go FIND somewhere
or go and exPLORE things / 'n just s-get LOST (..)

II. 4. and I was growing up in Montreal (.)
5. and ah (..) I was living with my MOther=
my par- my family had SPLIT /
and my mother was working=
6. so I used to find my w-way home every day
(7.) ah (..) but not usually DIRectly= / I usually found something to DO /
before my mother got HOME

III. 8. and I remember () / GETting on a streetcar (.) / with one
two OTHER friends / that=sort=of LOOKED to me / for a little
excitement / or something different
9. so I had these STREETCAR TICKets (.)
10. so we (.) USED three of these STREETCAR TICKets / to (.) get
on a streetcar / an-n GO somewhere
11. and=then=when we go off THAT streetcar
course=we=asked=for TRANsfers / to get on the NEXT streetcar
and then we got TRANsfers / to get on the NEXT streetcar
unTIL we GOT to the END of the LINE

IV. 12. what I DIDn't know was () / you COULDn't get a transfer / to
get- turn around and come back the other WAY
13. and I didn't have any more TICKets= /
and I didn't have any MOney= /
and I didn't know (.) REALLY where I was /
and neither did (.) these OTHER two kids (..)
14. SO-O (.) I remember thinking (..) / D'y'know=I=think=I've
BEEN here befORE (.) somewhere
15. so-o () exERTing some powers of CONfidence and leadership I
said (.) / OK guys () COME on (.) I know- I KNOW where to GO (..)

V. 16. and I FOUND this apartment building that I'd been to
sometime previously with my mother
17. and I (.) took the-e ELevator up to the whichever floor it
was / 'n KNOCKed on the door (.)
18. and my (.) MOTHER'S (.) BOSS'S WIFE (.) answ- opened the
DOOR () / and could not belIEVE / what she was SEEing=
there were three boys /
just (.) PARKED [laughs] /
outside her DOOR [laughs] /
with no money [laughing]
'n no bus tickets
or anything [laughs]
19. and (..) course=she=phoned=my mother and ah said (.) well

I'll (.) see the boys get home (.) an' so forth/

VI. 20. but I guess that's the- sort=of=the first memory (.) I
have of-of (.)
of BEing (.) my own person=
'n GOing with the wind [laughs]
'n going the w- TAKing my own fork in the road=
and to hell with everybody else/

VII. 21. ah (..) tuh (.) / but I do REmember it=

UNIT 4 b: *LITTLE WANDERER: DEPARTMENT STORE*

I. 1. um (.)
2. there are PERhaps earlier memories /
but they are ones which PROB-AB-LY (.) / are NOT my memories
they're PROB'LY (.) / what I remember my mother TOLD me
3. and so I probably have IMAGined (.) / MAny things / that my mother TOLD me / which are (.) not (.) TRULY my memories/
4. but there is ONE / that I SORT of remember / and this is kind=of=another funny story

II. 5. th- I=was- I would've been YOUNger
6. I would have only been about FIVE
(7.) maybe MAYBE only four
8. and my mother took me downtown Eatons

III. 9. and my mother thought (.)
OK little boy (.) SON (.) you know (.) / just STAND here
and (.) when the elevators go up
it goes GREEN
and it goes DIng
and when they come down
the RED light comes on
and it goes boNG
and there are FIVE elevators to watch
and there are people coming in and out / and going
(10.) and THAT will keep little R amused for ah /OO (.) some considerable time (.) /
WHILE (.) mommy goes to the sales (.) /
and BUYS (.) whatever she needs /
for Christmas () or whatever

IV. 11. well it ONLY took me FIVE MINUTES= / to figure OUT
that=there was (.) nothing MUCH MORE gonna HAPpen=
than what I'd SEEN alREADy=
12. so I went off to go and FIND her / and say ah
whats HAppening 'n
when are we GOing 'n
or can I have a LOLLIpop
or whatever the HELL it was
13. and needless to say= / in a BUSY Eaton- DOWN-TOWN Eatons
STORE in MontREAL ah / I didn't find MY MOTHer (.)
14. and ULtimately she CERtainly didn't () find () ME= / because
SHE cleared the STORE [laughs]

V. 15. But ah that's- as=I=say that's LARGELY HER (.) story= /
but I DO () vaguely () remember /
that when she came CHARGing up the (.)
St. Catherine's street to find / ah t-to get HOME
and phone the police from THERE (..)
(16.) she found this small boy on (.) her (..) / DOORstep
17. and she OPened her MOUTH (.) / to GIVE me the (.) BIGgest(.) /
ah (.) reprimand or whatever / TONGUE lashing /
18. and before she got a mou- a- a WORD out / I said MOM WHERE
HAVE YOU BEEN? [laughs] / which took ALL the WIND out of
her sails=

VI. 19. As=I=say maybe that's my mother's story / but [laughs]
20. I REMEMBER the STO-RY [interspered laughter] / SO VIVIDLY /
that I-
21. I () sort=of=can PICture- / or MAybe I () EVEN () DO /
remember the evENT=
22. I'm not sure

UNIT 5: *A LITTLE NAUGHTY I SUPPOSE*

I. 1. I remember one time (.) / I was ah () a little NAUGHty I
suppose
2. well (.) SURE I was

II. 3. um nothing to do () MUCH () / with marital problems but I /
I FOUND /
that- / I cum- SOMEbody I knew at () work (.)
that I was () heavily inVOLVed / in the work SIDE of
things (.)
4. and I found myself getting () very friendly with a young

lady who was ah () SEVERAL years younger than I
5. uh (..) / or RATHer / I would have LIKED to have been
heavily involved with this girl= [laughs]
6. that's probably a TRUer way of PUTting it

III. 7. A-N-D she was ah v-e-r-y (..) STRAIGHT
and v-e-r-y () careful
v-e-r-y () you=know
but- and a lot younger (..)
8. but OVER a period of time of months of working together /
a-n-d ah () / WE () someh-o-o-w-w-
you=know=how you extend invitations=
you=must=come=and=see=me=sometime and=so=forth=
we got to be (.) ACTually () REAL-l-y () FRIEND-ly
9. but I never kind=of=LOST this ah / SPARkle to my eye /
um(.) wh'n=I thought about her-r (.) / or met her
(10.) cause=I=used to meet her every week or (.) / twice a week (.) /
through () WORK

IV. 11. and one day-y / I found myself DOwn on the farm (.) /
ah-like the weekend retreat or whatEVer (.) / at HER
invitation=
12. and I (.) / b-BOLDLy and HAPpily CHARGED IN with ah / a bag
of (.) STEAK / and () bottles of WINE and so forth (..)
13. a-n-d () was having a great TIME
14. a-n-d () I remember () the OVERtures / 'n thinking
well you=know
well () uh ()
well uh
boy meets girl
girl meets boy
girl and boy=get=together
aha
or do they? uh (..)

V. 15. WELL () / SOMEhow after all the wine / and everything ELSE /
um there was anOTHer factor / my ONE and ONLY experience
with mariJUana (..) / which was only a (.) / like a (.) / a
cigarETTE or two (.) / or three / or a- I-
I=don't=know and=anyhow=it=doesn't=really=MATter
16. And ah / I was not REALly ah
ah I didn't=really appROVE=of=such=things
'n=I=really=didn't KNOW about=such=things
and=I=was=rather afRAID of such=things (.)

17. but ANYway / I was () having a () DAMN GOOD TIME=
18. so (.) whoopee (..)

VI. 19. WELL SOMEwhere between ah (..) /
passing out
and ah throwing up
and getting sick
and generally () feeling () TERrible
I managed to find the apPROpriate bed (..)
20. WITH DIFFICULTY /
cause I=had=to stumble=around the WHOLE
HOUSE / looking at everyone / before I found () the ()
PERson / in the ONE / that I was LOOKing for

VII. 21. um (.) THAT - all=of=that=wasn't the memory
22. the memory was the following morning ()
23. the AB-SO-LUTE () quiet
() peace
() birds
(.) satisfaction
24. I had a wonderful feeling of peace and-ah just [whispering]
a-a-a-h-h-h you=know /
oh this is AB-SO-LUTE () a-a-a-h-h-h

III. 25. [normal] Jesus () I've got to be at Vegreville / by NINE
o'CLOCK this MORning [laughs] ()
26. I better phone my WIFE / and tell HER where I AM
27. well=I=better=not tell her where I AM [laughs] /
[laughing]
I'd better tell her / that I'm alRIGHT [laughs]
28. ah (.) dear=oh=dear=oh=dear

IX. 29. but that was-s (.)
(30.) THAT's a precious memory
31. I mean I'm sure lots of guys have got stories
32. I KNOW lots of guys would LIKE to have stories like that
[laughs]

X. 33. um (..) the end of the story was that ACtually
although on THAT parTIcular MORNing
and THAT parTIcular DAY
WE / would BOTH
have ACtually
taken off to JAsper

HAWaii
New ZEALand and
and the rest of the world
forEVER=and=EVER Amen
ah sanity prevailed
responsibility prevailed
over time / what might have been a FLAMING affair ah / was kind=of ah (..) / just (.) LINGered into a very good friendship

XI. 34. but that WAS-
(35.) that MORNing was-s (..) / stirred FEELings that I'd never felt before (.) / and ah / and VERY MIXED feelings (.) / in MANY ways/ as you can iMAgine being rather a comp-romising situation in some ways
36. so / aside from all of the- sort=of the guilt and / perHAPS the- the NAUGHTIness of it all / looking at the POSitive side / it was- () HAHA /
37. well=I=would=have=been DOWN the AISLE probably in about / oh th- three HOURS / from THAT moment / if I hadn't () alREADY [laughs] been ah / TIED UP shall we say

UNIT 6: *ENGLISH PUB*

I. 1. you can prob'ly TELL / I'm ENGlish / from the- my ACcent
2. and I'm LIVing in Canada

II. 3. the memory of the English PUB () is-s (.) / is SOMEthing that you hear English people TALK about
4. um and I'm not going to pick a particular PUB / or a particular ocCAsion
5. there are SO MANy=
6. but they all merge into ONE

III. 7. and it's / the picture of-f / coming out of CHURCH
or maybe you don't go to church
(8.) um getting up LA-zy on a Sunday morning=reading the Sunday paper /
9. and you're ALways down to the PUB () / on a SUN-day LUNCH time
10. that's where the- that's where the PEOple all meet=

IV. 11. that's where (.) the NEIGH- not neighbours so much () but /
but FRIENDS from the TENnis club or-r t- /
people who get together

might have a common interest in motor rac-ing
or ah TEN-nis
or-r () bridge
or-r (.) YOUTH club- WHATever
get down
12. and they ALL have a PINT
13. and they- maybe they have TWO pints
14. and everyone () goes HOME () to their respective houses for lunch

V. 15. ah-h maybe they're all going out ah for a DO= /
16. 'n they're all going down to () some MUseum /
or some fete /
or some (.) SAIL-ing GIG () /
or something () today=but (..)

VI. (17.) you=know () a GOOD SOLid PINT of beer in the fist /
NOT at a table
NOT served by a waitress /
18. you GET it yourSELF
you struggle for it
you have to FIGHT to get to the bar
19. 'n then you go OUTside / into the SUNshine (.)
20. 'n you can stand in the parking lot
and the birds are there
and the cars going by
and the crickets going on on the green

VII. 21. its- its kind=of=a / a COLlection of memories
22. but its ALways the same KIND of feeling / that- that ah
23. the pub IS () a com-MUN-ity /
24. or the people who go there / get-
the LOC-als () the REGulars / that get=ta=know /
oh () there's that OLD guy=

VIII. 25. And ya=might () see people there / that you've never SPOken
to for twenty years
26. but you KNOW 'em (.)
27. and HE'S never spoken to YOU for twenty years
28. but HE knows YOU

IX. 29. 'n he- because you talk to people about people
and () who's that guy
oh ya I know him
he works so=and=so (.)

and=so=and=so

X. 30. but its a good feeling (.)
31. its a good feeling.

UNIT 7 a: *BRIDGE PLAYER: JUST ABOUT*

I. 1. um (..) / I'm a competitive BRIDGE player (.)

II. 2. everybody likes to WIN (.) /
and bridge players more than MOST=
3. that's=why=they PLAY=the=game (.)
which is ah / a game where people are out to prove how SMART they are /
or (.) perhaps () how DUMB everybody ELSE is (.)
which is kind=of STUpid be- [laughing] because ah /
that's not REALly the way it works

III. 4. um (.) but there is GREAT exhilaRAtion /
in ACT-ual-ly WINNING () an () EVENT
or () at getting the BETter of someone / who has an INTER-NAtional reputation
or somebody who has- or someone who is REckoned to () be () / one of the FINest players () in the world
I suppose if you were ah () a GOLFer / it would be like um / an AMateur winning the U.S. Open
5. Well (..) it's happened to me once=or=twice () /
not often () but once or twice

IV. 6. The elATion of () act-ually playing through a () day
or two days
or a weekend
or whatEVer
and COming through / as the champion (..) /
ah (..)
is something that you NEV-ER LOSE=
7. I mean () the () Alber- the American () Contract=Bridge=League has ah / a million
or=two
or=three=or=ten million members
or=whatever it is
and everyone aspires to become a Life Master /
and everyone aspires to WIN /
and so forth

8. but you=know / when you WIN () the BIG one=
when you win () something () BIGger=than=you=ever=
thought you MIGHT (.)
it makes A-L-L the learning
and A-L-L the trying
and all the FAILure
and [laughs] all the money and time and effort you put
into it
suddenly [laughs] /
in one deal of cards [laughs] /
it's all WORTH it ()
9. huh it- its amAZing

V. 10. I think prob'ly / it would be () HEALTHier and WIser to /
win the U.S. Open or /
or happen to ah be-win the Wimbleton tennis /
or something wo- more worthwhile but (.)
11. we each in=our=own=way ah like to compETE /
and do- do what we can /
and do it WELL /
12. and ah bridge is one of the things that I do (.)
if not THAT WELL certainly better=than=other=things=
that=I=do () so
13. that's ah ()

VI. 14. ESpecially the w- the first time it ever HAPpened I was
only-y (.)
well=I=was about twenty-TWO
15. and=I=was=the=oldest member of the () team-m=
the=others=were=all teenagers
16. and we (.) didn't=actually=win this event
we (.) JUST ABOUT KNOCKED OFF ah / four () English
internationals /
who were reckoned to be ah / three=of=the=FOUR=
best=players () in the world () at the time
17. and we had () specTAtors and kibitzers
like=you=wouldn't=believe-
the WHOLE TOURnament was VIRtually WATching us FINish
this MATch (.) /
which we lost by ah / a VE-RY () small () margin /
ALL on the LAST hand

VII. 18. SO () that was-
to ME that was like a win [laughs]

19. that was BETter than a win
that was- that was () nice/
20. SO () we kept coming back for more /
hoping that one day we WOULD win
21. and ultimately ah / we DID
we won our share

VII. 22. so that sums up ah sort=of (..) / the BRIDGE high

UNIT 7 b: *BRIDGE PLAYER: WHY BOTHER?*

I. 1. BUT I re-mem-ber-
2. on=the=other=side=of=the=coin I remember () / a bridge LOW=
3. I was playing with my very=very=favorite partner ah /
with two of () my GOOD friends
4. and we were playing in ah /
a qualifying event for a NAtional ah final

II. 5. ah-h-h / well () to=cut=a=long=story=short
I played extremely () BADly=
6. I=don't=think=anyone ELSE played particularly WELL
but I played extremely BADly
7. um a-n-d / we didn't qualify of course
8. in fact () we were ah / we had a ter-ri-ble score

III. 9. and (.) I remember this VERY VERY well () / like ()
10. why are we PLAY-ing THIS GAME?
11. I=mean (.) ah ()
this=is=terrible
this=is=terrible
th- the=WORST=has=HAPpened
the=worst=has=HAPpened=
12. HOW COULD WE PLAY SO BADLY? () you know

IV. 13. HOW could it BE this way=
14. oh () we w- we were- we were THERE
15. we were going to WIN it
16. and ah LOOK what HAPpened () you=know

V. 17. and this very=good=friend=of=mine and I /
both being () SOMEWHAT insomniacs /
SOMEWHAT being () NIGHT () birds /
and- and SO forth /
very good buds (..) /

we went home=
18. except we=didn't=go=home / we walked the streets for ()
three or four HOURS
19. I am SURE () it MUST have been () three or four HOURS
20. and we went ()
from the HEIGHTS (.)
to the DEPTHS
to=the=HEIGHTS=
to=the=DEPTHS
trying to ANalyze () / WHERE we'd gone WRONG

VI. 21. a-h (.) and we arrived at the conclusion () / or RAther ()
my BUDdy did () / that /
we hadn't gone WRONG /
it didn't really MATter /
it was ONly a GAME ()
22. and=I=mean () if it was going MEAN the BE=all=and=END=all=of
EVerything
ah (.) huh is it REALly so imPORtänt? (.)
(23.) when you have () a wife () and-ah children ()
and you have () a job
and you have () FUNctions
and you have () things to do ()'n places to go () 'n
all kind-
24. I mean (.) j- / Is LOsing a CARD game [laughs] / gonna be ()
the END of the WORld?

VII. 25. well / it took about TWO HOURS / to work THAT out of my
system
26. but () I had to admit () that (.) / ah () NO / it wasn't the
END=of=the=world
27. and-ah well () we don't need to play DO WE?
28. I=mean- we know- we know () what we can do

VIII. 29. but in the END (.) / we went full circle
30. and said /
well () if it doesn't MATter anymore /
then we won't get HURT anymore
so why don't we go to Saskatoon /
and play in the whatever=it=is (..)
31. and take the attitude that it doesn't matter=
32. we'll just GO
and just PLAY
and let the- let=the=chips=fall=where=they=may

and to HELL=with=them you know

IX. 33. ah we'll just go and enJOY ourselves
34. we're NOT going to let it GET to us () right DICK? (.)
35. 'at's RIght (.)
36. O.K. (..)

X. 37. so we'll GO (..)
38. so six we-weeks later or whenever=it=was / we WENT
39. and we WON the WHOLE DAMN THING
40. and THAT was another-huh-another elation ah in itself (.)

XI. 41. which is perhaps / a different story (.)
but I won't DWELL on it 'cause I think I've covered the subject

UNIT 7 c: *BRIDGE PLAYER: WINNING WITH STYLE*

I. 1. I think if I were REALLY writing my aut-autobiography /
I THINK () the elation of WINNING THAT event and /
and A-L-L the little details of how it came about /
PROBably (.) would ah / would fill out a little more (..)
2. but I'll () just exPAND on that ONE event / in one WAY or another=
3. this really describes the elation

II. 4. The elation was that WE-
you have to win eight matches /
well you have to- /
you play eight matches /
and you have to win more than=anybody=else/
5. so we had WON our first seven matches / and nobody else HAD
6. so we had to play an EIGHTH match knowing that /
even if we LOST
we would get SEVEN victories
and noone could-
noone could BEAT us=
7. they could TIE us / but they couldn't beat us

III. 8. so the directors were trying to figure out () / WHICH team / was to PLAY us
9. and they had a lot of CHOIces / of people who had won SIX matches / hoping to win SEVEN
10. so we wound up playing the NUMBER ONE SEEDS (.) / which pleased us all the more /

(11.) because we were ALL CONfident / that we would KNOCK- ()
KNOCK them off / an- 'n beat them

IV. 12. and (.) it wasn't JUST that we managed to win / it was the
STYLE () with WHICH () we DID it [laughs]
13. everybody at the table / had great PREsence
everybody played very WELL
we even rubbed their NOSES in it a=little=BIT [laughs]
MORE than a=little=bit
14. and we WHOMPED 'em something like 35 to ZIP [laughs]
15. and of course () we were eight=an=oh /
and-ah they were () six=an=two
ah one or two other teams CREPT in to () seven=an=one

V. 16. but THAT was the day I became a LIFE MASTER /
and its something which only () perhaps () BRIDGE
players would under-stan-nd
17. but it is a plateau /
probably greater than=any=OTHer in=the=game=of=bridge
18. SURE its better to win the Bermuda Bowl
or to be a GRAND master
or=whatever
but your FIRST TASTE of the BIG one
your FIRST TASTE of- of being a little PERson / playing
in a BIG game / with a LOT=of () SHARKS /
when you make the Life Master in THAT kind of style
THAT is a moment
19. and its a moment that lasted FIVE hours in the car
all=the=way=home [laughs]

UNIT 8 a: *SUMMER HOLIDAYS: AUSTRIA*

I. 1. I-I have a- / my-my business is- is ah / television proDUCtion=
2. I=mean=ever since I-ah left school () / I've had this-ah /
REAL interest in / in photography and pictures /
3. and I- I THINK I have a VERY () visual () sense so ()
4. a LOT of my memories are / are very () VISual / EVEN to the
point were some of them are / are () REAL photographs (.)

II. 5. I remember=the=very=first=time=I went to ah / AUStria (..)

III. 6. um (.) my sister and I got () together again / after the
family had split up when I was a kid (.)
7. and we used to spend our summer HOlidays together=

8. and of course there's (..)
9. there's a WHOLE (.) / couple of CHAPters of memories / RIGHT THERE

IV. 10. I was a bachelor
11. my moth- my sister () was also single
12. ah she's four years older than I
13. and ever since I was ah / a late teenager / we () TREAsure / the odd week or two / or even a weekend () we can spend together (.)

V. 14. um and it grew from these HOLidays that we use to take
15. um our lives took VERY different paths
16. ah in some ways they weren't particularly HAPpy paths
17. but when WE got together / WE (.) MADE (.) the world (.) SING

VI. 18. the first time we took one or two domestic holidays locally
cheap () little () hotel places
and made the most () of it
and it was fun
19. but the FIRST one that () / REally had=an=IM-pact () was the=first=time=that / EITHer=of=us had been on the continent of Europe

VII. 20. and we CHOSE to go t' () AUStria () for a HOLiday
21. it was a TWENTY-four hour () TRAIN ride (.) /
ah which was a bit of an ordeal in itself
except it was exciting
and we were young
22. it was over on the boat 'n (.) / day and night on the ah / train
23. and we GOT there (..)

VIII. 24. and I-ah there are a lot of memories out of THIS / because (..)
25. we went to a country
a terrain
a language
a schedule ()
a menu ()
of food that is ()
a night life (.)
as tourists=
of course holidays are always fun
26. but () all of it was /
totally FOReign

and NEW
and STRANGE
and WONderful
27. and we were both impressionable

IX. 28. 'specially me=I was only about sevenTEEN
29. I'd JUST started work
30. It was my first ah sort=of / go=OUT into the world
of EARNing a living
'n PAYing for my OWN holiday
'n not being a kid anymore=
31. I=mean it was really something

X. 32. and () every DAY was a MEMory
33. I don't remember them ALL of course
(34.) but=I=mean / just getting UP in the morning /
(35.) and HAVING () / the AUStrian TYPE of breakfast/

XI. 36. that is / you go out on the VERanda
37. the BAker's boy toils up the hill / with HOT ROLLS
you=know the Kaiser bun () type () thing
in the BASket
38. and th-they come HOT / in a CLOTH / from the BAKery
39. and you're having () FRESH () MADE ah preserves / 'n BLACK coffee

XII. 40. and the sun's coming up over the MOUNTains
41. and the- and the BIRDS are twittering
42. and the GRASS is GREEN
43. and the- / o-o-h-h / it was-

XIII. 44. and the air was so CLEAR / as you can imagine in the Alps=
45. it was ab-so-lute-ly unbelievable/

XIV. 46. and the whole day would go / um just looking around
'n SIGHT seeing
'n DRINKing and everything
'n s-getting the most of everything
47. and then the EVENing / the SAME kind=of (.)
well=no=not=the=same / DIFFerent kind=of things
48. but the SAME kind=of feelings ()
(49.) of WOW isn't this GREAT

XV. 50. we'd go down to the local WINE cel-lar
51. and we'd dance with the local () FELLahs and the local () WENches

52. and and THEY'd all speak GERman and PIDgin ENGlish / and we
couldn't speak ANYthing except ENGlish / so it was -
53. it was INteresting () / getting alONG with the LOcals
and drinking their WINE
and dancing to their MUsic
and and-ah () EVerything/

XVI. 54. and after that / we would go for a WAlk
up the MOUNtains /
in the MOONlight
maybe at MIDnight one o'clock in the morning
55. a-n-d o-o-h-h
56. TALK about SOUND of MUSic
57. I TELL YOU [laughs] / it was- [laughs]

XVII. 58. birds stirring in=a=young=man's BREAST
59. yah / I had one=or=two girl friends on THAT trip / but ah
60. yah / one in particular= / she taught me all kinds of german so-ongs 'n
61. it was-s-

XVIII. 62. it was something I'll never forget
63. and yet / I supPOSE I haven't THOUGHT about it for a long TIME=
64. it was about forty YEARS a-go
(65.) well maybe not forty / thirty-five ANYway

UNIT 8 b 1: *SUMMER HOLIDAYS: A DAY IN PARIS I*

I. 1. um (.) but=I=mean=there=were=a SUCcession of holidays LIKE that
2. ah we went to the south of France
3. and again / EVERY LITtle PLACE WE WENT was=a=memory
4. I=mean / to go-o to () Paris

II. 5. um I spent a whole DAY in Par-
I=mean FANCY going to Paris JUST for a day=
6. I as on my way to Switzerland (.)

III. 7. and (.) TRYing to see () the Louvre
well () I went to SEE the Louvre
8. but TRYing to see () the Louvre
a-n-d the l- Arc=de=Triomphe
a-n-d the-e Sacre=Couer
a-n-d the-e Eiffel Tow-
9. EVERYthing () all in one DAY () is [laughs] / quite an assIGNment
10. but I DID IT

IV. 11. and everything I did (..) / I was on my own
12. I-I-it was like my OWN feeling of a () SELF / um I ah aPRECiation
for ME / for for what I was=
sorry I'm not SAYing this right
13. I was getting appreciation for ALL that I saw
14. and it was private to ME (..)

V. 15. to SEE the Mona Lisa
16. I remember= now THIS is a moment

VI. 17. I remember standing in front () of the MO-na LI-sa
18. and of course its LEGendary
19. you look at the mosa l- Mona Lisa / and you ar-re SPELLbound
20. um and everyone KNOWS that that's what you're s'posed to BE

VII. 21. and um and it is THE most famous painting in the WORLD
22. and there it WAS
23. and I was LOoking at it
24. and I thought () Ah ha well there's the MOna=LIsa ()

VIII. 25. about fifteen or TWENTY minutes later I was / STILL STANDING
there STARING AT the MONA lisa (.) / along with a FEW=OTHer
PEOple who were rooted to the spot
26. and I can TELL YOU () / that if you ever SEE the=Mona=Lisa
w- the real one () there () in the Louvre (..)
you'll KNOW what they SAY about it
27. and there's NO WAY that y- that it can be desCRIBed to you
28. wherever you move / if you take-
if you take three paces SIDEways
or you you=you go to WALK off to go to see another exhibit
and you turn round to look BACK at it
she's STILL looking at you (..)

IX. 29. and you () can't () tear () your=EYES=away
30. it's TRUE
31. it it it's a phenomenon that ah [laughs]
32. I don't know what he DID da Vinci but ah [laughs]

X. 33. but the WHOLE a th- everything ELSE in the Louvre was
EQUALly imPRESsive
34. um THAT's a moment

UNIT 8 b 2: *SUMMER HOLIDAYS: A DAY IN PARIS II*

I. 1. going up the Eiffel Tower=
this is the same day
going up the Eiffel tower wasn't () / so much of a moment (.)
2. but RUNning down the-the-the ah the STAIRS from the TOP () /
was a moment (..)

II. 3. because I wasn't in an elevator with () / twenty OTher guys with CAMeras
4. I was just RUNning down as FAST as I could go
5. hubbidy=hubbidy hubbidy=hubbidy=
6. all=the=way down=the stairs

III. 7. and I got to-o three quarters of the way down to the main um
the main level
8. and there was a BANquet going to be () happening
9. because there were CHEFS=
there must've been FORTY chefs there
preparing hors-d'oeuvres /
and canaPES /
and ah french cuisine
like you've NEVer seen
and I just LOOKed in there=
I just couldn't beLIEVE what I was SEEing (.)
10. and I ran down the stairs again=

IV. 11. but=I=mean () / THAT's the way to DO the EIFfel tower
12. I=mean DON'T just () HAPpen by with a camera
and take two pictures of it
and forGET it
13. DON'T just go UP in the eleVAtor
and then come DOWN in the elevator
and say
well () that was nice
but I think the CN tower is high- / the ah CN
tower in Toronto is higher
14. I=mean [laughs] / who cares?

V. 15. the thing to DO / is to DO it on your own / and you=know and-
16. and WALK it /
and come down on y-
be it by yourSELF
17. be at PEACE and at ONE with yourSELF
18. and be a PART of it

'n exPERience it
'n

VI. 19. THAT was (..)
20. for me you=know THAT was something I remember (..)

UNIT 8 c 1: *SUMMER HOLIDAYS: MAJORCA I*

I. 1. then when we went to MaJOrca / there w- th- th-
2. a FUNny thing happened in Majorca

II. 3. AGAIN () / all these HAPPY things / happened with my SISter () /
on the TWO WEEKS that we managed to GET together-
well plus a- a weekend at Christmas
(4.) the two weeks vacation that we used to get together EVERY year-
5. in FACT / it was more like every two years / 'cause we couldn't afFORD
to make these ah / wonderful trips EVERY year
6. costs money (..)

III. 7. but when we went to Majorca / which is ah an island off Spain (..)
(8.) um ()

IV. 9. I used to ride a BIKE (.)
10. and I KNEW that / when you went to these sort=of LATIN places /
like ITaly and SPAIN / and so forth=
they had the- these wonderful things called / VESpers and LamBRETtas /
which were () like little MOTor SCOOTers
that you could actually GET on
and ride aROUND ()

V. 11. SO ah I (.) RENTed one of these things ()
12. and ah ()
course=I didn't have a licence=
I'd never DRIVEN one in my LIFE before
I=mean I=didn't=know=anything=
but I RENTed ONE

VI. 13. and the guy () came and brought it to the hotel
14. and-ah
DID I know how=to=do this
and DID I know how=to=do THAT
'n DID I have a licence
OH YES YES YES / DON'T WORRY about a THING

15. and-ah just leave it THERE / thank=you=very=MUCH
16. and I went back to have my BREAKfast

VII. 17. but as SOON=as HE'D=TURNED=the=CORner
gone=on=the=BUS
and=gone=BACK=to=the=DEpot
course I SNUCK DOWN THERE /
to try and get ON the thing
(18.) and ah (.) make sure that I could DRIVE it (.)
or START it ()
or DO ANYthing with it
19. and after FALLing OFF for about half an hour
and having a few CRASHES along the way
I managed to sort=of almost MASter the thing
20. an'=I=thought
OH
well THAT's ok
'at should be pretty easy

VIII. 21. and ah (.) so I went back
22. and ah my sister was just coming down for breakfast
23. I said=
OH it's all arranged=
we got the scooter=
this=that=and=the=other
24. she=says=
you're sure you can DRIVE=
I=s'=OH YAH
NO PROBlem

IX. 25. and from that moment on / we () toured the WHOLE ISland / on this () wonderful little motor scooter
26. and it was just abso-lutely [laughs] (..)

X. 27. (y)ehhh (.) it's like (.) watching FILM stars on the-
on the RiviERa
28. you=know () ROSanna BRAZzi
or ah-h people like that

XI. 29. I=mean () there you are
30. the world is your oyster
31. you've got a little scooter=
32. you can get around

XII. 33. you c'n go from Pal-ma
t' the other end of the is-land
34. you can go to the BIG swank-y hotel

XIII. 35. OH / we went to the big swanky hotel=
36. they wanted ah
something=like three dollars for a glass of WATer (..)
three DOLlars for a COKE=
three DOLlars for a SCOTCH (.)
but three dollars for a glass of water
37. you want a drink (.) / it's three bucks
38. I remember that

XIV. 39. um but (..) yah that was another () WONderful sort=of holiday=

UNIT 8 c 2: *SUMMER HOLIDAYS: MAJORCA II*

I. 1. ah one thing I DO remember about THAT was my FIRST () KNOWledge or inkling / of my SIster / having any reLATions / with a member of the opposite SEX () / that- that I (.) could HARDly AVOID [laughs] / 'cause I-
2. when the day came to GO HOME ah
she was in BED
and didn't want to get UP=
and didn't want to catch the bus
and didn't want to catch the plane [laughs]
and to HELL with the WHOLE THING
3. but ah / we managed to put a / a HAT on the guy's DICK / and get her (.) um / get her DRESSED / and OUT=of=there
4. and catch () the bus () in TIME

II. 5. but ah / when you think about THAT / with-with one's own sister
y- [laughs] you know it- you have- (.)
you have a- a strange kind=of twinge () or a feeling
6. but-ah so that was a- () a- a- a () thing

UNIT 9 a: *MY MOTHER'S DEATH*

I. 1. it MAY become apparent that () MOST of
if not all=no not all
but MOST of my memories are always HAPPY=
2. they're always ones uh-that ohh
sucCESS
or elATion

or WONderment
or TRIumph
3. or- they're all POSitive memories (..)
4. but you=know we ALL have SAD memories TOO ()

II. 5. I was at WORK one day-y
uh Wednesday morning () or whenever it was
6. and I was kind=of STRUGgling at work anyway
ahh NOT GEnerally just on this particular morning=
it's one of those MONday BLUES or something=
but it was-
I think it was a WEdnesday
7. and I was kind=of STRUGgling with my SCRIPTS
'n my PROblems
'n my- how I was going going to get around THIS
or budget for THAT
or get the job DONE
or-r you=know I was tire-
8. maybe I b-had been UP half the night before I=don't=know

III. 9. anyway=I=was=sitting at my desk feeling kind=of (..) / mnyah mnyah mnyah [with falling pitch] / when the PHONE went (.)
10. it was my STEPfather (.) / inFORMing me in (..) / I=don't=know twelve words or less / that my MOther had just died (.....)

IV. 11. well (..)
12. I sort=of TOOK it (.)
13. and kind=of listened
14. and it WASn't entirely unexpected (.)

V. 15. ah but these things are NEVER ha-ha unexPECTed I mean=
ah n-these things are never exPECTed=
16. there always a SHOCK even when you THINK that ah / there's an indication that it might HAPpen
17. it's AL-WAYS a SHOCK
18. I=mean () / I-I don't suppose anyone's ever LIVED (.)
who has any FEELing or GUTS about them at A-L-L
y'ever get the moth- the MES-SAGE that your mother JUST DIED
without feeling something

VI. 19. 'n [long intake of breath] so / ah I got through it very CALMly
20. an' I didn't (.) REAL-ly (.)

21. I didn't really REact
22. I just said (.) oh (.) well (..)

VII. 23. [sigh] so (..) I was told (.) / that there was no need to
come BACK for the funeral=
24. all the arrangements had been made=
25. AFTER all I WAS busy wasn't I=
26. and I had a CONtract
and I had a JOB to do-o
and it was a LONG way
and it cost a lot of MON-ey

VIII. 27. and (..) um there was no (.) n-need real-really=
28. because I HAD been home to see my mother um / like three
month's previously
29. so (..) I had SPENT TIME with her when she was alIVE

30. I did not NEED to (.)
make the EFfort to put on appearances and ah just ()
ful-fill some=KIND=of mis-placed DU-TY
when perHAPS my duty lay with () my imMEDiate
responsibilities (.)
of looking after my family and doing my job
and so forth (.)

IX. 31. and ah (..) not everyone would underSTAND that=
32. I think a lot of people would say
33. well there's no question ()
34. I'm going to BE there

X. 35. um but I kind=of shrugged 'n (.) thought ah (.)
yah=well I guess that's true
36. I-ah I WAS there
37. ah I-I did- I did the imp- I did the PROper thing / at the RIGHT time
38. um (..) ah (.) well maybe ()

XI. 39. SO I kind=of stumbled ARO-UND like / in this kind=of () FOG /
for about (.) an hour or two
40. and then- oh=boy- did IT () HIT me

XII. 41. ah (.) people were saying () you=know (.)
how are you
wha-what's the matter
42. 'n I'd say

oh nothing (.)
noth-ing
43. and / and FINally / when I ACTually had to TELL somebody / I
just collapsed like a paper bag
44. and ah (..) / whenever I think about (.) MY MOTHer DY-ing () /
it's (..) very difficult / to hold=back=the=tears
[cries] (.)

XIII. 45. [through tears] and I'm very PROUD of that (..)

XIV. 46. it's only because I'm going into it / in such detail I=suppose / that I'm ()
sort=of () close to that right now
47. um (.) 'cause normally I can disCUSS my mother ah
you=know what happened or something /
quite conversationally-
NO PROBLEM
48. WHEN I (..) DWELL on-n (..) how I was FEELing (..) / those
very feelings [through tears] hi-i-i () HIT me / right in
the same=ol' places you=know
so if (.) we could just stop the tape for a sec'

[TAPE BREAK]

UNIT 9 b: *CHRISTMAS*

I. 1. course you must also KNOW / that to FEEL this way (.) /
there are a THOUS-and hap-py MEMories () with my MOTHer
2. ah (.) sure I was a little BUG-GER
sure=she=got=after=me
sure=we=had=problems
huh (..)
but I remember things like CHRIST-mas ()

II. 3. I KI- Christmas is for CHILDren / an' I was a kid=just=like= everybody
ELSE (.)
4. and when you come DOWN-N in the morning (.) / and the LIVING room
is fesTO-O-ONed with
little / 'n [laughs] LARGE () /
WRAPped () parcels /
all in coloured PAper / 'n RIBbons /
and everything ELSE
OH

III. 5. an'=how=m'ch- / my=goodness=me there must be fif-ty or six-ty

packages here
6. and there's- / w'll=there's on-ly FOUR of us in the HOUSE
7. I=mean W-O-W
8. B-O-Y you=know I=mean (..)

IV. 9. ahh I can't remember any parTICular Christmas more=than=any=OTHer
10. because every Christmas was just as WONderful (..)

V. 11. just as won- and d'j'know SOME-THING?
12. it got BET-ter (..)

VI. 13. you=know it's FUN for little kids of ()
four=five=six ()
'n then it gets FUN- more FUN when you're ()
maybe eight=nine=ten
and you- you start () thinking about
SKAtes
'n BIcycles
and matERial things
more than () little TOYS 'n stuff
14. but you=know when you get to be-e
say seven-teen or eighteen
and then you get to be
twenty or twenty-TWO
or TWEnty-FIVE
it gets more=and=more=and=more WONderful (..)

VII. 15. but STILL as the CHILD
16. because your mother is there
17. and your mother's love
and your mother's care
and your FAM-i-ly
are all aROUND you
18. an everything- everything is bet- always=better=than=it=was LAST
year / for some reason

VIII. 19. an' you- you become an ADult and
20. well you don't just PLAY=
and have a choc'late bar=
and play with TOYS
21. I=mean you- you SOC-ial-ize
you have a GIN=and=tonic
ah y- you have a BRANDY
or a glass of SHErry 'n

22. and you apPREC-i-ate the DINner more

IX. 23. 'n you=know / and you're growing up 'n / and th- then you RE-al-ize that
life is SO-O worth living
and SO-O worth saving for
and SO worth (..) everything [laughs]
24. because () on Christmas day / there's the PROOF that / LIFE
is / TRU-ly / ah bountiful ()

X. 25. until you leave the family nest
26. and YOU bring up your OWN children
27. an THEN things are very different
28. because you see () you're not () living (..)
the life that YOU remember
and the memories that YOU had
of the way YOU thought
things OUGHT to BE

XI. 29. it's a very (.) large SHOCK / when YOU decide () / or you THINK () that
OK well we wrap all our things up on () such=and=such
and we ALL do this
and we ALL do that
and we all do the other
(30.) and then you get married / and your- and your () new wife says
well we go to MASS on ah ah Christmas EVE
and we-e (.) DON'T have our-r CHRISTmas dinner until ()
EIGHT o'clock at NIGHT
or um WE ALL open our presents in BED
or (..) we can't wait to rip the PAper off and its all ov-

XII. 31. ah anyway everything's DIFFERENT
32. s'-s'-you=know THINGS AREN'T JUST THE SAME
33. and (..) then they can't be any DAMN GOOD can they
34. and (..) they're not (..) / in a way (..)

XIII. 35. ah-'ntil eventually you bring up your OWN children
36. and what=you=hav'ta do-o / is to MAKE a CHRISTmas for them /
[through tears] like ya had yourself
37. but you=know you can't
38. you can TRY () / but you can't

XIV. 39. you see
you're not your FAther
you're not your MOther

and YOUR children aren't YOU
40. and it's not the SAME generation
41. and everyone you=know / the whole collection of people is () NOT the same
42. so those early memories of how WONderful everything WAS-S () are GONE (..)

XV. 43. except that they're still memories
44. so=that in THAT respect they're not gone
45. but the TIMES are gone (.)
46. the EVENTS are gone

XVI. 47. and I don't know how many adults I-I've talked to who- / who REALly (.) DON'T (.) give a lot of STO-ry about CHRISTmas
48. and I'm ONE=of='em () for the reasons I've just described
49. because it WAS so wonderful (.)
50. and it was so hap-py (.)

XVII. 51. but somehow-
maybe it's just because it's become more comMERcial these days
I=don't=know (..)
but it's imPORtant to me to remember () Christmas and my mother being the CEN-tre of Christmas
52. not me / my mother

UNIT 9 c: *EPILOGUE*

I. 1. my mother used to make me laugh
she- I used to make her laugh
we used to have a GAME of making one another laugh
2. I=mean () when you CONsider that my MOTHer was divORCed with two children / when she- when when THEY were little /
and in those days there wasn't Social Services
and there wasn't Welfare State=
there wasn't anything
you had to get on
and you had to survive
or to HELL with you (.)
3. and she picked up
and-and got on
and DID
4. and we SUFfered
and we went without
and we did a lot of things

II. 5. ah () and mother and I gr- / I GREW up with my MOTHer / until she ah remarried
6. and ah because we lived togETHer
SHE came first
I came first
7. ah maybe that's not a healthy thing I=don't=know
ah it's just the way things are
and the way things HAPpen to some people I s'pose
8. um (.) but we had a LO-OT a lot a lot of happy times

UNIT 10 a: *BACK TO ENGLAND: PUNCH OUT*

I. 1. ok I've given a bit of sad and a bit of happy about my mother / let me give you something different
2. I remember / having gone back to England from Canada
3. and there's a lot of memories conce- associated with that=
4. I'll give ya / um I'll give ya a couple or three (..)

II. 5. I was enrolled in the school / where () my mother chose to / to set house / which was () handy to her BROther / my UNcle
6. um so I was enrolled in this SCHOOL
7. um so () there I was with a Can- a VERY Canadian accent
being only EIGHT years=of=age
you=can=IMagine
been in Canada VIRtually all my live=
I had a very pronounced () NASAL () DRAWL from MONT-re-AL
8. and all these () OIK () COCKney children took () great exception to me

III. 9. and in FACT I'd only been in the school for TEN MINutes
while my mother and my / and my prosPECtive TEAcher / and the HEAD teacher of that particular school / were out in the corridor / having a- having a discussion about ME / and my-ah () my FUture (.)
when I was being SHOVED and PUSHED a little too-ah too much
10. and I wheeled round on () one=or=two=of=THESE KIDS
11. a-n-d all HELL let loose
and there was BLOOD all over the wall
and everything ELSE
12. and I just lashed out to ever- and kicked ah every- / the SON of=a= BITCH all OVER the place (.)

IV. 13. and ah (..) of course they had to come in and / and separate us

14. and THERE I was= / I was in trouble
15. I hadn't even- I hadn't even opened my first BOOK / and I was
in the SHIT [laughs]
16. [laughing] that's a memory= / I remember THAT one () VERY well

V. 17. um () the funny thing about that event was= / it had a VERY major impact
on my LIFE (..)
18. because (..) I- / having HIT this kid and go on hitting him
(.) because- /
well lets=face=it I was THREATened I=mean
I was being SHOVED AROUND
I was the interlop-
I was the person that was being BROUGHT IN
19. I was outnumbered () THIRTY to one by these OTHer kids / and
I was being PICKED on (.)
20. a-n-d so I () felt indignant 'n VERY justified / in just PUNCHing this guy
OUT you=know

VI. 21. um but you=know a FUNNY thing HAPpened
22. and this is () something that's () never () LEFT me ()
23. I- I really HURT that kid (.)
24. and ever since then I've- I've been the- the type that would ()
run away from a fight rather than () fight anybody ()

VII. 25. I=don't=know maybe I- / MAYbe it's FEAR /
26. I=don't=know
27. ah cause later- I'm a bit conFUSED- cause LATER ON I used to
get beat UP=a=lot
28. um and I wond- I OFTEN wonder WHY

VIII. 29. um and I think it's because of THAT ONE TIME / when I HURT
somebody
30. and I REALly=really=really felt BADly about it
31. um (..) ah (.) I- I=don't=know maybe I just never got OVer that= /
just () actually seeing this kid lying around [laughs]
and getting into TROUBle for it
32. I=don't=know maybe it just CHECKED me RIGHT THERE for good (...)

IX. 33. but=anyway that's a memory

UNIT 10 b: *BACK TO ENGLAND: A LOAF OF BREAD*

I. 1. another memory / um going back from ENGland is ah- this is a memory I have because it's so FOReign to (..) / everybody who'll (.) / hear this tape / or read this TRANScript
2. ah you READ about it in BOOKS / and you MAY see it in the MOVies / but you can't believe that it really HAP-pened

II. 3. my mother asked me-
ah we'd been living back in England for () a few weeks or whatever
and she asked me to go down /and buy a loaf of BREAD
4. and she gave me the money (..)
5. so I walked TWO miles / down to the BREAD shop (..)
6. ah (.) sure there's buses but ()
people don't take buses=
they cost MON-EY you=know
you don't have a penny HA'penny to take a BUS (.) you=know
you have tuppence HA'penny to buy a loaf of BREAD

III. 7. so I had my tuppence ha'penny / or whatever it COST
8. and I went down to the- to the BAKery
9. and there's a LINEup right down the street for bread ()
10. bread was in VERY short supply (.)
NOT RATioned ()
but-ah you=know it's in short supply=
and everybody WANTS it=
and there's only a limited amount

IV. 11. so (.) / I got down there in- on a Saturday morning
12. um you=know Saturday morning is- / is CHORES morning= help the MUM
13. we used to DO things in those days=
14. Saturday morning I had to DO MY CHORES / and this particular day I went down to the BAKer's

V. 15. and I stood in line for like=I=don't=know couple of hours or more
16. a-n-d there were STIL-L
I=don't=know fifty or more=a=hundred=
it seemed like HUNdreds of people in front of me=
and it was LUNCHtime=
and I was HUNgry=
and I want-ed my DINner
17. so=I=though'=t'=HELL with this / I'm GOing HOME FOR MY DIN-NER
18. so I went HOME (.)

VI. 19. and my mother said / well where's the bread?
20. I said / well () I didn't get to the () HEAD of the queue
21. um just still you=know / there's a GREAT BIG queue down the street /
and I've been WAITing in line ALL this time (.)
22. and ah (.) I'm HUNgry

VII. 23. so she opened a () can of tomato soup or something
24. and ah / course she couldn't give me any BREAD cause I hadn't BOUGHT
it
25. so I had a little SOMEthing
26. and ah she said / well (.) / do you feel like (.) going down and (.) /
joining the line AGAIN and (.) / and trying AGAIN ()
for this loaf of bread ?

VIII. 27. and I=thought / well I- you=know / I- I didn't have many friends
or anythin-
28. I'd just arrived in the country REALly
29. I=didn't have much to do=
30. I was just going to wander around by mySELF / so I might as
well w- wander around DOWN there / and get the loaf of bread

IX. 31. so I went DOWN AGAIN
32. and I waited until FOUR o'clock in the afternoon /
or thereabouts=it was late afternoon
33. and I GOT to the head of the line (.)
34. and I waited ALL that time

X. 35. [little child's voice] have you got a loaf of bread?
36. [harsh voice] HA-HA (.)
HA-HA
[normal voice] forget it () SON-ny
we've got a couple of CAKES here () if you're interested you=know
37. but=I='ought well
CAKE? (.) you=know
CAKE's more money (.) you=know
CAKE (.)
CAKE you can't HAVE () peanut butter on
38. ah well=I=s'pose=you=could but=I=mean
NO I couldn't buy CAKE=
my mother told me to get a loaf of bread=
they didn't have bread=
so I went home (..)

XI. 39. d'j'know / on reflection it's amazing that my mother belIEVED /

that I really WAS in that LINE () all day (.)
40. because nobody toDAY would EVER belIEVE a story like that=
i-if a kid CAME HOME without /
and said he WAITed in LINE for like () HOURS /
you wouldn't belIEVE him (.)
41. but my mother never DOUBted it because I=mean
THAT was what life was LIKE I=mean
if you wanted a loaf of bread /
you had to get up AWful EARly in the MORNing () 'n (..)
42. thing- things were HARD

UNIT 10 c: *BACK TO ENGLAND: BUYING MEAT*

I. 1. um 'nother story / like () a couple of days later= it-it's sort=of- / no couple of YEARS later= it's sort=of ah reLATed () in a way
2. I used to get very good at / at buying the MEAT (.)

II. 3. because um /
again Saturday morning being CHORES morning
my Mother would work from nine to six Monday to Friday
and she'd maybe do some washing= clean the house
and it was my job to go and do a bit of shopping (..)
4. and I became VERY GOOD at buying MEAT
5. now () how many () kids do YOU know / of about ah TEN / that ACTually DO / the family MEAT shopping / for the whole FAMily
6. ah I used to do it

III. 7. wh- it was RAtioned (.)
8. you had TEN pennyworth of meat / and two pennyworth of ah CORNed beef / PER person PER week (.) / which ah amounts to about twenty-five cents a person a week
9. now (.) if you get the CHEAPer CUTS of MEAT you get MORE MEAT / OBviously
10. and if you get the more exPENsive cuts of meat / well y-y-you- /
either you CAN't get IT /
or-ah you get () NEXT to NOTHing= /
you can't even get a MEAL out of it

IV. 11. so I became EXpert at ah / CHOOSing CERtain SECond- SECond cuts of meat
12. and the ONES that my MOTHer learned how=to cook WELL / were the ONES that I went OUT 'n BOUGHT
13. a-n-d you=know / SHE coached me as to
the bone

and the fat
and the trim
and the this
and the BEST end
and the MIDdle end
and the other end [laughs]
and the whatever else (..)
14. so-o there I WAS / ten years OLD doing the- / doing the GROCery shopping (.)

V. 15. and ah I used to-
'n they got me a little BIKE
16. and I used to go and do QUITE=a=lot=of shopping
used to get the GREEN groceries
'n I used to go to- to () the COBler's / the SHOE mender's
'n they used to hammer NAILS / into SOLES on shoes and stuff
didn't throw them OUT like we do NOW
17. yah in those days you never threw ANYthing out
18. it got rePAIRed and rePAIRed and rePAIRed until it WALKED into the trash can

VI. 19. well ()

UNIT 11 a: *SWISS PARADISE*

I. 1. 'member (.)
TRIP to Switzerland one time (..)
going up the Eiger
well I didn't actually () GO UP () the EIGer
I=mean I'm not a mountaineer or anything I-
2. but GOING up to () that place () called the Kleine Sch-Schiedeig
which is a kind=of=a promontory
kind=of=a little () mountain
mini-mountain
a hill OPposite the Jung Frau and the EIger
and you SEE the avalanches ACross the VOID
and you SEE the SNOW on the TOP
and you SEE this () NORTH FACE of the Eiger
of which they've made SEV-eral films=
you've probably seen some=of=them (..)
3. but to just BE there
and SEE it=
4. the S-I-Z-E (..)

it's imPRESSive

II. 5. well one day we decided- /
it's very expensive but you can take the railway to the TOP of the
Eiger (.)
6. and what it DOES is
it's like on a little underground CAble car that goes through the rock
and they've somehow () enginEERed
ah ah- it's not a cable car= it's kind=of=like a-
yah it's like a San Francisco cable car I s'pose
but it's just sort=of=a mountain railway that=
that () PUL-LS the THING aLONG on a cable and tracks /
on VERY high gradients (.)
and RIGHT through the rock in the moun-tain
7. so that at the end you come- (.)
at the top of the range / you can ACTually see over the
oth-er side / for miles and miles and miles of snow
that looks like it's three miles deep
and noone's ever WALKED on it
8. TALK about the ROOF of the WORLD

III. 9. ah there's a lot of memories about that PART of the world /
cause () my sister living in Switzerland () I've been FORtunate
enough to have been there two or three times (.)
10. but ah they all actually CLUSter into one memory of a place that is ah-h-
11. well course when you're on holiday things are different but it- /
it's like a little PAR-a-dise
12. it's- / it's- / ah ha [laughs]
it's terrific

UNIT 11 b: *SYNCRUDE*

I. 1. totally different thin- I'm very impressionable
2. I ah guess a lot of people are

II. 3. ah lately I've been working ah / a lot with SYNcrude (.)Canada Limited
who ah
DIG all this tar- Oil sand out of the ah ground
and separate the sand from the oil
and ah make ah a CONsiderable amount of CRUDE oil (.) /
at ah twenty or thirty dollars a barrel=whatever it is
th- I think they just PASSed their ah half- half a
BILLion barrels of crude
4. but anyway / because of my work I've been up there a number of times

5. the S-I-Z-E of everything up there=
you could see pictures of it=
you could have it on FILM=
you could have people TELL you about it=
you could SEE it on TElevision (.)
(6.) it wouldn't mean a THING / without you BEing there (..)

III. 7. they have a CRANE that like (.) it runs SEVENTY TWO THOUSand volts to RUN the thing
8. ah it weighs SEVeral THOUSand TONS
9. it PICKS up () three hundred TONS worth-
three hundred tons of ah earth /
in ONE scoop of the- / the BUCKet on the front of it
10. the BUCKet itSELF carries NINETY CUB-IC YARDS

IV. 11. ah the teeth WEAR OUT every thirty six hours
and they cost several thousand dollars apiece
12. um the conVEYer belts cost a MILLion dollars a MILE
and there's like () twenty seven MILES of them
13. they process TWENTY four THOUS-and () tons of ah oil sand ah an hour or a day or whatever it is
14. the HEAvy HAULers tha-tha-that= / take earth around and REjects and LUMPS of ROCK / CARRY () THREE () HUND-RED () TONS
count'em THREE HUNDRED () TONS / in one hit
and they're () buzzing all=over=the=place like little DUNE buggies
except that if you stand next to a tire-
the tires on these things are like () two or three times the height of a MAN
you=know they're like about FIFteen feet high

V. 15. um yah that's=a a more REcent thing / but=I=mean it-i-it's it's-
my WHOLE work with Syncrude is like a memory
16. like when I don't work THERE anymore / and when my projects are FINished there / and I move on
ah I don't think Syncrude can FAIL to leave its mark on ANYbody
17. um (..) sure
it's fron- STILL SOMEthing of a frontier town
it's-ah it's cut off () from everywhere else
's not a parTICularly wonderful place to live
but-ah whoo=it's=ah-
it SURE is an imPRESSive PLACE to SEE=
18. and-ah Syncrude d- do a pretty wonderful job for their people /

and everybody else / and very-
I adMIRE every much- every bit- everything they DO

VI. 19. but THAT certainly ah / would go into my autobiography / as-ah-an exp- as an experience
just having had the privilege of being there
and SEEING something of the world
and Syncrude IS UNIQUE in that respect
CERTainly UNIQUE Syncrude is
20. so I would- I would say that's pretty memorable ()

UNIT 12 a: *MARRIED LIFE: A PURPOSE IN LIFE*

I. 1. yeah one of the things that ah / I mentioned BEFORE / was this business of being in hospital
2. and being in hospital did one THING for me (.)
3. what it DID was to TEACH me /
or at least put in MY MIND /
that I was HERE for a purpose=
4. HOW could I possibly have surVIVed
the kind of ACcident
and the kind of ah PHYsical DAmage
that I-ah-I DID to myself
or was DONE to me
and COME through it ALL
when EVERYone thought that it was not-
I wasn't even worth ah th-the OPerating theatre time=
because I didn't=have=a=chance=
cause I was as good as dead on arrival

II. 5. but they- / they WORKed all night / and they kept me alive / and they brought me back to ah / this world
6. and-ah maybe that's why I have such good memories of that hospital is because ah / you=know they gave ME LIFE
7. ah ha [laughs] they GAVE me () my LIFE BACK
8. a-n-d ALL by myself without anyone () influencing me in=any=way / I determined () that (.) / I was brought back for A REA-son (.)
that there was SOME-thing in this world that I () was HERE for that I had to do
or-r () SOME purpose that I () couldn't understand () now

III. 9. when I was younger I used to go to church
10. and-ah I used to () go through the whole BIT / with-ah BIble classes Sunday School ah

11. I became an altar boy ah
        they call them SERvers in England
12. I got friends with () other guys who were () choirboys or whatever (.)

IV. 13. it was quite fashionable 'n quite the norm for middle class society to GO to CHURCH
14. I guess upper class and lower class and=everybody=else TOO
    but=I=mean / it was the DONE THING
15. and-ah as I got to the PUB years
        and the WORKing years
        and the () going=out=and=having=a=good=time years
        and everything else
    I couldn't REAL-ly see much sense of of-ah a PURpose to it=
16. I really couldn't make any decisions about it whatsoever at ALL

V. 17. but I DID () get that conviction
18. and I still have it toDAY () / THIRTY odd years later (..) /
    that () I am HERE for a reason
19. and I'm not sure what that reason is=
20. I never HAVE been sure what that reason is

UNIT 12 b: *MARRIED LIFE: DAINTY LITTLE ENGLISH ROSE*

I. 1. but one DAY-Y (.)
        I TOOK it upon myself (.)
        to take CARE of somebody (..)
2. I made the mistake of marrying her [laughs]

II. 3. she's a SWEET little girl
        just there CHIRP-y / and STU-pid
        and () you=know bouncing around life like [laughs]
        like [sighs] without a () CARE in the world
        without KNOWledge of- or-ah of ANYthing
4. and I thought you=know / THERE's SOMEthing that TOUCHed my heart
5. and THERE was SOMEthing that I could DO=
6 I could take CARE of this person that- / [sigh] that couldn't take CARE of herSELF / much less take care of anything ELSE

III. 7. she certainly couldn't ah DO anything
        like cook an EGG
        or make a BED
        or-ah DIRty her FINgers
        or DO anything

8. I=mean she was a DAIN-TY LIT-tle ENG-lish ROSE 'n
and I was going to NUR-ture this little ro-ose
and I was going to take CARE of it () 'n you=know
'n I daren't even PRUNE it you=know / for fear of
BRUISing the DAMN THING

IV. 9. um and love took off
10. and-ah SURE () I married her () an-
11. and OFF we WENT

UNIT 12 c: *MARRIED LIFE: NOT ONCE BUT SEVERAL TIMES*

I. 1. I don't KNOW even TOday if that WAS-s the purpose in LIFE
2. at the moment I'm () sort=of separated /
and I have been several () TIMES=
not just for a LONG time but for SEVeral times [laughs]=

II. 3. I think I've left ++ on THREE occasions
4. and-ah every time I do it AH-HA / ah-h-h who knows whether
th- / it'll be the last or not
5. every time I do it / I don't know why or how / it's just my
() STRIVing to-t-to do MORE
6. um I find that MY life with ++ has reTRICted me beyond MEAS-ure

III. 7. um all my PREVious stories of going
HERE and THERE and EVERYwhere
and SEE-ing things
and exPERiencing things
and feeling WONderful about things (..)
are not SHARED / with my wife (..)
8. because my WIFE () values () DIFferent things /
has no KNOWledge of the things that I feel
although as she's grown older she wants to
and perhaps she () DOES underSTAnd
9. but we come from very=very=very different backgrounds /
um which () you'd think it wouldn't MATter (..)
in ENGland it MATters (..)
10. not only in England but
when you SEE the problems of int-er-rac-ial marriages
when you SEE the problems of ah / just ra- interracial
..NEIGHbours for=goodness=sake trying to get along
when you see the problems of CATHolics and PROtestants
trying to get along
ah you realize that people DON'T get alONG () that well

unLESS they have a LOT in COMmon
unLESS their ROOTS are SIMilar
unless they have been taught the same values
and hold () the same things () dear (..)

IV. 11. ++ and I DO hold () SEVeral things () dear
12. um but we also have VERY different perspectives on MOST of them (.)
13. so that when I feel that I- I that I'm BEing () SUFfocated /
um I CAN'T SHARE that with ++
14. I also feel SOMEhow that like (.) / the most IMportant thing
well maybe it isn't the most important thing
IS to GO out and WORK
and make a living
and and and t-to pro-VIDE the very things that I
married her for () in the first place
to take CARE of her
and look AFTER her (.)

V. 15. but the difference is you=see / is that I can't go out and DO it (.)
16. ++ wants to () dicTATE and PULL the strings on this marionETTE of a
man
17. and tell me WHERE I should work
and HOW I should work
and how much MONey I should make (.)
(18.) and what TIME I should GO to work
and what TIME I should go ah GO HOME
and what we shall do when I GET home

VI. 19. um so therein lies ah / a very (..) STRANGE situation=
20. I think people would just say /
the=hell=with=it=
get divorced=
and thats=the=end=of=that
21. but ah () that doesn't () cut much ICE with my family
or ++'s family
or our upbringing
or our feelings
or the way w- we belIEVE () / in many ways
22. um so I guess we have THAT in common /
and we DO () love and care for one another very much
and we always HAVE

VII. 23. but we just-ah just BASH each other to pieces ah (..) /

psychoLOGically (.) /
with all kinds of psychological STROKES
that NEITHER of us EVEN KNOW we're DOing
until we look back like I'm doing NOW (.)
and conSIDer them
24. I- I suppose that PEOple hurt ea- HURT one another / BE-YOND BE-LIEF (.) / without ever MEANing to
25. um how many times do people in a- / a lifespan of sixty or eighty years say I'm sorry / or OUGHT to say I'm sorry
26. and perhaps some don't

VIII. 27. um human beings are pretty cruel
28. children are pretty cruel
29. ADults are pretty cruel
30. husbands and wives are pretty cruel

IX. 31. and it- it's the exCEPtion rather than the rule to see people with the matURity
and the LOVE
and the underSTANDing
to be- each to be able to give the other EIGHTY per cent and only ASK for twenty per cent BACK
32. because when you meet such a () a couple
and there's only a few that I could () ever () remember
those couples would get a HUNdred and SIXTY per CENT on a hundred perCENT inVESTment / which- which is () NOT BAD
33. um ++ and I always come up holding the short straws= / and we EACH believe that () / EACH of us is holding the shorter straw () sometimes
34. um so we FIGHT / about () we be- what we be-lieve / and what we're- and our DIFfering VALues (..)

UNIT 12 d: *MARRIED LIFE: LEAVING FOR CANADA*

I. 1. the first time it happened (.) / I wasn't working
2. ah I'd lost my () work my job
ah the industry wasn't in particularly () good shape
3. and we ran into money problems
4. and-ah because of my early childhood () memories of Canada / it SEEM-ed appropriate () at that time that- / that THIS was the MOment / to make the BREAK (.) and to go to Cana-
make the break with ENGland not ++
and go to Canada (..)

II. 5. so I announced that we would be GOing (..)
6. of course ++ announced that () we would NOT be going
7. and-ah it enSUED that () I () decided () to GO / and SHE decided to () to stay () in England
8. and I came out on my own

III. 9. um that was a very HARD thing / for BOTH of us
10. I=mean here we were
married THREE years
(11.) YOUNG
NO children
NO ties
NO anything
12. and YET () it was HEART wrenching

IV. 13. now I didn't know what would happen
14. ++ hoped that I would FALL on my FACE / and come home CRAWLing / with my tail between my legs
15. and-ah someHOW we would pick up the pieces / and everything would be all RIGHT
16. um but that was not the case ()

V. 17. um skipping on a few years / um ++ DID () come out to CAnada
18. and there was some VERY () poignant things that happened in-ah / when she came out

VI. 19. DIDn't take very kindly to Canada ANYway
20. the=only=thing=wrong=with=Canada was Canada / and=the= Canadians who LIVE here
21. um sounds very CYNical on MY part
22. ah but there we are

UNIT 12 e: *COMING TO EDMONTON*

I. 1. I CHOSE to make a life for myself
2. and I'll- I diVERT from ++ / for the moment
3. and GIVE you another s- memory and a story / which is VERY VERY crucial and important to me [choking back tears]
4. because it had a GREAT BEARing on () / my life since

II. 5. when I came to Canada- /
I- I was in the television industry and have been all my life
6. and Toronto is the centre of the media ah / in this country
7. and I () reSIDed in Toronto in a DOWN-TOWN hotel / with a

little help from ah / people that I knew / for about a MONTH
8. a-n-d I was given the RUNaround like you would NOT be-LIEVE

III. 9. I was promised () inter-views
MEE-tings
meet=you in=the=Four=Seasons at=four=o'clock=tomorrow
are you going out?
10. STAY in the hotel till I CALL you
we'll GET together for SURE=
we'll GET it on
it'll be great () you=know
11. I was QUALified
I was OVER qualified
I had ALL the attributes
I-
12. there I WAS
READ-Y for work
WANT-ING to do
I didn't ev- wasn't even going to ARGue about the MONey or ANYthing=
I just wanted to get in there and START (..)

IV. 13. and for a MONTH / I NEV-ER got () past=first=base
14. I=mean () first base was just a-
a HEL-lo
and a WONderful
n' GREAT to see ya () G-U-Y
15. and I thought / goodness me you=know / do people REALly mean what they SAY here?
16. or is it all a load of GUFF?

V. 17. and I phoned (.) / my OLDest friend / in EDmonton (.) / on a COUPle of ocCASions
18. and both times he said
well=I=don't=know=why=you're=wasting=your=time=in Toron'o
come out HERE= / come out HERE
EDmonton / this is where it's at
come out HERE
19. I PRO-MISE you
I give you my WORD
I've been WAITing for this you=know
it's been a LONG time
20. ah come out here / come an' see me (.)

VI. 21. so I got down to my last fifty BUCKS / and I really didn'thave much alTERnative
22. either I would starve / go and see my friend / or go back to England with my tail between my LEGS
23. so I made the-ah / the EF- [laughs] / a choice of ONE (.)
24. and I () SPENT my last forty-three dollars on a BUS fare to get OUT here (..)

VII. 25. that's when-ah (.) th- / the thing HAPpened
26. I came OUT here
27. I arrived at six o'clock / on a () SATurday morning
28. and after a bit of a kafuffle about trying to get into the apartment building / my OLDest friend HELD me / and GREETed me / and SAID
you're HERE=
here's your aPARTment=
I've got a two room apartment=
I've=had=it=for SIX months

VIII. 29. I KNEW you were coming=
I KNEW you were coming=
you didn't say in=so=many=words=but
I KNEW you were coming
30. so I GOT this aPARTment
and THAT's YOUR ROOM (.)
31. and this is MY room=
and this is the BATHroom=
and there's the kitchen=
and there's the fridge
32. by=the=way () the laundry's THIS way
the food- the freezer is HERE
HERE are the KEYS to my CAR
ah we- you're gonna meet a lit- a BUNCH of people tomorrow /
and on MONday you have FOUR job interviews (..)

IX. 33. well=the=end=of THAT little story was that
I h-a-d a JOB on the TUESday /
which was the VERY NEXT day (.) / after my interviews
34. I had a BANK loan on () FRIday
35. and I bought a car on () SATurday
36. and Edmonton / and everyone in it / has been very GOOD to me ever since ()

UNIT 12 f: *MARRIED LIFE: MY WIFE COMES TO CANADA*

I. 1. so-o I DIDn't go back to England with my tail between my legs
2. and much as ++ thought / that I couldn't POSSibly
GO to a new country and ah ()
DO- do what I was DOing
um she decided to come=and=have=a LOOK at it
3. and ah (.) she came=and=had=a LOOK at it
4. and ah () she didn't () LIKE () ANYthing=of=what=she saw (..)

II. 5. BUT (.) her ties to ME brought her OVER here/ some many months LATer
6. a-n-d she hadn't changed () a=HELL=of=a=LOT
7. she'd suffered a bit
because she HAD to go out to WORK
and she'd HAD to DO a few THINGS
that she didn't LIKE
that were unSAVoury
8. and she had to uproot / and leave her FAMily
her mother
and her brothers and sisters
because she chose to COME
BE here with ME=
which () I guess () says SOMEthing FOR me

III. 9. um and we () tried / and we () went through a lot of effort /
and ah so forth (.)
10. but it was very hard= / because she STILL had her VALues /
and I STILL had mine
11. and we STILL found a GREAT difficulty in SHAR-r-ing (.) /
ohh () our LIVES /
in=the=sense=of WHAT we wanted to DO
or WHAT we had to SAY
or WHAT we FELT
12. and a lot of that is being ENGlish

IV. 13. English=people DON't emote in the same way as OTHer people do
14. I've LEARNED since I've been here to ah / to emote quite=a=BIT / which
is-ah what you're getting on this TAPE
15. um but the English GENerally don't- / don't DO that kind=of=thing
16. I=mean IT'S JUST () NOT DONE

UNIT 12 g: *LOSING THE TWINS*

I. 1. um (..) a very very SAD thing happened () shortly after ++ came OUT here=
2. she was expecting twins
and I won't go into the whys or wheres or wherefors of how THAT came about

II. 3. but ah it's a very important thing to uh / an expectant MOTHer / that you're expecting twins
4. and-ah so we- / we looked FORward to this
5. and-ah we prepared for this
6. or-at least I wasn't TOO prePARed for it but-ah / SURE () I was gonna you=know (..) / ah (.) make the GOOD life and so forth (.)

III. 7. but on CHRIST-mas DAY in the hospital / she lost the TWINS
8. guess Christmas isn't too special to ++ EITHer (.) / since that year (..)
9. and that caus-ed () DAMage to-o ++'s heart that probably is (.) virtually irREParable that-
10. well () years=and=years=and=years later I guess / it's- ah we're still HERE / but that was () pretty BAD ()

IV. 11. it may seem STRANGE but you know / one night in the hospital
ah thing's weren't going that well
and she was tired
and she was going to sleep
12. and I was kind=of () fidgeting / to get off to the BRIdge club
or a tournament
or a GAME
or whatever it was
13. and ++ couldn't underSTAND why I would rather be doing THAT / than staying with HER () / in the hospital
14. and may-be () you listening CAN'T understand that EITHer

V. 15. um it just SEEMED that there was nothing I COULD DO / about ANYthing
16. perhaps now I'm older I REalize that / yes / there probably WAS something I could do=
17. just BEING there was I=suppose DOING something
18. maybe I- she didn't EVER get the support () from ME / in theway () that she NEED-ED

VI. 19. um (.) be-cause () I couldn't ACTively actually DO () ANYthing / in terms of an ACtion
a gesture maybe but not an ACtion=

20. I=couldn't=actually DO anything aBOUT anything
21. so I just () TOOK OFF
22. and got on with something that I COULD do / like go and play CARDS
[laughs]
or () go to the RAces
or () go and have a PIZza
or () get in the CAR
or drive aROUND
or go HOME
or () do the washing=
but DO-O someth- DO something ()

VII. 23. so THAT was a hurt for ++
24. that was another () HURT (.)

VIII. 25. and LOsing the twins was=a was=a / a BIG hurt (..)
26. and=she=wanted=to make all kinds of fu- funeral arrangements
and have a proper FUneral
and have headstones
and have a GRAVE / to go and VISit every year
or every Christmas
or Easter
or whatEVer (..)
27. a-n-d () I-I didn't go along with that
28. I just said
oh=well=whatever=you=like
bum=bum=bum=bum=boom

IX. 29. but ACtual-ly () the-e hospital people / tried to conVINCE her /
that it was BETter / NOT to GO / with that thing that route
30. because it would just bring up the hurt years=and=years=and=years in- /
in perPETuum
31. and that () basically the children / the babies / were never REALLY our
family / because they didn't survive
one survived birth but () only for () a very short time (.)
32. and=it=was=probably=less=hurtful=all=around / to sort=of
sweep it all under the CAR-pet / and let the HOSpital make
the arrangements / and to () do OUR BEST / to forget the whole thing=

X. 33. and that TENds to be () MY-y () apPROACH=to / issues of this type=
34. if there's NOTHing you=can DO / DON'T SUF-FER unnecessarily /
and-ah (..) um (.) beLABour the point
esPECially unHAppy points=
there's a lot of misery in the world without () DWELL-ing on them

35. what's done is done
wh-what is IS
and wh-what's happened has HAPpened
and let's get OVER it
and let's do the best we CAN
36. it- it's NO lack of repect for the () [voice breaks] / those () babies that were born

XI. 37. BUT () no ++ wanted to DO the right THING and everything
38. and-ah I-I I think that she regrets NOT having done

UNIT 13 a: *GAMBLING: WILLFUL ABSENCE*

I. 1. um (..) there have been TIMES you=know / when
beCAUSE ++ and I don't see eye to eye /
um I () WILLfully () abSENTed myself
you=know like () getting out from work LATE
ah that's () the most usual
(2.) or-r NOT going home from work () at ALL (..) hm
to GO () to the RACEtrack
or to the BRIDge club
or to the BAR-r
or to () GO see some FRIENDS
or go and take coffee with a BUDdy
or ah (.) WORK () extra hours
or whatev-
(3.) any-anything to avoi- to avoid going HOME=
because () when I DID get home / I got HIT with the third degree about
WHERE I'd been
and WHAT I was doing
and how much MONey it cost
and SO forth

II. 4. NOT that ++ was enTIRely WRONG
5. she had very good REAson to be (.) / perhaps dissatisfied with-ah MY-ah end of the bargain= / in terms of being married
6. cause I tended to-ah do my () THING
7. and if you () sort=of go back to my EARLY stories / about () ME / ah being an individualist
and being on the Eiffel tower by mySELF
and among the mountains by mySELF (.)
and spending a short time with my SISter
where () SHE does what SHE likes
and I do what I like

and if we c'n () BE together and enjoy some'in' toGETHer someTIMES
that's great ()

III. 8. um (.) maybe its sort=of coming OUT
uh that () I'm NOT what ++ needs
nor is SHE what I need (.)
and yet we're still here
9. and we still CLING (.) / and we still LOVE / and each of us thinks / well maybe ONE day-
10. I=mean if everything were RIGHT / it would be terRIfic
11. that's the sixty-four-r () THOUSand dollar QUEStion / IF AS and WHEN () COULD () everything be RIGHT (.)

IV. 12. we even went to COUNsellors about such things /
ah which in MY view is-ah / perhaps a waste of time /
because they TELL you what YOU TELL yourself / 'n
what's inside YOU / 'n they TELL you-ou-
13. ah they don't tell you anything you don't know alREADy
14. they're () perhaps just () a VERY good SOUNDing board
15. and make you FACE things perhaps BETter

V. 16. um but we have lived our LIVES () this way
17. and I think GAMBling has a large part to DO with it

VI. 18. ++'s- () ++ comes from a very- / what=USED=to=be a very WEALThy AFfluent and aristocratic family
FRENCH on her father's side
um MONied English on her lef- mother's side
19. they had a hotel down in Cornwall=
20. everything was wonderful
21. a-a-nd her father PISSED it all away WITH-ah / BASically with- / with betting horses

VII. 22. um and then he got very CAREful
23. and then perhaps didn't bet SO MUCH
24. but-ah the BOTtom LINE was / that when the bills didn't get PAID / it was be-cause TOO MUCH MONey had gone to the bookmaker (.) / until he got out of his depth
25. and I have BEEN / mySELF / very CLOSE to that / on a number of occasions

VIII. 26. uh I don't know where () I got it FROM
27. ah I just found the exCITEment () of ODDS () an attrac- /

attracted by-ah SOMEthing for NOTHing=
28. ah=well=not=really SOMEthing for NOTHing but- / but just the- the CHANCES of getting an EDGE / or / I guess er it's reflected in BRIDGE
29. I guess it's reflected in ah you=know
exCITEment
CHEAP THRILLS
ah s- you=know something lets- /
GO-ING OUT AND () DOING SOME-THING /
instead of just () sitting around doing NOTH-ing
ah enterTAINment
ah wanting to be WEALTHier than I am

[TAPE ENDS]

IX. 30. yeah wanting to be wealthier than I am

X. 31. I THINK THAT statement probably applies to (..) / ninety-nine percent of all people who- / who GAMBLE
32. I'm not talking about um
ah an odd raffle TICKet lottery TICKet or whatEVer
just for the fun of the thing
or () for () the chance in a million=
but the people who actually ACTively GO out
and play BIN-go
or go to the HOR-ses
or go to the caSIN-os
or play POKer
or whatever it IS
the people who actually () GAM-ble / they want to BE (.)
WEALTHier (.)
LUCKier (.)
and more FORtunate
than they ARE
33. and I am no exception (.)
34. a-n-d (.) NONE of us () de-SERVE to be (..)

XI. 35. but the REA-son- /
there's always a- a motivAting force / beHIND (..) / ah that kind=of a / a WANTing
36. and in my case / I () can honestly say that I- I was- /
I was a bit of a GAMbler
quite BAD before I even MET ++
and I resolved NOT to be / when I MARried her

I really did
and I () kept aWAY from () a LOT of it
37. um but what happened was (.)
that the PRESsure of NOT HAVing ENOUGH MONey
well that in itSELF wasn't TOO bad /
because if I had had a not- / NOT HAD enough money /
and I was living with my MOTHer / or I was living with my SISter
I would not have HAD the problems that I HAD
38. but because I had a responsiBILity
and I had taken it upon mySELF / to take CARE of this little fragile FLOWer
and I didn't have the where-with-all to keep ++ in the STYLE to which she would like to be acCUstomed
and the style to which I would LIKE her to be accustomed
and I myself TOO would like to be accustomed (..)
motivated me to / may-be-e bet a pound or two / in the hopes of winning ten=or=twen-ty
or a HUNdred
or a THOUSand
or whatever it MIGHT BE

XII. 39. a-n-d I guess gambling- /
well I KNOW that gambling is SOME kind of a disease
40. and it's-s been something () throughOUT my life () that I find it () a little hard to CONquer
41. I HAVE conquered it I think
42. BUT () I STILL [laughs] / inDULGE myself (.) / because I LIKE it

XIII. 43. AND () I STILL have that little- / well it's TWO things really
44. ONE is I still want to be wealthier and more fortunate and- / and everything / like I said before / like () gamblers do
45. but actually I've now grown to NOT be a compulsive LOSer
46. I've actually grown to () enJOY it for what it is (..)

XIV. 47. um just () trying to outsmart somebody
or beat the odds
or to- t'-t' have some kind of an interest which is / sort=of MATH'matical ANalytical ah
you=know which hockey team is going to beat another
ah who's going to get the most points
ah which horse is liable to start first from the gate
ah whose liable to have the queen of spades on the beginning er on the bidding

ALL of these things are a challenge=
course BINgo's no challenge at all
I=mean just SIT there / and GET BORed (.) /
for three hours while you () just STAB INK on PAper
48. but anything that requires a CHALlenge / is a challenge () to me ()
to try and BEAT the DAMN thing
49. and THAT in itself is a carrot
50. that in itself is- / is an atTRACtion / that I can't- /
I find it HARD to resist (.)

XV. 51. and aGAIN you=know / ++ canNOT underSTAND it
52. and ++ () CANnot forGIVE it / or deal with it / or put UP with it
53. and when I'm NOT with ++ I can do as I LIKE
54. and when I AM with ++
I EITHer have to () DO-O () as SHE wishes (.)
or-r () not DO as I wish (.)
or be very SECretive about / what I do-o
that I WISH to do
that I don't want her to know about
because I can't be BOTHered to ARgue / or suf- anyone
suffer pain on () THAT account

XVI. 55. SO THAT is () largely a reason for () ++ and I () not ever () MAKing it (..)
56. and gambling is LARGEly responsible

XVII. 57. I discussed this with my sister years ago
58. and she doesn't understand it EITHer
59. but she () is understand-ING eNOUGH / to say
WELL / if you can conFINE yourself to five dollars a WEEK /
or something that's totally meaningless and trivial
and you can enjoy the fun out of THAT
then where's the HARM in it?
60. and then you don't have to keep it a secret from ++ /
and () s- so=on=and=so=forth (.)

XVIII. 61. a-n-d she's RIGHT
62. but there's ALways the lurk / and there's ALways the DANger /
of () overstretching
63. there's STILL () always the threat to ++
64. so although / in THEory THAT () is a good iDEa / in practice it doesn't
work out

UNIT 13 b: *GAMBLING: NOT A VERY GOOD CURE*

I. 1. I'll give you a couple of ah () QUICKies on the / th- / the
whole gambling front here=
2. we're talking about little- / little sort=of CUbicles of THINGS that
HAPpened like

II. 3. right out of the blue one day-=
I was working / all DAY and () EVERY day / and I was working
every EVening along with my () buddy
4. a-nd () by the time we got through / at about eleven o'clock at night /
we were pretty sand bagged
5. but we were SO HIGH from WORKing / and the- / the projects
we were working on / there was NO WAY you could go HOME and
go to SLEEP
6. I=mean you=know / you're HIGH= / you gotta come down= / you
gotta reLAX

III. 7. SO () he towed me off to SOME caSIno in Earl's Court
8. n'=I'd never really experienced anything like this (.)
9. but I WENT IN (.)
10. and I just bought some chips / and I just THREW one here and one there

IV. 11. um to cut a long story short
I bet ah um a dollar on RED and it came up RED
12. so I bet a dollar on HIGH and it came up HIGH
13. and I bet a dollar on () ODD and it came up ODD
14. and I bet a dollar on () BLACK and it came up BLACK

V. 15. or-a- whatEVER I did () seemed to work
16. and then I even put a dollar on () ah ah a combination of SIX numbers
or FOUR numbers
or THREE numbers
and- and- and THEY all came UP
17. and I nev-er had a los-ing spin
18. by which time everyone at the TAB-le / was just putting several hundred /
or several THOUSand / on top of my ONE DOLLAR (.)
a-n-d I STILL never lost

VI. 19. and everyone at the table WON
20. to the point where I actually put ONE dollar on number TWENTY-nine /
and all around and on and everything to DO with twenty-nine / was
RAINED on by everyone who was playing the game
21. and it came up twenty-nine
22. and they closed the TABle

VII. 23. well I guess that's a memory that ah [laughs] / I would remember
24 um it's trivial / but I was THERE
25. and I [laughs] / and I CER-ainly remember how I felt THAT DAY
26. I felt like ho boy I'm the king

VIII. 27. that is not a very good cure for a gambler

UNIT 13 c: *GAMBLING: DRINKS ON THE HOUSE*

I. 1. ah-h / another time um / I never had that much luck at the races
2. I actually- I used t'- I used t'- I-I bet a LOT you=know /
like () not a lot in one go but / conSIStently all the time
3. so you=know / there was never any perCENtage
4. I=mean I didn't know HOW to bet / I just wanted t' to DO it you=see

II. 5. but one day I got lucky / and-ah-
well one DOES once and again if you do it LONG enough
6. um and I seemed to clean every single race
7. I just went down to the local track
8. and I NEVER bet more than about () twenty dollars=
it was like five dollars or ten dollars
or two dollar exactor
or five dollar quinellas
or whatever

III. 9. a-n-d I got to about the seventh race
10. and I'd won every race=
11. I had TWELVE hundred dollars in my pocket
12. and I had to go to WORK

IV. 13. so I just bought a TEN dollar ticket for the next race
14. went to work early
15. walked into the bar
16. said DRINKS ON THE HOUSE (.)

V. 17. gamblers do very silly things
18. and-ah that's one of the HIGHS that they GET / that's one of
the things that they DO
19. course while we were there/ we had to turn on the RADio /
and see who won the EIGHTH race / that I hadn't bothered to
stay for
20. and () that was another hundred dollars / cause it won at ()
EIGHT to one or something like this [laughs]

VI. 21. SO () there you go / gamblers sometimes DO have / ah [laughs] / good stories
22. and I guess that's why they go on gambling / cause they hope it'll happen every DAY

UNIT 14: *WILL ANYONE EVER THANK YOU?*

I. 1. I remember going to a PARty once
2. I um I didn't parTICularly want to go to this party=
but it was-ah kind=of a party that I was exPECTed to go to
or at least SHOW up at
and so forth
3. so I just DUly showed up
4. and-ah had a drink
and aNOTHer drink
and aNOTHer drink
and so forth

II. 5. so I- / my TONgue got pretty loose
6. and I- / I remember sort=of BRAGging about how-
well I guess it was bragging
(7.) that I was working night and day with this job
and I had a / a part time EVening job doing something ELSE
and I was WRITing columns for someone ELSE
and I was helping out () / a friend at HIS business doing something ELSE (.)
(8.) and I was SPENDing all this time
and MAKing all this money
and- well not making so much money
but being REALly BUsy
and doing an awful LOT

III. 9. a-n-d this girl
that I sort=of took a little bit of a SHINE to anyway
um said what FOR
10. and I said PARdon
11. and she said WHY are you- why- when you-
12. when YOU are DEAD [laughs] / will any-ONE ever THANK you? / or reMEMber you? [laughs]

IV. 13. and (..) / I never sobered up so fast in ALL my life
14. I-ah took off=
15. I went home as fast as I could

16. and you=know that- that- that- that's / that funny little EVEning has been
 with m- / I- / I-

V. 17. I remember that QUITE often
18. I remember that quite often

UNIT 15: *POIGNANT MEETINGS*

I. 1. um / anoth- a- a- another () evening that remember- /
 there was a SER-IES of evenings
2. and this was another ah PERiod in my life / where I had ACTually LEFT
 ++
3. and I was-ah inVOLVed with another woman
4. but on Sunday eve- one eve- one or another evening / now and again /
 I used to meet ++ / at the HILton hotel (.)
  for COFFee
  and DANish
  or () gateau
  or something

II. 5. and (..) / the grand piano would () play (.)
6. and everything was washed a-way (..)
7. and the two of us TCHA / just sat there crying [cries]
8. and I remember that FAR more viVIDly than the girl I LEFT her for

IV. 9. HUH (.)
10. but they were wonderful evenings / in=as=much=as they were very very
 sad (..)
11. but they were wonderful / because I- I- / MAYbe I felt that I was getting
 THROUGH to her
12. and- and [trailing off] that's another little thing

UNIT 16: *FAMILY HOLIDAY*

I. 1. oh there was one time I went on HOLIday
  I talk about holidays a LOT
2. 'n I didn't want to GO on this one at all
3. I was going with-ah / my WIFE
  and her MOTHer
  and her NIECE
  and her DOG
  and our () BABY=in=arms
4. a-n-d a LOT of things happened on this holiday

II. 5. we DROVE to Jasper
6. it was HELL
7. on the way ++'s MOTHer BROKE my transmission
ah well she ALmost broke my transmission=
she certainly broke the-ah MUFfler system
8. so the REST of the HOLIday we had no MUFfler

III. 9. um we got to where we were GOing / at the end of the DAY /
and about a five hundred mile DRIVE / with lots of BELLYaching /
and comPLAINing / about everything
10. and we GOT there
11. and as soon as we GOT there / I was TOLD / by everybody ELSE /
that we had to LEAVE / because they didn't LIKE it
12. so () / the next day we UP and LEFT / because () nobody LIKED it

IV. 13. so we managed to GET the muffler fixed
14. and-ah we're heading on south down highway two / in SEVENty
mile=an=hour RAIN
and we're going SEVENty miles an hour in the opposite
dirECtion
and we've got SUITcases on the roof
and everything ELSE
15. and PING off comes the roof rack
16. and there are our suitcases / ALL () OVER () HIGHWAY TWO

V. 17. and I have to () CLIMB out
and GET all the suitcases
and PUT all the UNDies
and the SMAlls
and the SOCKS
and the () whatever else everyone had
BACK in the suitcases ()
GET the roof rack
which was FOUR hundred yards
BACK up the highway
GET it
PUT it back on the () roof
'n LASH the whole thing together
PUT the suitcases back up
18. and NOT ANOTHER WORD was SPOKen () /
(19.) as I drove NUDE all the way to where we were GOing (.)
20. THAT's something I'll never forget (..)

VI. 21. the HOLi-day- /

actually that was () like the SECond day of the holiday
22. from THERE it just got WORSE [laughs]

VII. 23. we-um went down to national PARK
(24.) where-ah all these wonderful people that I did NOT want to be on holiday
WITH / decided to pick n- FLOW-ers
and saw up TREES
and collect ah THINGS out of the park they had no right to TAKE
ah and so forth
25. so that gets me into a lot more phiLOSophy
about where I beLONG
or where I DON't beLONG
and different VALues that people have [laughs]
which I won't go into here
26. but it was CERtainly an EVENT / that-ah (.)

VIII. 27. it ACTually motivated to write a STORY / about my life
28. and the way I thought of DOing it / was to write it through the eyes of my
() DOG
I=mean not through MY perspective /
through HIS perspective
29. so actually WHAT it beCAME was / the story of-ah / my DOG's life ()
as seen through HUman eyes in in-in his poor=little body
an'an' so forth
and having all the KIND=of emotions that I HAVE
30. so I'm able to sort=of say what () I () think about everything / and really ()
it looks as though it's the dog's um story
31. so () that was aNOTHer thing (..)

IX. 32. I even took a WRITing course one time=
33. I-ah sent off for a writing course
34. and-ah (..) / I kept getting all these things to DO for a writing course /
and-ah all these asSIGNments
35. and I thought ()
well () why am I DOing this?=
they're asking me to do STUFF
and it's ALL HARD work
and they're more interested in telling you how to SELL your stuff
than how to WRITE your stuff

X. 36. so in the end I just gave it up
37. and-ah I still owe them money to-ah this date
38. but as I'd written scripts / and sort=of stories / and bits=and=pieces for
years / I- / I real-ly HUH wasn't convinced so (.)

UNIT 17: *THE DAY I WAS FORTY*

I. 1. well (.) yeah this is surely a memory and a funny story

II. 2. do you KNOW what I DID on the DAY I was FORty?
or () shortly after the DAY I was FORty?

III. 3. I WENT into WORK
4. I QUIT my JOB
5. I put the HOUSE up for SALE
6. and traded my CAR with MONey I didn't-
er for MONey I didn't HAVE
to buy a BIGger one
7. CASHed in my pension
8. and had a GREAT SUMmer (.)

IV. 9. WENT over to England
10. SAW my wife
11. and inFORMed her that we no longer had a JOB
12. the house was on the MARket
13. and um / WELL=
what shall we do NOW=
14. I'm FORty=
it's TIME to CHANGE MY LIFE

V. 15. uhh (.) / funnily enough () nothing changed (.)

VI. 16. I came BACK
17. WE came back
18. we took the house OFF the market
19. we eventually got rid of the car
and got a diff- / and got a SENSible car
20. I didn't get my job BACK
but I carried on WORKing for them
21. and it was as though () nothing had ever changed (..)

V. 22. but when I was FORty
or just after FORty
I was () JUST DESp'rate (.) to DO () SOME-thing

VI. 23. what was the MEANing of my life=
24. where was I GO-ing
25. WHY was I working for the SAME company / till the DAY I DIED=

26. WHY wasn't I GOing anywhere
27. WHY wasn't I making a lot of MONey
28. WHY weren't- / WHY wasn't I SATisfying children and ah the KIDS 'n

VII. 29. why-why-why weren't things BET-TER you=know like

VIII. 30. NOW's the time
31. BOOF
32. let's () CUT it ALL before I get too OLD to DO anything
33. let's do something ex-CIT-ing (.)
34. like quit your job ()
35. and then GO BACK 'n WORK for them ANYway

IX. 36. so () that was-s () another thing

UNIT 18: *OLIVE AND ANCHOVY PIZZA*

I. 1. I LIKE funny stories [laughs]
2. I LIKE the odd the CORNball the uh off the WALL thing

II. 3. well one day I was-ah having pizza
4. you=know- an'=I=don't=know () if ANY of YOU have ever gone to have pizza / with like TEN other guys
5. and you all have TEN menus
6. and you=all=decide=you're=gonna=have PIZ-za

III. 7. so what it is / is it's a COMmunal thing=
8. you all have more=or=less the same THING / or similar things
9. and you just share () what you HAVE
10. but it takes everybody like HALF=an=hour to decide what they want / even though they've HAD it a HUNdred times before

IV. 11. so the waitress came o-ver
12. and she said are you ready to or-der
13. and I said YES
14. and everybody LOOKed at me (.)

V. 15. so she said well what would you like?=
16. I=said=we'll have THREE () LARGE () OLIVE=and=ANchovy PIZzas
17. and everyone went () BLAhhhhh
18. 'n=I=said well you SA-ID / ANY-THING= it's OK= I'll eat ANY-thing= anything you like= 'at's fine / SO () I went () and GOT () WHAT I like (.)

VI. 19. so they said / WELL () WE're NOT having THAT

20. so I turned to the waitress and I said /
well I'll have ONE medium OLIVE and ANchovy pizza
21. and you can bring it when it's ready in twenty minutes /
by WHICH time THIS bunch might be ready to ORder [laughs]
22. and I don't think they were (.) / EVEN by THAT time (..)

VII. 23. so () that's a- a little stor/ actually that's an amusing story
24. I-I-I LOVE telling that story
25. because it comes up TIME and TIME and time and time again=
26. everytime I go to have pizza I'm reMINded of that ONE TIME (.)

VIII. 27. how PEOple can be SO-O-O [laughs] ONE thing [laughs]
28. 'n [while laughing] you PUT 'em to the TEST
29. and they're NOT easy to PLEASE at all [laughs]
30. they=don't=know WHAT=the=HELL they WANT [laughs]

UNIT 19 a: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: MY LITTLE PIECE OF THE WORLD*

I. 1. you=know / um / I-ah / I-ah sold UP
and packed UP
and-ah got the child- / ah ++ and the kids
and went back to England
2. a-n-d
BOOF
no WORK
no JOB
no nothing (.)
3. BUT / I was fortunate that-ah / I came by () some money
4. my fath- ACTually my father died

II. 5. and-ah I didn't know my father very well
6. ah hadn't seen him since I was FIVE
7. so it didn't have a great imPACT on me=
except that I felt that I OUGHT to feel GUILty about it
or that I ought to feel more than I FELT
8. um suffice=to=say that I DIDn't

III. 9. and being in VERY DIRE straits / with a family to support /
um that was of more interest to ME
10. um but the result of the WHOLE thing / of NOT being able to get any
WORK / and SUDdenly having a CERtain amount of MONey / caused ()
me () to () think / well maybe I should get a business
(11.) or get () some () kind=of=a WAY of making my MONey where I
don't have to reLY on SOME () ASSHOLE giving me a job / or

emPLOYing me / and going about BUSiness that I have NO
interest in
12. SO to=cut=a=long=story=short I BOUGHT a () restaurant

IV. 13. EVERYbody () told () me () I () was () CRA-zy
14. ah in a LARGE sense everybody was RIGHT
15. but I went into this THING (..) / HOOK line and sinker
16. and I gave it everything I HAD

V. 17. and ++ wanted to be PART of it
18. and-ah she wanted to HELP me
19. but I KNEW () that SHE didn't KNOW as much as she THOUGHT
she KNEW
20. and I KNEW () that our PAST history / probably / we would
not be comPATable / with LIVing together
raising CHILDren together
um having a LIFE together
and WORKing toGETHer as WELL?
21. you=gotta=be=kidding

VI. 22. ah I=mean part of working is an esCAPE from HOME (.)
23. and part of HOME is an escape from WORK=
24. and I think- / MY feeling is that a man needs BOTH
25. I guess some people c'n- c'n- c'n- c'n manage it / but I can't

VII. 26. but my MAIN thought was / NO / this is MINE
27. ah ++ () you=got=your=home
you got your kids
you got your dog
you've got EVerything
28. you- you've got YOURS / let me have MINE=
29. I want my little PIECE of the world / so that I can manage it /
and run it as I SEE FIT= / not as YOU see fit (..)

UNIT 19 b: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: BUSINESSMAN*

I. 1. so I went into this-ah / into this business=
2. how LITtle I knew / and how GREen I was

II. 3. within about () THREE months / I was talking to the bank manager
4. and I said /
well-l uh Peter uh
um TELL me
if I got together say () a million dollars / or a couple /

would the BANK MATCH it
cause I've got one or two ideas you=know / about-ah how
we could ah REAL-ly um MAKE things happen here um
5. 'n=he=said oh sure NO PROBlem
6. you get a million pounds / I'll match it with a million pounds () /
if the project is ah- / if the inVESTment is ah / WORthy

III. 7. so I got REALly BIG ideas
8. SUD-DEN-LY I was in business
9. SUD-DEN-LY I was attached to ah / the ROTary club ah / a
little bit um
10. I became a- a- a PERson / walking up and down the HIGH street

IV. 11. HULlo () MISter ++ =
12. how are YOU () MISter ++ =
13. nice to MEET you () MISter ++ =
14. how's business () MISter ++

V. 15. we must to get- / you=KNOW / I became- / I KNEW the local ()
acCOUNtants
and the BANK managers
and the LAWyers (.)
(16.) the inSURance salesmen
the- the-ah local merchants and the businessmen
the ga- the GUY that ran the GARage
the vet- the vet'inarian
17. you=know I=mean I became a member of SOCiety
18. WOW / did I ever TAKE OFF= / wasn't this wonderful (..)

VI. 19. and THEN (..) well (..)

UNIT 19 c: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: TOUGH LAMB*

I. 1. the most enJOYable thing were- was- was the little STORies and-
2. and actually I reMEMBer THOSE () more than ANYthing

II. 3. I remember COOKing (..) / for an enTIRE restaurant / all () by my-self
with somebody just doing a little bit of washing up
and-ah well doing ALL the washing up
and-ah a couple of girls doing the WAITing (.)
4. and everybody comes in at seven-thirty eight o'clock
5. about quarter after eight I'm busy / putting up () all kinds of () STEAKS
and FISH
and () you=name=it

ALL () a la carte
cooked to order
EVERYthing
top to bottom
when my WAITress comes in
6. and says the table eight deMANDS to see me

III. 7. I said / YOU're the waitress
8. DEAL with it
9. I'm BUSY
10. can't you see- / what d'you want me to DO=
leave TWENTY dinners
here all to BURN
while I go and talk to some () ASShole
who wants to SEE me?

IV. 11. who is it ANYway?
12. table eight
13. well who's table eight?
14. I don't know () never seen 'em before

V. 15. well DEAL with it
16. so off she goes
17. she comes back
18. no he inSISTS on SEEing you

VI. 19. so I managed () to get () another () table or two's dinners OUT
slow down everything ELSE
tell the HELP to kind=of () MAKE sure nothing burned=
20. I went OUT there in my apron / and SAW the guy
21. and=I=said well () what seems to be the problem () SIR I said
22. this LAMB () he said () slamming it across the table

VII. 23. I said () well () what's the MATter with it
24. IT'S TOUGH (..)
25. really?
26. YES () and besides THAT it's SMALL (.)

VIII. 27. so=I=said well 'ats the NORmal SIZE 'ats () 'ats 'ats what everybody HAS
28. I=mean I- I- I can't understand it being TOUGH
29. I=mean we've never had a problem beFORE / but if you'd like something ELSE um
30. WELL CER-tainly I'm NOT having THIS () you=see

IX. 31. so I picked it up and said what would you like?
and=he said a sirloin STEAK
32. and=I=said how would you like it DONE?
and=he=said medium RARE
33. and=I=said thank=you=very=much SIR
it'll be on the table in TWELVE MIN-utes
34. and I advise the REST of your party to conTINue with their dinners
so that () at least THAT doesn't spoil

X. 35. so-o- but the STORy is that I went back to the KITchen /
36. I GAVE the lamb chops
ah the rack of lamb or whatever it was
to the GIRL / who was WASHing DISHes
37. and sh-she couldn't find a knife and a fork / cause she had
them all in the DISHwasher
38. so she took two sp- TEAspoons /
and CUT all the meat /
and ATE all the food / until () you could've LICKED
you COULD-N'T EVEN () LICK () the plate CLEAN= / it
was clean already

XI. 39. like SHE () ATE the WHOLE thing and said
40. THAT is the BEST () MEAL I have [laughs] had for YEARS (..)

XII. 41. and later the ASShole gets up and pays his bill
42. and=I=said I'm SORry you had a PROblem with the LAMB
43. he=said
problem?
WHAT problem
WHAT lamb
it was WONderful
44. [laughs] and out he WENT (.)

XIII. 45. but THAT's the KIND of THING you GET () in the CAtering industry (.)

UNIT 19 d: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: NICE TIP*

I. 1. um / course the CAtering inDUStry's full of stories=

II. 2. I remember one time I was- / I was kind=of wait-ing and-ah
waiting table
and doing a bit of COOKing
and running the place as I DI-ID (.)
3. and some () nice people came IN-N

III. 4. and-ah () they were from out of town=
out of COUNT-ry
and so FOR-th
5. the meal came to about=a=hundred DOL-lars
6. and not being familiar with the CURrency / or not really () CARing / they left two hundred and fifty dollars
7. and said THAT'S FINE / VERY GOOD

IV. 8. ohh () that was a nice tip [laughs]
9. they certainly FELT they got THEIR mon-ey's worth (.)
10. 'n so=did=I
11. so [laughs] that was () kind=of an interesting story (..)

UNIT 19 e: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: YOU NEVER CAN TELL*

I. 1. there was another time when um we were- /
we were USually busy every table FULL on=a SATurday NIGHT
2. and for some rea-son / in the slow season / there was a Saturday / when NO-BODY SHOWED up=
3. there were no reserVAtions= / nobody was THERE (..)
4. so (.) we decided to close UP / about nine o'CLOCK

II. 5. after all there was nobody THERE=
nobody to cook FOR=
nothing to DO-O
6. so it=was () POINTless
7. so we're-
the CHEF's busy (.) mopping the floor
everyone's CLEANing up
SETting up for the next DAY
and in come two PEOple
8. [mimics quavering old voice] are you open for dinner? they said [stops mimic]

III. 9. WELL () in a manner of speaking YES / in a manner of speak-i-n-g () / I wouldn't adVISE you
10. I=mean do you really want to SIT in an empty restaurant all by yourself [laughs]
11. we usually have a GREAT time=
and a party atmosphere=
and music=
and everything GOing=
everyone's having a good TIME

12. why d'n'cha come back next SATurday? [laughs]

IV. 13. so we closed up

V. 14. next Saturday (..) / they showed up a-GAIN (..)
15. we were bu-sy=
16. we didn't have a table=
17. they had to wait three quarters of an hour to get in (..)

VI. 18. just goes to SHOW you= / you never () can TELL
19. STUpid business (..)

UNIT 19 f: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: EARNING MY KEEP*

I. 1. but probably the BIGgest memory I have / is a sense of PRIDE
of achIEVEment / in that (.)

II. 2. we had no reserVAtions
3. it was quiet
4. I didn't expect to be doing very much business (..)
5. so (.) / I () was f-fron-ting the enTIRE business myself

III. 6. and in came () two () old customers / whom I () knew () very=well
7. and I set them DOWN
8. an' we all three () had a little DRINK
9. and I took their o-

IV. 10. they said / WHAT's GOOD () OLD=BOY?
11. so I TOLD them=
12. I suggested a couple of things
13. and=they=said that sounded GOOD=

V. 14. so I went off to get someTHING / when two MORE people came in (.)
15. so then I had to () go an lay the table for the FIRST two /
take a () drink order () for the SECOND two /
and rePEAT the process /
by which time FOUR MORE pr-eople came IN
16. well=to=cut=a=long=story=SHORT / there were EIGHT-teen people in
the restaurant / ALL waiting for FOOD / at the same time
17. so I had to
TAKE the drink orders
POUR the drinks
LAY the tables with knives=and=forks and everything else=
cause I have CLEAN tables () in MY place

DO all the preparation
DO all the COOKing
SERVE all the FOOD
POUR all the WINE (.)
and do all the washing up AFTER (..)

VI. 18. well I DID it
19. EIGHT-TEEN totally DIFF'rent () FOUR () COURSE () meals / at one and the same time
20. and I got out of there at three o'clock in the morning
21. and I thought / B-O-Y do I ev-er earn my KEEP [laughs]

VIII. 22. in the end (.) I sold the restaurant=
23. and I ONly LOST=a HUNdred THOUSand DOLlars on the DEal (..)

UNIT 19 g: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: A FRIEND VISITS*

I. 1. one of my VERY old friends / + / came over from CANada to my REStaurant

II. 2. um she came to see ME-E=
3. she came () perhaps- / well first=of=all she LOVES her food ANYway
4. so ah-ah () a TRIP to a RESTaurant is no HARDship for +
5. but () it was a long way out of her WAY
and she had to sort=of make her way DOWN THERE
and kind=of make the TRIP (.)
and so forth

III. 6. so she came
7. and of COURSE / I just LA-ID everything on like=you=wouldn't=believe
8. I=mean the STEAK
and the DESsert
and the SALad
and OH boy (.)
9. SHE still TALKS about it / to THIS day (.)

IV. 10. and the following year / she came over again
and brought her BROther down
and the two of them had aNOTHer () WONderful meal
and so forth
11. and-ah / SHE still TALKS about it / to THIS day

UNIT 19 h: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: IF YOU'D COME*

I. 1. and (.) you=know () what it DOES
2. it makes me feel () / well how did I ever lose money=
3. I=mean () how could I-
4. well I knew how I lose-lost money=

II. 5. I didn't get the BUSiness
and I didn't get enough PEOple
at quite enough TABles
on eNOUGH ocCASsions
6. the odd Saturday night or=whatever was good
7. the odd busy night here=and=there was good
8. but you=see you have to do VOLume / to be in BUSiness (..)

III. 9. but the most HURT-FUL thing
well it was a combination of hurt and pride
10. when I () ACTually SOLD () the REStaurant
and it became COMMON KNOWledge
that it was GONE (..)
that it had changed hands
EVERYbody in the NEIGHbourhood
my customers
and PEOple I KNEW who WEREn't CUStomers
who never came NEAR the place
would stop me in the high street
or in the- the lineup in the BANK
or in the-ah PRODuce
or the () GREEN grocery
or whatever
in the GARage=and=say
R / WHY did you SELL? (..)

IV. 11. and I said / WELL () you=know / I'm going out of BUSiness=
12. I'm losing MONey=
13. I can't afFORD to-ah / to keep this place going
14. I can't afFORD it (.)

V. 15. 'n they said / what are we going to DO WITH-OUT you
16. [laughs] and I said / well you'll have to get on with the guys that BOUGHT it
17. well they're a bunch of () ah () INDians aren't they?
18. they-I guess we're going=to=be a CURry house or something

VI. 19. so I said / well that's THEIR problem=

20. that's YOUR problem=
21. it's not MY problem anymore
22. if you'd come to my restaurant [laughs] you=know
        when I was THERE
        and I had DOUGHnuts to sell
        and STEAKS to cook
    then I wouldn't be IN this predicament
        and I'd still BE here
        and you'd still have your- / your restaurant that you LIKE so much
        that you never bothered to show up-

VII. 23. well actually of course I didn't SAY all that
24. but THAT was what was going through my mind
25. and b-o-y did I ever fe-el it
26. and when I got out of there / I STILL have that sense of treMENdous pride / of doing () really ()

UNIT 19 i: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: LOU AYERS*

I. 1. I=mean=an illusTRAtion of- of- OF it is that-ah LOU AYERS
        who you may not have HEARD of
    was=a VERY prominant FILM star () producer-director from HOLLYwood
2. his wife came over
3. and SHE came to eat
4. and she was SO impressed / that I got a SIGNED autographed photograph / from LOU AYERS by AIR MAIL / within a MONTH of her () being there for- / for the meal that I served (.)

II. 5. and I served it to her / when () I () was doing the cooking / FOR () / the enTIRE restaurant / and there wasn't an empty seat in the place (.)
6. so the food couldn't have been BAD (.) / when I was cooking it all myself

UNIT 19 j: *ENGLISH RESTAURATEUR: FUNNY THING ABOUT CHEFS*

I. 1. SO (..) lot of pride there in in in COOKing
2. um but you do it long enough [laughs] you- /
    it's kind=of nice to have a rest / and go out / and eat FAST FOOD for a change [laughs]

II. 3. funny thing about CHEFS
4. funny thing about cooking

III. 5. ask any chef / that for a LIVing / cooks cordon bleu (.)
chateaubriand (.)
'ollan-daise (.)
you=name=it (.)
6. ask them what they they want to eat
7. if you're lucky they'll say
AN egg
A cheese sandwich (.)
or BAcon sandwich
or () piece of meat pie
8. ANYthing SIMPLE EASY forGET it you=know

IV. 9. they're not INterested in- in- in EATing () food (.)
except maybe proFESsionally
to TASte
or t' t' to comPARE
to LEARN something
10. but (.) to NOURish themselves?
11. two eggs 'n bacon eas- easy OVer please
12. most chefs will ask for that

UNIT 20 a: *BRUSHES WITH THE CROWN: PERRY MASON*

I. 1. It was about 1962 (.)
2. when I was travelling home from work one time

II. 3. I got in my car from the parking lot
4. and it was about ten thirty eleven o'clock at night
because () working in the television industry () you tend to work in the evenings
5. and I was going home
6. and I was just (..) crui-sing along / slower than () normal speed actually

III. 7. a-n-d () a girl go off the bus / came around the bus / and ran across the crosswalk
8. and I- () I HIT her
9. well I didn't really hit her / I kind=of stopped
and she ran into the car
and I jumped out
and I HELPed her
10. and I- () I got her home

IV. 11. a-n-d-ah I got her home

12. out of- you=know because I- she was OBviously a bit shaken up
13. she WASn't hurt=
she could walk=
she was fine=
she wasn't even bruised=
no problem
14. but I just took her home which is-
oh she was going to see her BOYfriend as a matter of fact
which is- which is what gives rise to this STORy

V. 15. um / it was you=know eight or ten blocks from the bus stop
16. so I drove her up the hill to () wherever it was=
17. she'd () gave me the address
18. and I got her there

VI. 19. and her boyfriend opens the door
20. and I exPLAIN () to the young man that-ah- what had HAPpened (..)
21. and he gave me a funny LOOK
22. a-n-d-ah () I thought no MORE about it (..)

VII. 23. till about a week- a month later / ah a policeman comes round to my house / and SERVES me with SEV-EN summonses (.)
to appear in court for DANgerous driving
driving without due care and attention
SPEEDing
ah not stopping at a CROSSwalk
u-u-um failing to report an accident
um () la=TI=da=DI=da et cet- 's about SEVen of them (.)
24. so I told the policeman / W'LL what a lot of () j-JOLLup you=know
25. this is () NONsense=
26. this is an=a trumped up piece o' NONsense

VIII. 27. I=mean () uh TOLD him the STORy
28. told him what happened= / MY version / ah which I wasn't obliged to do
29. but I was feeling kind=of (.) SHOCKed / an' well quite CHATty
30. I=mean I hadn't anything to hide (..)

IX. 31. but I had to go to COURT
32. so I WENT to court (.)

X. 33. and (..) they asked who was defending me
34. and I said / I am (..) and so -
uh er I didn't have anyone () repreSENTing me or other
35. and so they-y- they-ah asked me to plead

36. and I pleaded NOT GUILTy
one=two=three=four=five=six=seven

XI. 37. so they had to () TRY the CASE
38. so they TRIed the CASE=
39. they read the charge
40. they-ah brought on the witnesses / wh-which consisted of the () GIRL / one or two witnesses that they HAD / and so forth

XII. 41. so every time they-ah brought forward the testimony / they-ah () turned to me and said / have you got any questions (..)
42. it went something like this

XIII. 43. so WHERE WERE you at the time of the accident
44. um I was looking in a shop window
45. oh so you didn't SEE the accident
46. oh well I was THERE

(XIV.) 47. I=said but you were looking in a shop WINdow / so you didn't actually () SEE-E the accident () / am I right?
48. well I HEARD it
49. no further questions (..)
50. and so on

XV. 51. I-ah- eventually the GIRL's called to the stand
52. and she said- she gave her testimony=
53. she was crossing the crosswalk=
54. and this CAR came and HIT her

XVI. 55. so-o I said well-l () / y- when you got off the BUS you went round beHIND the bus (.) / and you-ou entered the cross-walk / without seeing () whether or not there was a CAR coming (..)
56. ah (.) well yes I didn't see you / I=w=uh=um=you=ah () NO
57. um so I said well () / I was just coming along the road= you didn't SEE me
58. so she said NO

XVII. 59. I said ah were you RUNning or WALKing across the crosswalk
60. she said I was HURrying
61. so I said were you RUNning or WALKing across the crosswalk
62. she said well I was in a HURry
63. I said WERE TWO FEET OFF THE=GROUND
64. she says I'm not sure
65. I said NO further QUEStions
66. CASE disMISSed

XVIII. 67. well of course I got out of there
68. and said well Jesus I should have been PERry MAson
69. and I went home with another big HIGH of-ah (.) / how I () had a little triumph that day
70. DOES your heart good doesn't it ()

UNIT 20 b: *BRUSHES WITH THE CROWN: SUING THE CROWN*

I. 1. yeah well following on from my-ah / my PERRY MAson story / um I have a totally different story

II. 2. uh i- / one day I was ah /
it was Chr- / it was BOXing day I DO believe
3. and-ah I was leaving this sort=of / ah out of- OUT=of=the WAY place where we were staying for CHRISTmas /
um to go and see- to MEET the PEOple that-ah / were coming to VISit us /
and on the way to buy some CREAM from a local FARM
4. and it was VERY icy and VERY slippery

III. 5. and-ah I went and got the cream
6. and-ah I was () driving along
7. and there come the PEOple

IV. 8. so I pulled over to the side of the road ()
9. as they came up the opposite way
10. it was a country lane so you- you couldn't () you=know

V. 11. so they went BY me so there was room for cars to get by
12. and I got out of my car
and-ah WENT to go and MEET them
and say OH hang on fellows
you=know I'll just turn around
and you follow me in
and then you won't get lost
you=know the usual kind=of WELcoming your GUESTS to a kind=of remote country ah STEAD
13. and I was walking towards their car when this ah / car came over the rise hitting sixty sixty five miles an hour / on SHEET ice (.)

VI. 14. well the driver was rather GOOD / because he MISSed / um +'s car
15. and-ah he MISSed ME / or ALmost missed me=
actually the edge of the car just CLIPped me

16. and he- a-n-d he CRASHed into MY car / and TOtalled it (.)

VII. 17. well this CAR / was a police CAR / driven by a uniformed policeman
18. and I was carted to hospital / with my HEAD bleeding
19. a-n-d I had () a bunch of stitches in my head / and half my
HAIR ah shaved off (.) / for the purpose (.) / on BOXing day

VIII. 20. and () an hour or so- well about an HOUR went by=
21. we had to phone ++ / and let her KNOW (.)
where we WERE
and WHAT had HAPpened (.)
and would WE BE home
and everythi-
22. and not to worry / everything was ALL RIGHT

IX. 23. ah and not to worry / everything WAS all right
24. I=mean ah I got out of the hospital with a few stitches in the HEAD /
and a bit shaken
25. and-ah my- our friends drove us () BACK
26. and we had our Christmas turkey / and all of the- /
CHRISTmas you=know (.)

X. 27. but anyway / my car was totalled
28. so () we have a one ca- / we're a one car FAMily
29. um we had to get back to town / uh once our () sort=of holiday was OVer
and I had to go back to WORK
and I didn't have any CAR (.)

XI. 30. I had inSURance
31. but THAT TOOK a while to sort out
32. and I needed wheels
so I had to RENT a car
because I couldn't afford to go and BUY one

XII. 33. and-ah what will- what was to do?
34. well the only thing the lawyer said / was that we had to SUE the
R.C.M.P. (.)
35. so SUE the crown I did (..)

XIII. 36. a-n-d () I had to go to a discovery hearing and so forth
37. and my- / my lawyer actually SAT there
and RUDEly and NOISily READ his newspaper
because everything THEY had to say was a CROCK
(38.) and-ah we had an open=and=shut case

XIV. 39. so there I was with a CAR that was totally wiped off the face of the earth
a few stitches in my HEAD
a lot of inconvenience
'n-ah () probably () a couple of thousand dollars worth of exPENses
40. when all was SAID and DONE () / we SETtled out of court
41. I got one THOUSand dollars / of which my lawyer took the majority
portion (.)

XV. 42. um so I think next time I'll go the PERRY MAson route
43. and I won't ah EVer ah bother with LAWyers (.)
44. because [laughs] I've got a little more FAITH in myself /
than I have in putting my trust in-ah / the proFESsional advice of others /
sometimes

XVI. 45. beSIDES which () I'm my OWN PERson
46. [laughs] take- take my lumps

UNIT 20 c: *BRUSHES WITH THE CROWN: RAILWAY TIES*

I. 1. um / on the other side of the coin/ I've been in the DOCK / a few times
2. um one occasion I remember

II. 3. people are always scavenging the countryside f'r () little bits=and=pieces
that they NEED / or take a FANcy to /
like-ah a Christmas tree
or-ah a few rocks
or-ah something for the rockery or something for the yard
or-ah a bit of old JUNK that's lying around
4. and-ah I took a fancy () to some-ah / rail-way ties one time /
which I just saw lying on an emBANKment
5. and they'd BEEN there for months / as far as I could tell
6. I thought / well if they're going to SIT there for months /
I might=as=well HAVE 'em (.)

III. 7. well I knew full well that you could BUY them for / you=know
a FAIR dollar
8. and I- I NEEDed a few
9. and I thought / well if they're just lying there / why don't I just go GRAB
'em
10. so I coerced a FRIEND of mine / or perSUAded a FRIEND of mine (.) /
to help me go GRAB 'em cause they're rather HEAVy

IV. 11. so I rented a U HAUL for the purpose [laughs]

12. and-ah () obviously I knew I wasn't enTIRely in the RIGHT / cause I went at NIGHT
13. and we were REALly in the middle of the ACT / when flashing blue and red lights ca- arRIVE on the scene
14. and we're carted off to the local COP SHOP / and-ah finger printed / and () put in JAIL

V. 15. a-n-d I have to ah=appear uh / charges of THEFT
16. and-ah it was quite a deMEANing () experience
17. um I didn't feel () parTIC-ularly bad about it
18. but-ah we were taught a SHARP lesson (.) that-ah (.)

VI. (19.) what doesn't beLONG to you doesn't beLONG to you=
20. and yet you look around / and you see PEOple [laughing] / every DAY / getting DEALS
    and HUH RIPping off SOMEone / [stops laughing] or something
    and getting FREEbies
    and-ah GETting the MOST out of EVerything
21. [sighing] all I ever seem to do is PAY for it [laughing] / in () one () shape or form [stops laughing]
(22.) or SUF-FER for it

VI. 23. s' ah that's a few stories on the- / on the LEGal front

UNIT 21: *ROMAN CATHOLIC*

I. 1. one topic of conversation which comes up (.) a great deal is-ah (.) reLIgion [laughs]
2. uh politics of=course is anOTHER one
3. and-ah often [laughs] / as soon as you get into religion or politics / the discussion is [sighs] / is ended before it beGAN= / but it goes on for five hours anyway= / and noone- noone's ANY the WISer
4. but I DO remember one story

II. 5. I was-ah courting my wife at the time
6. and-ah we got together with () believe=it=or=not () her GODfather / her CATHolic GODfather / and her girlfriend that she was-ah rooming with
7. and the four of us went out for dinner / and this=that=and=the=other / and had () AN evening (.)
8. AN-D the discussion came around to religion at some POINT (..)

III. 9. Now I'm NOT a religious man=
10. I- I used to be an altar boy

I used to-ah go to church
I used to carry the flag in the BOY scouts
and-ah go through all the ah NORmal things / that a () MIDDLE class ah family do

11. um and I- / over my FORMative years I sort=of TRIED to get into the space of what-ah ah ah / of the JEsus and-ah (..) /GOD and- / and=everything

12. and I- / and I susPECT like many people () huh / I'm none the wiser / and HAHA- / and none of us ever WILL be

III. 13. but then I'm not getting into philosophy= I'll tell you about the story (.)

IV. 14. SO after this DINner / um / we were all sitting around in th- / in the apartment / having COFfee /
and-ah so forth /
and-ah religion CAME UP /
and () I (.) STARTed (.)

15. I was being SOLD () a BILL () of CATHolic GOODS that I () was having NO PART of

16. and I remember (.) / this man who was ah ++'s GODfather (.)/
was associated with the CHURCH /
had all kinds of ARGUments and DOGMA and=EVerything /

17. and I said to HIM (.)
if YOU () can HONestly () look ME in the EYE
and TELL me () that it is RIGHT (.)
for PEOple () to LIVE () in GOLD palaces () with GO-LD () LACE ro-bes
and EAT and DRINK like K-KINGS (.)
and be surROUNDed by THOUSands of FILTH-y STARVing PEOple
who are GIVing (.) MOST of what they HAVE () to the CHURCH (..)
if YOU can SAY () that THAT is JUST
and THAT is IN the NAME of GOD (..)
I WON't beLIEVE you

V. 18. a-n-d I actually MADE the guy () THINK

19. and I actually turned- / I actually made him QUEstion () his own () sort=of THINKing about the thing / when you LOOK at it from that perspective

20. a-n-d [laughs] my wife ah
well she WASn't at THAT time
she said / I have NEV-ER () seen that man FLOORed () in all my life=

21. and I guess- (..) / I guess that's ONE of the things that led to ++ and I getting married or something [laughs]

there was something about [laughs] it that kind=of (..)

VI. 22. but-ah THAT's a memory that I DO have=
because when people DO talk about religion / I remember () THAT time
23. and- and THAT'S-S sort=of one thing / c- that I CLING to
24. that's one thing that helps me KEEP IT ALL in perSPECtive
25. religion is NOT a God-made thing / it's a man-made thing

UNIT 22: *CALGARY TOURNAMENT*

I. 1. moving along (..) / we talked about BRIDGE before
2. but here's- / here's something that I remember actually / because it- /
it WAS so DIFFerent

II. 3. when you belong to-ah / the=American=Contract=Bridge=League /
and you enter an- an event / you- you- ()
you HAVE to be governed by certain rules
and you have to () go aLONG
and be HERDED like a bunch of sheep
and sit at this TAble
and move to THAT table
and so forth
4. and NOW they've invoked no smoking ah rules and regulations
and=so=forth

III. 5. anyway=I=went down to this ah (.) / I went down to this ah /
TOURNament / in Calgary / with-ah a friend of- DEAR friend of mine
6. and we- we b- we booked into the hotel / for the weekend /
exCEPT our ROOM wasn't ready

IV. 7. so we couldn't book into the room
8. so there we were
um filthy day
filthy weather
room not ready
and we had to BE somewhere / to start our game of BRIDGE
9. so we- / we shuffled off down- / put our suitcases back in the car /
and shuffled off BACK down there (.)
(10.) and started to PLAY / the-ah first session of bridge (..)

V. 11. well THAT was a disASter
12. um we did NOT enjoy the opponents
we did NOT enjoy the cards
or th- the PLAY

or th- the SPEED of the PLAY

VI. 13. ah it was in some GRUBby HALL / ah comMUNity hall / CROWDed beyond belief
14. HALF the field were / GOing into the lobby / after every SECond hand / to SMOKE themselves to DEATH
15. but there was a dirECtor / a certain + + / who comes STORMing in (.)
RATing- beRATED all the smokers up and down
how BAD it was
and how they were abUSing their PRIVileges
and all this () BULLshit
16. so-ah we- we were even LESS amused

VII. 17. ah and we were just finishing off / when we were told
that HALF of the field would be in / the NORTH WEST quadrant of Calgary / to play-ah against each other / in the final
and the OTHER HALF would be in / the south EAST quadrant / of-ah Calgary / to be playing in the- in the FINal ALso
that the results would be comPUTed / across the telephone / or something
or would be known / the FOLlowing DAY
ah DIRections would be given to everybody
WHERE these venues would BE
and little MAPS were being handed OUT
18. and uhet uhet
19. WHAT's going ON here?
20. I=mean () THIS is the MOST () DISorganized badly run THING I can imAGine

VII. 21. so anyway () moving along / we decided / well we'd better get back to the hotel / an' comPLY
22. we must comP-L-Y / and do what was- what's exPECTed of us
23. we've ENtered this thing=
we've gotta BE somewhere toNIGHT=
let's find a hoTEL
24. so we went BACK to the hotel (.)

VIII. 25. but on the way (.) / we got splashed HEAD to TOE in the MUD / by YOUNGsters running through the CARpark
26. an' + and I were wearing you=know / reasonably respectable clothes / and we got C-A-Ked with MUD and SLUDGE from the CARpark=
27. so LET'S get to the HOtel=
and get a WASH
and a SHOWer
and change

and something to eat=
maybe we'll FEEL better
28. so we get back to the hotel

IX. 29. room's STILL not ready
30. they still don't seem TOO interested in this- / ah-uh in us STAYing there
31. so I got a REfund of SUCH money as I'd paid already
32. and we TOOK off (.)

X. 33. and we never stopped- / we never got out of the car until we got to RED DEER
34. and we never phoned the BRIDGE people
35. and we never-ah / ah made our aPOLogies or anything
36. we just () took off=

XI. 37. ohh / this is so- / this is PLEAsant
38. this is- this is- [laughs] this is PEACEful
39. this is worth DOing you=know
40. we () were being treated like a bunch of SHEEP

XII. 41. well of course there was a PRICE to PAY
42. there were all kinds of remonSTRAtions
43. and-ah the directors were searching CALgary for us
and we got rapped through the knuckles
and we got () virtually BANNED from the A.C.B.L.
and we were TOLD that / we musn't do THIS
and we musn't do THAT
and HOW DARE we
and so forth
44. MY atTItude was / well who GIVES a shit
I=mean if- if it has to be THAT unBEARable
and that DIFficult
and that unPLEASant
I=mean who CARES anymore (..)

XIII. 45. so (.) well that's sort=of a memory of the story of=of=of ho- / what a ROT-TEN day it was
46. a-n-d how () that CAUSed me to- / and + / to have ah / take VIOlent reACtion to- / to this kind of TREATment
(47.) and- and-ah DO that which was NOT conventional /
by just () taking off and forgetting the whole thing /
withOUT making the () PROPER () phone=calls / and niceties
and everything else=
48. it was just () AH (..)

UNIT 23: *VIOLENT THINKER*

I. 1. I was very ANGRY that that time / and so was +
2. we were REAL-ly PISSED OFF / which is WHY / we DID what we DID
3. and being ANG-RY reminds me of-ah / something ELSE I want to talk about (.)
4. it's called being a () VI'lent THINK-er

II. 5. now there have been MANY times () in my life where- /
LIKE the incident at the- CAlgary where /
MY mind has become exTREMEly kind=of (.) tunnel visioned / and-
well to put a-
NO not too FINE a point on it /
VIOlent (..)
6. and it reminders me that one time back in ENgland / perHAPS thirty years ago / um I went to see the BANK manager
7 and I-i- /
when you go to the bank manager /
you usually go because you need MONey
and I can't remember why I went to SEE him
maybe I was opening an account /
maybe I was-ah / or
TRYing to
maybe I was trying to borrow money /
or WHATever
8. and he was just () there () listening to me

III. 9. he would pose one question / and I would answer SIX
10. and I think I was in a bit=of=an ANGry space at THAT time / because I was IN-DIGnant () / about ()S-SOME-thing=
11. it might've been () the proCEDures
or () the REF'rences that you NEED
and ALL the steps you have to () GO through
and ALL the horseshit you have t' kind=of comPLY in this society
12. and I gave VENT () to my () SPLEEN / or whatever=you () like to put it (.)

IV. 13. and he didn't SAY much=
14. he just LOOKed at me and smiled and said
you know (.) you're a VIO-lent think-er (.)
which STOPped me DEAD in my tracks
15. but it's something I have NEV-ER forGOTten
16. and you=know the man's RIGHT (.)

V. 17. because (.) / when I SEE the things that governments do
an' the things that PEOple do
and the things that-ah that HAPpen out there
and-ah-
18. we all have our oPINions about how the world should BE= /
and [laughs] we arGUE about it day=and=night / it's part of living
19. [loud whisper] BUT I GET REAL-LY ANG-RY [normal voice] /
when my point of view isn't WHAT's happening you=know [laughs]
20. and I DO get angry- / I guess I AM a violent thinker

UNIT 24 a: *CAMPING: WONDERFUL AND MISERABLE*

I. 1. and when you live to be about fifty-ah (.)
(2.) you talk about MEMories / and you talk about looking BACK on a- /
on a LIFE / and AUTObioGRAPHical things (..)
(3.) fifty years is an aw-ful long time
4. and-ah y- it's not very difficult t' just focus ah / on something
that happened ah / at ANY MOment there

II. 5. there's a WHOLE series of things that happened out of ah / ++ being in Canada
and US not () having (.) / maybe as much money as we'd LIKE
or- and- and roughing it
and-
6. being part of the Canadian WAY / is to go CAMPing

III. 7. going camping is-ah IS-
8. well=I=don't=know / it's certainly not REALly the BRITish way of doing things [laughs]
9. ++ likes flush lo-os
an- flush toilets
and-ah nice sanitary arrangeme-ents
and a comfortable be-ed
(10.) so to sleep on the GROUND / with a tent over you-ou-

IV. 11. I 'member one time we were at-ah / ROCK LAKE / () in AUGust
12. it was NICE in the day but THAT night
the wind came down out of the s- the-ah the snowy MOUNtains
a-n-d the rain beat down to the point it was almost SNOW
the wind was so violent it just=about tore- / wrenched
the tent RIGHT=out=of=the=GROUND
and we were HUDdled there
SOAKing wet
FREEZing to death () / in THIS MIS-ery

wondering wh- what on EARTH we were doing there
having DRIVEN / like the last SIXTY miles on a DIRT
ROAD with nothing but ROCKS in it (.)
13. an' we must've had ROCKS in our HEADS / to go and do a thing like that
14. BUT (.) I reMEMber it (.)

V. 15. and I remember it FONDly
16. you=know we were with you=know couple of other couples who're also on
the same GIG (.)
17. THEY didn't have- beFALL the same () disASters
18. they were all in their campers / or their () WELL anCHORed
eQUIPment (.) / that we () were TOO mean or TOO poor to BUY

VI. 19. but-ah I remember sitting around the campfire and
and enJOYing ah / the TALK
and the- the FISH
and the whatEVer
20. ah it was FUN (.)
21. but it was misERable TOO
22. and when ++ and I EVER went camping / it was a combinAtion of
WONderful and MISerable (.) / in one way or another (.)

UNIT 24 b: *CAMPING: VERNON*

I. 1. I remember we went down to ah / VERnon ah / down to the okanAgan=
2. now THAT was wonderful
3. 'cause () the WEATHer was WARM
and=it=was JUNE or juLY
and=it=was the PEAches
and-ah-
4. AHH

II. 5. and ++ really / really ah ORganized it well

III. 6. we-ah RENTed a TENT trailor
7. and we- we went DOWN there
8. and so we didn't have this TENT business= / we just () erECted the thing
9. and we just () slept there / and drove around

IV. 10. ah we got really SUP-ER orGANized=

V. 11. we went down to the local butcher shop
12. and we would buy () such meat as we'd want THAT DAY
13. a-n-d we had sort=of=a COOLer=

we'd=give=him the () FREEZer PAD
and he'd put it in his FREEZer
and then the next DAY we'd give him the () SPENT ONE
and he'd give us a fresh freezer pa- / block of ICE
basically / to keep our food nice and-
14. every-thing was tic=it=ee=boo

VI. 15. until ONE DAY
one morning
++ was going to the () washroom
which is a concrete structure in the campsite there just ()
tic=it=ee=boo
16. and she saw this sign / BE-WARE of SNAKES
17. well / it took ++ about SEVEN minutes to PACK UP and leave that place
[laughs]
18. she was-s () PETrified (..)

VII. 19. and on the SAME holiday there was one time she had to get up
and go out in the night / and she didn't WANT to disTURB me
20. so she's trying to climb out of the ah tent trailor at night
21. except she forgot there were no stairs ah leading OUT / or she MISSED it
or something
22. but she fell down / a-n-d-ah () split her middle () as she called it

VIII. 23. the-ah- there's a- sort=of=a- a rusty ridge of metal right THERE
where the DOOR should've been
24. and she was trying to climb oVER
25. and she () imPALED herself on it
26. and we had to go to hospital and have her () vaGINA sewn up [laughs] /
or stitches put in / or whatever (.)

IX. 27. but that's a memory that SHE has I guess [laughs]

UNIT 25: *TEACHING BRIDGE*

I. 1. you=know it's aMAZing
2. um (..) you never REALly KNOW what we're capable of
(3.) un- / until we actually CHARGE IN and make a fool of ourselves
4. um (..) I 'member one of my EARly days in Canada

II. 5. I was working away quite happily
6. and I got a PHONE call from / ah d- / ah EduCAtion / wanting to know if
we/ if we KNEW any people who could TEACH BRIDGE
7. and I said know people who could teach br- / well d'j'- (.) / yeah

8. there must be HUNDreds of people who could teach bridge

III. 9. and they said / well- / well we- ()
10. I said-ah / do you HAVE any people who want to LEARN? / how to play bridge? / at school?
11. oh yeah we have THOUSands of people who want to learn
12. trouble is we can't find anyone to TEACH them

IV. 13. and I said / ohh well
14. I could probably give you a () hundred NAMES / if you'd PHONE me toMORrow
15. they said / A hunDRED names? / like WHO? / like WHAT? / you=know
16. like () the guy sat UP and took NOTice

V. 17. so I said / I don't know
18. let me THINK about it
19. I'll go down to the club and- / and-ah
20. WHAT club?

VI. 21. well it wound up with the next day- / well he went- /
actually NOT the next day / he wouldn't LET me off the PHONE
22. he said / well what about yourSELF / what about-
23. he- / he was just- / just DESparate for a- / a name / ANYBODY / li- like no qualifications / NOTHING
24. just- / he just wanted someone to teach some bridge

VII. 25. he WOUND up with conVINCing me / that I should go DOWN to the local composite HIGH school / and teach a bunch of-ah BRIDGE students / how to PLAY the game
26. well I'd never taught ANYbody ANYthing in all my LIFE (.)
27. and I had NO iDEa how to () run a course / or how to DO ANYthing
28. but-ah oh well you=know / OH WELL

VIII. 29. the FEELing sort=of GOing to () the venue / and SETting UP
(30.) and the PROspect of WALKing IN / to a classroom / with THIRTY PEOple
or howEVer many there WERE / twenty odd anyway
and TEACHing them something () / that I-
31. I KNEW about the SUBject
32. but I was () CERtainly no TEACHer

IX. 33. ah (.) / I remember / like week after week after week / having to GO to the SESsions / and the FEELing of/ of actually WALKing DOWN the CORridor

34. basically you have to walk in THERE and be a SHOWman (.)
35. and I got a GREAT HIGH / out of driving home afterwards
(36.) and thinking / BOY I did a GOOD job (.)

X. 37. BUT (.) two hours before that / three hours before that / I was walking down the- / the HALL there () /
and I TELL you / I had to make sure my PANTS were CLEAN
38. because-ah / I was real-ly scared= /
you know I was REALly scared / and nervous about the whole THING
39. and you=know there's () a WHOLE BUNCH of PEOple looking up to ME
and- and who am I? you=know (..)
40. but once the ice is BROken
it's amazing what a human being can do

XI. 41. and-ah yeah / I got some GOOD students
42. and-ah / we got some GOOD results
43. 'n it was- / I was kind=of glad I did it
44. SO much SO that-ah / you=know it's something that I conTINued for some years you=know and- / and really got a lot of joy out of- out of DOing

UNIT 26: *PAT ON THE BACK / HI R*

I. 1. in summary you=know life- / life is-ah / what life's all about is highs and lows
2. I=mean / and different people get 'em in different ways / and stuff (..)

II. 3. a lot of the middle stuff / uh [expels breath] I=mean doesn't mea(n)- / you forGET
4. ah yeah / the BRAIN doesn't really NEED to- / to remember those things= and you discard it= / it's just dai- daily HUMdrum
5. its the HIGHS and LOWS that you remember (.)
6. and I guess different people ah (.) / certainly remember the HIGHS / and maybe OTHER people tend to DWELL on the LOWS / depending on their POSitive NEGative attitude towards life

III. 7. ah (.) / BASically I remember- (..) /
I remember a lot of LOWS
8. but I don't remember them THAT well
or I'm not able to focus on them
9. they're sort of innermost and they're private
and they'll never be forGOTten
um and you=know I can shed TEARS on them
and so forth

10. but-ah there's not much we can DO about it

IV. 11. I think we ALL like a pat on the back for a job well done
12. and in REcent times I- / you=know I've been FORtunate enough to FIND that- / to find my NICHE
in terms of my wor-
proFESsional ah situation
working
where I have actually (.) been able to bring ALL my characteristics to BEAR
and still BE () the MAVerick that I am
and the rebel that I am
and the VIOLent THINKer that I am
and harness all those energies to GOOD proDUCtive WORK (.)
and to HAVE everyone around me appreciate them (.)
13. when the president of the COMpany can TRUST me
and give me tickets to the HOCKey game
and take a client out to the HOCKey game
and-
which I didn't care to GO TO in any case
but-ah you=know when the bosses ah rally round
and support
and go to the aWARDS dinner
and bring me back some aWARDS
that I happen to have won in VanCOUVer
when the CAMeraman
or the EDitors
or the- the BOYS around the PLACE
and the girls that run in the office you=know
sort=of treat me as I walk in
at ELEVEN o'clock in the MORNing
or three o'clock in the afternoon
whatEVer time I CHOOSE to show UP
with the same kind=of / OH () HI R you=know
it-it-it-this- it's REALly nice to-
14. it's a REAlly lovely feeling / and its one that () I () won't forget (..)

V. 15. I remember alSO- / you=know ah when I came back from Canada- ah from England / after a FIVE YEAR absence / ah I'd LOST TOUCH
16. two years before I went back to England / I didn't have any work
I was () FIGHTing unemPLOYment
I was trying to work in a RESTaurant
ah do ALL KINDS of THINGS
17. um / and I was walking down Jasper Avenue / and the place had

CHANGed
18. and-ah a lot of my f- friends had moved on
and changed their jobs
moved HOUSE
and you=know it was VERY different

VI. 19. and I'm walking down Jasper Avenue / HI R
20. and I looked around
21. and there was () a guy there
22. I didn't () KNOW him from a HOLE in the ground

VII. 23. well this KID was about TWENTY
24. so I guess the time I'd seen him before THAT / he must have been FOUR-TEEN
25. ah but HE recognised ME
26. and that- / he GAVE me something / because-

VIII. 27. about () F- FOUR blocks down the road / I-
on the other side of Jasper
looking in a store window
or whatever it was
somebody else / HI R
28. HEY WH- WHERE the hell you BEEN
29. I don't know this ga- guy EITHer (.)
30. took me about TWO days to figure out who HE WAS you=know

IX. 31. but it's kind=of nice isn't it /
when YOU () are in a () BIG CITY /
or you're in a- / in an environment where you FEEL like a bit of a fish out of WATER /
and then you hear
HI R
HI DON
HI whoever=you=are ()
you=KNOW
32. it does you good=
33. it- it makes you feel- / well it- / HEY [laughs] / I'm not a NObody
34. I- (.) you=know

X. 35. so I guess-s () in summary / I tend to focus () on the good things / the REAL good things

UNIT 27: *A COUPLE MORE*

I. 1. just give you one more little/ little story
2. um talking about this unemployment time
and being a WAITer and everything
and GETting involved with restaurants and stuff ()
and so forth
3. ah (.) COUPLE of things
4. I went to the Edmonton Inn one time- /
I don't know if I even told you this story
but I'll TELL it to you cause it's very fast

II. 5. I went to the Edmonton INN
6. and I went into their MAIN ah hoity-toity dining room
7. and SAT down
8. ah an'=they=said YES SIR

III. 9. I said ah may I see the maitre dee
10. and=he=said OH=
yes- yes=SIR=
just=a=MOment SIR=
can I get you sea- can I get you a SEAT? (.)
11. ah would you care for something to DRINK?=
12. YES I=said / I'll have a double SCOTCH / ah 'n NO ice

IV. 13. ah so I'm sitting there with my DRINK
14. and I pick up the menu
15. and I look at the menu
16. and the maitre dee comes BUSTLing over

V. 17. and I say / OH
ah pleased to meet you=
DO have a seat=
MAY I buy you a drink
18. so [laughs] he sort=of LOOKS at me
doesn't know REALly whats going on / or WHAT'S on my mind
19. so he sits DOWN
20. and says well uh I'll have a glass of wine () thank YOU

VI. 21. and so we're sitting there / and () I look at the menu
22. and I said / you know you have a VERY VERY () FI-NE menu here
23. well
THANK you sir=
THANK you very MUCH SIR
he says

24. yeah that's-
YES
we're- we- WE kind=of LIKE it

VII. 25. and=I=said / and THIS RO-OM is () is REALLY-
26. I've been to every- / EVery room in- / in the CIty
27. and THIS IS () the PLACE
28. he=said / well that's very nice of you to say so

VIII. 29. I=said / WELL I've decided that this is where I'm gonna WORK
30. so WHEN DO I START? (.)

IX. 31. well he fixed me up with a job.

X. 32. working at another place at the-ah / Convention Inn SOUTH-(.) /
yeah there's quite a lot of psyche to that story [laughs] REALly
33. it's kind=of putting the b- BOOT on the other foot=
or- or looking at a- a PROblem of getting a JOB /
ah getting some work
and taking a totally different attiTUDE
and putting your personality on the LINE
34. and [laughs] / I don't know WHY I did it / or HOW I did it /
but I- I- it just kind=of () FELL OUT you=know
35. it was part of () ME I s'pose

XI. 36. um / when I was at the Convention Inn South /
I=mean I remember doing all kinds of things
37. you=know MAKing ah Spanish coffees
and pouring FLAMing BRANdy
from three foot high
down into a brandy glass
and () making () Caesar salads
and tossing the lettuce
and GRINDing the anchovies
and everything
38. making () all kinds of things / and there's a lot of creativity about THAT
39. but aGAIN () I remember little things like (.)

XII. 40. customer's paying ()
I=don't=know () couple of hundred BUCKS /
for his () table of ah / guests for dinner or whatever
41. he says YES I think I'll have some Black Forest cake if you=don't=mind
42. I said-ah no I don't mind
43. but-ah no I don't think you'll have Black Forest cake /

and THERE it was () sitting like () on the desert trolley like ten f- /
four or five YARDS away

XIII. 44. and=he=said OH isn't that Black Forest cake
45. I=said well
YEAH
it is ()
but-ah YOU'RE NOT having ANY
46. and he LOOKed at me
47. and=he=said wh- wh- what d'you mean?

XIV. 48. I=said you don't REALly want that Black Forest cake do you?
49. it's been SITtin' there for five days
50. I've got some nice STRAWberries in the back=
51. would'ja LIKE SOME? [laughs]

XV. 52. but you=know [laughs] / I made another FRIEND

UNIT 28: *SOMETHING VERY IMPORTANT*

I. 1. I haven't told you yet / about something VERY important
2. a-n-d it's a memory that () I'll always HAVE
3. ah I=mean I'm in the MIDdle of this particular memory RIGHT NOW
4. um it's been going on for a year / or two / or three

II. 5. I- um I have a VERY good BUD / + / with whom I live
6. and () I'll tell you the story of how we got to- [laughs] GETHer=

III. 7. I- I- I was oVER here in () Canada on my own / ah leaving my wife and family in England (.)
8. and-AH I had to find somewhere t'- to LIVE / to hang my hat and so for-
9. I looked around
and I couldn't afFORD this
and I looked for shared accomodation
there's a bunch of FREAKOS or WIERDOS you=know / that- / like FREELOADer kind of welfare people / that do that kind of thing
10. and AH / I was getting PRETty dePRESSed

IV. 11. and I met a mutual FRIEND / through a friend of mine () / who was prob'ly as different from me as-ah / a person can BE (.) / in many ways (.)
12. and I propositioned this LAdy who HAD this house and this accomodation / that I should MOVE IN

13. well a couple of days later I DID () move in
14. bu- and it was kind=of STRANGE / and she was really () kind=of () surPRISed about the whole thing / having lost her husband a couple of years / or THREE / before

V. 15. and it was all platonic
all straight forward
and all business LIKE
and all () friendship
16. and well we'll see how it works out (.)
17. one thing led to another (.)
18. and we've become very good friends

VI. 19. but the story is (..) not just THAT in itself
20. beHIND that is- is- / we have GROWN to-ah a f- / a REALly FINE / yet somewhat strange / relationship (..)

VII. 21. we both work
and we work at odd days
and odd times
and odd-
22. I=mean + works ah seven days a week
or two days a week
or five hours a week
or thirty hours a week
or whatever
23. and she works all hours days and night / as I do
24. and-ah sometimes we work
sometimes we're both off
and sometimes we PASS each other in the NIGHT
as I'm going to work
and she's coming home (.)
and vice versa

VII. 25. THAT's fine
26. I guess it suits BOTH of us / that way (.) / a little bit (.)

VIII. 27. but you=know (..) / when I get PAID / + has bills that- / that haven't been paid
28. and-ah well I don't actually PAY rent / which is what I-ah-
I started out paying RENT
but-ah THAT didn't last very long
29. I just pay her uTILity BILL
or her PHONE bill

or I just pick up two hundred bucks worth of groceries
or I take her car
fill it with gas
get it serviced
whatever
30. you=know I=mean THAT's how I contribute (..)

IX. 31. um and then after a couple=of=weeks after I've been paid /
and I send money home to ENGland / I- I get pretty thin on the ground
32. and + says you got any MONey?
33. and I say
yeah=
oh yeah I got a-
I got-
I got-
34. NO she- / NO YOU HAVEN'T she says YOU'RE BROKE

X. 35. and I say NO I'm not
36. I got TEN bucks
37. she says YOU can't go around with ten bucks=
38. she gives me forty dollars ()

XI. 39. we go to the BINgo (..)
40. she wins a () whatever she wins / she HANDS it to me /
goes in MY pocket
41. it's OUR money
42. it's OUR money

XII. 43. you=know you got money=
we got money
I got money=
we got money
44. NEITHER of us have money / we can GET money (..)
45. we've both got money (.) / well let's go and blow it=
46. let's have a good time [laughs]

XIII. 47. but you=know () / we have NEV-er ONCE to count-
COUNTed the COST
48. NEITHER of us () has EVer added up / ANY pennies
and ha'pennies dimes nickels /
and said PAY you=know
49. I'm contributing MO-RE
or I'm contributing LE-SS
or I OWE

or I-
50. you=know there's never been an accounting

XIV. 51. and + always says THAT's the way it SHOULD be (.)
52. that's the way it should be (.)
53. if you're gonna start arguing about- /
if you're gonna start arguing about QUARTers /
pretty soon you're gonna be arguing about THOUSands /
an- (.) or vice versa
54. and-ah (.) imp- /
it's one of her () phrases /
when poverty comes in the door love flies out through the window

XV. 55. and () you cannot alLOW MONey / to dictate / WHO you are
or HOW you feel
or WHAT you do
56. sure () you can't really live very well withOUT it
57. but-ah money isn't everything
58. + has taught me THAT / very very well

UNIT 29: *JUST AN ORDINARY GUY*

I. 1. I guess ah / like everybody else I-ah- /
you=know when you're a young man you sort=of
LOOK to the future
what you're gonna BE
and what you're gonna DO
and-
2. of course you've got your mothers
and your wives
and your sweethearts
and your brothers=and=sisters
and your- everyone ()
kind=of () egging you ON
trying to make you UP
make you feel good
make you BE somebody
3. and inside you're just the same small PERson
(4.) you=know [laughs] / WANTing
and deSIRing
but aFRAID
and-
and so forth

II. 5. and-ah- / but- but the YOUNG know no FEAR
6. and you- / you=sort=of THINK that you're gonna be sucCESSful
7. a-n-d I would suspect that the majority of us-ah / perhaps
don't REALly know what we ARE gonna DO (.)
(8.) until we get a- ACTually FIND ourSELVES doing it / and not
knowing how we GOT there

III. 9. ah but in the professional world you=know / you have a JOB to do
10. and I-/ I remember being in television all my live you=know
I- / as I GREW somewhere along the line / I- I- I thought
well maybe I'll BE-
11. you=know maybe I'd like to RE-MAKE "Intolerance"
ah maybe I'd like to-o () make some BIG movies
maybe I'd like to be a BIG SHOT
maybe I'd like to-
12. you=know cause you're always looking to GROW

IV. 13. A-N-D a few years ago
14. ah I decided / hey I'm not a BIG SHOT
15. I'm just an ordinary guy you=know
16. I=mean there's nothing special about ME

V. 17. and once I came to the realization that I wasn't going to be Cecil B.
DeMille / my work got a lot BETter (.)
18. and () I enJOY it more
19. a-n-d I can se-e / a lot more STOCK in what I DO-o / than that which I
THOUGHT I might have liked to do
20. I=mean we ALL search for glory
and we all look to the stars
and everything else
but when it ALL comes down / you're just a small BEing

VI. 21. and-ah SO it sort=of () brings me to the thing here (.)
22. um () oo- who am I and where am I going
23. you=know / I () REALly () DO () NOT () KNOW
24. here I am FIFty-two years of age / and I just () DO NOT KNOW ()
WHERE I'M GOing ()

VII. 25. and sometimes it BOTHers me (.)
26. but-ah LARGEly it doesn't
27. largely I say well I do what I do
and I do what I CAN
and I [laughs] look to the BEST
and sort=of look FORward

28. ah but I SURE dig a lot of HOLES for myself (.)
like not paying my taxes
or-ah not conFORMing to society
and so forth

VIII. 29. LIVE for today and to HELL for tomorrow / cause I could be under a bus tomorrow
30. I=mean tomorrow's not really important
31. well tomorrow's important MAYbe but- / next WEEK maybe but-ah
32. two years down the road I=mean WHO CARES [laughs]

IX. 33. well you CARE
34. but-ah you just don't know what's gonna happen /
so WHY WORry about it
35. just [laughs] just get ON
and make the most of what's RIGHT THERE
that you can deal with RIGHT THERE
in the here=and= now
without sort=of () contemplating five year plans
36. ah everytime I've contemplated a five year plan /
it never worked out the way () I planned it [laughs] /
or the way anybody ELSE would have planned it

X. 37. ah so I guess I'm not a- / in a WAY I'm not a BUILDer
38. I LIKE building
39. and I- I would LIKE to t' t' kind=of ah
BUILD on strengths
and conSOLIDate
and have a founDAtion
an' an' an' have SOMEthing
that I can DRAW from
money in the bank
an' and all these kind of things (.)
40. but I'm not pre-pared to PAY the PRICE

CHAPTER VIII

LINGUISTIC STRUCTURING OF THE TEXTUAL WORLD

> ...the common feature of human experience, that which is marked, organized, and clarified by the fact of storytelling in all its forms, is its temporal character (Ricouer, 1987/1983, p. 358).

This chapter describes the linguistic features of R's discourse. These features are conceived first as apophantic moments of the text of the transcript. They are one step removed from the reconstitution of a textual world and from the specific content of R's personal world or of his convictions as convictions. These descriptions will not focus on the attempt to fulfill the particular textual world of the transcript in imagination. Rather the goal is to provide a description of, and justification for, the parsing of this discourse presented in the previous chapter.

A hierarchical model of speech organization was previously outlined, in part as a means to address the practical problem of partitioning the transcript into pieces that can be separately examined. Formally this model constitutes separate levels of nested organization for words, idea units composed of words, clauses or lines composed of idea units, verses composed of clauses, units of heterogeneous types composed of verses, and the text composed of heterogeneous types of discourse units. The units at any given level of the text are viewed, at least initially, as contiguous, mutually exclusive, and jointly exhaustive. In this experiment, specific personal memories were requested so the autobiographical pact is assumed throughout. The appropriate level of parsing was anticipated to be the one on which relatively self-contained narratives emerge. As employed here, this model and the expectations surrounding it must be understood not solely as a natural model, but also as a preliminary to engaging the hermeneutic-phenomenological task of reconstituting the whole of which they are not pieces but moments, that is, the textual world, and ultimately the personal world of R.

The discussion will focus upon three separate levels of the discourse conceived as a hierarchically layered object of language: the verse structure, the structure of discourse units, and further levels of organization of the discourse units including their organization as moments of an implicit life story. The ultimate goal of fulfilling the personal world will lead to the consideration of phenomenological themes and the attempt to integrate structural descriptions into a phenomenological framework.

Verse Structure. As previously described, the exercise of transcription made apparent an intermediate level of textual organization in R's text between the level of lines (sentences or clauses), and the level of structural units that is implied by an analysis of personal narratives. A general description of the verse structure of R's discourse is in order, although it will be one without the level of grammatical detail and sophistication characteristic of descriptions supplied by linguists (e.g. Gee, 1986, 1989a,b,c, 1991; Hymes, 1981; Tannen, 1989). It will also be exemplary rather than exhaustive.

Gee's analyses of verse structure proceeded mainly with transcripts of children's narratives, and did not often face complex sentences containing multiple embedded phrases and clauses. R's discourse, on the other hand, does present these features. Consequently the structure of verses is often quite complex, and boundaries between verses are often indistinct. There are also frequent cases in which more than one possible versification is consistent. A flexible approach which recognizes this indeterminacy of verse structure at the level of particulars while recognizing its broad applicability is therefore warranted.

To clearly establish the verse as an integral unit at all, it might be necessary that it, first, be part of an unfolding discourse which presents multiple verses with similar internal structure, most especially in terms of number of lines and/or cadence; and second, that it present itself as clearly separated from surrounding verses by distinct linguistic markers (established as serving this purpose through repetition elsewhere) and/or through the convergence of several such linguistic markers.

Following upon the isolation of verse as 'object', a variety of questions might be asked, requiring answers in various degrees of detail, such as the general extent of verse structuring, the general nature and internal variation of verses, the degree of homogeneity of verse structure within and across the structural units within which they are embedded, and the degree of covariation present between aspects of verse structure and aspects of structure at other, both higher and lower, levels of organization.

While within a naturalistic inquiry, answers to these questions might invoke an attempt to offer causal explanations for such a patterning, the constitution of these answers need remain, in the first instance, only purely descriptive. If the concept of verse were taken too rigidly, if verse were thought to be a necessary level of structuring of all speech, or if verses were invested with necessary and sufficient conditions, the analytic result might be the imposition of a verse structure on the discourse by the investigator rather than a description of an apparent verse structure. Verse structure is a level of organization which has a varying visibility, and should be considered, in the first instance, not as piece to be fit into a causal explanation of discourse, but as a descriptive level of organization. Even within a natural attitude, this indeterminacy itself should suggest that verse structuring is a level of organization easily disrupted by other aspects of speech production.

The following, then, are generalizations derived from constituting a verse structuring of R's discourse:

First, verse structuring is a general characteristic. In almost every narrative unit, there is a more or less apparent structuring into verses.

Second, verses are usually four lines long (although Unit 17: The Day I was Forty is a notable exception). This is most clearly apparent where clauses are simple, consisting of a single idea unit. The following example is taken from Unit 13c: Drinks on the House (verses III & IV):

9. a-n-d I got to about the seventh race
10. and I'd won every race=
11. I had TWELVE hundred dollars in my pocket

12. and I had to go to WORK

13. so I just bought a TEN dollar ticket for the next race
14. went to work early
15. walked into the bar
16. said DRINKS ON THE HOUSE (.)

This example clearly shows grammatical parallelism between the individual lines within each verse. Thus each of the lines in the first verse begins with 'and I' (except the third which elides the 'and', continuing the second without interruption) and continues with a simple verb-object construction. Further the first and third lines are long (each with four or five beats, 'feet' in poetic terms) while the second and fourth lines are short. In the second verse, the clauses are also simple verb-object constructions, but in the last three lines the 'and I' is elided although at least the 'I' is implied. This example also illustrates common indicators of the boundaries between verses. Thus both verses begin with sentential connectives which contrast with the connectives used within the surrounding discourse. Line 13 begins with a different word, 'so', where three of the lines of the previous verse had been connected by 'and', while the 'and' in line 9 contrasts with the ones used in lines 10 and 12 in being performed with relative temporal extension. As well, the first verse ends with a word accorded special emphasis as does the second verse, though less emphatically. Finally after the second verse there is a pause which is longer than that typically found between idea units or clauses.

There is another effect produced by the patterns of connectives in these verses: the pace of events is felt as rapid and accelerating. There are fewer words in the lines of the second verse than those of the first, and in general there are few elaborations of the events in subordinate phrases or clauses. (As well, as can be ascertained from the word count and timing information presented in the index to the transcript, this narrative unit has one of the most rapid presentation rates). This effect is also consistent with the information presented in line 12, that R was operating against a deadline, and would be consistent with a fulfillment of R as moving hurriedly in this situation. For Ingarden (1937/1973), this would be an example of parallelism between separate phonetic and semantic strata of the discourse.

Other examples in R's discourse of multiple verses containing simple clauses are found in the anecdotes: Unit 18: Olive and Anchovy Pizza, and Unit 19c: Tough Lamb (particularly verses IV..IX). Each of these examples also involve rapid speech. They also contain verses which present dialogue. The following example, taken from Unit 19c (verses VII to IX), illustrates variations in verse structure which presents dialogue:

23. I said () well () what's the MATter with it
24.   IT'S TOUGH (..)
25. really?
26.   YES () and besides THAT it's SMALL (.)

27. so=I=said well 'ats the NORmal SIZE 'ats () 'ats 'ats what everybody HAS

28. I=mean I- I- I can't understand it being TOUGH
29. I=mean we've never had a problem beFORE / but if you'd like something ELSE
    um
30. WELL CER-tainly I'm NOT having THIS () you=see
31. so I picked it up and said what would you like?
    and=he said a sirloin STEAK
32. and=I=said how would you like it DONE?
    and=he=said medium RARE
33. and=I=said thank=you=very=much SIR
    it'll be on the table in TWELVE MIN-utes
34. and I advise the REST of your party to conTINue with their dinners
    so that () at least THAT doesn't spoil

Once again, verses are initiated by contrasting connectives and concluded by contrasting phrases and/or pauses: 'I said' starts the first verse but is elided in the remaining lines of the verse which are presented without narration, and there is a pause at the conclusion of the verse; 'so I said' starts the second verse and there is no further narration until the 'you see' which marks the conclusion; and 'so I' starts the third verse which thereafter uses 'and' as a connective. The duality of dialogue ('I said...then he said...') is well suited to a verse structure with an even number of lines as is illustrated by the first verse in which an exchange consisting of two simple lines from each participant is presented. It is also well suited to a more extended monologue of three lines and a single response as is illustrated in the second verse. The third verse (as constituted here) presents a third way in which a dialogue can be represented: by making the two parts of an exchange and/or a portion of a monologue into a single compound line with a more complex dual (A-B) structure. It should be noted that this third verse might also be consistently constituted as two separate verses where each clause forms a single line. However, here and in the tape recording, there are no clear markings indicating a boundary between lines 32 and 33, and there is no pause between clauses in lines 31 and 32. Further, the complex line structure consisting of two conjoined clauses is consistent with the flow of the discourse: in the first of the verses, the clauses are simple (except perhaps for the fourth line); in the second verse, both the first and third lines have an A-B structure and the second and fourth lines consist of a simple clause; while in the third verse, all lines have this A-B structure. This also contributes to an acceleration of pace through the segment, one which is consistent with the pressure that R has established himself to be under in cooking for the entire restaurant (Unit 19c, verses II and VI especially).

This example leads naturally into the third general observation, that verses can show a complex internal structure. One variant of the standard verse structure involves an embedded repetition of phrases or clauses within a single line; this embedded repetition also frequently appears in substructures with a four-fold repetition, as is illustrated in Unit 2 Hospital Times (verse III):

7. most people (.) / really kind of (.) FEAR hospital
    ii. disLIKE hospital /

iii. complain about the MEALS /
    b. the RULES
    c. the regulAtions
    d. the PAINS
iv. and so forth

8. sure there's all of that (...)

9. but all my memories of THAT [choking with emotion] / were SO-O (.) WONderful=

10. I mean (.) the FACT / of being ALIVE (..)

In line 7, there is a double embedding of a four fold repetition. At the lowest level a list is presented containing four items about which complaints are registered (meals, rules, regulations, pains). At the next level of organization a list is presented containing three phrases which describe attitudes or actions typical of people in hospitals (fear hospitals, dislike hospitals, complain) and a fourth phrase ('and so forth') which functions to indistinctly intend and terminate an indefinitely long list, and at the same time, present the fourth item in the four-fold structure.

This form of line structure, even down to the terminating indefinite item is quite frequent within the discourse. It is repeatedly used, in various forms, in the short Unit 19g English Restaurateur: A Friend Visits, which is repeated in full below:

I. 1. one of my VERY old friends / + / came over from CANada to my REStaurant

II. 2. um she came to see ME-E=
    3. she came () perhaps- / well first=of=all she LOVES her food ANYway
    4. so ah-ah () a TRIP to a RESTaurant is no HARDship for +
    5. but () it was a long way out of her WAY
      ii. and she had to sort=of make her way DOWN THERE
      iii. and kind=of make the TRIP (.)
      iv. and so forth

III. 6. so she came
    7. and of COURSE / I just LA-ID everything on like=you=wouldn't=believe
    8. I=mean the STEAK
      ii. and the DESsert
      iii. and the SALad
      iv. and OH boy (.)
    9. SHE still TALKS about it / to THIS day (.)

IV. 10. and the following year / she came over again
      ii. and brought her BROther down
      iii. and the two of them had aNOTHer () WONderful meal

iv. and so forth
11. and-ah / SHE still TALKS about it / to THIS day

In this unit, line 8 contains a simple listing of three items terminated by a general item ('oh boy'), while both line 5 and line 10 are constructed out of a sequential list of events each presented within a single clause, and each again with an indefinite fourth and terminal item ('and so forth').

In some cases, a judgement must be made as to whether such a sequential list of phrases constitutes a portion of a line, or a separate line, or even a separate verse. Consider Unit 13c: Drinks on the House, Verse II:

5a. but one day I got lucky / and-ah-
b. well one DOES once and again if you do it LONG enough
6. um and I seemed to clean every single race
7. I just went down to the local track
8a. and I NEVER bet more than about () twenty dollars=
b-i. it was like five dollars or ten dollars
ii. or two dollar exactor
iii. or five dollar quinellas
iv. or whatever

The structure of line 8, as constituted here, is a double (A-B) structure in which the B clause of the line is a four-fold list of items (Making this list a five fold list by separating 'five dollars or ten dollars' in 8ai would have implied a pause as though between idea units which does not occur in the oral discourse; the effect when exaggerated is rather 'a=or=b pause or=c pause or=d pause or=whatever'). This parsing, rather than one in which the list is seen as a separate line, seems consistent with the lack of pause after the A clause, and also with the fact that this verse already contains a line with a dual structure. In line 5, the B clause is a self-interruption delivered *sotto voce* with respect to the A clause. (One other parsing seems consistent. This would involve a doublet verse curtailed by the self-interruption, and a four-line verse consisting of lines 6,7 and 8a, and 8b constituted as separate lines).

Another example of this type of verse structure decision is taken from Unit 8b Summer Holidays: A Day in Paris, verses VIII and IX:

25. about fifteen or TWENTY minutes later I was / STILL STANDING
there STARING AT the MONA lisa (.) / along with a FEW=OTHer
PEOple who were rooted to the spot
26. and I can TELL YOU () / that if you ever SEE the=Mona=Lisa
w- the real one () there () in the Louvre (..)
you'll KNOW what they SAY about it
27. and there's NO WAY that y- that it can be desCRIBed to you
28. wherever you move / if you take-
i. if you take three paces SIDEways

ii. or you you=you go to WALK off to go to see another exhibit
iii. and you turn round to look BACK at it
iv. she's STILL looking at you (..)
29. and you () can't () tear () your=EYES=away
30. it's TRUE
31. it it it's a phenomenon that ah [laughs]
32. I don't know what he DID da Vinci but ah [laughs]

In this case, the parsing of line 28 might be at issue. Is this a four-fold line (sub-verse) or is it a separate verse? Either parsing seems consistent because of the self-interruption/ correction in the first clause of line 28. That is, the correction can be seen to complete the verse consisting of lines 25 to 28, and 28i becomes the first line in the next verse, or, as constituted here, the subverse 28i-iv can be seen to present itself as a part, clause B, of line 28. In either parsing, the basic four-fold structuring is maintained.

It is clear, however, that a subverse can be nested within another verse. Consider this example from Unit 4b Little Wanderer: Department Store (verse IV):

11. well it ONLY took me FIVE MINUTES= / to figure OUT
 that=there was (.) nothing MUCH MORE gonna HAPpen= / than
 what I'd SEEN alREADy=
12a. so I went off to go and FIND her
 b. and say ah
 i. whats HAppening 'n
 ii. when are we GOing 'n
 iii. or can I have a LOLLIpop
 iv. or whatever the HELL it was
13. and needless to say= / in a BUSY Eaton- DOWN-TOWN Eatons
 STORE in MontREAL ah / I didn't find MY MOTHer (.)
14. and ULtimately she CERtainly didn't () find () ME= /
 because SHE cleared the STORE [laughs]

In this example, line 12b clearly initiates a subverse which is nested within the larger four line verse of lines 11 to 14. Again it illustrates the inclusion of a terminal general item to complete the four-fold structuring. Reports of dialogue seem to provide opportunities for this type of nested structuring (for another example see also Unit 7b Bridge Player: Why Bother?, verse III and verse VIII).

There are also many examples of more complex verse structures, which are nevertheless recognizably composed of four lines, within R's discourse. They also often reflect internal parallelisms between complex lines that consist of multiple phrases or clauses. A first example is found in Unit 3: Swiss Dinner Party, verse II:

2a. i-s to sit across the table /
 with my DEAREST friends /
b-i. or my nearest and dearest

ii. and family 'n loved ones (.)
iii. people I CARE about=
iv. people who care about ME
3a. a-n-d (...) WINE and dine (.) /
have a DINner party
b-i. or it doesn't have to be a DINner PARty /
ii. it can be a SIMPLE AFFAIR /
iii. like ah (..) MACaroni CHEESE
iv. or PEAnut butter SANDwich
4. ah (.) and SHARE (.) / MY feelings
ii. and MY comings and goings
iii. my past present future
iv. with-with-with them/
5. A-N-D () to reciproCATE
ii. and SHARE THEIR FEELings er too (.)
iii. to input what I CAN
iv. and so forth

In this verse, each line has a complex structure which consists of a primary clause and an elaboration. This can be seen most clearly by examining a skeleton of the verse constituted as its primary clauses. In this form, it nevertheless coheres strongly as narrative:

2. i-s to sit across the table / with my DEAREST friends
3. a-n-d (...) WINE and dine (.) / have a DINner party
4. ah (.) and SHARE (.) MY feelings
5. A-N-D () to reciproCATE

The elaboration or second part added to each of these primary clauses is, in each case, a four-fold structure or part of one. In the first two lines, this four structure is presented as a distinct second portion (B clause) to the dual structured A clause (where the duality of the A clause is presented with emphasis through a pair of idea units). In both cases, there is a further parallelism in that the first two and second two segments of the B part four-fold structure are closely linked together (there is a pause between the two dual segments, and there is either a close grammatical connection or a distinct grammatical parallelism between the sublines). In addition, the dominant connective is 'or'. In the second two lines of the verse, the elaboration completes the primary clause into a four-structure by adding three parallel segments. Here the dominant connective is 'and'. Again, a close connection is maintained between the first two and second two lines of the sub-verse. The strong general impression of repetition throughout the full verse is maintained at deep structural levels, particularly in line 4, with a repetitive structure within each sub-line. This extends even to the 'stuttered' delivery of 4iv, which parallels the three-fold list internally present in line 4iii.

A second, even more intricately structured example is found in Unit 2 Hospital Times, verse VI:

16a. but the most MEmorable PART / of the WHOLE THING is that /
    we we-re ()
        like THIRTY of us /
        in a ward= /
        in ONE ROOM (.) /
  b. COOPED UP TOGETHER / all with our various PROblems (.) /
        like a BUNCH of little boys
        in school /
        in a CLASSroom
17a. and we made the nurses' lives [laugh] / a little HELL / now and THEN-N
  b. we would
        turn TOIlet paper /
        into paper AEROplanes /
    and we would
        throw ORanges /
        at the NURses
18a. and (.) we would DO / all KINDS of things () /
  b. to alLEViate the BOREdom= /
        to MAKE a little FUN out of LIFE=
19a. and by goodness you=know it WAS FUN /
  b. and we LEARNT a lot

In this verse, as well, a skeleton of clauses, the A clauses of each line, is distinctly intelligible as a narrative framework:

16a. but the most MEmorable PART / of the WHOLE THING is that /
    we we-re () like THIRTY of us / in a ward= / in ONE ROOM (.) /
17a. and we made the nurses' lives [laugh] / a little HELL / now and THEN-N
18a. and (.) we would DO / all KINDS of things () /
19a. and by goodness you=know it WAS FUN /

But in this verse, the B clauses are also distinctly intelligible as a possible verse:

16b. COOPED UP TOGETHER / all with our various PROblems (.) /
    like a BUNCH of little boys in school / in a CLASSroom
17b. we would turn TOIlet paper / into paper AEROplanes /
    and we would throw ORanges / at the NURses
18b. to alLEViate the BOREdom= /
    to MAKE a little FUN out of LIFE=
19b. and we LEARNT a lot

In this second or off-beat verse, while each of the B clauses present a clarification or more definite fulfillment of the meaning of the A clauses (an 'evaluation' in Polanyi's (1989) reconstitution of Labov's description of personal narrative), the B clauses considered together are separately coherent as fulfilling a school room situation (with the exception that the word 'nurses' intrudes in line 17b.). The whole verse then is a complex interleaving of a description and a metaphorical comparison.

Each of the two interleaved verses have a consistent structure: the A verse consists (with the possible exception of the first line) of single clauses, while the B verse (with the exception of the final line) consists of a dual (A-B) structure. In the second and third line, these two clauses are grammatically parallel ('we would...and we would...', 'to...,to...'). There are also parallelisms in structure between the homologous 'lines', most notably in line 17 where the second portion of each 'line' begins with 'like' and contains three idea units, each of the latter two beginning with 'in'. It may also be that an exaggerated emphasis on the idea units in the second and third lines of the A verse create a parallelism with each of the two parts of the more complexly structured second and third lines of the B verse. As well the final line completes the verse as a parallelism between simple clauses. In summary, the whole presents a strong poetic effect.

Further generalizations about verse structuring involve relationships between this level of organization and the organization of verses into personal narratives, and will be postponed until narrative organization has been considered.

Structure of the Discourse Unit. Initially, the prejudgement that units of discourse are also narrative units will be maintained. Two descriptions of integral narratives have been presented previously. One is a model, due to Labov, of narrative as a linguistic object in which oral personal narratives are complex wholes constructed of several distinct ordered pieces, each with distinctive semantic properties. The other, a phenomenological interpretation of a structural model due to many investigators, characterizes narrative as a tripartite realization ('lamination' in Young's (1982) terms) of nested semantic moments. This description distinguishes strata which can be characterized metaphorically as separate worlds. The lowest level distinguishes the level of objects of a textual world intended as natural and unquestionably present (fabula level), the second level presents (generally hidden or internal mental) aspects of the subjectivity to whom these objects have meaning (story level), and the third level presents mental aspects of the subjectivity who tells the story (commentary level). What, then, is the relationship between these two general descriptions?

This question can be explored in the very first unit of R's discourse (Unit 1: The Queen Mother) which provides an exemplary conformity to Labov's model of personal narrative. A Labovian analysis begins by examining transcribed narratives for independent clauses representing the events of the narrative. For Labov, those that occur in a fixed presentational sequence corresponding to the temporal order in which the events of the narrative occurred (in the constituted fabula world) constitute the primary sequence (or core narrative in Mishler's (1986a,b) terms). Clauses whose order of telling does not mirror an order of events are regarded as subsidiary to the core narrative (i.e. as forming other, optional, structural pieces). Whatever else the clauses of the core narrative may present (and in Labov's and to a greater extent Polanyi's (1989) analysis they may also present evaluations), the core narrative must present the basic structure of the fabula of the narrative, the level that, according to Martinez-Bonati(1960/1981), must be fulfilled concretely in imagination as the initial act in understanding. In order to maintain a separation between fabula and story, however, an additional constraint is added here: that the events must have been potentially visible to external observation by an observer placed hypothetically in the fabula world. This is necessary because mental acts which would have been accessible only to a character (or the narrator) constitute his/her experience of the fabula; and hence belong to a different narrative level of the second structural description, the level of the story (or perhaps of the commentary).

Following these guidelines, the core narrative for the first unit is presented below. (Note that '...' indicates ellipsis).

Core Narrative (Unit 1: The Queen Mother)

5. one time () I was working (.) on (.) a function () involving the ROYal FAMily
7. an-nd the Royal Family came out () / to the (.) function
8. and we performed all our DUties (..)
9. and then we were ALL SENT HOME

11. my (.) COLLEAGUE and I / kind of () CAUGHT one another's eye
{and we decided to return}
15. so we-e (.) / TRACKED BACK ...
16. ... SNUCK IN ...
LOOKed here 'n
LOOKed there=
17. ... wandered the CORridors
18. and we opened a DOOR
and went IN (.)
25. ... we saw one or two OTHER guys / from (.) the ah crew ...
27. so we all sh-shuffled toGETHer=
29. ... a LARGE military looking ma-an ... came OVer
30. and he SAID... would it aamusse you / to be (.) introduced/ to the queen
MA-THAH
31. well=wel=wel=well=absoLUTely=...
33. ... he BROUGHT / her MAJESTY / over ...
34. and we went through the form / of the bow / and the-th' proper adDRESS
35. AND / SHE TAlked TO US / for HALF an hour (..)
40. AN-ND WE WENT HOME (.)

Two features of this rendering of the core narrative require immediate comment. First, in the terms of Labov's analysis, line 5 is not strictly speaking a part of the core narrative, (nor most probably are lines 7,8, and 9), but are rather a part of what he calls the orientation. (They are included above to provide a contextualization for the core narrative; and this is, of course, how similar clauses function in providing an orientation for any narrative). Thus the core narrative does not exhaust the clauses that directly constitute externally visible objects and hence directly fulfillable entities of the fabula world. Basic furniture of the fabula world can be presented in such an orientation section (and occasionally elsewhere) through what Polanyi (1989) calls 'durative-descriptive' phrases or clauses, which constitute elements of the fabula world as being also present even when not otherwise apparent within the narrative action of the core narrative. A specialized form of contextualization that the orientation section often provides is illustrated here by lines 7,8 & 9 which relate historical events, events which preceded the action of the narrative but which provide a temporal context for the core narrative. In the current case, the status of the events of line 7,8, and 9 as orientation rather than as part of the core narrative is ambiguous; in other cases, the temporal contextualization may be provided by a description of a generalized or iterative action sequence of which the core narrative is an exemplification or variation (e.g. Orientation through historical action: In the summer we used to go swimming every day. First we would ... Core Narrative: This particular day...). An example of this form of orientation in R's discourse is provided in verses I and II of Unit 4: Little Wanderer. (In the current unit, a case might even be made that line 6, 'I was a cameraman on a television broadcast event', is a summary statement of historical action of which lines 5,7,8 and 9 detail an exemplification).

The second feature worthy of immediate comment is the phrase from line 11 included between curled brackets 'and we decided to return' which is not present in the narrative, but is rather an implication derived from the lines:

12. THERE WE WERE /
    in our tuxEdos / and our SILK SCARVES /and EVerything (.) /
    for the EVENT
13. and we were going HOME?
14. ah () we didn't THINK so

These lines are a presentation of the mental contents of the subjectivities involved, even if as seems probable, they are also intended to indicate that a conversation took place. These lines consequently belong primarily to the level of story rather than to the level of fabula per se. This example indicates that contents of the fabula need not be directly posited as natural objects or events by the narratorial voice, but instead may be indirectly presented as the (inferred) intended-as-natural objects or events underlying such a description of the mentality of the principal subjectivity. There will of course be uncertainty in such an indirect fulfillment: for example in this case, while a discussion seems to have been likely, it is also possible that the entire decision to return was formulated wordlessly, through the 'glance' constituted in line 11. What does seem to be a safe inference however, given the way the narrative unfolds, is that a decision to return was made (in the world constituted as fabula).

There are a number of additional clauses through the narrative unit which share this character of indirect positing even though they appear to present (and may so present) additional features of the furniture of the fabula world, and thus might be considered to be part of the fabula level as well. Notably here these include the description of the room into which R entered (in line 19) and the details of the appearance of the military man (in line 29). Being dressed in 'our tuxedos and our silk scarves' in line 12 above is also an example of this form of indirect positing of aspects of the fabula world. Most often, however, these clauses function to ends other than the enriching of the furniture of the fabula world as well, in particular (as above) in presenting these intended objects as apparent through the consciousness of the principal subjectivity (or as 'focalized' in Genette's 1972/1980 term). Consequently they too will be considered here to belong primarily to the second level of the tripartite structural division, the story, even though in natural inference, they would be (almost automatically) understood as constituting additional aspects of the fabula world. It is the possibility (even though perhaps exceedingly remote) that these objects might later be distinguished as misapprehensions of the principal subjectivity, as not then corresponding to objects of the constituted fabula world, that ultimately mandates their differential status. Since in initial presentation, they potentially occupy only the mental world of the subjectivity, they are not of the essence in understanding the (actual) events of the fabula world *fully constituted as natural and externally visible* (Martinez-Bonati, 1961/1981). This distinction is also consistent with Labov's parallel classification of phrases and clauses which constitute them as belonging to the evaluation part of the narrative rather than as belonging to the core narrative itself.

The character and distribution of these evaluative lines and phrases can be made clearer in a re-presentation of the full narrative, in which the phrases of the core narrative are italicized and the evaluative phrases are indented. (The remaining highlighted verses at the beginning and end of the narrative will be discussed later).

UNIT 1: THE QUEEN MOTHER

ABSTRACT

I. 1. **well () let's START / with the EASiest one of all**
2. **ah it's-ah a SHORT STORY=**
3. **'n it's a ve-ry (..)**
4. **it's a MEmorable THING / that I think () ANYBODY would () apPRECiate**

ORIENTATION

II. 5. one time () I was working (.) on (.) a function () involving the ROYal FAMily
6.   I was-s () a CAM'RAMAN on a television ah /
        broadcast (.) / event
7. an-nd the Royal Family came out () / to the (.) function
8. and we performed all our DUties (..)

III. 9. and then we were ALL SENT HOME
10.   TOLD / that we would derig=all=the=equipment
         the=following= DAY

COMPLICATING ACTION

IV. 11. as we GOT / to our CAR / which was PARKED /
ah-um down=the=ROAD=aways /
my (.) COLLEAGUE and I / kind of () CAUGHT one another's eye
12. THERE WE WERE / in our tuxEdos / and our SILK
SCARVES / and EVerything (.) / for the EVENT
{and decided to return}
13. and we were going HOME?
14. ah () we didn't THINK so

V. 15. *so we-e (.) / TRACKED BACK to where we ca-me from /*
BACK to the-ah / the VENue
16. sort of (.) sort of
SNUCK IN
is- in a way /
through a DOOR 'n
LOOKed here 'n
LOOKed there=
couldn't SEE anything (.)
17. kind of
wandered the CORridors
18. *and we opened a DOOR /*
and went IN (.)

EVALUATION

19. LO and behold (.) /
CHANdeLIERS /
smoked=salmon=caviar and chamPAGNE /
DIAmonds and you=name=it (.) /
EVERYWHERE
20. and we were IN

VII. 21. and we were STANDing there / feeling (.) /
rather NAked
22. and=I=remember () feeling VERY NERvous / and
very GUILty / that I'd CRASHED / gatecrashed a
PARTY as it were (.)
23. ah but rather a SPECial do (.)
24. and I was STANDing there=

COMPLICATING ACTION (Continued)

VIII.25. and (.) LOOKing around (.) the room /
we saw one or two OTHER guys / from (.) the ah crew / had had the SAME idea
26. and there WE ALL WERE / little ones and TWOS /
like (.) sticking out like (.) a SORE THUMB
27. *so we all sh-shuffled toGETHer=*
28. SOMEHOW we managed to all congregate into a /
ah an even MORE NOTICEABLE group / of about
SIX of us (...)

IX. 29. and we were (.)
just WONdering (.) / what was going to
HAPpen= if anything /
and HOW long it would be / before we were
THROWN OUT / on our EAR (...) /
STILL taking the champagne / from the (.)
BUTlers / that were going BY /
and (.) QUAFfing down the caviar / and
everything else /
when a LARGE military looking ma-an /
with a PURPLE FACE /
and a WHITE BEARD /
and a WHITE musTACHE /
with ROWS and rows and rows of military medals
across his (.) ample CHEST /
came OVer
30. *and he SAID /*
[affecting rasping British accent] I saay
you chaps / he said /
would it aamusse you / to be (.) introduced / to the queen MA-THAH
31. [drops accent] *well=wel=wel=well=absoLUTely=*
yah=wa=we would be HONOURED you=know /
32. we were all STAMmering 'n /
but inSIDE / the ELATION of being / kind
of (.) ACCEPTED and WELCOMED IN (.) /
was=was ONE thing /
but the PROspect of actually= / ACTUALLY
ME-ETING / the queen mother / was
something that (.) / I don't think ANY
of us / could have compreHENDed (.) /
before it HAPpened /

RESOLUTION

X. 33. *and in DUE course / he BROUGHT / her MAJESTY / over to MEET us*
34. *and we went through the form / of the bow / and the-th' proper adDRESS*
35. *AND / SHE TAlked TO US / for HALF an hour (..)*
36. and we TALKED ABOUT (.) / our JOBS / and our
LIVES and-an=so=forth (..)

XI. 37. and I've never FELT / a GREATER presence / of
a GREAT LADY / a great person / in my WHOLE
LIFE=
38. I mean (..) it was INCREDible
39. it was- we were feel=
we were made to feel AT EASE /
we were made to feel WELcome /
we were ma-made to feel VALUed=/
you=know (.) here we were PEONS (.) you=know /
amongst the ar-arisTOCracy (..) /
in the EXTREME/
40. *AN-ND WE WENT HOME (.) /*
like () on a CLOUD

CODA

XII. 41. and that was (..) thirty years ago / nearly
42. but IT'S / probably the most HONourable (.) MOment / that
I can reMEMber / that-
XIII.43. it was NOTHING REALLY
44. I mean () so we casually MET some person (.) you know /
who HAPpened / to be ROYALTY
45. BIG DEAL
46. NO / it was MORE than a big deal / it was (.) REALLY
REALLY (.) MOMENTOUS

XIV. 47. and ANYONE / who has never MET / ANYONE of the Royal
Family / I don't think can really apPRECiate=
48. and when I say MET / I mean REALLY s- s- / really STOOD
there / and TALKED ABOUT (.) / a LOT of (.) things= / NOT
JUST how=are=you=and=how=d'you=nice=to=see=you and on to
the next person in the line /
49. I mean ACTually standing around / and CHITchatting for
half an hour (..) / on HER TURF not ours (.) / was- was
an experience that ah
50. I think I've said it now / 't'was really WONderful

In examining verses IV through XI, which constitute that portion of the narrative unit that contains clauses designated as belonging to the core narrative (and which will be called hereafter the narrative proper), a variety of forms of evaluative phrases and clauses can be distinguished. First, there may be descriptive clauses or phrases which amplify the description of an item of the fabula world (e.g. 'which was parked down the road aways' descriptive of the car in line 11, and 'with a purple face' etc. descriptive of the military man in line 29). Second, there are a number of durative clauses, clauses that indicate a continuing activity or enduring state. Such clauses are marked by a present or past participle (e.g. 'looking around' in line 25, 'were standing' in line 21) or by a preposition of duration ('*as* we got' in line 11). When presented as an initial participial clause, they present a durative state relative to the action presented in the immediately following clause (e.g. 'as we got to our car..., [we]... caught one another's eye' in line 11, 'and looking around the room, we saw one or two other guys... in line 25). In many cases, these durative states would remain coherent if they had been constituted as separate actions of the core narrative (e.g. 'we walked back to the car, we caught one another's eye', 'we looked around the room, we saw one or two other guys') except for a resulting shift in emphasis (which is, of course, part of the reason for regarding them as evaluative rather than narrative). When presented alone, these durative clauses present an enduring state occurring between the actions of two narrative clauses (e.g. 'we were standing there' and 'I was standing there' in verse VII which come between the action of crashing the party and the event of being approached by an authority). A third form of evaluation is a repetition which presents again the content of the previous clause, usually in greater detail (e.g. 'and she talked to us for half an hour, and we talked about our jobs and our lives...' in lines 35 and 36, or the action of moving together into a group presented as action in line 27 and repeated evaluatively in line 28). A fourth form is the direct constitution of internal states, knowable to a participant but only inferentially available, if at all, to an observer (e.g. 'feeling very nervous and very guilty' in line 22).

These different forms of evaluation can be combined within single lines. For example, the first five printed lines of line 29 present a four-fold structure of durative description using participles, the first two clauses of which constitute internal mental states. Another example is found in line 32 where the initial idea unit is both durative and repeats the content of line 31, while the remainder of the line directly constitutes co-occurring mental states.

Perhaps the most subtle form of evaluation is focalization which, although formed of these same linguistic devices, invites an inference that the narratorial voice has been momentarily overlain by the voice of the principal subjectivity, that the narrator's voice in telling the story is also and at the same time speaking the inner thoughts of the principal subjectivity, and consequently implying a particular mental process. Focalization is thus an effect of the story level. Direct dialogue may be considered both as a form of focalization in taking the voice of the principal subjectivity, and also as an externally visible action (as in 'well...absolutely..' in line 31). Less equivocal are situations in which the internal thoughts of the principal subjectivity are given voice. One example is found in lines 12 to 14 which (most especially in lines 12 and 13) can be heard as internal discourse, as what the subjectivities of the narrative were 'saying to themselves'. Verse VI is another example which will be described further in the next chapter. Another ('cross-modal') example is found in the second six printed lines of line 29 in which the order of inventory of the descriptive characteristics of the military man mimic the order in which they might have been seen by the principal subjectivity as the man approached. Thus the man is first seen as large and as (perhaps indistinctly) military, then as presenting particular facial features, and finally as distinguished by a large number of (now separately visible perhaps as he looms closer) military medals (perhaps clearly seen only when the principal subjectivity averts his eyes downwards in nervousness and/or deference).

Evaluative clauses and phrases can directly place a value upon the situation of the fabula world, either as viewed at the time of occurrence by the principal subjectivity, or as later (re-)evaluated by the narrator. A good example of such an evaluation is found in line 26 'sticking out like a sore thumb' (although the voicing is indistinct: this might be a concurrent evaluation by the principal subjectivity or primarily a retrospective evaluation by the narratorial voice). Any clause or phrase which presents such a direct evaluation is clearly a part of the story level (or of the level of commentary) because valuation is a process which requires a subjectivity. Many clauses here characterized as evaluative do not appear to directly present such valuations, however.

According to Labov's analysis, a central property of evaluations is that the constitution of the particular fabula world is indifferent to variations in the order (although perhaps within fairly narrow boundaries) in which these evaluations are presented. That is, the furniture of the fabula world and the ordering of events will have been constituted identically (in their aspect as fabula) even with some variation in the ordering of clauses (e.g. there is no difference in the fabula world as potentially visible per se given a line such as '[we]... caught one another's eye, as we got to our car...' as contrasted to the actual line 11 'as we got to our car..., [we]... caught one another's eye'; or within a line such as 'a military looking man, large, with rows and rows and rows of military medals across his ample chest, with a white mustache, and a white beard, and a purple face' as contrasted to the actual list presented within line 29). It is as a result of this relative indifference to order in the constitution of the world of the fabula, that the *actual* order of free clauses (and phrases) is taken as evaluative. That is, the order of presentation reflects a preference of the narrator, a preference which may be motivated, and which may also, as we have seen, mimic or parallel processes of the principal subjectivity (possibly) operative during the unfolding of the action of the fabula world.

The consequences of Labov's division of the narrative into core and free clauses, then, while it may not always result in a perfect correlation with the distinction between the fabula and the story, does sensitize the reader to carefully consider the candidacy for fabulaic status of the furniture presented in evaluative clauses and phrases, and most especially to the voicing of these phrases. At each point, who speaks? Who is the subjectivity who is constituted as in turn constituting this furniture? Does it belong only to that subjective world as appearance, or does it occupy the fabula as well?

An objection may be offered here against what might yet appear as an arbitrary distinction between the fabula and the internal world of the principal subjectivity. This objection might perhaps especially be made in the case of an autobiographical text in which an identity between author, narrator, and principal subjectivity is posited (through the autobiographical pact). Or further, wouldn't the recounting of the actions of a dream be both internal events of the principal subjectivity, and yet (at least sometimes) present a core narrative under this analysis? This objection, however, overlooks the fact that the fabula as presented is already itself a constitution by its narrator. The assumption, even in autobiography, that the fabula world corresponds to an 'actual natural world' is not required, and once this is seen, there can be no distinction in principle between relating a realistic narrative and relating a fantastic one. There is no judgement that need be made in any narrative about the degree to which the fabula corresponds to any 'actual natural world', yet the fabula world will be no less present to the auditor/reader if fictional, or if specifically constituted as having been dreamt or imagined. The fabula remains present as a base world (perhaps with its own more or less fantastic character), posited as externally existent relative to the actions of the principal subjectivity; the principal subjectivity must be conscious *of* a world, and this world of which it is conscious is the fabula. Consequently, the distinction between fabula and story can be seen to parallel the distinction between noesis and noema within a phenomenological analysis, even if, during narratological analysis it must also be recalled that the principal subjectivity itself is noematic with respect to the noesis of the narrator (and then again at another level the author) who posits it. It is the act of narrating which constitutes both the principal subjectivity and the fabula as a base world within which a narrative unfolds. We may choose to view the principal subjectivity as but a part of the furniture of the fabula, but this will destroy its status as conscious of that world, and capable of having that consciousness expressed.

The nesting of worlds (the author's encompassing the narrator's in turn encompassing the principal subjectivity's) which results from remaining sensitive to the intentionality of posited subjectivities can be indefinitely recursively reiterated (Ryan, 1985, 1986, 1991; Spence, 1987). An example of such a reiterated structure in R's discourse is to be found in Unit 4b Little Wanderer: Department Store in which the narrative action is constituted as visible through the subjectivity of R's mother ('what I remember my mother told me' Unit 4b, line 2). But whatever degree of recursivity may be separately constituted (and there may be several levels: 'Yesterday I met a friend who told me a story related to him by X that went "Once upon a time there was a traveling minstrel who related the following tale:..." '); at minimum in a retrospective autobiography, three levels (fabula, story, commentary) will be present, even if in fiction a concerted effort may be made to eliminate the level of story by eliminating all traces of the subjectivity of a principal character externally viewed by the narrator, or even if in concurrent report a concerted effort may be made to eliminate the level of story/principal subjectivity by blending it completely with the concurrent subjectivity of the narrator.

Thus there is (at least) a fabula world posited as existent, a principal subjectivity posited as conscious of that world who can express its appearance, and finally a narrator who, having constituted the principal subjectivity (as having constituted the fabula world), can comment directly upon that world, or upon the subjectivity of that world (the story), or yet again upon its own subjectivity and world as independent of the fabula or story.

While such commentary by the narrator can occur at any point within the unfolding narrative (e.g. line 36 '...was something that I don't think any of us could have comprehended before it happened' where the I of the clause is clearly the I of the narrator rather than the I of the principal subjectivity), it is typically located in the initial and final sections of the narrative unit which Labov has labeled abstract and coda. In the current narrative unit, the abstract (in verse I) presents the narrative voice commenting upon the narrative to follow ('it's a short story' in line 2, 'it's a memorable thing' in line 3') without however, as is quite frequently the case according to Labov, giving a summary of it. The abstract constitutes the core-narrative-to-follow as a possession of the narrator's and allows him to evaluate it as an object, commenting upon its 'tellability' or value as a story. Young (1982) also notes the function of the abstract in easing the transition from the conversational situation within which the narrative is to be related (constituted as its own normative 'discourse world') into the fabula and story worlds which will be subsequently constituted. This discourse world is directly indicated in this first narrative unit, (though not often in other narrative units due to the monologic nature of the discourse), by the phrase 'well let's start...' which begins the narrative unit and which explicitly constitutes the auditor as a participant of the discourse world into which the narrative will be inserted as a different nested level.

The coda serves functions analogous to those of the abstract at the conclusion of the narrative, by signaling a transition back to the world of discourse or at least to the world of the narrator in current time (e.g. 'and that was thirty years ago nearly' in line 41), and by providing an opportunity to again provide evaluation of the core narrative as an object (although this time with the opportunity to comment on specific portions of the narrative proper as already constituted, rather than as emptily intended as in the abstract). In this unit, such evaluations predominate ('...most honourable moment...' in line 42, 'more than a big deal' and 'really really momentous' in line 46, 'I don't think can really appreciate' in line 47, and 'twas really wonderful' in line 50), although the coda here also provides a contrastive summary recapitulation of the entire narrative (in line 43 to 45), as well as a repetition and enhanced description of a critical portion of the narrative (the time with the Queen Mother herself, in lines 48 and 49).

It should also be noted that the placement of the boundary between the core narrative and the coda in this unit is a matter of judgement and a case could well be made for including verse X within the coda section. Verse X begins with a clause which is clearly uttered in the narratorial voice ('and I've never felt a greater presence of a great lady, a great person, in my whole life' in line 37), and the narrative section could be viewed as closed by the 'and so forth' (of line 36), intended as including the ultimate resolution of an eventual parting. This verse could thus be viewed as (an initial) narrator's recapitulation and commentary on the whole core narrative. In the current case, the inclusion of the narrative clause 'and we went home...' (in line 40), and the placement of the recapitulating evaluations (in line 39) as appropriately referring to the narrative moment arrived at in line 36 lead to the judgement that this verse remains predominantly narrative in nature.

To this point, the following categories and interrelationships of the structural description of narrative and Labov's linguistic description have been discussed:

abstract: from within a discourse world which includes the auditor, the narrator emptily intends the narrative proper (fabula/story) as an object and offers an initial commentary on it, establishing a recursive relationship between the world which he now occupies and the worlds of the narrative to be related.

orientation: the narrator constitutes a spatial and temporal context within which the narrative proper unfolds and bridges the gulf between discourse world and fabula/story world.

narrative proper: the narrator enters the fabula world and unfolds narrative time directly (principally in the clauses of the core narrative) and indirectly (within evaluative clauses) from inside the principal subjectivity, interleaving these modes while also allowing for an occasional momentary exit back to the discourse world for a direct narrator's comment on either fabula or story.

coda: the narrator suspends narrative time and reenters the discourse world where he can offer commentary on the now fully constituted narrative object as narrative object, or upon selected moments of it, and upon its relationship to his own subjective world.

It remains to further examine the narrative proper including especially the relative distribution of evaluation and core narrative clauses, and to examine the relationship between the current description and the description, previously presented, of the discourse as constituted of consecutive verses.

In general, Labov's analysis of the personal narrative follows a tradition in poetics that began with Aristotle. Aristotle, in analyzing tragedy, defined plot as a single formal structure unified and complete, with a proper beginning, middle, and end, which was imitative of an action; and elevated its analysis to a preeminent position within the analysis of literature (Aristotle, Poetics, Ch. 10). Thus, even the initial move in a Labovian analysis, the localization of independent *active* clauses as the core narrative, continues this traditional focus upon the plot. The further division of the narrative proper into pieces called the complicating action and resolution, in Labov's analysis, follows Aristotle faithfully:

> Every tragedy falls into two parts, - Complication and Unraveling or Denouement. Incidents extraneous to the action are frequently combined with a portion of the action proper, to form the Complication; the rest is the unraveling. By Complication I mean all that extends from the beginning of the action to the part which marks the turning-point to good or bad fortune. The Unraveling is that which extends from the beginning of the change to the end. (Aristotle, Poetics, Chapter 18).

Can these structures be isolated from a personal narrative without recourse to a single judgement of the turning-point or climax, and an artificial segmentation at that point? In Labov's model, the narrative proper may contain a separate segment between the complicating action and the resolution consisting of purely evaluative clauses. If there is a segment which is heavily or exclusively evaluative between two longer stretches of the narrative proper which contains a larger proportion of narrative clauses, a linguistic justification for Labov's division may be provided.

In the narrative unit under consideration, there is such a differential distribution of core and free clauses in the narrative proper. In particular, there is a cluster of narrative clauses in verse V followed by an absence of narrative clauses in verses VI and VII, in turn followed by a gradual increase in the frequency of narrative clauses until there is again a cluster of narrative clauses in verse X and yet again a predominance of free clauses in verse XI. That is, there is a vast section of the narrative proper stretching across verses VI to IX where evaluative clauses predominate, sandwiched between two verses in which narrative clauses predominate.

In terms of Labov's model, verse V would clearly be part of the complicating action, and verse XI would clearly be part of the resolution. However, it is also clear that the action does continue, albeit slowly, especially in verses VIII and IX, and that the turning-point of the plot, judged on semantic grounds, occurs in line 30 (perhaps specifically after the second 'he said') of verse IX. It therefore seems inaccurate to label verses VI through IX as a 'piece' of evaluation.

If evaluation is treated not as a structural piece, but as a structural level, as in Polanyi's analysis, the long stretch in which evaluative clauses do predominate might be more accurately labeled 'a pregnant pause in the action'. If we take seriously the connotations of 'pregnant' here, the narrative proper comes to be seen, as it was by Aristotle, as a created object of the author, one which he can manipulate to conform to normative ideals of storytelling. From this point of view, the distribution of evaluative clauses in the narrative proper becomes a rhetoric device, a device constituted by the author/narrator in his role as part of the discourse world, the world which includes the audience intended for his discourse. That this discourse world is present in the personal narrative has already been established in consideration of the abstract; within that abstract the narrative proper has already been intended, although emptily, and thus it exists for the author/narrator already as an object to be carefully unfolded for fulfillment by that audience. The distribution of evaluation, then, within the narrative proper can be a device to accentuate the suspense fulfilled by the audience as the action unfolds, and intendedly so. Variation in the distribution of evaluative phrases or clauses is therefore a part of the structural level called commentary.

In the current narrative unit, verse IX stands out as an example of the strategic distribution of evaluative phrases and clauses. In particular, line 29 is specifically constructed in a way which accentuates suspense. In several previous lines (line 11, 21-22, 25, and 26), R has used the construction 'participial clause-narrative clause' to move the narrative proper forward. Line 29 has the same basic pattern, but the participial clause is replaced by a four-fold structure of participial clauses (a sub-verse), and, in addition, the narrative clause is interrupted by a four-fold adjectival listing of characteristics of the 'military looking man' (the fourth member of which is itself drawn out in length relative to the previous three) just prior to its conclusion. The effect may be said (following Genette, 1972/1980, p. 93ff) to lengthen the 'narrative time' relative to the 'fabula time' where narrative time represents the established pace of the succession of events in the relating of the narrative within the discourse world, and fabula time represents the pace of the succession of events as these are constituted to unfold within the fabula world proper. This effect of line 29 can be seen most clearly when it is directly compared to line 33. The actions of these lines (the approach of the military man and the approach of the Queen Mother) likely took approximately the same length of time *within the time frame of the fabula*, but their duration in discourse ('real') time (in speaking or reading) is markedly different (the first contains 78 words and 6 distinct pauses, the second contains 12 words and no pauses). Another accomplishment of this portion of the narrative unit is that this aspect may also be a focalization; the lengthening of narrative time may also mimic a lengthening of subjective or 'story time' for the principal subjectivity. Thus the nervous anticipation of an impending negative consequence, liking being 'thrown out on our ear' (line 29), prior to the invitation from the military man, gives way to an elated anticipation of 'actually, actually meeting the Queen Mother' (line 32), and is at least consistent with a corresponding change in subjective perception of the passage of time, that is 'lived time', within the principal subjectivity.

Another effect which may be attributed to the author/narrator's relationship to the discourse world is the distribution of verse boundaries relative to the distribution of structural boundaries of the pieces in Labov's model. At least as constituted here, each of these pieces starts and ends at a verse boundary, in line with the suggestion made earlier that oral speech is hierarchically organized at the linguistic level. Further, the effects discussed above can be seen to be modulated by differences in the complexity and metricity of such verses.

Even the deviations in the four-structuring of verses (notably in verse III) can be made coherent under the notion that structural pieces are *meant* by the author/narrator to end upon a verse boundary. (Or we might be prepared to say, following Merleau-Ponty (1986/1945, p. 48), that this nested relationship between grammatical and already semantic levels is *motivated* without being explained by the grammatical units). Consider, then, what might be required of an author who wished to maintain such a verse-structure correlation, if he were to embark upon a verse that will not end until after a structural boundary has been encountered (that is, will have insufficient content to allow the verse to be completed when the current section is also naturally completed). One possibility, and the one which is suggested by verse III, is to foreshorten the current verse and begin a new verse on the structural boundary. One way in which this may be allowed to occur without an undue interruption of metrical fluency (as perceived by an audience) is to accentuate the boundary of the new verse. The second line in verse III, which ends the verse, is delivered with a rapidly accentuated pace and then the pace is immediately slowed at the beginning of verse IV, which also initiates the narrative proper.

Another device which allows the realignment of verse boundaries is illustrated in the second narrative unit (Unit II: Hospital Times) in lines 2 and 3. Here, a self-interruption (between line 2 and line 3) realigns line boundaries, and a long pause after line 3 allows the realignment of verse boundaries. This same device is used again in line 10 (and perhaps also in line 8). Both of these boundaries may also be seen as boundaries between structural pieces of the personal narrative.

The full model of personal narrative has now been constituted with the interpretation of the distinctions made by Labov within the narrative proper between complicating action and resolution *as an effect of the narrator's constitution of the narrative proper as an object of the discourse world.* Similarly, the relationship between versification and the constitution of the personal narrative has also been attributed to the level of the discourse world. The first narrative unit of R's discourse has been shown to exemplify this description prototypically. However, as will now be discussed, this model does not adequately describe all of the narrative units of R's discourse and the initial assumption that all discourse units are personal narratives will require modification.

Variation in the Structure of Discourse Units. A personal narrative must contain narrative clauses in a core narrative in order to qualify as a member of the set of linguistic objects described by Labov's model. Units which relate repeated or iterated actions alone have been explicitly excluded from consideration (Labov, 1982, p. 361). Genette (1972/1980, 1983/1988) however, in analyzing Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu*, (admittedly about as far from an oral discourse as many could conceive), notes the high frequency with which 'episodes' (as recognizable discourse units) in that work adopt a generalized or iterative structure. Genette's description of narrative includes the iterative episode and the singular episode both as proper to a narrative work.

Unit 6 in R's discourse is an example of a unit composed of iterated episodes and is presented again below:

UNIT 6: ENGLISH PUB

ABSTRACT

I. 1. you can prob'ly TELL / I'm ENGlish / from the- my ACcent
2. and I'm LIVing in Canada
II. 3. the memory of the English PUB () is-s (.) / is SOMEthing
that you hear English people TALK about
4. um and I'm not going to pick a particular PUB / or a
particular ocCAsion
5. there are SO MANy=
6. but they all merge into ONE

ITERATIVE NARRATIVE
SEQUENCE I

III. 7. and it's / the picture of-f / coming out of CHURCH
or maybe you don't go to church
(8.) um getting up LA-zy on a Sunday morning=reading the Sunday paper /
9. and you're *ALways* down to the PUB () / on a SUN-day LUNCH time
10. that's where the- that's where the PEOple *all* meet=

IV. 11. that's where (.) the NEIGH- not neighbours so much () but

but FRIENDS from the TENnis club *or-r* t- /
people who get together / *might* have a common interest
in motor rac-ing
or ah TEN-nis
or-r () bridge
or-r (.) YOUTH club- *WHATever*
get down
12. and they *ALL* have a PINT
13. and they- *maybe* they have TWO pints
14. and *everyone* () goes HOME () to their respective houses for lunch

V. 15. ah-h *maybe* they're *all* going out ah for a DO= /
16. 'n they're *all* going down to () *some* MUseum /
or some fete /
or some (.) SAIL-ing GIG () /
or something () today=but (..)

SEQUENCE II

VI. (17.) you=know () a GOOD SOLid PINT of beer in the fist /
NOT at a table / NOT served by a waitress /
18. you GET it yourSELF
you struggle for it
you have to FIGHT to get to the bar
19. 'n then you go OUTside / into the SUNshine (.)
20. 'n you *can* stand in the parking lot
and the birds are there
and the cars going by
and the crickets going on on the green

EVALUATION

VII. 21. its- its kind=of=a / a COLlection of memories
22. but its *ALways* the same KIND of feeling / that- that ah
23. the pub IS () a com-MUN-ity /
24. or the people who go there / get-
the LOC-als () the REGulars / that get=ta=know /
oh () there's that OLD guy=

ORIENTATION/NARRATIVE ACTION (Continued)
SEQUENCE III

VIII.25. and *ya=might* () see people there / that you've never
SPOken to for twenty years

26. but you KNOW 'em (.)
27. and HE'S never spoken to YOU for twenty years
28. but HE knows YOU

IX. 29. 'n he- because you talk to people about people
and () who's that guy
oh ya I know him
he works *so=and=so (.)*
and=so=and=so

CODA

IX. 30. but its a good feeling (.)
31. its a good feeling.

This unit has no core narrative, although it does contain three distinct iterated action sequences, (each it should also be noted beginning and ending at verse boundaries). These action sequences are all exemplifications of 'the memory of the English pub' (line 3). In verse II, R constitutes the first sequence of actions as itself an idealized exemplification of an often-repeated sequence, 'they *all* merge into one / and its the picture of...' (lines 6 and 7), and the repetitive nature of the action is indicated again shortly into the sequence, 'you're *always* down to the pub' (line 9). The actions are presented in a present tense which clearly intends the past as well (the 'historical present tense') and the sequence is initiated in an indefinite second person, a 'you' which clearly includes an 'I' as well. The idealization of this sequence is indicated by the use of definite and inclusive descriptors ('always' line 9; 'all' lines 10,12,15,16; 'everyone' line 14) in counterpoint to indefinite intentions, modal modifiers and verbs, and specific alternation ('whatever' line 11; 'something' line 16; 'maybe' lines 7,13; 'might' line 11; 'or' lines 7, 11). In each case the main action (generally in the main clause) is definite and inclusive and alternation is found in subordinate clauses, or as a specific listing. Nevertheless the whole constitutes a definite sequence, although one which might differ in specific (so noted and indefinitely intended) particular ways in each repetition. This structure is illustrated in paraphrase below (where '|' is used to indicate alternation):

Action Sequence I: Sunday at the Pub

1. after *attending* church |
reading paper
you ALWAYS *go* down to the pub Sunday morning

2. where ALL the people *meet* who *share* an interest in
motor racing |
tennis |
bridge |

youth club |
whatever

3. they ALL *have*
a pint |
two pints

4. then EVERYONE *goes*
home to lunch |
off to some do |
    museum |
    fete |
    sailing gig |
    something

The second action sequence of this unit is contained in verse VI, and might be entitled 'Getting your Pint'. It does not contain alternation and the 'can' of line 20 is the only verb interpretable as modal. This action sequence must still be considered iterative, however, for several reasons. First, it begins with an indefinite image, '*a* good solid pint of beer in the fist' (line 17), the feeling of which is (in context) an apparently oft repeated one. Second, it is grammatically continuous with the first sequence. It too is related in the present tense and it reestablishes the indefinite second person subject initiated in line 9. Finally, the two sequences are semantically connected by images of spring or summertime ('tennis club','motor racing' line 11; 'sailing gig' line 16 in the first; 'sunshine' line 19; 'birds', 'crickets', line 20 in the second). The two sequences do form part of the same 'picture'. They are distinct, however. The grammatical theme has shifted from the joint action of a group of persons ('they' in lines 12 to 16 of which the 'you' of line 9 is a member) to the action of a single person ('you' in lines 17 to 20). Furthermore, it is presented out of order; the actions of the second sequence would typically have unfolded during the span of time covered by the first action sequence. (Chrono-logically, this sequence would belong at approximately line 12 or 13 in the first action sequence). This pair of sequences presents a relationship of a particular type, the first iterative action sequence has been unfolded as a whole before another iterative action sequence which spans a portion of the same time in greater detail is unfolded, also as a whole. This is akin to the re-views (repetitions and recapitulations) of the coda section (e.g. of Unit I: The Queen Mother, discussed above), insofar as there is a reconstitution of the same time span. But in those cases the reviews repeat what has previously been presented, for emphasis or from a different point of view, and do not constitute a multitude of additional fabulaic elements as is the case here.

The third action sequence, 'Meeting the Regulars' presented in verses VIII and IX is not so closely associated with the first two as these are with each other. In fact, R specifically indicates that the 'merged picture' of the English Pub experience in verses III to VI is now reconstituted as 'a collection of memories' (line 21) of the English Pub and constitutes this third sequence as an exemplification of a separate generalization concerning English Pubs ('the pub is a community' line 23). The nested relationship between the first and second action sequence has now given way to an associative relationship at the thematic level of the pub, although it is possible that exemplifications of this sequence might have occupied the very same time spans as the earlier sequences. While the specific indicators of spring-summer have disappeared, the sequence is still delivered in the present tense with an indefinite second person subject. This sequence also itself contains a nested exemplification, an indefinite conversation, paraphrasing and illustrating 'because you talk to people about people' (in line 29). Again this exemplification may have been presented out of order, it would seem to fit more naturally with the previous (self-interrupting) exemplification in mimicked dialogue, 'oh there's that guy' (at line 24).

The tripartite structural division of narrative into fabula, story, and commentary is less distinct in this unit than it is in a singular narrative such as Unit I: The Queen Mother. The narrator's voice is the strongest subjective presence in the unit, and the unit may be heard primarily as a commentary, expressing the current convictions of the narrator now. The fabula level of the narrative, the level of objects, is intended by the author only in its typicality, and is therefore indefinite and indeterminate in fulfillment. Thus, for example, even while we may suspect that R himself was thinking of a particular pub out of which he might carry his pint to the parking lot, since he never confirms this, it remains possible that it is a general characteristic of experiences in many different Pubs.

The principal subjectivity of the story level is typically submerged within the narratorial voice in this unit. Thus no internal mental states are separately constituted for the principal subjectivity in relation to transitions in the action (as was the case, for example, within the singular narrative unit I: the Queen Mother where the principal subjectivity's mental state was constituted directly and changed in the course of the action from nervousness to elation). The mental state of the principal subjectivity is rather presented indirectly as an exemplification of a state recognized and singled out in generalizations about the experiences by the narrator. In fact, these mental states may only be recognizable by the narrator *as he remembers now*, and may not have been recognizable or recognized at the time of the action (or at *all* times of the action) by the principal subjectivity himself (that is, they were horizonal). Thus the always present 'same kind of feeling' (line 22) attributed here to the sense of 'community' may not have been so recognized at the time, but rather recognized then in the way it is ultimately recognized now, as an indistinct 'good feeling' (lines 27 and 28). So too with the feeling of 'a good solid pint of beer in the fist' (line 17). The effect of the unit as a whole is therefore to reinforce the continuity of the narrator in current time and the principal subjectivity of the past.

The principal subjectivity's presence is, however, more keenly felt in the second action sequence which is presented without alternation, and (largely) without modal verbs. Line 20 can be understood as focalizing the constituted surroundings from inside the principal subjectivity as he surveys the soundscape ('birds', 'cars', 'crickets'). In the third action sequence, where R lapses into mimicked dialogue (in line 23 and again in line 26) the principal subjectivity is present as speaker/listener. Both of these segments are singularized relative to their contexts, presenting a single definite situation as having been repeated an indefinite number of times. This repetitive aspect is not directly signaled within the sequence by alternation or the use of modal or iterative adverbs. The principal subjectivity seems to be distinctly constituted, then, in the transition from a more to a less markedly iterative sequence.

There appears, therefore, to be a relationship between the frequency which is assigned to an action sequence and the distinctness of a story level in autobiographical discourse. In a singular episode, the principal subjectivity is distinctly constituted, but in an iterative narrative that principal subjectivity may become progressively more submerged in the narratorial voice. The current narrative unit exemplifies an iterative narrative in which the subjectivity of the narrator is merged with that of the principal subjectivity. In addition, no discontinuity between the past and present is constituted. These mergings are effected primarily by the historical present tense which not only constitutes the present, but also constitutes the past, and the future. The iterative action sequence, while constituted as definitely having occurred in the past, is therefore not precluded from potentially reoccurring in the present or future. Thus 'I' refers simultaneously to I as I was then, I now, and perhaps also I as I will be. .

Labov considers the type of iterative action pattern exemplified here (including modifiers of repetition, alternation, and historical present tense or past tense) to be typical of orientation sections of personal narratives. Such iterative action patterns are found in the orientation sections of many of R's (well-formed in Labov's sense) narratives (e.g. Unit 3: Swiss Dinner Party, verse II, previously presented as an illustration of a complexly structured verse, Unit 4a: Little Wanderer, verse II). Where a core narrative is subsequently related, it is a particular exemplification (either typical or distinguished in some way as extraordinary) of this iterative patterning.

This typical sequencing that Labov suggests (iterative narrative then singular narrative) is also consistent with models of episodic memory in which knowledge about action is posited to consist of generalized representations, or 'scripts', according to which commonly performed actions generally unfold (in action and in narration). These theories also suggest that particular memories are 'stored in memory' in conjunction with the scripts that they exemplify (or partially exemplify) (Schank, 1982; see also Barsalou, 1988). An iterative narrative would thus be the presentation of a script, and a singular narrative which might follow would have been 'stored in memory' with this script.

Another example of a narrative unit dominated by iterative actions is Unit 2: Hospital Times, which presents an example of iterative action sequences presented in the past tense which do not span the temporal distance between past and present:

UNIT 2: HOSPITAL TIMES

ABSTRACT I

I. 1. I have a () a MEMORY of (.) / a SEVEN MONTH'S duRAtion=
2. but I won't (.) sort of (.) go through the whole SEquence/
because it (.)
3. it IS / () an EVENT unto itself (..)

ABSTRACT II/NARRATIVE PROPER

II. 4. *one morning I WOKE UP / having been in a COma / for SEVEN (.) DAYS*
5. *and I spent the NEXT SEVEN MONTHS in hospital*
6. and its NOT going to take seven months / to tell the STOry
III. 7. most people (.) / really kind of (.) FEAR hospital
disLIKE hospital /
complain about the MEALS /
the RULES
the regulAtions
the PAINS
and so forth
8. sure there's all of that (...)
9. but all my memories of THAT [choking with emotion] / were SO-O (.) WONderful=
10. I mean (.) the FACT / of being ALIVE (..)

ORIENTATION/EXTENDED CODA

IV. 11. I=was=a=young=MAN / about TWENTY-ONE / seeing other PEople around-
12. we weren't SICK /
because I'd been ah injured / in a motor accident /
so most people had been BROKEN UP / rather than DISeased
13. so people had BROKEN LEGS /
and bashed-in HEADS /
and-ah EYE problems (.) /
and ar- broken arms /
or whatEVer
14. ah I had ah MOST of the above/

(ITERATIVE ACTION SEQUENCE 0)

V. 15. but the CARE / of the nurses () / the comPASSion / ()
you know () of ALL the people= /
whether it were doctors (.) /
interns (.) /
ah cleaning staff (.) /
WHAT-EVER (..)/

ITERATIVE ACTION SEQUENCE I

VI. 16. but the most MEmorable PART / of the WHOLE THING is that/
we we-re ()

like THIRTY of us / in a ward= / in ONE ROOM (.) /
COOPED UP TOGETHER / all with our various PROblems (.) /
like a BUNCH of little boys in school / in a CLASSroom
17. and we made the nurses' lives [laugh] / a little HELL /
now and THEN-N
we would turn TOIlet paper / into paper AEROplanes/
and we would throw ORanges / at the NURses
18. and (.) we would DO / all KINDS of things () /
to alLEViate the BOREdom= /
to MAKE a little FUN out of LIFE=
19. and by goodness you=know it WAS FUN /
and we LEARNT a lot

ITERATIVE ACTION SEQUENCE II

VII. 20. a-n-d (...) and I ap-pre-ciate that (.) /
MY MOTHer CAME /
VIRTUALLY EVERY DAY /
for seven MONTHS [choking with emotion]/
21. PEOPLE / I had hardly kno-wn beFORE / came to SEE me (.)/
either REgularly /
or ocCASionally () /
or even just ONCE /
22. *PEOPLE /*
CAME /
to my twenty-first [choking with emotion] BIRTHday/
in the hospital
23. and they came from AMER-ic-A [choking with emotion] /
SCOTland /
SWITzerland /
ALL over

CODA

VIII. 24. and (...) it was a real fe-eling- / I mean THAT was rehabilitation in itself
25. I mean the FACT that / everyone CARED SO MUCH [choking with emotion] /
was (...) / ah (.) just treMENdous=
26. and it's something that-ah / when I [choking with emotion] THINK about it (.) /
there's no excuse for () ah () /
for feeling BAD /
or DOWN /
or GUILty /
or (..) any negative thing=in=this=world (.)
when I can remember THAT /

27. I OWE those people [chuckles] / to go out / and do
something good / and BE somebody ()

IX. 28. so that was a wonderful time.

This unit presents considerable difficulties for a Labovian analysis. The majority of the 'narrative clauses' (presented above in italics) occur (in lines 4 and 5) at the beginning of a section which might easily have been understood on first hearing as an abstractive summary of a more detailed narrative to be unfolded, (especially as R offers a commentary which refers indistinctly, in line 6, to 'the story' to follow). As the unit unfolds, however, no further narrative clauses are presented (with one exception very late in the unit [to be discussed below]). By the beginning of verse VI (line 16) it seems clear that none will. In an orthodox Labovian analysis, therefore, verse II must be seen as the narrative proper, and all that follows it in the unit would be seen as an extended coda, which explicates the 'point' (first made apparent in lines 9 and 10) of this foreshortened narrative. This section (verses II and III) would appear if presented in isolation as a well-formed (though short) personal narrative, but it is apparent in context that R himself does not regard it even as essential to the 'story' he is telling, which is yet to follow (line 6). The narrative clauses of this section turn out to have constituted not a summary for a more detailed recapitulation of narrative action but rather an empty or unfilled span of time within which iterative action sequences are then constituted as having repeatedly occurred. In retrospect, the meaning of line 2 'I won't go through the whole sequence' may be seen to have foreshadowed this intention. In addition, 'it is an event unto itself' (in line 3) may also be seen in retrospect to constitute the whole seven month time span as a single punctate event (in a foreshortened temporal perspective of a life story, for instance). Consequently the full unit can be seen as centered on a description of an event rather than as a sequence of actions constituting a narrative of events presenting greater detail about one larger event, this even though it appears that R could have chosen to so constitute it ('I won't go through the whole sequence' implies that I could have gone through that sequence if it would have served my purpose to do so).

The heart of the unit then becomes the iterative action sequences presented in verses VI and VII. Verse VI is presented in a past tense (successively 'we were', 'we made', 'we would turn', 'we would throw', 'we would do', 'it was',' we learnt') which specifically includes an iterative past tense verb form 'we would' which is a marker for repetition (Chatelain, 1987). The repetitive is also marked by adjectival modifiers connoting repetition ('now and then', line 17) and plural indefinite nouns ('all kinds of things', line 18). The verse also presents a succession in the constitution of action from general to specific and back to general (even while remaining iterative). It begins with a description of a durative state which is then compared to a contrasting durative state connoting general iterative actions (as typical of 'a bunch of little boys in school', also by the way implicitly connoting a daily cycle). It then presents a general statement of action repeatedly occurring within this state, "made the nurses' life a little hell" (line 17), which is then specifically exemplified, again with more specific iterative actions. The final two lines successively return to the general, the first repeating and extending the range of activities presented as typical in the previous line, and the second returning to the presentation of a durative state which characterizes the sequence as a whole. The effect is to allow a progressively more determinate fulfillment of the action sequence.

Verse VII is also presented in the past tense (the verb is 'came' in each of the four lines, itself an iteration) and iteration is indicated in adverbs and adverbial phrases, in one case with alternation ('virtually every day for seven months, line 20; 'either regularly or occasionally or even just once', line 21). Repetition is thus constituted both of single persons acting in the same way repeatedly and of different people performing the same generic action. This verse is marked by a progression in specificity as well, this time from iterative in the first two lines to singular as an exemplification of the iterative in the final two lines. This sequence (iterative as contextualization, singular as exemplary) has been noted previously as a common one for personal narratives, and this verse may also be seen in isolation as a foreshortened narrative (as was the section consisting of verses II/III).

It should also be noted that the incomplete verse V also presents a nominalization, 'care', which connotes a set of iterative actions, not only as repeated through time, but also as repeated by many persons 'whether it was doctors, interns, cleaning staff, whatever' (line 15). It may thus be considered as the first of three iterated sequences in the unit. Under this conception, the progression from general to specific in each of the other action sequences is mimicked by a progression across them in terms of the degree of specificity that each ultimately obtains (from lesser to greater). In addition, the latter two action sequences can be understood as themselves exemplifications of this 'caring' as presented in verse V.

In this unit as in Unit VI: English Pub, the action sequences are kept distinct from each other. Each of the principal sequences is introduced by a statement of commentary in the voice of the narrator ('but the most memorable part of the whole thing is ...' and 'and I appreciate that...') both in the present tense, prior to a shift into the past tense in which the action is related. In addition, while each of the sections (including also the early singular narrative) may be separately seen not to contradict a chronological fulfillment internally, the chronologies of the individual sections overlap, and each specific section reconstitutes a span of time that has previously been constituted, although in a different aspect. Such a multiple reconstitution of the same time span in a singular personal narrative would likely be understood as an intellectual failing of the teller (as in the inept joke teller who has to 'backtrack' to include a detail critical to the punch line), although this may not be true in an extended written narrative where it might serve a specific narrative purpose (as, for example, in many mystery stories, or in stories with multiple plot lines (Ryan, 1987b)). However, it is clear that a choice is available in how a narrator chooses to fill an emptily intended time span; it may be expanded chronologically in a singular narrative, or it may be filled by one or more separately constituted (but chronologically overlapping) iterative action sequences.

This full unit can now also be seen as intermediate between a singular narrative which reconstitutes a past and specifically constitutes a distinct principal subjectivity (such as Unit I: Queen Mother), and an iterative narrative of the past, present, and/or future where the principal subjectivity is submerged in the narrative voice (such as Unit VI: English Pub). The narrative framework (presented in verse II) has constituted the principal subjectivity as distinct from the narrator now and the iterative action sequences are clearly intended to belong to the principal subjectivity of the past. Consequently, this form of iterative narrative does present a distinct story level in addition to the fabula and commentary levels. This unit illustrates that a distinct story level depends not upon specific narrative clauses alone, but can also be present within an iterative episode when the iterated action sequence itself is allocated to a temporally bounded past, discontinuous with the present.

There is still, however, a degree of merging of the narrative voice and the principal subjectivity, and it is again often unclear whether the feelings attributed to the principal subjectivity are intended as having been his mental state at the time, or are the narrator's feelings now in recollecting. Thus the paralinguistic features displayed during the recounting of verse VII indicate that emotions are currently being experienced, but it is not clear whether these are also intended as the emotions of the principal subjectivity during the time, or at least during part of the time, recounted.

The most interesting example of this merging of subjectivities is found in the first iterative action sequence presented in verse VI (also previously analyzed as an example of a complex interleaving of separate sub-verses). On the one hand, the main clauses taken together present a fabula possibly spoken (focalized) at least partially in the voice of the principal subjectivity. The problem in distinctly separating voices here is compounded by the fact that an iterative narrative in the past tense can introduce an additional level of subjectivity, one in which the principal subjectivity is constituted as itself looking back upon previous cycles of the iteration from a position occupied at one (or more) points in the ongoing iterations. The phrase 'by goodness you know it was fun' (in line 19) is suggestive that such a position is being occupied; it is easy to see oneself at the conclusion of a game or joke offering congratulations to other players such as 'by goodness, you know, that was fun'. In such a case, a subjectivity is constituted as himself remembering (commenting upon) the fabula currently being related. Clearly, however, 'having had fun' is an attribution of a mental state that belonged to the principal subjectivity at various times during the (then) ongoing iterations, and the story level is definitely present. On the other hand, the secondary clauses taken together present a contrasting picture. They form a commentary in the voice of the narrator looking back upon this sequence of actions from his position in current time. While this commentary may also be descriptive of the mental state of the principal subjectivity at that past time (and hence contain it), aspects such as 'and we learnt a lot' (in line 19) sound more like a retrospective judgement by the narrator now than a concurrent judgement of the principal subjectivity.

The type of construction just attributed to the main clauses of verse VI would perhaps be a past tense counterpart to an iterative narrative presented in the present tense (for example, as in unit VI: English Pub discussed above) which leaves open the possibility that the narrator in current time is commenting upon an iterating sequence from a position within the time in which the iterations are continuing or possibly continuing. It is also the construction used in the coda of the present unit. Thus the phrase 'when I think about it [i.e. the topic of the narrative just related]' (in line 26) indicates that the *remembering* is itself an iterative action that (repeatedly) results in the consciousness of a particular *conviction*, 'There's no excuse for feeling bad...; I owe those people to go out and do something good and be somebody' (lines 26 and 27) which is a current and continuing characteristic of R, the narrator now.

It is time now to consider how the two iterative units just discussed should be understood functionally. Because they do not (at least indisputably) possess a core narrative, they do not fit Labov's criteria for a personal narrative. They do, however, seem to be well-structured units of discourse, even in terms of the elements available from Labov's model. Thus both begin with an abstract which moves the auditor from the discourse world into a fabula world constituted by the narrator, and both end with a coda which returns the auditor to the current discourse world from a fabula world. As well, both present a story level in which a principal subjectivity is constituted as conscious of, and operating in, the fabula world, and which is separate, at least to some degree, from the narrator. Further, the central element of these units, the iterative action sequence, is not foreign to personal narratives which do have a core narrative; such sequences do appear in the abstract, in the coda, or as a part of what Labov would call the evaluation, where they may function as a bridge between the fabula world and the discourse world, or assist in supplying a motivation for the story, in articulating 'the point of the telling'. What function do they perform, then, in autobiographical discourse when separable, as in these examples, from a core narrative? .PM2

Temporality and the Generic Dimension of Discourse. Recall that in the description of a narrative as laminate there are at least the following layers: a fabula world, a principal subjectivity posited as experiencing that world, and a narrator who in constituting them can comment directly upon that world and its subjectivities. In the development to follow, discourse genres will be considered first as independent of the attempt to be self-referent or autobiographical; that is, the author will be assumed to be distinct from the narrative subjectivity who, in turn, constitutes the contents of its experience as natural objectivities within a natural fabula world. Persons are also constituted as natural objects in the fabula world, and remain distinct from the narrative subjectivity. These assumptions will later be relaxed in order to consider the special properties of autobiographical discourse.

In order to situate iterative discourse, it should be contrasted not only with singular narrative, but also with descriptive discourse. In a descriptive discourse, the narrative subjectivity presents an inventory of the properties of a natural object (possibly a person), and these may include dispositional properties constituted as formally analogous to, for example, the fragility of glass or the solubility of salt. Such a dispositional property seems enduring and outside time, but contains within its horizons indefinite temporal unfoldings in the fabula world which, in becoming fulfilled, can come to be seen as actualizations of the disposition.

Now consider, as a formal tool, a dimension anchored on one end by a singular *narration* unfolding a fabula world in time and anchored on the other end by a *description* in which fabula time appears to have been largely or completely suspended. These extremes capture the traditional generic distinction between narration and description as discourse types (e.g. Chatman, 1990). Narration is seen as essentially chronological, as representing a causal succession of events which may occur to or around an object in a fabula world; and description is seen as essentially atemporal, as inventorying an enduring set of properties of a (possibly complex) object separated from its fabula world. If this distinction is seen as absolute, as structural, then any discourse type which does not constitute a determinate temporal (and therefore also causally driven) succession simply cannot be narrative; this is the position that Labov has taken and the one which makes iterative discourse units of the type previously presented non-narrative for him. A relativization of this distinction which results in generic constructions such as 'description "in the service of" narrative' and 'narrative "in the service of" description' (as proposed by Chatman, 1990) clears no place for the iterative. Genette (1972/1980, 1983/1988) for one, however, rejects any such absolute distinction between the narrative and descriptive; and he does so in order to accommodate the iterative (and the descriptive as well) as potential moments within a narrative unfolding.

In following Genette's intent, we might try to fit the iterative action sequence into a now continuous dimension at a position between the extremes of traditional narrative and traditional description; for it neither posits the singular for which the world flows in a succession nor posits the timeless and enduring, but rather merges the two by constituting a pattern involving the object and its world which repeats in time. That is, while a pure narrative about an object will leave the internal properties of that object horizonal, and while a pure description of the properties of that object will leave the unfolding of its actions horizonal, the iterative will connect these internal and external horizons together by positing a repetition which, on the one hand, indicates the object's properties and, on the other hand, constitutes the passage of time for that object. While a particular discourse may exemplify only one of these types, it will typically include a combination of all three. Let us examine how this is possible by examining, in particular, how time is constituted in each pure type.

First, consider the pure narrative. A prominent structural description of the narrative (Pavel, 1985; Prince, 1982; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977) posits time as a divisible linear stream of successive natural events. The simplest form of narrative intends a span of time in a (constituted-as-natural) fabula world and fills it with an episode, a succession of (constituted-as-natural) actions performed by or on a single natural object or person (and viewable by a strategically placed subjectivity, the narrator). According to these theories, each of the successive component actions of an episode manifest a structure analogous to that of an episode itself, and can thus come to be regarded as episodes themselves. That is, each action of an episode can be related as itself a coherent episode, in turn composed of a succession of actions. The filling of time in composing a narrative is consequently a recursive process and can be articulated to various levels of granularity. Each element in a succession may be replaced by a succession of elements with like structure which fills the same time more densely; each element of this new succession will fill a narrower span of time. This nesting can also be viewed as proceeding from more to less dense filling of time as well; each episode can itself be viewed as part of a sequence composing an episode of a wider time span.

According to this model, a form of hierarchical paraphrase of narratives should be possible. That is, a sequence of actions constitutive of an episode may be replaced (with loss of determinacy of fulfillment, but without loss of episodic structure in a temporal succession) by nominalizations which summarize that sequence in a smaller number of actions. Evidence that hierarchical paraphrase is a reliable ability has been generated in studies of summarization of simple core narratives (Rumelhart, 1975, 1977).

This recursive decomposition in narrative is generally viewed as virtual in relation to a particular discourse, as having already been realized in the core narrative as constituted, but it can also be explicitly present within a discourse unit. In this case, a span of time previously constituted at one level of granularity is *reconstituted* within the discourse unit usually at a different level of granularity (and often as an evaluative 'device' in Labov's terms, or to provide commentary).

Particular discourse units operate within this model of linear time by allowing actions reconstituted at differing levels of granularity to become connected in a single linear sequence. Even apparently unfilled spans of time can be inserted into a succession without destroying the coherence of the sequence. (This was the property noted by Dilthey in his characterization of the coherence of an experience as such). Further, the order of the sequence can be transposed by a narrative voice in presentation provided that the resulting scrambled sequence retains some linguistic marks of a temporal order within the fabula world, so that the reader/auditor can (at least largely) restore the succession in fulfillment. Johnson-Laird (1983) has convincingly demonstrated the increasing incoherence of progressively more radically reordered discourse when such markers of succession are omitted.

An iterative action sequence constitutes time in a different way. While a *single* iteration of such a sequence would resemble a narrative episode and would therefore fill a span of time conceived as linear, the full duration of the set of multiple iterations clearly fills a wider span of time. Yet the full span of time of the full set of iterations is frequently of indeterminate length; first, because the iterative action sequence itself does not typically constitute the length of the time span (itself possibly variable) between iterations; and second, because it may not constitute a total number of iterations, especially when the sequence is currently being repeated or is constituted as possibly reoccurring in the future. Finally, the span of time taken for each particular iteration may itself be indeterminate or may vary. Consequently, the total span of time constituted by an iterative action sequence will not be fully filled.

The recursive decomposition that is possible in a narrative is also possible for an iterative action sequence. This recursive decomposition will perhaps more often be directly expressed than virtual, however. Typically a previously constituted time span or portions of that span are reconstituted in the discourse. This can occur in two general ways. The reconstituted time span can present a portion of each iteration of a previously presented action sequence at a different level of granularity, in which case it is itself another iterative action sequence. Or, a single sequence can be reconstituted and related as a core narrative of one of the previously constituted iterations.

Because the total span of time constituted by an iterative action sequence will not be fully filled, multiple iterative action sequences can be coherently constituted to occupy the same time span, and can be understood to have unfolded as independent cycles, possibly without overlap. This also means that events of a narrative can also be constituted to occupy the same time span as one or more iterative action sequences. The converse is also true; a time span constituted within a narrative can contain one or more iterations of an iterative action sequence, (though this is not generally noted by models of the core narrative which tend to imply that the time span of a linear sequence can only be recursively decomposed into more detailed linear sequences). It also becomes clear that more than a single core narrative might also share the same time span for the same reason; that is, the actions and events of the second may simply occur within the unfilled interstices between punctate events of the first.

Finally, in a description, many properties can be constituted as simultaneously present within an object because horizonal actions in time are only indefinitely intended (if in the past) or potentially intended (if in the future). Here again, however, a recursive decomposition is possible since individual properties can be posited which relate to various levels of granularity of nested action sequences.

These differing means of constituting time allow for a variety of nested relationships between descriptions, iterative action sequences, and narratives. Thus in a particular discourse, the horizonal time span of a property may be fulfilled by an iterative action sequence or by a narrative sequence, or time spans constituted by either a narrative or an iterative action sequence can be constituted as recursively containing time spans of the other type. It therefore seems possible not only that particular units of discourse (integral for example under a description similar to Labov's) could contain either pure or mixed forms of these types of discourse, but also that such discourse units might themselves be interconnected by means of these same relationships at a higher level of granularity into integral discourse units of a wider span.

Let us now consider how this description must be augmented when the discourse becomes reflective or autobiographical; that is, when the autobiographical pact is in force and the author, narrator, and principal subjectivity are constituted as identical[1].

In the previous description, the principal subjectivity was maintained as a natural object within the fabula and it was implicit in that description that the narrative subjectivity did not adopt the personal attitude with respect to the principal subjectivity. That is, the narrative subjectivity did not occupy or focalize the principal subjectivity, did not take its point of view. While the narrative subjectivity may choose to continue this natural attitude in an apparently autobiographical discourse, the narrative subjectivity has genuine access to the consciousness of the principal subjectivity through memory and can therefore not only observe its status as a consciousness but also 'inhabit' it, and present the fabula world as object of consciousness for that subjectivity. It is important to note however that the formal distinction between narrator and principal subjectivity is maintained, even in autobiography, in the distinction between I-now who narrates and I-then who occupied the fabula world. It requires an act of consciousness to constitute these two as identical, which need not occur explicitly in a discourse. Thus the personal attitude can be adopted towards the principal subjectivity in fiction where either the identity between author and narrator or the identity between narrator and principal subjectivity, or both, may not hold (giving rise to a number of characteristic structures in fiction e.g. omniscient narration, fictional autobiography, etc.). These possibilities might reasonably be thought to originate as variations on the immanent ability for self-reflection through memory, however.

Similarly, it was implicitly maintained in the previous description that the narrative subjectivity did not express a reflection upon itself. In any discourse, the narrative subjectivity can, of course, be constituted as itself a full blown consciousness, and as such, one of its abilities is self-reflection. The expression of the self-reflection of a narrative subjectivity does not require the explicit positing of a story level or a fabula world, however. In an autobiographical context (where author and narrator are constituted as identical), this form of self-referent discourse might be most often apparent in a reply to a question such as 'Who are you?'. A typical answer would give an inventory of the narrator's personal qualities now (e.g. Yardley, 1987), (in Husserl's terms, current convictions; in Allport's terms, cardinal traits). This personal inventory would be constituted as a description of the natural self now, a presentation of self as apparent natural body in a natural enduring state (now and for some time to come), as possessing dispositional properties.

Autobiographical discourse abounds with statements of this form, most typically in the abstracts and codas of personal narratives where they are constituted as commentary in the voice of the narrator. An example in the current discourse is R's statement 'I'm a competitive Bridge player' which initiates Unit 7: Bridge Player. In most cases, however, the intentional horizons of these statements are resolved, at least in part, in the subsequent constitution of a core narrative and/or an iterative action sequence. It does not seem impossible, however, that one or more recognizable units in an autobiographical discourse might consist entirely (or predominantly) of such statements of personal convictions. In the current discourse, Unit 29: Just an Ordinary Guy arguably provides such an example.

These properties lead to an addition, in the case of autobiography, to the dimensional model of discourse which was previously used to order narrative, iterative, and descriptive forms of discourse. In autobiographical discourse, the iterative is not only intermediate between the singular and punctate in time and the enduring and apparently timeless, it is also intermediate between the narrative and the descriptive, in that it, like the narrative, constitutes a story level, (though this story level is typically not fully detached from the narrative voice), and yet it is this narrative voice that is the only subjectivity apparently present in self-referent description. That is, in the autobiographical pure narrative, I-now and I-then are distinctly present, while in self-referent description only I-now is apparent. It is in the iterative that I-now becomes merged with I-then and both are implicitly present, though as an explicitly constituted identity.

This view of the dimension also reveals how intermediate generic forms can be created in autobiography. The two iterative units of the current discourse which were previously discussed would come to occupy different positions on this dimension. Unit VI: English Pub posits action sequences which have recurred in the past and may also come to occur in the present and future. The subjectivity who experiences these iterations is both the I of the past and the I of the present which, while both present in the unit, are merged, indistinctly separated. This iterative unit is therefore relatively closer to the descriptive pole on the posited dimension. Unit II: Hospital Times posits action sequences which recurred only within a distinct period of the past to a relatively more distinct principal subjectivity. This iterative unit is thus relatively closer to the narrative pole of the dimension.

A consciousness of time is essential to the constitution of discourse units at each point along this dimension. This goes beyond the role of the dimension itself as a formal device for representing variations in temporal constitution and in the constitution of consciousness, in ordering a transition from punctate occurrence in time to recurrence in time to property enduring in time, or in ordering the transition from distinct story level to submerged story level to apparently missing story level in autobiography. This essential relationship may be seen most easily by considering the constitution of an iterated action in itself.

Both time and a transcendent consciousness of time are required to constitute such an iteration, to see any two particulars separated in time as exemplifications of some one thing singular which may again recur. To see a pattern is to recognize it, *re-cognize that pattern as potentially recurring in time*, as already having had aspects available to consciousness in the past. Even if elements have not been cognized at first occurrence as already formed as a particular pattern, they are cognized as having that potential to reveal a pattern which itself has the potential to recur. It is *this* ability of consciousness to see patterns in time that underlies all points on the dimension.

Thus even pure narration is more than a mere unfolding of the successive, it also requires the constitution of a pattern. According to Ricoeur:

> ...it must be said that any narrative combines, in varying proportions, two dimensions: a chronological dimension and a non-chronological dimension. The first may be called the 'episodic dimension' of the narrative. Within the art of following a story, this dimension is expressed in the expectation of contingencies which affect the story's development; hence it gives rise to questions such as: and so? and then? what happened next? what was the outcome? etc. But the activity of narrating does not consist simply in adding episodes to one another; it also constructs meaningful totalities out of scattered events. This aspect of the art of narrating is reflected, on the side of following a story, in the attempt to 'grasp together' successive events. The art of narrating, as well as the corresponding art of following a story, therefore require that we are able *to extract a configuration from a succession* (Ricouer, 1981, p. 278).

The descriptive also implies the iterative. In reflection, I can become aware that the description of dispositional properties of myself or other human beings as timeless amounts not to an elimination of, but rather to a submersion/subversion of, time. Such a description can become a way of hiding time and potentially a way of hiding consciousness itself. In a description in which the natural attitude is adopted the voice of the consciousness of the past has been silenced; if a generalization across human beings locates a 'pure' disposition which is then reified as a natural causal mechanism, the narrator's voice of the present is silenced as well, and the suppression of consciousness is completed (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1986/1945, p. 71). But a dispositional property attributed to a human being is most often a nominalization of an iterative action sequence (or an aspect of that sequence). Just as the singular is veiled by the iterative and cannot be distinctly seen, the iterative is similarly horizonal but obscured in the descriptive. In order even to cognize a dispositional property, it must constitute a pattern which can come to unfold in time, and which can come to be recognized as precisely a recurring pattern of *that* disposition.

I know even myself most fundamentally as just such a pattern in time and memory, in the repetition of that pattern, and in its potential to repeat again. Every singular memory presents again as principal subjectivity that I who was in the past conscious of that event; and structurally that I is a separate I from the I that I now am conscious of being. Since I cannot ever come to see a substantial I which is enduringly identical, I must re-cognize it so. I-then and I-now are *iterations* of an I which transcends and unites them.

At this point the formal dimension on which the narrative, iterative and descriptive have been ordered has emerged as representing variations in the constitution and reconstitution of temporal objects. The iterative is now visible as a canonical form in the centre of this dimension which, in the genesis of consciousness, gradually sharpens into the narrative and softens into the descriptive at the ends of the dimension, rather than appearing merely as a set of intermediate points between narration and description at two stable endpoints.

Complex discourse units and high level structure. The structural dimension along which descriptions, iterated action sequences, and narratives are ordered; and the diverse manner in which time is constituted and filled using these discourse types suggests that discourse units may assume a more variegated form than has thus far been highlighted in R's transcript. In particular, processes of recursion within and across these types of temporal objects allow discourse units to be expanded into integral discourse units of longer span and richer fabric.

If discourse were structured entirely from discourse units of the particular type articulated in Labov's model of the personal narrative (even allowing for the variant form of the iterative action sequence as a well-formed discourse unit), division points between successive similarly structured units should be easy to establish. In particular, each personal narrative would end with the resolution section of a core narrative, and/or with a coda that returns the speaker and auditor from the fabula world to the discourse world. In dialogue, this division might also be marked by a switch of speaker (or the intention to switch speakers as signaled by a lengthy pause). Such devices are also present in R's monologue, even as far as the attempt to reestablish dialogue. Thus R's act of shutting off the tape recorder not only clearly signals the end of particular units of monologue but also indicates a desire to leave the monologue by inviting a switch of speakers.

Yet many apparent divisions in the monologue do not bracket discourse units that fit the simple form of the personal narrative or the iterated action sequence. In particular, some such units do not even appear to stand alone as personal narratives because they are missing one or more conventional sub-sections. More frequently such units have some claim to the self-sufficiency characteristic of a personal narrative but seem nevertheless to be intimately related to the units that proceed and/or follow them.

Under the structural description of pure narrative as recursively structured (Pavel, 1985; Prince, 1982; Rumelhart, 1975, 1977), a narrative composed of episodes may be recursively inflated in the telling such that the complexity and degree of articulation of each episode approaches that of a personal narrative. Each episode might nevertheless remain part of the chronological development of a single narrative thread, and in particular may unfold within a span of time constituted, for example, in an initial abstract or orientation section. In cases of this type, the challenge of establishing a hierarchical ordering of like-structured elements and the assignment of particular units to particular levels (for example extended narrative subsuming a set of personal narratives) may come to resemble the challenge encountered earlier of distributing a particular string of discourse across the theoretical levels idea unit, line and verse. The solution here might be the same; that is, work with a particular parsing in light of the possibility that it might not be the only consistent one.

An outstanding example of this threaded form of discourse organization in R's transcript is Unit 12: Married Life. The following excerpt has been pared to make salient the bases of continuity between the parts, each of which have some claim to status as a separate personal narrative or discourse unit. In particular (and to use Labov's terms), evaluation sections have been eliminated in the excerpt, and core narratives of the parts have also been eliminated if the abstract and/or orientation sections (that are retained) constitute the temporal object that will be unfolded (and/or summarizes the action of the narrative to follow). Thus the excerpt consists primarily of sections of discourse resembling abstracts and codas.

UNIT 12: MARRIED LIFE

a: A PURPOSE IN LIFE

1. yeah one of the things that ah / I mentioned BEFORE / was
   this business of being in hospital
2. and being in hospital did one THING for me (.)
3. what it DID was to TEACH me / or at least put in MY MIND /
   that I was HERE for a purpose=

...

17. but I DID () get that conviction
18. and I still have it toDAY () / THIRTY odd years later (..)/
    that () I am HERE for a reason
19. and I'm not sure what that reason is=
20. I never HAVE been sure what that reason is

b: DAINTY LITTLE ENGLISH ROSE

1. but one DAY-Y (.)
   I TOOK it upon myself (.)
   to take CARE of somebody (..)
2. I made the mistake of marrying her [laughs]

...

9. um and love took off
10. and-ah SURE () I married her ()
11. and OFF we WENT

c: NOT ONCE BUT SEVERAL TIMES

1. I don't KNOW even TOday if that WAS-s the purpose in LIFE
2. at the moment I'm () sort=of separated / and I have been several () TIMES=
   not just for a LONG time but for SEVeral times [laughs]=
3. I think I've left ++ on THREE occasions
4. and-ah every time I do it AH-HA / ah-h-h who knows whether th- /
   it'll be the last or not

...

d: LEAVING FOR CANADA

1. the first time it happened (.) / I wasn't working
2. ah I'd lost my () work my job
   ah the industry wasn't in particularly () good shape
3. and we ran into money problems
4. and-ah because of my early childhood () memories of Canada/ it SEEM-ed
   appropriate () at that time that- /
   that THIS was the MOment / to make the BREAK (.) and to go to Cana-
   make the break with ENGland not ++
   and go to Canada (..)
5. so I announced that we would be GOing (..)
6. of course ++ announced that () we would NOT be going
7. and-ah it enSUED that () I () decided () to GO / and SHE
   decided to () to stay () in England
8. and I came out on my own

...

14. ++ hoped that I would FALL on my FACE / and come home
    CRAWLing / with my tail between my legs

...

16. um but that was not the case (...)
17. um skipping on a few years / um ++ DID () come out to
    CAnada
18. and there was some VERY (...) poignant things that
    happened in-ah / when she came out

e: COMING TO EDMONTON

...

2. and I'll- I diVERT from ++ / for the moment
3. and GIVE you another s- memory and a story / which is
   VERY VERY crucial and important to me [choking back tears] ...

33. well=the=end=of THAT little story was that I h-a-d a JOB on the TUESday /
    which was the VERY NEXT day (.) / after my interviews

34. I had a BANK loan on () FRIday
35. and I bought a car on () SATurday
36. and Edmonton / and everyone in it / has been very GOOD to me ever since (...)

f: MY WIFE COMES TO CANADA

1. so-o I DIDn't go back to England with my tail between my legs
...
3. and ah (.) she came=and=had=a LOOK at it
4. and ah (...) she didn't () LIKE () ANYthing=of=what=she saw (..)
5. BUT (.) her ties to ME brought her OVER here / some many months LATer
...
9. um and we () tried / and we () went through a lot of effort / and ah so forth (.)
10. but it was very hard= ...
...

g: LOSING THE TWINS

1. um (..) a very very SAD thing happened () shortly after ++ came OUT here=
2. she was expecting twins ...
...
7. but on CHRIST-mas DAY in the hospital / she lost the TWINS
...
9. and that caus-ed () DAMage to-o ++'s heart that probably is (.) virtually irREParable that-
10. well () years=and=years=and=years later I guess / it's- ah we're still HERE / but that was () pretty BAD (...)
...

The first section of the unit begins with the constitution of a conviction that 'I was here for a purpose' (line 3), continues with an explication of this conviction and its precursors, and ends both with a confirmation that this conviction is long standing: 'and I still have it [the conviction] today, thirty odd years later, that I am here for a reason' (line 18), and with a confirmation that the object of this conviction, the 'reason', is not and has not ever been clearly visible. The second section unfolds an episode of meeting and marrying, and places it in the context of the 'purpose in life' previously constituted. The third section begins by explicitly confirming this nested relationship (between the act of marrying and the conviction of purpose), implying that, at the time, it was thought to be that 'purpose in life' or at least strongly related to it. This section continues by then reconfirming that this purpose remains unclear and indefinite even through the marriage, and ends by offering as evidence of this continued uncertainty a set of repeated separations-reconciliations between R and his wife. This new temporal object, the repeated leavings, is a more detailed explication of the temporal object marriage, and it, in turn, begins to be progressively unfolded in the next section with an episode detailing the first separation. This is later followed by an episode detailing the first reconciliation. Between these sections is one that presents an episode that R himself constitutes as a diversion (Unit 12e, line 2). It is, however, presented in proper chronological order between the first separation and the first reconciliation; and it does provide an explanation of why R's wife's expectation that he 'would fall on my face and come home crawling with my tail between my legs' (Unit 12d, line 14) was not met. The section detailing the reconciliation ends by reemphasizing the continuing poor quality of the marriage, and the final section begins to further unfold this quality by detailing the episode of the loss of the twins.

Schematically, this unit is structured as a single narrative thread although the time that is covered by the full narrative span is repeatedly constituted, each time in a different and more detailed fashion. The effect, however, is that the discourse unit is unfolded according to the sequential model of linear time characteristic of a personal narrative. Thus the first section constitutes a temporal object, in this case a personal conviction maintained over a period of about 30 years. The second section reconstitutes this same time span as a marriage that partially exemplifies this conviction. The details surrounding the beginning of the marriage are presented as a personal narrative. Similarly, the same time span occupied by the marriage is then reconstituted as a set of separations and reconciliations that partially exemplify the marriage. Next a set of three sequential episodes reconstitute the first of these separations-reconciliations. The marriage as it spans the time from the first reconciliation to the present is again reconstituted and characterized (negatively), and finally a narrative episode that chronologically follows the first reconciliation is presented as a partial exemplification of this negative span in the marriage.

Not all complex discourse units follow the pattern of threading narrative units into a linear time course. In particular, the iterative action sequence presents additional possibilities for recursive structuring. Because the iterative action sequence is constituted to have multiple exemplars, more than a single narrative episode can be recounted as a recursive decomposition of an iterative action sequence (or of a description). A segment of discourse in which this has occurred may have a complex organization that does not fit either the pure chronology or the iterative action sequence but which contains parts that resemble both.

Consider Unit 13 Gambling, which has been divided in the transcript into three parts. It is represented again below, in an extremely schematic form to make the organizational structure salient.

UNIT 13: GAMBLING

a: WILLFUL ABSENCE

1. um (..) there have been TIMES you=know / when
    beCAUSE ++ and I don't see eye to eye /
        um I () WILLfully () abSENTed myself
    you=know like () getting out from work LATE

ah that's () the most usual
(2.) or-r NOT going home from work () at ALL (..) hm
to GO () to the RACEtrack
or to the BRIDge club
or to the BAR-r
or to () GO see some FRIENDS
or go and take coffee with a BUDdy
or ah (.) WORK () extra hours
or whatev-
(3.) any-anything to avoi- to avoid going HOME=
because () when I DID get home / I got HIT with the third degree about
WHERE I'd been
and WHAT I was doing
and how much MONey it cost
and SO forth
...
17. and I think GAMBling has a large part to DO with it
...

b: NOT A VERY GOOD CURE

1. I'll give you a couple of ah () QUICKies on the / th- /the whole gambling front here=
2. we're talking about little- / little sort=of CUbicles of THINGS that HAPpened like
...
27. that is not a very good cure for a gambler

c: DRINKS ON THE HOUSE

1. ah-h another time um / I never had that much luck at the races
...
5. but one day I got lucky / and-ah-
well one DOES once and again if you do it LONG enough
...
21. SO () there you go / gamblers sometimes DO have / ah [laughs] / good stories
22. and I guess that's why they go on gambling / cause theyhope it'll happen every DAY

The first section of this unit constitutes an iterative action sequence that R attributes to himself of 'willful absence'. Midway through a discussion of the effect of this willful absence on his relationship to his wife, he reconstitutes the iterative action sequence into gambling, that is exemplary of, though not coextensive with, willful absence. After a discussion of gambling as an iterative action sequence and as a cardinal trait, R then relates two separate exemplifying narrative sequences, each of which appear virtually self-sufficient and each of which is relatively well-described by the model of the personal narrative.

Neither of these two previous complex discourse units are exclusively organized by a chronological ordering of time conceived as a linear ordering, nor are they organized exclusively by atemporal pattern similarity. Rather, in each there is both a constitution of time as unfolding, and a constitution of a pattern that transcends an exclusively linear temporal ordering. Following Linton (1986), we might identify the units salient at the level of such complex discourse units, and distinguish between them by using the terms 'extendure' and 'theme'. An extendure is a time-bounded set of memories 'loosely bound by the coexistence of some significant personal orientation ... [and] reflect[ing] large defining units of our lives' (Linton, 1986, p.57), while themes are 'the coherent directions or unifying aspects of life' (Linton, 1986, p.57).

In Linton's empirical studies of her own autobiographical memory, themes are viewed as subsuming extendures within an hierarchical ordering. Thus a persistent thematic distinction for Linton was that between a work/professional 'life' and a social 'life', whereas her work life was articulatable in terms of a number of fixed segments of time such as 'when I worked at such-and-such a place'. But while two separate extendures might overlap, they could do so presumably only because they were subsumed under different themes (in for example 'when I was seeing so-and-so' subsumed by a social theme yet overlapping 'when I worked at such-and-such a place' subsumed by a work theme).

Thus extendures are properly seen as time segments, spans of linear time, aspectualized by a thematic moment. They represent (a portion of) the unique historical articulation of this thematic moment. We can retain the special notion of the thematic moment that is actually realized in an extendure by calling it a *thema* (cf. Murray, 1938), but to restrict the idea of theme in discourse to thema is to limit it too severely. If we were rather to associate the idea of theme with a recurrent pattern of experience, then the expression of theme in discourse becomes associated with the iterative action sequence, and a theme can come to be fulfilled in a discourse unit without necessarily subsuming an extendure or a discourse unit (like a personal narrative) that relates one. Extendure and theme might then be seen as parallel and interwoven units constituted of experience and consequently as bases for differing organizations of discourse. Thus a higher order discourse unit relating an extendure might as likely constitute multiple subordinate themes as a discourse unit relating a theme by unfolding successive extendures.

This is to reassert that a span of constituted time can be filled either by decompositions into linear segments or by contained cyclical iterations, that the relationship between time segments and themes is multirealizable in both directions. Discourse is but a linearly organized representation of a more complex patterning of extendures and themes in experience. To understand the higher order organization of discourse, one must therefore attend to the sequencing and subsumption relations between the themes and extendures constituted in it.

Based upon the earlier distinction between narrative and iterative action sequence we might begin by proposing, as contrasting ideal types, that a higher order discourse unit organized purely as an extendure would resemble a set of personal narratives unfolded in chronological sequence, where each episode in the extendure (beyond the first) may (but again may not entirely) rely upon its predecessor to provide its abstract and/or orientation and each successor (before the last) to provide its coda; and that a higher order discourse unit organized purely as a theme would resemble one or more interrelated iterative action sequences, each possibly (but again not necessarily) including one or more distinct personal narratives as exemplars.

Broadly speaking, Units 12 and 13 as they have been presented above approximate these ideal types: Unit 12 is a constitution and unfolding of the extendure 'my marriage', while Unit 13 is a constitution and exemplification of the theme 'my gambling'. But it is also clear that these units present more themes and more extendures than the ones that we have described as organizing them as higher order discourse units; and further, that they also refer to themes and extendures previously constituted in other discourse units. It is thus revealed as a matter of speaker choice (and perhaps analyst judgement) which themes and which extendures provide the organization for higher order discourse units. A more detailed analysis of Units 12 and 13 is indicated.

At the very beginning of Unit 12, after the long pause marking the transition to a new discourse unit, R begins by reconstituting an extendure that he had previously related, his time in hospital (Unit 2: Hospital Times). To this extendure, he attributes the development of a personal conviction 'that I was here for a purpose' (line 3). Next, this extendure and its relationship to this conviction is reconstituted in greater detail (lines 4 to 8). Then (in the next two verses, lines 9 to 16) a relationship is constituted between the conviction and an extendure 'attending church as a youth', as much to distinguish this conviction obtained as a consequence of hospital times from similar convictions held by others that are sometimes attributed to a religious upbringing. This extendure is clearly subordinate to the theme 'being here for a purpose' and is foreclosed (in lines 17-20) by a reconstitution of the conviction, and the addition of details including the duration and clarity of that conviction. The discourse unit might have ended at this point. It would then have been easily seen as the constitution of a personal conviction or theme attributed to the stay in hospital (that forms a subordinate extendure in this discourse unit) and distinguished from convictions attributable to churchgoing (that forms a second subordinate extendure in this discourse unit). Or, it could be said, the conviction forms the thema of both related extendures.

However, R continues with another extendure, related narratively, that is begun with the connective 'but' (Unit 12b: line 1). This narrative is not a self-contained personal narrative, though it has many of the features of such a unit (such as a recognizable core narrative). Instead it is constituted as a natural continuation of the previous unit. All of the first section (Unit 12a) therefore functions as an orientation section to the extendure unfolded narratively in Unit 12b.

That the thema for this extendure remains the personal conviction 'being here for a purpose' is explicitly confirmed at the transition to the next discourse subsection (Unit 12c: line 1). This might lead one to believe that the full discourse unit is organized around, and is subordinate to, the personal conviction. However, R proceeds to immediately reconstitute his marriage as an extendure consisting of multiple sequential separations-reconciliations and the remainder of Unit 12 unfolds this extendure 'my marriage' as a temporal segment. This provides some justification for regarding the personal conviction as realized in the discourse as orientation to the organizing extendure 'my marriage' rather than as superordinate theme exemplified by 'my marriage'.

Supporting this analysis is the insertion of the episode constituted in Unit 12e. First, R constitutes it specifically as a diversion from '++'; that is, the story of his marriage (in Unit 12e: line 2). Second, it can be inserted here despite its status as a diversion precisely because it fits in this position in the chronological ordering of the extendure 'my marriage' despite the fact that it is subordinate to a separate extendure (that we might speculate is constituted as 'being in Edmonton' as implied by the line that closes the episode and presents the coda to it: 'and Edmonton and everyone in it has been very good to me ever since' (Unit 12e: line 36)). This, of course, does not prevent its status as enabler of the further unfolding of the marriage extendure as R in fact notes explicitly (in Unit 12f: line 1).

Also supporting this analysis is R's constitution of various themes that can be properly seen as subordinate characterizations of the extendure 'my marriage'. For example, in Unit 12c, where the relationship between the extendure 'my marriage' and the conviction 'being here for a reason' is first asserted, two separate themes are subordinated to the extendure. The first (in Unit 12c: lines 5 to 22) reconstitutes the themes of earlier units (especially Unit 8: Summer Holidays) making them a source of conflict within the marriage (and characterizing the marriage as conflict-filled), most directly in:

7. um all my PREVious stories of going
    HERE and THERE and EVERYwhere
    and SEE-ing things
    and exPERiencing things
    and feeling WONderful about things (..)
  are not SHARED / with my wife (...)

This theme, in turn, is articulated in terms of other subordinate themes or extendures (e.g. 'we come from very very very different backgrounds' in line 9, 'the most important thing... is to go out and ... make a living and to take care of her and look after her' in line 14, '++ wants to dictate and pull the strings on this marionette of a man' in line 16), offered as explanations.

The second subordinate theme in this unit (constituted in lines 23 to 34) is an iterative action sequence subordinate to (descriptive of) the extendure 'my marriage':

23. but we just-ah just BASH each other to pieces ah (..) /
  psychoLOGically (.) /
    with all kinds of psychological STROKES
    that NEITHER of us EVEN KNOW we're DOing
    until we look back like I'm doing NOW (.)
    and conSIDer them
24. I- I suppose that PEOple hurt ea- HURT one another /
  BE-YOND BE-LIEF (.) / without ever MEANing to

This theme (reconstituted in line 34 as fighting) is abruptly foreclosed without exemplification, so that the linear unfolding of the extendure 'my marriage', now reconstituted at a lower level as a set of leavings and returnings, can be resumed. (But this is not the last appearance of this theme in this discourse unit, as will be discussed below).

After the narrative of the first leaving to Canada (Unit 12d) and the inserted narrative about R coming to Edmonton (Unit 12e) comes the narrative of '++' coming to Edmonton (Unit 12f) in which the extendure 'my marriage' is again described in terms of an (explanatory) subordinate theme:

11. and we STILL found a GREAT difficulty in SHAR-r-ing (.) /
    ohh () our LIVES /
        in=the=sense=of WHAT we wanted to DO
        or WHAT we had to SAY
        or WHAT we FELT
12. and a lot of that is being ENGlish
13. English=people DON't emote in the same way as OTHer people do
14. I've LEARNED since I've been here to ah / to emote quite=a=BIT /
    which is-ah what you're getting on this TAPE
15. um but the English GENerally don't- / don't DO that kind=of=thing
16. I=mean IT'S JUST () NOT DONE

Finally, R relates the narrative of 'losing the twins' (Unit 12g). It seems unclear initially what the thema of this extendure is, though it is again clearly chronologically well placed; that is, it is a subordinate narrative episode fitting into the extendure 'my marriage' at this point, but it does not continue the narration of the previously constituted set of separations-reconciliations by recounting, for example, the prologue to the next separation. At one point (line 8), R reconstitutes the theme of a previous discourse unit (Unit 9b: Christmas), but this is clearly an aside. At the conclusion of the core narrative (at line 10), however, R relates, as a coda, a pair of episodes which are finer-grained episodes of the core narrative. The first is:

11. it may seem STRANGE but you know /
    one night in the hospital ah /
    thing's weren't going that well...
12. and I was kind=of () fidgeting / to get off to the BRIdge club...
13. and ++ couldn't underSTAND why I would rather be doing THAT / than staying
    with HER () / in the hospital

...

20. I=couldn't=actually DO anything aBOUT anything
21. so I just () TOOK OFF

...

23. so THAT was a hurt for ++
24. that was another () HURT (.)

In the final lines (line 24 and 25), with the use of the word 'hurt' R reinvokes the earlier theme of unintended 'psychological bashing' (Unit 12c: lines 23 to 34), although not explicitly. The second coda episode is a second exemplification of this earlier theme:

25. and LOsing the twins was=a was=a / a BIG hurt (..)
26. and=she=wanted=to make all kinds of fu- funeral arrangements...
27. a-n-d () I-I didn't go along with that
...
37. BUT () no ++ wanted to DO the right THING and everything
38. and-ah I-I I think that she regrets NOT having done

This relationship to the earlier theme properly situates the extendure in this last subunit as a subextendure of 'my marriage' rather than 'my separations-reconciliations', and also as exemplary of (subordinate to) the theme of fighting which itself is subordinate to the extendure 'my marriage'.

By using a pause and a change in voice quality, R begins Unit 13 (Gambling) by distinctly separating it from Unit 12f (Losing the twins). It is immediately evident in his constitution of the theme 'willful absence' (line 1), however, that the first coda episode of unit 12f is also subsumable under this theme. There are also distinct similarities between this theme and the theme of 'going and experiencing' (re)introduced in Unit 12c (line 7) as subordinate to 'my marriage'. These latter relationships are then made explicit:

6. cause I tended to-ah do my () THING
7. and if you () sort=of go back to my EARLY stories / about () ME /
ah being an individualist ...

Furthermore (as becomes evident in lines 8 to 14), 'willful absence' is initially constituted as another theme subordinate to the extendure 'my marriage'. To this point these appears no justification for considering this section of discourse as separate from the extendure central to Unit 12.

It is with the introduction of the theme of gambling (in line 17: 'and I think gambling has a large part to do with it') that the discourse unit is revealed as distinct and begins to yield its shape. The gambling theme is formally a subordinate theme to the theme of willful absence. R has already constituted a number of themes as subordinate to and descriptive of the extendure 'my marriage' (including differences in backgrounds between he and '++', differences in responsibilities, power relations, fighting, and willful absences). Gambling as an activity of R's has also been constituted twice (in Unit 12f, line 22; and again in Unit 13, line 2) although both times as but one of a list of activities in which R engages in periods of willful absence. But nothing has prepared the auditor for the assertion that gambling has played a defining role in the structure of the marriage. This assertion has the force of revelation, and from this point to the end of the unit, the justification of this revelation is the primary focus and shaper of the discourse.

Immediately after the revelation, R relates, in the form of a personal narrative, the story of '++'s' father (in lines 18 to 24). For this story, gambling becomes the thema of an extendure, the gambling 'career' of R's father-in-law. Though never directly asserted, the effect of this story upon '++'s' attitude towards gambling is implicated, at least in part because the unit is constituted initially as '++'s' story, and because it follows upon the assertion that gambling is critical to the (now negatively toned) marriage extendure. R then asserts his similarity to his father-in-law (in line 25). This rhetorical device immediately turns gambling from a theme into an extendure in which gambling is the thema, and R begins an unfolding of his own gambling 'career' (though he frequently returns to gambling as an abstract theme). He begins by describing his initial attraction to gambling and offering justifications (subordinate themes) for it (in lines 26 to 30), and then expands upon the 'wanting to be wealthier than I am' theme as a general characteristic of gambling (in lines 31 to 34). (It should be noted, however, that this expansion may be related to the ending of the tape and the 60 second pause in the monologue which it occasioned). R next unfolds (in lines 35-38) the impact upon his gambling career of meeting and marrying '++'. In this, the extendure 'my marriage' becomes subordinated to the extendure 'my gambling career'. Then R again (in line 39) offers a general thematization of gambling as a 'disease' (perhaps focalizing it by locating it in the unfolding of the extendure at the time it may also have become a thematization of the I-then during the living). This is followed (in lines 40 to 42) with a further unfolding of 'my gambling career' which brings it forward to the present. But after admitting that gambling is yet a current activity, R offers further thematizations of its current recurring attraction (in lines 43 to 50). The next discourse section (lines 51 to 54) returns to the extendure 'my marriage' and unfolds explicitly the connection between gambling, willful absence, and the marriage, concluding with a short restatement of the relationship between 'my marriage' and 'my gambling' (lines 55 and 56). There follows a coda (in lines 57 to 64) in which a solution offered by R's sister at some early point in his gambling career is related and rejected (again, in the present, as it was also no doubt rejected in the past). Finally, almost as afterthought, two independent exemplifying personal narratives of gambling (from early in the gambling career and illustrative of its allure) are presented (Units 13b and 13c).

This second analysis of Units 12 and 13 has demonstrated that a variety of extendures and themes can be constituted in complex discourse units. Furthermore, in determining the prime organizational elements of the complex units the subsumption relationships between these extendures and themes have not been decisive. It is rather the framing and accenting of themes and extendures by the speaker, the distribution of what Labov called abstracts, evaluations and codas, which is constitutive of the discourse structure. This is typically a function performed at the level of commentary (in our description of the textual world as a tripartite lamination), a function performed by the narrator/author or I-now, often initially in an abstract or orientation well in advance of the unfolding of the narrative or iterative action sequence. But in the longer and more complex discourse units, the discourse often gradually shifts and retains only a (temporally) local structure, now unfolding in a different manner than might have been anticipated (or even directly constituted) by the speaker at the beginning of the discourse unit.

It is this gradual drifting among multiple themes and extendures, and perhaps also a tendency to reconstitute extendures and themes previously related, which may signal most clearly the difference between the products of intensive self-reflection (prepared discourses or written ones) and the products of spontaneous self-reflection. For it cannot help but seem that while these themes and extendures, and the subsumption relations between them, may survive another retelling, the apparent discourse structure will not. In another retelling, for example, the story world unfolded in unit 2 might well be immediately followed by the connected story world unfolded in unit 12.

It is the commentary, the constituting of the story (and fabula) worlds by I-now that is most unstable, because the I-now is still capable of again reconstituting and unfolding the past not only in a different order, but also in terms of not yet consciously available themes and extendures. Some of these extendures and themes may already be implicit in the discourse structure.

Even the constitution of a higher level unit of discourse can be an apparently 'accidental' process which does not explicitly indicate a prior self-reflective act of I-now, but rather results from cognitive processes of the narrator/author (generically characterizable perhaps as a form of free association). In this regard, consider the parallel personal narratives unfolded in Unit 11a Swiss Paradise and Unit 11b Syncrude:

UNIT 11: IMPRESSIVE VISTAS

a: SWISS PARADISE

1. 'member (.)
   TRIP to Switzerland one time (..)
   going up the Eiger
...
3. but to just BE there
   and SEE it=
4. the S-I-Z-E (..)
   it's imPRESSive
5. well one day we decided-
...

b: SYNCRUDE

1. totally different thin- I'm very impressionable
...
3. ah lately I've been working ah / a lot with SYNcrude (.) Canada Limited who ah
...
5. the S-I-Z-E of everything up there=
(6.) it wouldn't mean a THING / without you BEing there (..)
...
17. ... but-ah whoo=it's=ah-
    it SURE is an imPRESSive PLACE to SEE=

Despite the radical differences between the fabula worlds constituted in these units, the terms (and intonations) utilized by the narrative voice to evaluate these worlds ('(the importance of) BE(ing) there', 'imPRESSive', 'S-I-Z-E', 'SEE') strongly suggest a shared theme, and a non-accidental adjacency that justifies the assumption that they form separate exemplifications of an implicit (or horizonal) theme.

It has previously been noted that episodes of extendures properly adjacent in fabula time and subordinate exemplifications of explicitly constituted themes have been separated by the narrating I-now in the unidimensional temporal unfolding of discourse. Analysis is required to restructure the hierarchical and temporal relationships among these separated explicit elements. Analysis will also be required to discover these relationships for implicit themes which we may similarly presume may be constituted in separated units of discourse.

Implicit Life Story. In the discourse units discussed above (Unit 12: Married Life and Unit 13: Gambling), there is a straining towards chronology, a tendency to reach back to the past for an orientation to the current discourse unit, a tendency to unfold time linearly, or to constitute an extendure from a theme. This tendency is evident also in the discourse as a whole. Thus R recounts the episodes of his youth and childhood relatively early in the discourse, orders Unit 2: Hospital Times, Unit 12: Married Life, Unit 15: Poignant Meetings, Unit 16: Family Holiday, Unit 17: The Day I Turned Forty, Unit 19: English Restaurateur, Unit 26: Pat on the Back, and Unit 28: Something Very Important, in chronological order within the discourse, and completes the discourse with a concurrent commentary of the I-now (Unit 29: Just an Ordinary Guy).

For human beings, the ultimate extendure is 'my life' itself and the thema of that extendure a matter of doubt or a matter suppressed. In constituting a personal world, the linear unfolding of my life is decisive, as is well expressed by Schutz:

> The most important and absolutely unique autobiographical aspect (insofar as it can be "standardized" by the social superstructure of biographical categories) is the flow of experiences in my inner duration. Since every situation and every experience has a horizon of the past, every current situation and experience is necessarily codetermined by the uniqueness of the course of experience, of its autobiography. The sequence in which experiences successively order themselves and, correlatively, the "place" in the course of life where certain experiences occur, is most significant. When we as adults turn to past segments of our life, we can discover very "decisive" experiences that subsequently determined our life. These experiences repeatedly play such a role, less from an inherent quality than from the special point in time in which they occur. We read a book at a particular phase in our intellectual development, became acquainted with a person at a "decisive" point in time, became ill at a certain time, became satisfied or disappointed "too early" or "too late" by one or another experience, etc. These are experiences and are subject to the same structural laws as all my other experiences, just as the experiences of my fellow-man are. They are typical experiences of this or that sort, but they have a unique biographical articulation and consequently a specific

> meaning because they fit into a particular place in the flow of our duration (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p. 56).

It is this unfolding of the life extendure which underlies the autobiographical task, it is typically the 'object' which all of the elements of the autobiographical discourse taken together intend, and it is its implicit presence which shapes the form of the full discourse.

Phenomenological Horizons. Consider finally how the distinction between narrative and iterative, extendure and theme functions within a fully constituted autobiography. First, autobiographical discourse intends the autobiographical pact, an understanding about the nature of the discourse to be shared by an autobiographer and a reader/auditor. The contents of this pact are re-presented below (in a slightly different order):

1. I, the undersigned, have faithfully related
2. the story of my life
3. *in order that* you, the reader, can come to know me as I know myself.

The purpose of my autobiographical telling, if faithful, is to allow you to come to know me as I know myself. I know myself now as an inventory of my personal qualities. These qualities have temporal horizons in the past and future which are only indeterminately intended by a direct expression of this inventory. I also know myself in memory as possessing an unfolding history. Because I can never find a concrete self, I must find the unity which transcends these aspects of my self by constituting the temporal horizons of my personal properties. In this way I can constitute that self. In Ricoeur's words (as quoted once before):

> It is in telling our own stories that we *give* ourselves an identity. We *re[-]cognize ourselves* in the stories we tell about ourselves. (Ricouer, 1985, p. 214, *Italics added*).

A full 'story of my life' will fulfill the temporal horizons of my personal qualities, reconstitute the flow of time, and, in the process, insert a unified I into that flow.

But a pure narrative which I might tell in which I-then figures as just a natural being of the fabula world would not be sufficient. While that narrative, the linear unfolding of events, reconstitutes time, the I which was conscious, would be lost. For that I-then was always, as I-now am, a consciousness of the fabula as it was lived. It is only in creating a story in which a subjectivity is conscious of the fabula world that an I-then can be said to have being. But I need also to bridge the formal separation of that I-then and this I-now. This bridge is through the iterative and the thematic.

Telling my life story around and through an extendure in a core narrative becomes the recounting of a struggle to recognize a self as exemplary of what might not even yet be a fully constituted or fully fathomed pattern. Elements of my personal world are figured against the ground of the repetitive, patterns which have already been constituted, and this presents me with an opportunity to look again for patterns *in them*. These elements may yet come to be seen as exemplifying patterns in being brought to consciousness from memory, in being reflected upon, and in being formed into a story. Straus evocatively expresses this genesis of the pure narrative from the iterative in experience:

> As living beings, we go on from hour to hour in the great circle of day and night, awakeness and sleep, hunger and satisfaction. In this change from need to satisfaction, each condition is limited to itself. Yesterday's meal will not satisfy me today. Every moment is swallowed up by the following one. We move in a circle. Over this figured bass runs the melody of the events which we note in our curriculum vitae. There are two profiles of time - the narrow vista of immediate needs and the wide horizon in which we realize our historical selves. We live on two levels of existence: on that of daily routine and on that of great events - great in the limited dimensions of our lives. While the candle of our life wanes, our historical shadow grows. The motto of daily routine is to get it over and done with. The motto of great days is to preserve it and write it into the memorabilia (Straus, 1960/1966, p.67).

The iterative in time, then, is basic to me in knowing myself as subject of a singular narrative.

The iterative in time is also basic to me in knowing myself as possessor of an inventory of properties. Repetitions are the evidence for the nominalizations, the fulfillments for the empty intentions, of my current character sketch. In my re-cognition of these as patterns, as themes, I also intend for myself a future. I express my ability to recognize a future instance as also exemplary of that theme I now recognize. Those properties of mine which will endure exist for me only in relation to such patterns; I must be able to judge them relevant to future iterations of some such same pattern in order that these properties may be seen to be expressed in my actions, in order that I may know them to be *my* enduring properties, and in order that I may express them so that you may know me as I know myself.

Notes

1 It is possible that some of these identities will not be maintained in a discourse, even where self-reference occurs. This gives rise to a variety of intermediate narrative forms between the unreflective narrative in which no identities are posited and the autobiography.

CHAPTER IX

FULFILLING THE PERSONAL WORLD

This chapter moves from a consideration of the apophantic or formal aspects of an analysis of textual worlds, based upon R's discourse as an exemplar, to a consideration of the content of the particular personal world out of which this textual world was forged. In short, the goal is to fulfill R in his personal world. The challenge is to fulfill that personal world as it is, as a world unfolding and unfolded in all directions around an I, a world that can actually be the world in which that I is embedded.

It has been argued that considerations of the *actuality* of that world are to be set aside as inherently unanswerable in this task of understanding. Rather a faith in the sincerity of the autobiographical pact is substituted, and the question of the natural existence of this personal world recedes in favour of the complexities of understanding how this textual world *could possibly* be a personal world. This does not destroy *the* coherence of the task of understanding *some one possible* personal world, with a single unique historical unfolding and a single unique set of recurrent concerns as the present contents of that personal world.

The personal world of the particular I is a full-bodied world, filled now by a multiplicity of structured contents. In creating an autobiographical discourse, that I has turned to these myriad and always potentially present-now structures, has seen some, and has picked them from the horizons to use to structure the discourse that that I presents as its life. Describing these chosen contents is the first part of the analyst's task.

Unfortunately the full personal world is not *simply* present to the auditor or reader after its transformation in a discourse into a textual world. Not all relevant contents were active within the consciousness of that I as it was relating its discourse. Such additional contents will have been *present, however*, in the same way as the beams supporting a building are present, out of immediate sight. The linear structure of the discourse hinders the attempt by an analyst to take an inventory of *all* the beams supporting the personal world at any point. In contrast, for the I of this world, the option to have stopped at any point and looked more completely was always ready-to-hand. The second part of the task of the analyst, then, is to come to understand how those structured contents not immediately available from the discourse must also have, and have had, a presence to the personal world.

That that I has not described a beam which supports it cannot mean that that beam is not present. The I of the personal world has not now chosen to relate, and may not have seen, all relevant contents. If the analyst chooses to direct his or her gaze in fulfillment of that personal world in a way that that I did not, what seems necessary as a corrective is that that I must be given the chance to look again in that direction, and tell if the world the analyst is now seeing *is* part of its personal world. If that I no longer exists to look, the analyst must remain aware that however much he or she may desire to enter *that* personal world, the best that can be done is to argue that the world now fulfilled *as* that personal world is a possible and coherent one.

It has also been asserted that the patterning of the personal world in a discourse is a complex intermingling of themes and extendures. While a particular extendure, locatable in a linear unfolding time, is unidimensional and hence amenable in principle to a linear unfolding in the unidimensional mode of discourse; themes, as recurrent temporal objects, are multirealizable with respect to extendures, and many can fill a span of time linearly constituted. On the one hand, autobiographical discourse shows a tension in the direction of the unfolding of the extendure 'my life' as a chronological construction; on the other, it presents a variety of coexisting themes, coexisting in the present (or past) because they illustrate propensities with respect to the constitution of time, as these propensities have become known by their occurrence and recurrence in the past. The tension presented by the multiplicity of such themes is a tension induced by the task of possessing the personal world precisely as the personal world of an I, a self who has the power to constitute and reconstitute a personal world, a self for whom the properties which present justification for that world are always implicitly present.

In this view there are two interlocking tasks for the analyst in understanding the personal world of another: getting the extendures 'right', and getting the themes 'right'. Examining extendures will consist not only in reconstituting the order of events and in restoring these events to their full body as continuous and continuously unfolding (even where never 'filled in' explicitly by the discourse), but also by fulfilling the thema of these extendures. Examining themes will consist not only in fulfilling them completely, but also by sensing their presence, even if implicit, in the constitution of extendures (as thema and as subordinate 'filling' themes).

Beyond these considerations, there are properties of the attempt to analyze R's discourse as just R's personal world which will encumber the analyst. First, R can no longer be naively encountered. The analyst has already heard (or read) the discourse, and has already experienced the intentional world(s) constituted within it in some concrete (or 'concretized') aspect. The analyst will have recognized these worlds as worlds of R (through the autobiographical pact) and, as a result, will have created a 'stock of knowledge' (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973) about R and his personal world.

This stock of knowledge will have been articulated in the first instance in terms of preexisting typifications of human beings and their life course which we all possess by virtue of our own previous life experience and by virtue of our membership in a (particular) social-cultural world. The most basic level of typifications are socially given aspects of our jointly constituted life-world:

> "Typical biographies are offered to everyone in every society. An unalterable condition of each course of life is that it be articulated in social categories" (Schutz & Luckmann, 1973, p.98).

These typifications serve as a backbone of our experiencing of others. In our society, for example, these backbone typifications typically relate to family and career and are articulated temporally, that is, as extendures. (We might refer to them as a 'resume' with allusion to Straus, 1960/1966). There are also families of typifications within these broader categories which are age specific, and are typically articulated as stages of development. These typifications are part of the way we progressively experience R in an encounter with him or his discourse. While information presented within a set of narratives may be unordered relative to any one of these typifications, we can readily re-present it in temporally ordered form. We can do this because we experience R through these backbone typifications. For example, though current age may never have been presented as a central component of any of the intentional worlds we experienced through R's discourse, we can respond to a question about R's age now (placing him at time of this writing as middle-aged, or as 52, depending upon the specific degree of articulation of our typifications of R) and he will thus be concretized for us as of the type 'middle-aged' or of the type 'aged 52'. This typification must have consequences for how he appears to us now: he will not be concretized as wearing diapers or as having extremely thin silver hair.

In addition, this stock of knowledge of R will consist of additional articulated typifications (which in unarticulated form may be shared by a specific subgroup within society, or may be particular to ourselves). Since every concretized aspect of R's discourse has already been encountered as objects of a type they will have been concretized by us and tied specifically to R through these typifications. That is, our preexisting typifications will have become articulated in our encounter with R into a personal type (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973) which organizes our stock of knowledge about R. Therefore the first approach to R in these analyses through which we encounter R again will necessarily be made against the background of the now preexisting personal typification by which we have come to know R.

A second encumbrance in the attempt to fulfill R's personal world is that we cannot encounter R independently of our goals for the encounter. Any analysis can be described as an attempt to articulate the personal typification by which R is known in greater detail, and to provide converging evidence for the coherence of this personal typification from an experience of the text. However, the direction in which this articulation proceeds will stem from the personal world of the analyst, and will be selective. It must be recognized that in reading my analysis of R, your task is doubly difficult: to separate R from R as I typify him.

Implicit Life Story. The current section presents an articulation of some of the extendures of our socially given biographical typifications, filling in, for a personalization of R, information presented explicitly in his discourse, but yet not explicitly unfolded as narratives according to these extendures.

For anyone who has encountered R through his discourse, such an unfolding should be possible to some degree as a result of the personal typification that will have already been formed as a part of what is necessary in order to understand his discourse at all (cf. Ingarden, 1973/1937). To the extent that this analysis captures these typical categories and to the extent that Schutz and Luckmann are correct about their centrality, any such articulation should be recognizably similar to those presented below.

Thus consider again how you can fulfill R right now. He will be presented concretely to you now as of a certain age (or age range), in a certain place, as of a certain marital status, as of a certain career, and additionally as in possession of certain characteristics typical of persons of that certain age, career, etc. This typification will have been formed as R was concretized from your encounter with his discourse, often through textual means not recognized as central, and will have guided the further formation of concretizations that make available much that is given only implicitly (and indeed much that is not given at all). In addition, these typifications as they extend beyond the information given into specific expectations of a person of this type may, where not yet fulfilled or contradicted in fulfillment, give rise to problematic aspects, starting points for a query of the text, in search of a more completely articulated understanding of R.

I have employed the categories **Temporal-spatial Trajectory, Career, Natal Family, Family/Marital, and Major Hobbies/Interests** which are the life course categories of the typical resume or social history, and have made an entry in the table below only if close reading has revealed explicit evidence for its inclusion. Further external categories which might be examined, or might have been chosen for this analysis are presented in a variety of places, including especially structured intake interviews in psychology, medicine, and social work.

R in Social/Historical Categories

I. Temporal-Spatial Trajectory

Entry	Evidence
Born late 1938 or early 1939	(Unit 29:24 'Here I am fifty-two years of age')
in England	(Unit 10a:2 'having gone back to England')
Lived in Montreal: age 4 or 5	(Unit 4b:13 'Eatons store in downtown Montreal')
Returned to England: age 8	(Unit 10a:2 'having gone back to England') (Unit 10a:7 'being only eight years of age')
Returned to Canada	
to Edmonton	(Unit 12e)
age: over 24	unmarried in hospital in 1960 (Unit 2) but 'married 3 years' (Unit 12e:10)
probably over 25	present at Christmas with mother in England at age 25 (Unit 9b:14)
but younger than 40	quits job in Canada on 40th birthday (Unit 17)
probably considerably	has children at age 40 (Unit 17), but did not have them when wife joins him in Canada 'some many months later' (Unit 12:5)
Returned to England	
age: older than 40	(Unit 17)
at least 42	quit job at age 40 (Unit 17) but battled unemployment for 2 years before returning to England (Unit 26:16)
no more than 44	(by inference from below)

Returned to Canada	
to Edmonton	(Unit 26)
age: at least 47	(Unit 26:15 'five years later')
no more than 49	has been back in Edmonton 3 years (Unit 28:4,7)
Residing there currently (Unit 28)	

II. Career

Primary Career	
Television Production	(Unit 29:10 'in television all my life')
for 35 years	(Unit 8a:2 'since I left school', Unit 8a:28-30 'at age 17')
in England	
incl. stint as cameraman	(Unit 1:6 'working as a television cameraman')
age: 22 or 23	(Unit 1:41 'thirty years ago nearly')
interrupted by unemployment	(Unit 12d:2)
and in Canada	(Unit 12e:33)
incl. as a producer	(Unit 9a:7)
incl. freelance since 1979	(Unit 17:20)
incl. Syncrude Canada	(Unit 11b:3)
interrupted by unemployment	(Unit 19:1,2; Unit 26:16)
but incl. recent awards	(Unit 26:13)
currently working	(Unit 26:12)
Secondary Career	
Restaurant Industry	
as waiter	(Unit 27a:2)
in Edmonton	(Unit 27:5,31;32; Unit 26:16)
when not in tv	(Unit 27a:2)
as owner	(Unit 19; Unit 19a:12)
and operator	(Unit 19f:5,17)
in England	

III. Natal Family

Parents divorced	(Unit 9c:2)
age: 5	(Unit 19a:6)
raised by mother	(Unit 9c:5)
estranged from father	(Unit 19a:6)
Mother remarried	(Unit 9c:15)
Mother now deceased	(Unit 9a)
Father now deceased	(Unit 19a:4)

leaving inheritance	(Unit 19a:3,4)
of moderate size	(Unit 19a:12 & Unit 19f:23)
One sister	
four years older	(Unit 8a:12)
raised apart	(Unit 8a:6; but see Unit 9c)
currently resides in Switzerland	(Unit 11a:9)

IV. Family/Marital History

Married	(Unit 12b)
age:over 25	(Unit 9b:14 & Unit 9b:30)
Separated	
(at least) 3 times	(Unit 12c:3)
First Separation	
R to Canada	(Unit 12d)
Reconciliation	
wife to Canada	(Unit 12d:17; Unit 12f)
months/years later	(Unit 12f:5; Unit12d:17)
Second Separation	
lives with other woman	(Unit 15:8)
Reconciliation	
in Canada before	
return to England	(Unit 19a:1)
Third Separation	
R returns to Canada	
alone	(Unit 28:7)
currently separated	
living in relationship	(Unit 28:12,17,18)
sending money to wife	(Unit 28:31)
history of marital infidelity	(Unit 5, Unit 15, Unit 28)
at least 2 children	(Unit 9b:35, Unit 17:28)

IV. Major Hobbies/Interests

Duplicate Bridge	(Unit 7)
from age 22	(Unit 7a:15)
to present	(Unit 22)
incl. teaching	(Unit 25)
Gambling	(Unit 13)

Several observations about this analysis are in order. Clearly, the table is incomplete even in the categories chosen for inclusion. In part this could be remedied by expanding the entries at particular points to include further details that were presented in the relevant units of the discourse. (The entries for hobbies and interests are clearly of this type). On the other hand, various 'bridging' or explanatory events or sequences are simply not present in the text, at least in part because R chose not to tell his story as the unfolding of these standard extendures. (One prime example surrounds R's relationship with his sister as he was growing up; that is, did she live with R and his mother?; another concerns the almost complete absence of detail about R's children). In a similar vein, many details about R's television career are not explicitly stated though inferable with a high probability of accuracy by persons familiar with 'working up the ladder' (either in a profession in general, or in even greater detail, if this process is understood for the television industry in particular). Thus it seems likely that R began in the industry as a 'lad' just out of school in a 'helper' capacity, and learned and held a variety of jobs of increasing technical skill and responsibility until he became a producer responsible for all aspects of television program production. Little information additional to that presented in the table is provided explicitly by R on this topic, however.

Further, the distribution of information with respect to these standard extendures provides general information about the themes/ extendures in his life which R considered important at this telling. Clearly, his relationship with his wife appears as a more important extendure than his progression through his television career, when the amount of detail in the discourse devoted to each of these topics is examined, for example.

This standardized arrangement of information is capable of forming a background text for further psychological analysis. For example, it is not immediately clear that questions which arise in this re-expression of the text, are not open to analysis by close query of the text. Thus a close reading of the text may well yield a coherent (though speculative) answer to questions such as the reason for the apparent unimportance of his children to R.

In any case, this analysis, or some implicit variant of it, will have formed a background for an individual concerned with the reconstruction of the personal world of R. For some, it may also clarify questions of place and motion for particular aspects or extendures of the text, given that the discourse locates itself variously in England and in Canada, and that the sequence of returnings and leavings itself is never narrated in full, either as such or in the context of any extendure the full unfolding of which would presume them (such as a career narrative or a marital/family narrative).

Thematic Analysis. To motivate a detailed consideration of the particular themes of R's textual (and personal) world, a review and extended discussion of themes and their classification and identification follows.

Beginning from a definition proposed by Linton (1986) in the context of autobiographical memory and yet adhering to a tradition in phenomenology (e.g. Gurwisch, 1966, 1974; Madison, 1990; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1986), a theme was previously characterized as a recurrent pattern in experience[1]. In the first instance, themes are understandable as temporally accented phenomena rather than as spatially accented phenomena, as akin to melodies rather than to trees. They are perhaps first recognized in reflection in the medium of the voiced and heard (Ihde, 1973/1983).

In phenomenological terms, my themes are first cognized by me within and through the persistence and change of objects I have constituted intentionally, typically as natural, for which (or for whom) as part of that naturality, time has been posited as unfolding or as having unfolded (cf. Husserl, 1925/1954/1977, p.73). That is, time is filled for me by ontological contents which have entered, left, and now reentered the stream of consciousness, and whose re-cognized recurrence has made possible my grasping of patterns as bearing these ontological contents. The temporal pattern as a noematic content is an ideal identity in a manifold of temporal moments of my presentative (filled, lived) experience.

Consequently a theme has both an ontological content and a patterning of that content in time, a shifting or changing or a repositioning, as its essential moments. Every theme as being *of* a consciousness also implicates as an additional moment in its constitution the I of the consciousness of that ontological content. Thus themes are the possessions of an I-now, and consequently moments of a personal world. Excepting only boundaries on possible experiencing itself, there are no further restrictions on what can possibly come to appear in experience as thematic.

In particular the following should be noted. First, while the ontological content of a particular theme may essentially contain a particular re-cognized intentional content constituted as natural and as persisting and unfolding in time, a theme may also be constituted as an essence, as containing that which must be true of any of a set of particular intentional contents that they be contents of that kind. Thus, while 'my relationship with my father' may (here emptily) intend a particular theme of my experience, so too might 'my relationship with figures of authority' where participation of any particular contents in the unfolding and recurrence of this second theme through time is governed by whether they manifest for me the essence designated by 'figures of authority'.

Second, this same example makes evident the potential for themes to be hierarchically structured, to contain within themselves other themes as moments. Thus, 'my relationship with my father' while itself a theme of my experience, may also manifest the essential character, and hence exemplify, the superordinate theme 'my relationship to figures of authority'.

Third, experiences of ontological contents do not need to be continuous or contiguous to allow their constitution as participating in a single theme. The temporal moments of the content now seen as thematic may have been discontinuous in my stream of experience; there will have been durations in that stream as lived during which consciousness was not of that theme's ontological contents or indeed of the theme itself.

Fourth, the same ontological contents, even experienced as transcendent objects, can present themselves to me as exemplifying more than a single theme. Ontological contents bear a multirealizable relationship in both directions to themes; a theme may be exemplified by many contents and a content may exemplify many themes. A wide variety of themes can thus be my possessions, and in a wide variety of phenomenal guises.

It is also the case that a theme and its ontological contents that are my conscious possessions (in now constituting an autobiographical discourse, for example) may differ *as phenomena* from those which were my precise possessions in an originary unfolding. For the theme, even as now faithfully related, may not have been available then to consciousness as a determinate theme. The theme is a temporal object, and may not have been constituted or constitutable (except perhaps with an indeterminateness characteristic of a consciousness of that which lies in the future) at the time of the original unfolding.

That is, the theme may have been wholly or partly horizonal (or implicit) in my original experience. Thus, for example, at first hearing of *this* musical composition, while I might anticipate a melody, a particular melodic content will not be available to me to fulfill in memory or to reconstitute as *that melody* until after it has unfolded in time. Nevertheless, the theme is a single unity. It is the identity in the manifold of the infinitude of its possible graspings. Thus I can report that I first heard *that melody* at such and such a time even though it was at the time of that original experience as yet but an emptily intended melody, and I can coherently mean by this, and be understood to mean, the one thematic melody that I heard at that time, even if its presentation then was under a different aspect.

The consciousness of a theme per se is the result of a *reflective re-cognition* of ontological contents as thematic, as constituting a familiar temporal object, or as exemplifying a familiar temporal pattern. Once so constituted, of course, such a theme can be re-cognized as *that theme* in its reoccurrence in now occurring ontological content. That is, it can then be possessed as determinate theme even as it is unfolding.

Yet a theme may remain implicit to me even as I express my experience in an autobiographical discourse. First, I may not now engage in the act of reflection which would make the fulfillment of the current expression an exemplification or an expression of a theme for me, even though such a theme is part of my stream of consciousness as the result of a previous act of reflection and even though I might have done so or might yet do so at some other time. Second, I may have never yet engaged in the act of reflection that would make that theme present to me, even though at some future time I may be able to do so.

Themes thus have both an open character and a history. They are open in that they can be constituted (or reconstituted differently) as determinate theme at any point in the unfolding of the stream of experience which contains appropriate ontological contents. They are historical in that there is an originary point in the unfolding stream of experience before which the ontological contents of the theme will not have been available for constitution as a theme.

Themes can easily be distorted even in a reflective constitution of them and can come to be seen, under the natural attitude, as natural pieces of a natural world rather than as recurrent *moments* of a unified experiencing. In the natural attitude, the ontological contents which exemplify a theme in a particular occurrence will be constituted as natural and transcendent, as persisting within a single transcendent and absolute flow of time external to the flow of experience. Thus the objects which are of the theme may appear to carry the theme itself among them; it too will seem to transcend. I may lose my awareness of my essential role in constituting this theme, and my experience of it may become imbued with passivity, as relying upon the presence of that transcendent ontological content, as having been *caused* by it (rather than as *motivated* by it to appear thus). Even in reflection, I may now naturalize myself as the object of natural causes, and I may come to see my themes as themselves the result of my natural properties, reacting to the natural objects which caused them to manifest thematicity. I become myself a collection of distinct natural mechanisms. This is the natural line of thought that presents me to myself as an inventory of properties, and leaves me the problem of reconstituting *my self* out of them as again a whole. It is by relating *my story* that I can then reconstitute a lived time and *my* *self* within it.

In this story I can indicate themes in a number of ways, as has been discussed previously. First, a theme can be expressed in an iterative action sequence. Second, if separated from the historical-temporal horizons salient in this form, a theme may also be expressed (although perhaps emptily) as a description, a named property typically understood as a concrete causal mechanism impelling recurrent action, or as a trait. Third, a theme may be exemplified in a sequential narrative, whether or not marked as one of a set of recurrences. Each of these forms can intend an aspect of a theme, but perhaps the fullest expression of a theme will blend all of these forms in a single discourse which presents the theme as the thema of an extendure unfolding linearly in time, as itself a single story.

I can also choose to mark my reflective consciousness of a theme as theme through a self-referent statement that attributes this theme to me. This allows a distinction to be drawn for the purposes of analysis between a theme and a *conviction* (Husserl, 1925/1954/1977). A conviction is a judgement that a particular theme is a possession of the reflective consciousness of its possessor. It is a theme, but one distinguished by its current presence to self reflection. On the other hand, I may choose not to mark a conviction that I hold as a conviction in my discourse, despite its presence as conviction in my consciousness. Or finally, as was suggested earlier, I may be currently reflectively unaware of the thematic nature of the theme which I am currently expressing, either because it is not currently present to me, or because it has never yet been.

Another distinction that can be drawn in my expression of a theme is that between the expression of the internal and external horizons of a theme. In any expression which is thematic, I will intend the internal horizons of a theme. I can, however, choose to explore the internal horizons of a theme in my discourse, attempting to allow the fulfillment of that about it which makes it a theme in my experience. On the other hand, I can emptily intend the theme as part of the external horizons of another theme which I am currently expressing. Since themes may present a hierarchical structuring, it is also possible that the theme I emptily intend as one of the external themes of the theme currently being expressed, together with this current theme, may be the internal horizons of a yet more encompassing theme.

It is also possible that a theme, even a conviction, may not have clear and distinct determinable horizons, but may yet be definitely present to me in this indeterminate form. Such a theme (which will be called an *aporia* after Ricoeur, 1981) may have indeterminate internal horizons (e.g. 'What is that feeling, I recognize it but cannot describe it.') or external horizons (e.g. 'I know I have smelled that smell before, but where?'). It may also be marked in discourse, or may remain unmarked. And, of course, it may also remain implicit in discourse and in the experience of its possessor.

This array of properties and possibilities for the expression of themes present a formidable challenge to the analyst who would fulfill the themes of another's personal world. Let us propose at the outset however that the themes to be sought most ardently are those we consider *pervasive*, those which seem to animate considerable regions of the personal world[2]. Such pervasive themes may be expressed as convictions, or may remain unexpressed in the target discourse, whether implicit there by intention, or whether implicit because reflectively unavailable to the narrator of the discourse.

Because, as has been emphasized in previous analyses, the analyst can no longer naively encounter R and fulfill his world with an unencumbered systematicity, one place to begin is with a thematic element that has caught the attention of the analyst, perhaps from his first typification of R. Since the analyst is already directed towards pervasive themes, this initial impression may prove to have fertile horizons for further analysis. Alternatively, the analyst may begin from knowledge of the types of linguistic structure in a discourse associated with the expression of themes, and search the discourse for an expressed theme judged to have a fertile horizon for further analysis. A third possibility would be to begin with a particular intentional object or objects and enumerate the contexts in which this object is constituted, or the convictions or themes expressed in relation to this intentional object; an example of this form of analysis is given by Baldwin (1942) within the idiographic tradition. Because of the focus upon pervasive personal themes, this lower level of analysis will not be pursued here.

Analysis itself will consist of the attempt to bring the horizons of a chosen theme into clear sight. Success will require three outcomes. First, the internal horizons of the theme must be brought into sight. Second, the external horizons of the theme must be brought into sight, and its pervasive influence judged. Third, the theme must be judged to be a theme of the personal world of the teller, rather than simply a theme in the experience of the analyst. This third outcome may well depend ultimately upon a judgement of the coherence which the explicated theme brings to a consideration of the personal world as a whole, indeed such a judgement is the ultimate test of any concept (Husserl, 1913/1962)[3].

Each of these outcomes will require that the analyst continue to refine his or her conception of the theme. This will involve imaginal variation under a form of phenomenological reduction. The attainment of these outcomes will also require that the analyst bring his conception of the theme into contact with the discourse, and see that discourse *in light of* that theme. This will involve abduction. These processes of the analyst will, of course, be hopelessly intertwined, and may well be composed of cycles of activity in which one or the other aspect dominates. This process can also be described as the realization of an hermeneutic circle.

The full expression of an analyzed theme would, under the conception of theme presented above, entail an explication of its internal horizons (at minimum those deemed essential to its presence), an indication of the pervasiveness of this theme in the personal world, and (where available) an unfolding of the historical-temporal horizons of the theme (possibly as an extendure of which this theme is the thema).

Both the progress towards this goal, and its presentation upon completion, might be enhanced by a method of systematic enumeration. A linguistic analysis of an autobiographical discourse which unitizes it, separates out levels of fabula/story/commentary within each unit, and characterizes genre (as exemplified in Chapter 8), can serve as an invaluable aid to such an enumeration. For example, a matrix can be formed in which the vertical dimension consists of the individual units of the discourse, and the horizontal dimension can come during analysis to consist of individual themes (or thematic moments of individual themes). The entries of the matrix may consist of information about the presence or absence of an expression of the theme in a particular discourse unit, as well as information about the manner of expression of that theme in that unit (for example, whether as a conviction, as an exemplification or as an external horizon, etc.).

For the analyst such an enumeration does not obviate the need to engage in the thought processes described previously; rather it may be regarded simply as an aid to memory and/or as a form of expression. However, the continuing critical examination of such a matrix (perhaps numerically) may also make available to the analyst new horizons to consider beyond those enumerated in the matrix[4].

Several pitfalls to any such examination must, however, be noted. First, themes are moments, not pieces, of the personal world, though in such a representation as the one suggested the tendency to naturalize elements and regard them as pieces may prove difficult to resist. Second, the unitization of the discourse will represent (as apparently equal), discourse units with radically different properties. A discourse unit can consist of an iterative action sequence, a description, a sequential narrative, or multiples of each in many combinations. Further, the mere presence or absence of a theme in any particular unit of discourse gives no indication of the nature of its expression, or of the degree of saturation of the theme in that unit. Third, any numerical procedure performed upon such a matrix is immediately detached from the experience of the analyst and thus from contact with the textual and personal worlds. Anything that results from such a procedure must be reincorporated into the experience of the analyst who may attempt to fulfill it, bring it into contact with the personal world, and judge its fertility. The analyst must not be naive enough to believe that numerical procedures are incapable of producing unthinkable results.

The specific thematic analyses which follow are intended to be exemplary of the procedures described abstractly above. I have attempted to be as complete as is possible about the unfolding process of identifying and explicating themes in these exemplary analyses; this may have resulted at times in detail which might, from the vantage point of a completed analysis, appear superfluous. Finally, I also do not regard these analyses as a set as complete; they simply point in the direction of a more complete analysis.

The Theme of Being-an-Individualist. An example of a pervasive theme expressed as a personal conviction by R is found in the abstract of Unit 4 a: Little Wanderer: Bus Ride:

2. I was always ah a bit of an adVENturer
    bit of a LOner=
    bit of an indiVIDualist I s-guess
3. used to be () MY (.) THING to
    to go off on my ownio and / go FIND somewhere
    or go and exPLORE things / 'n just s-get LOST (..)

An elaboration of this theme is also expressed in the coda of this discourse unit:

20. but I guess that's the- sort=of=the first memory (.) I have of-of (.)
    of BEing (.) my own person=

'n GOing with the wind [laughs]
'n going the w- TAKing my own fork in the road=
and to hell with everybody else

These sections present a conjunction of self-descriptive properties as well as two general iterative action sequences which allow a partial fulfillment of these descriptions. R uses the trait ascriptions 'adventurer', 'loner', and 'individualist' as partial descriptions of what he clearly regards as a single nexus or theme of his life. The first iterative action sequence (in line 3) expresses a youthful recurrent pattern of 'going exploring and becoming lost'. The second iterative action sequence (in line 20) uses metaphor to express a more general recurrent pattern of 'following his own path.' In both sequences, R emphasizes that these actions are importantly a form of self-assertion ('MY THING', 'BEing my own person'). He also implies that these self-assertions may be regarded by others as capricious ('going with the wind' perhaps in the sense of 'as the spirit moved') and as reckless, ill-considered, or perhaps inconsiderate ('and to hell with everybody else'). Each of these implications may be tentatively regarded as subsidiary themes in further analysis.

Between these expressions of convictions about self is a core narrative which R presents as exemplifying them. In it R tells of how, as an adventure, he and a group of friends traveled the bus routes only to discover that they were without sufficient money to retrace their journey. This is clearly consistent with his description of the major elements of the current theme. At this point, a new thematic element is introduced:

15. so-o () exERTing some powers of CONfidence and leadership I said ( ) /
OK guys () COME on (.) I know- I KNOW where to GO (..)

R recognizes his surroundings and proceeds to the apartment of a friend of his mother's, and the adventurers are able to return safely home. Here R shows resourcefulness and a confidence in his own abilities, and is able to secure a successful outcome. Whether confidence and successful outcomes are always characteristic of the expression of this theme for R will be another focus for further analysis.

While R indicates that this is his first memory of a narrative exemplifying being-an-individualist, in the next discourse unit (Unit 4 b: Little Wanderer: Department Store), he relates a story about himself that he remembers hearing from his mother in which he violates an injunction to wait for her and successfully finds his way home alone. The main elements of the current theme are present: R capriciously asserts himself in what might be regarded as a reckless way, follows his own path, yet is successful. Perhaps importantly, R violates a constraining injunction in asserting himself. This may be an exemplification of his earlier description: 'to hell with anybody else'; it too is a thematic element which might be a moment of the central theme. For example, it does not require excessive imagination to place this element in the horizons of R's earlier story, especially in these lines from the beginning of that story:

4. and I was growing up in Montreal (.)
5. and ah (..) I was living with my MOther=
    my par- my family had SPLIT /
    and my mother was working=
6. so I used to find my w-way home every day
(7.) ah (..) but not usually DIRectly= / I usually found something to DO /
    before my mother got HOME

Together, then, these contiguous units express R's conviction that he is an 'individualist', present an iterative action sequence from his youth which further describes this property, present his earliest memory of the expression of this property and this sequence as a narrative exemplification, present a story told him by his mother as an even earlier exemplification, and present a more abstract iterative action sequence which we might tentatively regard as the form in which this property is exemplified in R's later life. In addition, several subsidiary themes are introduced which may be essential to the central theme, or which may be separate pervasive themes. From this beginning, R might have chosen to relate an extendure composed of a chronology of narratives expressing this central theme. This he did not do, and it remains as an analytic task to search the remainder of R's discourse for further expressions of this theme and its subsidiary elements.

R himself makes explicit reference to this theme again in Unit 13 a: Gambling: Willful Absence:

1. um (..) there have been TIMES you=know / when
    beCAUSE ++ and I don't see eye to eye /
        um I () WILLfully () abSENTed myself
    you=know like () getting out from work LATE
        ah that's () the most usual
(2.) or-r NOT going home from work () at ALL (..) hm
    to GO () to the RACEtrack
    or to the BRIDge club
    or to the BAR-r
    or to () GO see some FRIENDS
    or go and take coffee with a BUDdy
    or ah (.) WORK () extra hours
        or whatev- (3.) any-anything to avoi- to avoid going HOME=
    because () when I DID get home / I got HIT with the third degree about
    WHERE I'd been
    and WHAT I was doing
    and how much MONey it cost
    and SO forth
4. NOT that ++ was enTIRely WRONG
5. she had very good REAson to be (.) / perhaps dissatisfied
    with-ah MY-ah end of the bargain= / in terms of being married

6. cause I tended to-ah do my () THING
7. and if you () sort=of go back to my EARLY stories / about () ME
    ah being an individualist
    and being on the Eiffel tower by mySELF
    and among the mountains by mySELF (.)
    and spending a short time with my SISter
        where () SHE does what SHE likes
        and I do what I like
        and if we c'n () BE together and enjoy some'in'
        toGETHer someTIMES
        that's great ()

This reference comes at the conclusion of a long multi-narrative extendure detailing R's marriage (Unit 12a-f: Married Life) during which he had also expressed what can now be seen as another statement of this theme (in Unit 12 c: Married Life. Not once but several times):

2. at the moment I'm () sort=of separated / and I have been
    several () TIMES= not just for a LONG time but for SEVeral
    times [laughs]=
3. I think I've left ++ on THREE occasions
4. and-ah every time I do it AH-HA / ah-h-h who knows whether
    th- / it'll be the last or not
5. every time I do it / I don't know why or how / it's just
    my () STRIVing to-t-to do MORE
6. um I find that MY life with ++ has reTRICted me beyond
    MEAS-ure
7. um all my PREVious stories of going
        HERE and THERE and EVERYwhere
        and SEE-ing things
        and exPERiencing things
        and feeling WONderful about things (..)
    are not SHARED / with my wife (..)
8. because my WIFE () values () DIFferent things /
        has no KNOWledge of the things that I feel
        although as she's grown older she wants to
        and perhaps she () DOES underSTAnd

Both of these excerpts constitute iterative action sequences within the extendure of R's marriage. The one presented first is concerned with recurrent willful absences from home and wife, while the second is concerned with recurrent marital separations. In both cases, R presents more than one reason for these recurrences, and continues by explicitly referring to previously related stories and their themes as external horizons of both the recurrences and of the reasons offered for them. In the first, being-an-individualist is explicitly named as the theme of these previous stories, and in the second this theme is very probably implicitly present. As well, in the second excerpt the subordinate theme of being constrained and acting individualistically at least in part in response to this constraint is explicitly presented as a reason for the separations, while in the first excerpt this theme is implicitly present (particularly in lines 3 to 5). Not present is any reference to confidence or a successful outcome, at least in relation to the marital extendure; and caprice appears to be present, if at all, only in the choice of type of willful absence.

These references do, however, make explicit the presence of the central theme in other discourse units. Thus in the first excerpt R explicitly presents his day in Paris (related in Unit 8b A Day in Paris) and his holidays with his sister (related primarily in Unit 8a Austria and Unit 8c Majorca but perhaps also horizonally including Unit 11a Impressive Vistas: Swiss Paradise and Unit 3: Swiss Dinner Party) as exemplifications of being-an-individualist. He also elaborates (in the latter part of line 7 of the first excerpt) upon how the theme is expressed when activities do involve others, specifically that freedom of self-assertion is maintained and respected, and that shared activities happen without coercion. In the second excerpt, the aspect of adventurer and its reward of enriched experience is elevated into a value (lines 7 and 8), the sharing of which seems necessary for R in order to maintain positive forms of shared activity. Both of these convictions present themes connected to being-an-individualist which may be additional pervasive themes or possibly subordinate themes. Each may be examined in further analyses.

A return to Unit 8a-c Summer Holidays does reveal the following direct expressions of the theme of being-an-individualist. In Unit 8 b 1: A Day in Paris I:

5. um I spent a whole DAY in Par- / I=mean FANCY going to
   Paris JUST for a day=
...
9. EVERYthing () all in one DAY () is [laughs] / quite an assIGNment
10. but I DID IT
11. and everything I did (..) / I was on my own
12. I-I-it was like my OWN feeling of a () SELF / um I ah
    aPRECiation for ME / for for what I was=
        sorry I'm not SAYing this right
13. I was getting appreciation for ALL that I saw
14. and it was private to ME (..)

and in Unit 8 b 2: A Day in Paris II:

15. the thing to DO / is to DO it on your own / and you=know and-
16. and WALK it /
        and come down on y-
        be it by yourSELF
17. be at PEACE and at ONE with yourSELF
18. and be a PART of it

'n exPERience it
'n

As R himself later notes (in Unit 16: Family Holiday):

1. oh there was one time I went on HOLIday
   I talk about holidays a LOT

An inventory of discourse units in which holidays are described includes not only those mentioned above (Unit 8a-c, Unit 11a, Unit 3) but also Unit 16: Family Holiday and Unit 24: Camping, Units 7c: Bridge Player: Winning with style and 22: Calgary Sectional in which playing bridge is associated with holidays, and Units 9b: Mother: Christmas and 17: The day I turned forty in which holidays are present horizonally. Holidays, at least in R's teenage and young adult life, involved travel to exotic locales, provided the opportunity to explore on his own (as in Unit 8b: A Day in Paris), removed work constraints and constraints imposed by others' expectations, and were successful in providing enriching private experiences. In forming an extendure which chronologically unfolded the theme of being-an-individualist, descriptions of youthful holidays with sister would follow upon the early experiences described in Unit 4: Little Wanderer.

In the chronological development of the theme, however, the aspect of constraint gradually comes to dominate. R constitutes the constraints he felt in his marriage as partially responsible for some of his recurrent actions, and explicitly counterpoints these actions and constraints against the theme of being-an-individualist.

Even in holidays, which had previously provided an outlet for the full expression of the theme, constraints are frequently present. Thus in Unit 16: Family Holiday, R reveals that he did not want to take a holiday accompanied by his wife, infant child, and mother-in-law, and in the coda describes his reflections on the holiday:

26. it ACTually motivated me to write a STORY / about my life
27. and the way I thought of DOing it / was to write it
    through the eyes of my () DOG
        I=mean not through MY perspective / through HIS perspective
28. so actually WHAT it beCAME was / the story of-ah / my DOG'S life ()
        as seen through HUman eyes in in-in his poor=little body
        an'an' so forth
        and having all the KIND=of emotions that I HAVE
29. so I'm able to sort=of say what () I () think about everything /
    and really () it looks as though it's the dog's um story

Clearly, this 'dog's view' is an expression of R's feeling constrained.

R does not always suffer constraints with silent compliance however. In Unit 22: Calgary Tournament, he relates the story of leaving a bridge tournament on the spur of the moment. First he becomes aware that the tournament is not unfolding as it should but remains aware of obligations he has undertaken:

19. WHAT's going ON here?
20. I=mean () THIS is the MOST () DISorganized badly run
 THING I can imAGine
21. so anyway () moving along / we decided / well we'd better
 get back to the hotel / an' comPLY
22. we must comP-L-Y / and do what was- what's exPECTed of us

Later, however, he decides:

40. we () were being treated like a bunch of SHEEP

His reaction now to the obligations which constrain him (and the consequences of assertive action):

44. MY atTItude was / well who GIVES a shit
  I=mean if- if it has to be THAT unBEARable
   and that DIFficult
   and that unPLEASant
  I=mean who CARES anymore (..)

And he takes assertive action with an apparently successful outcome:

32. and we TOOK off (.)
33. and we never stopped- / we never got out of the car until
 we got to RED DEER
34. and we never phoned the BRIDGE people
35. and we never-ah / ah made our aPOLogies or anything
36. we just () took off=
37. ohh / this is so- / this is PLEAsant
38. this is- this is- [laughs] this is PEACEful
39. this is worth DOing you=know

Although:

41. well of course there was a PRICE to PAY
42. there were all kinds of remonSTRAtions

He summarizes in the coda:

45. so (.) well that's sort=of a memory of the story of=of=of ho- /
 what a ROT-TEN day it was
46. a-n-d how () that CAUSed me to- / and + / to have ah /
 take VIOlent reACtion to- / to this kind of TREATment

(47.) and- and-ah DO that which was NOT conventional /
by just () taking off and forgetting the whole thing /
withOUT making the () PROPER () phone=calls /
and niceties and everything else=
48. it was just () AH (..)

This narrative, while clearly weighting the aspect of action in reaction to constraint, presents many of the thematic elements of R's earlier episodes of being-an-individualist, including capricious self-assertive action, a 'to hell with everybody else' attitude, and an (at least partially) successful outcome.

Relating it also prompts R to recall another episode in which constraints lead to anger and assertive action (Unit 23: Violent Thinker):

11. it might've been () the proCEDures
or () the REF'rences that you NEED
and ALL the steps you have to () GO through
and ALL the horseshit you have t' kind=of comPLY in
this society
12. and I gave VENT () to my () SPLEEN / or whatever=you ()
like to put it (.)
13. and he didn't SAY much=
14. he just LOOKed at me and smiled and said
you know (.) you're a VIO-lent think-er (.)
which STOPped me DEAD in my tracks
15. but it's something I have NEV-ER forGOTten
16. and you=know the man's RIGHT (.)
17. because (.) / when I SEE the things that governments do
an' the things that PEOple do
and the things that-ah that HAPpen out there
and-ah- 18. we all have our oPINions about how the world should BE=/
and [laughs] we arGUE about it day=and=night / it's part of living
19. [loud whisper] BUT I GET REAL-LY ANG-RY [normal voice] /
when my point of view isn't WHAT's happening you=know [laughs]
20. and I DO get angry- / I guess I AM a violent thinker

This episode expresses another conviction, an explicit self-characterization, which is an aspect of, or horizonal to, being-an-individualist, and perhaps one which allows a measure of self-assertion without irreversible actions.

In one of his final discourse units (both in discourse time and in chronological time), R encorporates this characterization into his discourse (in Unit 26: Pat on the Back / Hi R):

12. and in REcent times I- / you=know I've been FORtunate
enough to FIND that- / to find my NICHE

in terms of my wor-
proFESsional ah situation
working
where I have actually (.) been able to bring ALL my
characteristics to BEAR
and still BE () the MAVerick that I am
and the rebel that I am
and the VIOLent THINKer that I am
and harness all those energies to GOOD proDUCtive WORK (.)
and to HAVE everyone around me appreciate them (.)

Now, being-an-individualist seems to appear as being a maverick, a rebel, and a violent thinker, but also appears without the overt conflict that seemed present in many of the expressions of the theme during R's young and middle adult years. His work appears now to be a place where being-an-individualist or being-a-maverick leads to success.

Not all of the aspects of being-an-individualist have been transformed, however, as R relates in the grand coda to his autobiography (in Unit 29. Just an Ordinary Guy).

27. largely I say well I do what I do
and I do what I CAN
and I [laughs] look to the BEST
and sort=of look FORward
28. ah but I SURE dig a lot of HOLES for myself (.)
like not paying my taxes
or-ah not conFORMing to society
and so forth
29. LIVE for today and to HELL for tomorrow / cause I could
be under a bus tomorrow
30. I=mean tomorrow's not really important
31. well tomorrow's important MAYbe but- / next WEEK maybe
but-ah
32. two years down the road I=mean WHO CARES [laughs]
33. well you CARE
34. but-ah you just don't know what's gonna happen / so WHY
WORry about it
35. just [laughs] just get ON
and make the most of what's RIGHT THERE
that you can deal with RIGHT THERE
in the here=and=now
without sort=of () contemplating five year plans
36. ah everytime I've contemplated a five year plan / it
never worked out the way () I planned it [laughs] / or
the way anybody ELSE would have planned it

Clearly, the aspects of 'following the wind' with confidence explicitly expressed in his chronologically earliest exemplifications of being-an-individualist are still present now, here expressed as the current conviction that living in 'the here and now' 'for today and to hell for tomorrow' without 'contemplating five year plans' remains the best way to live fully.

This appears to be the final evolution in the chronological unfolding of the extendure for which being-an-individualist is the thema: R's early successful and exuberant adventuring met constraint and conflict within his marriage and adult life where it presented its aspect of rebellion more prominently, but has come to be accepted and valued in his career; and now, in R's later middle age, it presents most prominently the aspect of living for the present moment without undue contemplation of the future.

There are other places in the discourse in which aspects of being-an-individualist are present. For example, in Unit 20 a: Brushes with the Law: Perry Mason, R expresses his sense of accomplishment at acting as his own lawyer:

67. well of course I got out of there
68. and said well Jesus I should have been PERry MAson
69. and I went home with another big HIGH of-ah (.) / how I ()
had a little triumph that day
70. DOES your heart good doesn't it ()

and later in the same extendure (Unit 20b: Brushes with the Law: Suing the crown) expresses his intention to proceed in the same manner in the future:

42. um so I think next time I'll go the PERRY MAson route
43. and I won't ah EVer ah bother with LAWyers (.)
44. because [laughs] I've got a little more FAITH in myself/
than I have in putting my trust in-ah / the proFESsional
advice of others / sometimes
45. beSIDES which () I'm my OWN PERson
46. [laughs] take- take my lumps

Also, in the abstract to Unit 25: Teaching Bridge, R re-expresses his conviction that confidently 'charging in' reveals one's capabilities:

1. you=know it's aMAZing
2. um (..) you never REALly KNOW what we're capable of
(3.) un- / until we actually CHARGE IN and make a fool of
ourselves

The theme of being-an-individualist seems also to be horizonally present in many of the major life decisions that R relates, including his decision to come to Canada shortly after his marriage (in Unit 12: Married Life):

Unit 12 d

5. so I announced that we would be GOing (..)
6. of course ++ announced that () we would NOT be going
7. and-ah it enSUED that () I () decided () to GO / and SHE
   decided to () to stay () in England
8. and I came out on my own

Unit 12 e

1. I CHOSE to make a life for myself

Unit 12 d

14. ++ hoped that I would FALL on my FACE / and come home
    CRAWLing / with my tail between my legs
15. and-ah someHOW we would pick up the pieces / and
    everything would be all RIGHT

Unit 12 f

1. so-o I DIDn't go back to England with my tail between my
   legs

his decision to strike out at age 40 (Unit 17: The Day I was Forty)

2. do you KNOW what I DID on the DAY I was FORty?
      or () shortly after the DAY I was FORty?
3. I WENT into WORK
4. I QUIT my JOB
5. I put the HOUSE up for SALE
6. and traded my CAR with MONey I didn't-
      er for MONey I didn't HAVE
   to buy a BIGger one
7. CASHed in my pension
8. and had a GREAT SUMmer (.)
9. WENT over to England
10. SAW my wife
...
14. I'm FORty=
      it's TIME to CHANGE MY LIFE
...
21. and it was as though () nothing had ever changed (..)
22. but when I was FORty

or just after FORty
I was () JUST DESp'rate (.) to DO () SOME-thing
...
30. NOW's the time
31. BOOF
32. let's () CUT it ALL before I get too OLD to DO anything
33. let's do something ex-CIT-ing (.)

and his decision to open a restaurant in England (Unit 19:English Restaurateur):

10. um but the result of the WHOLE thing / of NOT being able to get any WORK /
and SUDdenly having a CERtain amount of MONey /
caused () me () to () think / well maybe I should get a business
(11.) or get () some () kind=of=a WAY of making my MONey
where I don't have to reLY on SOME () ASSHOLE giving me a job /
or emPLOYing me / and going about BUSiness that I have NO interest in
12. SO to=cut=a=long=story=short I BOUGHT a () restaurant
13. EVERYbody () told () me () I () was () CRA-zy
14. ah in a LARGE sense everybody was RIGHT
15. but I went into this THING (..) / HOOK line and sinker
16. and I gave it everything I HAD
17. and ++ wanted to be PART of it
...
21. you=gotta=be=kidding
22. ah I=mean part of working is an esCAPE from HOME ( )
23. and part of HOME is an escape from WORK=
...
26. but my MAIN thought was / NO / this is MINE
27. ah ++ () you=got=your=home
you got your kids
you got your dog
you've got EVerything
28. you- you've got YOURS / let me have MINE=
29. I want my little PIECE of the world / so that I can manage it /
and run it as I SEE FIT= / not as YOU see fit (..)

Finally, many of the activities in which R engaged during his 'willful absences' from his marriage (and which he expands upon in various discourse units) seem consistent with this central theme of being-an-individualist, although perhaps the theme is present to them only in the deeper horizons.

The Shape of Personal Specialness. In Unit 12 a: Married Life: A Purpose in Life, R expresses in some detail his conviction that he has a purpose to fulfill in life, and the genesis of this conviction:

1. yeah one of the things that ah / I mentioned BEFORE /
   was this business of being in hospital
2. and being in hospital did one THING for me (.)
3. what it DID was to TEACH me / or at least put in MY MIND /
   that I was HERE for a purpose=
4. HOW could I possibly have surVIVed
      the kind of ACcident
      and the kind of ah PHYsical DAmage
      that I-ah-I DID to myself
      or was DONE to me
   and COME through it ALL
      when EVERYone thought that it was not-
         I wasn't even worth ah th-the OPerating theatre time=
      because I didn't=have=a=chance=
      cause I was as good as dead on arrival
5. but they- / they WORKed all night / and they kept me alive /
   and they brought me back to ah / this world
6. and-ah maybe that's why I have such good memories of that
   hospital is because ah / you=know they gave ME LIFE
7. ah ha [laughs] they GAVE me () my LIFE BACK
8. a-n-d ALL by myself without anyone () influencing me in=any=way /
   I determined () that (.) / I was brought back for A REA-son (.)
      that there was SOME-thing in this world that I () was HERE for
      that I had to do
      or-r () SOME purpose that I () couldn't understand () now

Later in the same unit, R reiterates the conviction, making clear that it remains a current conviction that even now presents an aporia for him:

17. but I DID () get that conviction
18. and I still have it toDAY / THIRTY odd years later (..)
    that () I am HERE for a reason
19. and I'm not sure what that reason is=
20. I never HAVE been sure what that reason is

Also in the same unit, R compares the aporiac nature of this conviction to the mysteries of his youthful religious training, although he disassociates this particular conviction from religious beliefs.

R then continues by explicitly relating that this conviction of special purpose has been in the horizon of his marital life, especially in his decision to wed (Unit 12b: Married Life: Dainty Little English Rose):

3. she's a SWEET little girl
      just there CHIRP-y / and STU-pid

and () you=know bouncing around life like [laughs]
like [sighs] without a () CARE in the world
without KNOWledge of- or-ah of ANYthing
4. and I thought you=know / THERE's SOMEthing that TOUCHed my heart
5. and THERE was SOMEthing that I could DO=
6. I could take CARE of this person that- /
[sigh] that couldn't take CARE of herSELF /
much less take care of anything ELSE

continuing immediately (in Unit 12 c: Married Life: Not Once but Several Times) that:

1. I don't KNOW even TOday if that WAS-s the purpose in LIFE

It may have appeared that caring for wife and family was a sufficient expression of R's destiny during the early years of his marriage (as above, and as presented in this excerpt from Unit 12 c: Married Life: Not Once but Several Times, though even here R expresses some doubt):

14. I also feel SOMEhow that like (.) / the most IMportant thing
well maybe it isn't the most important thing
IS to GO out and WORK
and make a living
and and and t-to pro-VIDE the very things that I married her for ()
in the first place
to take CARE of her
and look AFTER her (.)

But it does not appear that caring for wife and family is sufficient in R's current view to fulfill this special destiny. This reemergence of the question of personal destiny becomes most evident in Unit 14: Will anyone ever thank you? and in Unit 17: The Day I turned Forty. In Unit 14, R describes all of the things he is doing, especially in relation to work, and is caught up short by the question:

12. when YOU are DEAD [laughs] / will any-ONE ever THANK you? /
or reMEMber you? [laughs]
13. and (..) / I never sobered up so fast in ALL my life
14. I-ah took off=
15. I went home as fast as I could
16. and you=know that- that- that- that's /
that funny little EVEning has been with m- / I- / I-
17. I remember that QUITE often
18. I remember that quite often

In Unit 17 R relates how he suddenly abandons his job the day he turns forty:

22. but when I was FORty
    or just after FORty
  I was () JUST DESp'rate (.) to DO () SOME-thing
23. what was the MEANing of my life=
24. where was I GO-ing
25. WHY was I working for the SAME company / till the DAY I DIED=
26. WHY wasn't I GOing anywhere
27. WHY wasn't I making a lot of MONey
28. WHY weren't- / WHY wasn't I SATisfying children and ah the KIDS 'n
29. why-why-why weren't things BET-TER you=know like

In both of these units, despite a relatively successful provision for family through a conventional middle class life style, the aporia of an unfulfilled personal destiny again becomes present to R. Also in these excerpts, several additional questionings about the nature of that destiny are constituted. What, then, does R believe the shape of his destiny to be?

Convictions relevant to this questions first become apparent in the original presentation of Unit 2: Hospital Times, where the theme of personal specialness is horizonally present (as we later learn) though not explicitly constituted:

25. I mean the FACT that / everyone CARED SO MUCH [choking
  with emotion] / was () / ah (.) just treMENdous=
26. and it's something that-ah / when I [choking with emotion]
  THINK about it (.) / there's no excuse for () ah () /
    for feeling BAD /
    or DOWN /
    or GUILty /
    or (..) any negative thing=in=this=world (.)
  when I can remember THAT /
27. I OWE those people [chuckles] / to go out / and do
  something good / and BE somebody (.)

Here (in line 27), it becomes clear that his purpose in life is viewed by R as an obligation, and that he believes it to consist at least in part in 'do[ing] something good' and in 'be[ing] somebody'.

One interpretation of these phrases, 'accomplishing something noteworthy through personal abilities and thereby standing out' is itself a pervasive theme for R. For example in his discussion of growing up in England in the post war years, R presents episodes in which he is distinguished by his activities, and he explicitly calls attention to their unusualness. First he relates an episode in which he waits unsuccessfully for a loaf of bread (in Unit 10 b: Back to England: A Loaf of Bread) and comments:

39. d'j'know / on reflection it's amazing that my mother

belIEVED / that I really WAS in that LINE () all day (.)
40. because nobody toDAY would EVER belIEVE a story like that=
i-if a kid CAME HOME without /
and said he WAITed in LINE for like () HOURS /
you wouldn't belIEVE him (.)

Then he describes his prowess at doing the family grocery shopping (In UNIT 10 c: *BACK TO ENGLAND: BUYING MEAT):*

5. now () how many () kids do YOU know / of about ah TEN /
that ACTually DO / the family MEAT shopping / for the whole FAMily
6. ah I used to do it

This theme of standing out as a result of achievement is also central to R's descriptions of his bridge playing (especially in UNIT 7 a: *Bridge Player: Just About):*

1. um (..) / I'm a competitive BRIDGE player (.)
2. everybody likes to WIN (.) /
and bridge players more than MOST=
3. that's=why=they PLAY=the=game (.)
which is ah / a game where people are out to prove
how SMART they are /
or (.) perhaps () how DUMB everybody ELSE is (.)
which is kind=of STUpid be- [laughing] because ah /
that's not REALly the way it works
4. um (.) but there is GREAT exhilaRAtion /
in ACT-ual-ly WINNING () an () EVENT
or () at getting the BETter of someone / who has an
INTER-NAtional reputation
or somebody who has- or someone who is REckoned to () be () /
one of the FINest players () in the world
I suppose if you were ah () a GOLFer / it would be like um /
an AMateur winning the U.S. Open
5. well (..) it's happened to me once=or=twice () /
not often () but once or twice
...
14. ESpecially the w- the first time it ever HAPpened I was only-y (.)
well=I=was about twenty-TWO
15. and=I=was=the=oldest member of the () team-m=
the=others=were=all teenagers
16. and we (.) didn't=actually=win this event
we (.) JUST ABOUT KNOCKED OFF ah / four () English internationals /
who were reckoned to be ah / three=of=the=FOUR=
best=players () in the world () at the time

17. and we had () specTAtors and kibitzers like=you=wouldn't=believe-
    the WHOLE TOURnament was VIRtually WATching us FINish this MATch ( ) /
    which we lost by ah / a VE-RY () small () margin /
    ALL on the LAST hand
18. SO () that was-
    to ME that was like a win [laughs]

and again in this summary description of a satisfying win (from Unit 7 c: Bridge Player: Winning with Style):

16. but THAT was the day I became a LIFE MASTER /
    and its something which only () perhaps () BRIDGE
    players would under-stan-nd
17. but it is a plateau /
    probably greater than=any=OTHer in=the=game=of=bridge
18. SURE its better to win the Bermuda Bowl
    or to be a GRAND master
    or=whatever
    but your FIRST TASTE of the BIG one
    your FIRST TASTE of- of being a little PERson / playing
    in a BIG game / with a LOT=of () SHARKS /
    when you make the Life Master in THAT kind of style
    THAT is a moment
19. and its a moment that lasted FIVE hours in the car
    all=the=way=home [laughs]

The aspect of standing out is also salient in R's description of his days as a restaurateur (in this excerpt from Unit 19 b: English Restaurateur: Businessman):

3. within about () THREE months / I was talking to the bank manager
4. and I said /
    well-l uh Peter uh
    um TELL me
    if I got together say () a million dollars / or a couple /
    would the BANK MATCH it
    cause I've got one or two ideas you=know /
    about-ah how we could ah REAL-ly um MAKE things happen here
    um
5. 'n=he=said oh sure NO PROBlem
6. you get a million pounds / I'll match it with a million pounds () /
    if the project is ah- / if the inVESTment is ah / WORthy
7. so I got REALly BIG ideas
8. SUD-DEN-LY I was in business
9. SUD-DEN-LY I was attached to ah / the ROTary club ah / a little bit um

10. I became a- a- a PERson / walking up and down the HIGH street
11. HULlo () MISter ++ =
12. how are YOU () MISter ++ =
13. nice to MEET you () MISter ++ =
14. how's business () MISter ++
15. we must to get- / you=KNOW / I became- / I KNEW the local () acCOUNtants
    and the BANK managers
    and the LAWyers (.)
(16.) the inSURance salesmen
    the- the-ah local merchants and the businessmen
    the ga- the GUY that ran the GARage
    the vet- the vet'inarian
17. you=know I=mean I became a member of SOCiety
18. WOW / did I ever TAKE OFF= / wasn't this wonderful (..)

This excerpt also introduces the importance for R of belonging to a community. This is a second possible interpretation of 'doing good', and particularly of 'being somebody'. 'Being part of a community' is also a pervasive theme for R. For example, he expresses it in his nostalgic reminiscence about the English Pub (in Unit 6: English Pub):

25. And ya=might () see people there / that you've never SPOken to for twenty years
26. but you KNOW 'em (.)
27. and HE'S never spoken to YOU for twenty years
28. but HE knows YOU

He also expresses it directly in the orientation section to the presentation of his evening in a Swiss mansion (in Unit 3: Swiss Dinner Party):

1. I'm one of these guys=-
   actually one of the things I like to DO /
       MORE than anything (..) /
   is-is to SIT / across the TABLE
       's probably why I'm here [laughs]
2. i-s to sit across the table / with my DEAREST friends /
     or my nearest and dearest
       and family 'n loved ones (.)
     people I CARE about=
       people who care about ME
3. a-n-d () WINE and dine (.) /
     have a DINner party
     or it doesn't have to be a DINner PARty /
       it can be a SIMPLE AFFAIR
         like ah (..) MACaroni CHEESE
         or PEAnut butter SANDwich

4. ah (.) and SHARE (.) / MY feelings
        and MY comings and goings
        my past present future
    with-with-with them/
5. A-N-D () to reciproCATE
        and SHARE THEIR FEELings er too (.)
        to input what I CAN
        and so forth

More recently (in chronological time), the first of these themes ('standing out through personal achievement') has become a subordinate aspect of the second ('belonging to a community') as is expressed in Unit 26: Pat on the Back / Hi R:

11. I think we ALL like a pat on the back for a job well done
...
13. when the president of the COMpany can TRUST me
        and give me tickets to the HOCKey game
        and take a client out to the HOCKey game
        and-
            which I didn't care to GO TO in any case
    but-ah you=know when the bosses ah rally round
        and support
        and go to the aWARDS dinner
        and bring me back some aWARDS
            that I happen to have won in VanCOUVer
    when the CAMeraman
        or the EDitors
        or the- the BOYS around the PLACE
        and the girls that run in the office you=know
    sort=of treat me as I walk in
        at ELEVEN o'clock in the MORNing
        or three o'clock in the afternoon
            whatEVer time I CHOOSE to show UP
    with the same kind=of / OH () HI R you=know
    it-it-it-this- it's REALly nice to-
14. it's a REAlly lovely feeling / and its one that () I ()
    won't forget (..)

This subordination is made more salient by the immediate juxtaposition of this excerpt with an episode in which R is recognized on the street after returning, unemployed, from England. He concludes:

31. but it's kind=of nice isn't it / when YOU () are in a () BIG CITY /
    or you're in a- / in an environment where you FEEL like a bit of a fish out of

WATER / and then you hear
HI R
HI DON
HI whoever=you=are ()
you=KNOW
32. it does you good=
33. it- it makes you feel- / well it- / HEY [laughs] / I'm not a NObody
34. I- (.) you=know

The final evolution of the theme of a special personal destiny is presented in the final summary unit (Unit 29: Just an Ordinary Guy). Here R chronologically reviews the theme and forsakes his belief in a special destiny, although he reasserts that the aporia of his purpose remains, though it now does not concern him as much as it did previously:

1. I guess ah / like everybody else I-ah- /
you=know when you're a young man you sort=of
LOOK to the future
what you're gonna BE
and what you're gonna DO
and-
2. of course you've got your mothers
and your wives
and your sweethearts
and your brothers=and=sisters
and your- everyone ()
kind=of () egging you ON
trying to make you UP
make you feel good
make you BE somebody
3. and inside you're just the same small PERson
(4.) you=know [laughs]
WANTing
and deSIRing
but aFRAID
and- and so forth
5. and-ah- / but- but the YOUNG know no FEAR
6. and you- / you=sort=of THINK that you're gonna be
sucCESSful
7. a-n-d I would suspect that the majority of us-ah / perhaps
don't REALly know what we ARE gonna DO (.)
(8.) until we get a- ACTually FIND ourSELVES doing it / and
not knowing how we GOT there
9. ah but in the professional world you=know / you have a JOB to do
10. and I-/ I remember being in television all my live you=know I- /

as I GREW somewhere along the line / I- I-
I thought well maybe I'll BE-
11. you=know maybe I'd like to RE-MAKE "Intolerance"
ah maybe I'd like to-o () make some BIG movies
maybe I'd like to be a BIG SHOT
maybe I'd like to-
12. you=know cause you're always looking to GROW
13. A-N-D a few years ago
14. ah I decided / hey I'm not a BIG SHOT
15. I'm just an ordinary guy you=know
16. I=mean there's nothing special about ME
17. and once I came to the realization that I wasn't going to be Cecil B. DeMille /
my work got a lot BETter (.)
18. and () I enJOY it more
19. a-n-d I can se-e / a lot more STOCK in what I DO-o /
than that which I THOUGHT I might have liked to do
20. I=mean we ALL search for glory
and we all look to the stars
and everything else
but when it ALL comes down / you're just a small BEing
21. and-ah SO it sort=of () brings me to the thing here (.)
22. um () oo- who am I and where am I going
23. you=know / I () REALly () DO () NOT () KNOW
24. here I am FIFty-two years of age / and I just () DO NOT
KNOW () WHERE I'M GOing ()
25. and sometimes it BOTHers me (.)
26. but-ah LARGEly it doesn't
27. largely I say well I do what I do
and I do what I CAN
and I [laughs] look to the BEST
and sort=of look FORward

To summarize, the extendure of the theme of believing in a special destiny begins for R in the hospital where he survives a youthful motoring accident. From the beginning R has believed that his destiny will involve 'doing good' and 'being somebody'. Over his life the aporia of the nature of that destiny gradually shifts. For a long time, he believes that this destiny is to be found in caring for a wife and family, but around the age of 40 he becomes aware that this seems insufficient. In the first part of his life, he has also strived to stand out through personal achievement in his work life, but as he has grown older he has increasingly come to appreciate that 'being somebody' can also mean being a valued member of a community. Finally, while he still remains perplexed by the aporia of his purpose, he has come to believe that he is, like most of us, 'ordinary' and has not and will not come to stand out through extraordinary personal achievement.

Once again, as with the theme of being-an-individualist, R's preferred leisure activities appear to have the theme of personal specialness in their farther horizons.

The Theme of Being-Awed-by-a-Magic-World. A consideration of R's leisure activities, and in particular the place of his gambling activities within his personal world should begin with those aspects which are recurrently present to gambling, and especially with those aspects which are recurrently present beyond gambling but are thematically connected. One of these concerns the aspect of the world which recurrently catches R's attention, and which seems to be present in the horizon of many of his activities while being-an-individualist.

Consider the following verse, taken from Unit 1 Queen Mother:

19. LO and behold (.) /
CHANdeLIERS /
smoked=salmon=caviar and chamPAGNE /
DIAmonds and you=name=it (.) /
EVERYWHERE
20. and we were IN

If the preceding and following verses of this unit are examined, it can be seen that this verse is an interlude between two verses in which bodily movement of the central character occurs; the preceding is concerned with locating this room within a building and the following is concerned with occupying the room. This verse is transitional, it is concerned with crossing the threshold between these two scenes of activity.

From the structural perspective this verse presents a focalization in Genette's (1972) sense. Experientially this vocalization unfolds schematized aspects of the text in Ingarden's (1937/1973) sense. That is, we who experience the world constituted in the narrative both hear and see in ways not explicitly presented by the text.

The focalization occurs because the narrator places himself within the constituted world occupying the position of the central character of the narrative (who he was, of course, during the original experience) and gives voice to the experience as it unfolds in that world. What is voiced is understood to occur or have occurred internally to the character. At this point, then, the voice heard is simultaneously the voice of the narrator telling the story and the internal voice of the central character experiencing the world constituted by the narrative.

By following this voicing as a reflection of the psychological and physical orientation of the character in this world, we can conclude: he is struck by the scene, he stops, he surveys the scene before him, he remains in awe.

The first two of these moments are introduced by the phrase 'Lo and behold'. While 'Lo and behold' itself is a phrase in modern usage, it has archaic connotations ('lo' being an archaic form of exclamation of surprise, grief, or joy) of the wondrousness of the beheld. It is also exclamatory, and carries the instruction look! or see! The whole imparts a sense that the character has been taken aback both psychologically and physically.

The ordering of the inventory of objects also carries implicit knowledge of the direction that was followed by the gaze of the narrator/character. This gaze begins at the top of the room (chandeliers), moves downwards (to take in food arrayed, possibly on tables, more likely on trays carried by servers cf. the reference to butlers in line 29) and then moves upwards or outwards to the persons in the room (who alone could be besparkled with diamonds). The ability to so understand the scene depends upon, in the first instance, an implicit knowledge of the typical locations of items of this type in a room.

The exclamation 'everywhere' completes this surveying activity of the narrator/character with an assertion that objects of these types populated the whole scene.

Other aspects of the inventory of items contribute to the sense of awe introduced by the phrase 'lo and behold'. First, the object list starts and ends with objects which impart a numinous shimmer to the scene - they sparkle and glitter. Even if the chandeliers are not properly concretized as crystal (a concretization supported, if at all, by presuppositions of how such a room occupied by a Royal party should appear), then the act of surveying the room if accompanied by eye or head motion would bring some lights from the chandeliers into awareness while obscuring others behind their supports. Second, the phrase 'you name it' imparts a sense of amazement. That is, it communicates that if you the reader/auditor can concretize an element which would rightly belong to this scene (the internal horizon of a Royal party), then it was also there. But it also suggests that the narrator/character remains awed by the profusion of such objects to the point of losing the ability and/or the desire to separately inventory them. And this is accompanied by the sense that the character has not tarried long in awe and survey before being overtaken with the realization that he is no longer a surveyor of the scene alone, but also a participant in it ('And we were in').

Many of these aspects of the constituted world of the narrative are implicit but, when read or heard, unfold schematized aspects of the constituted world 'held in readiness' by the text. The internal state of the character, filled with awe, is one of these. Another is the exclusively visual constitution of the scene. That is, the objects constituted in this world are seen and not heard by the central character despite the fact that such a scene will obviously have had an acoustic aspect. The seen is the schematized aspect. 'Lo and behold' invites a visual survey of the scene and we are drawn to concretize objects in this aspect, rather than in their heard, or perhaps even smelled, aspects. Beyond the invitation, however, (and the consequent echo of the gaze if explicitly concretized) the objects themselves are presented without explicit aspect (it is not sparkling diamonds or fragrant smoked salmon but diamonds and smoked salmon which form the inventory of objects available in the constituted world).

Altogether, then, the (albeit tentative) theme of the experience of R that arises from this verse includes both his ability to be awed, and the visual character of this being awed. The status of this theme as theme will depend upon its presence explicitly or implicitly in other units of his discourse.

Perhaps the most explicit constitution of aspects of this theme is to be found in the orientation to Unit 8a: Summer Holidays: Austria:

1. I-I have a a- / my-my business is- is ah / television proDUCtion=
2. I=mean=ever since I-ah left school () / I've had this-ah /
   REAL interest in / in photography and pictures /
3. and I- I THINK I have a VERY () visual () sense so ()

4. a LOT of my memories are / are very () VISual /
   EVEN to the point were some of them are / are () REAL photographs (.)

This commentary thematizes an unusual visual sense as one of R's properties, and connects it directly both with his lifelong career in television and with the visual nature of his memory.

While awe is not part of this particular constitution of this theme, it is found in latter parts of the discourse unit which unfolds episodes exemplifying this theme including R's trip to Austria:

19. but the FIRST one that () / REally had=an=IM-pact () was the=first=time=that /
    EITHer=of=us had been on the continent of Europe
20. and we CHOSE to go t' () AUStria () for a HOLiday
21. it was a TWENTY-four hour () TRAIN ride (.) /
      ah which was a bit of an ordeal in itself
      except it was exciting
      and we were young
22. it was over on the boat 'n (.) / day and night on the ah / train
23. and we GOT there (..)
24. and I-ah there are a lot of memories out of THIS / because (..)
25. we went to a country
      a terrain
      a language
      a schedule ()
      a menu ()
         of food that is ()
      a night life (.)
    as tourists=
      of course holidays are always fun
26. but () all of it was /
      totally FOReign
      and NEW
      and STRANGE
      and WONderful
27. and we were both impressionable

and including as well the mountain scene recurrently encountered there:

40. and the sun's coming up over the MOUNTains
41. and the- and the BIRDS are twittering
42. and the GRASS is GREEN
43. and the- / o-o-h-h / it was-
44. and the air was so CLEAR / as you can imagine in the Alps=
45. it was ab-so-lute-ly unbelievable /

The linked pair of extendures (Unit 11a: Swiss Paradise and Unit 11b: Syncrude) (presented and analyzed previously in Chapter VIII) also constitute this theme of being awed by seeing an unexpected world. The theme is also constituted in Unit 8b1: Mona Lisa where R encounters the Mona Lisa and remains rooted to the spot in awe (line 25); and in Unit 8b2: Eiffel Tower where R encounters the bustling preparations for a banquet on his hurried descent from the Eiffel Tower by foot:

9. because there were CHEFS=
    there must've been FORTY chefs there
    preparing hors-d'oeuvres
        and canaPES
        and ah French cuisine like you've NEVer seen
    and I just LOOKed in there=
    I just couldn't beLIEVE what I was SEEing (.)
10. and I ran down the stairs again=

and in Unit 9b: Christmas when the small child (R) comes down the stairs on Christmas morn to see the room transformed and parcels under the tree:

4. and when you come DOWN-N in the morning (.) / and the LIVING
   room is fesTO-O-ONed with
      little / 'n [laughs] LARGE () /
      WRAPped () parcels /
      all in coloured PAper / 'n RIBbons /
      and everything ELSE
   OH
5. an'=how=m'ch- / my=goodness=me there must be fif-ty or
   six-ty packages here
6. and there's- / w'll=there's on-ly FOUR of us in the HOUSE
7. I=mean W-O-W
8. B-O-Y you=know I=mean (..)

Upon further examination, many of these exemplications also conform to the particular actions which underly the original verse from Unit 1: Queen Mother. The action sequence constituted in that verse is:

1. I come (with effort or risk)
2. I see and am awed or amazed
3. I enter (or attempt to enter)

In this form, Unit 13b: Not a Very Good Cure also fits the thematic nexus

Gambling and the Theme of Bestowal. The anecdote presented as Unit 13b: Not a very good cure provides a prime example of the importance of the implicitly meant to an analysis of author's meaning. This unit is repeated in full below:

UNIT 13 b: GAMBLING: NOT A VERY GOOD CURE

1. I'll give you a couple of ah () QUICKies on the / th- / the whole gambling front here=
2. we're talking about little- / little sort=of CUbicles of THINGS that HAPpened like
3. right out of the blue one day-=
   I was working / all DAY and () EVERY day / and I was working
   every EVening along with my () buddy
4. a-nd () by the time we got through / at about eleven o'clock at night /
   we were pretty sand bagged
5. but we were SO HIGH from WORKing / and the- /
   the projects we were working on /
   there was NO WAY you could go HOME and go to SLEEP
6. I=mean you=know / you're HIGH= / you gotta come down= / you gotta reLAX
7. SO () he towed me off to SOME caSIno in Earl's Court
8. n'=I'd never really experienced anything like this (.)
9. but I WENT IN (.)
10. and I just bought some chips / and I just THREW one here and one there
11. um to cut a long story short
    I bet ah um a dollar on RED and it came up RED
12. so I bet a dollar on HIGH and it came up HIGH
13. and I bet a dollar on () ODD and it came up ODD
14. and I bet a dollar on () BLACK and it came up BLACK
15. or-a- whatEVER I did () seemed to work
16. and then I even put a dollar on () ah ah a combination of
    SIX numbers
        or FOUR numbers
        or THREE numbers
    and- and- and THEY all came UP
17. and I nev-er had a los-ing spin
18. by which time everyone at the TAB-le / was just putting
    several hundred / or several THOUSand / on top of my ONE DOLLAR (.)
    a-n-d I STILL never lost
19. and everyone at the table WON
20. to the point where I actually put ONE dollar on number TWENTY-nine /
    and all around and on and everything to DO with twenty-nine /
    was RAINED on by everyone who was playing the game
21. and it came up twenty-nine

22. and they closed the TABle
23. well I guess that's a memory that ah [laughs] / I would remember
24. um it's trivial / but I was THERE
25. and I [laughs] / and I CER-ainly remember how I felt THAT DAY
26. I felt like ho boy I'm the king
27. that is not a very good cure for a gambler

The general context of the anecdote has been established by the previous unit (Unit 12a Gambling: Willful Absence) in which the author has presented an extended commentary on his self- characterization as gambler. He introduces the anecdote as a quick story 'on the whole gambling front' (line 1); that is, as a concrete example of experiences representative of (at least some aspect of) his gambling career. This establishes for the audience a context within which the anecdote will unfold. The extent to which the audience can concretize in its typicality this context and each element of this context as it is introduced is the extent to which the implicit can be become available. This is particularly important in this anecdote because no description of these elements is directly provided. That is, while the general external horizons of the anecdote have been presented in the previous unit, the internal horizons of the nested set of elements (and consequently the immediate external horizons of each such nested element) are not explicitly presented.

As the first level of nesting of elements, the author tersely informs the audience of the setting for his escapade ('some casino in Earl's court', line 7) but thereafter takes for granted that the general character of this setting is known to his audience. Thus while the audience knows that the casino is an object in the internal horizon of the 'whole gambling front', detailed understanding of how or why this is the case is available only to those for whom both gambling and casinos have been typified in previous experience. But the author knows that I, his audience at the time of telling, does share such an understanding as we have met each other in casinos with some fair frequency in the past. He might therefore have felt justified in leaving these details out of his account with fair assurance that I would understand that they were intended as implicitly present. As a result of this specific effect of my presence, a discussion of my appreciation of the shared understandings is warranted.

A second level of nesting of elements becomes available when R first mentions the type of bet which he is placing ('I bet a dollar on red' [line 11]). Here he implicitly signals (to anyone who can typify in some concreteness the internal horizons of a casino including specifically the type of games generally played there) that he is playing Roulette. This because Roulette is the only game generally played within casinos in which betting on red is a permissible move. 'Playing Roulette' is a complex meaning structure that includes within its internal horizons the nature of the game both in its logical structure (or rules) and in the way in which these rules are put into practice in a casino, and that includes within its immediate external horizons (that is, within the relationships between 'being in a casino' and 'playing Roulette') the typical behavior of Roulette players (of several types). It is at this level that a detailed explication of the implicit typification is most important to understanding the intended meanings of the author.

Logically, the game of Roulette involves the repeated selection by apparently random means of one from 37 (or 38) distinct possibilities. Players bet upon the outcome of each selection. The nature of the betting is controlled by the attributes assigned to the possibilities. Thus each possibility is labeled with a number (from 0 ['zero'] consecutively through 36 ('thirty-six') and the 38th number if present is labeled 00 ['double zero']). In addition, each possibility is associated with a colour (green for 0 and 00, and red or black in equal proportions for each of the remaining 36 numbers).

Various types of bets are allowed. Each will pay off at odds which would be fair if there were no green number among the possibilities. All bets are lost when a green number is selected (with exceptions noted below) and this constitutes the advantage to the casino ('house'). Betting is allowed on whether the number selected is red or black, odd or even, high (greater than 18) or low (18 or less), each paying off at 1:1; first third (numbers 1 through 12), second third (13-24), third third (25-36), each paying off at 2:1; or on various combinations of numbers (a single number paying off at 35:1, two numbers at 17:1, three numbers at 11:1, four numbers at 7:1, six numbers at 5:1). Zero (and double zero) may be bet as single numbers or as combinations and will be paid at the odds appropriate to the combination, should it be selected. The multi-number combinations on which bets are permitted are constrained by the way in which this logical structure is implemented concretely. Finally, any better may place any number of bets in any amount on any outcome provided that the total bet on a single outcome (or single combination) does not exceed a maximum determined by the house (the 'house limit') and provided that each bet is in whole number increments above a base bet ('minimum bet') also established by the house.

This logical structure is concretely implemented as follows. A large wheel is mounted on a table in the horizontal plane within a housing which extends above it. The wheel is divided into 37 (or 38) numbered and colored equal-sized recessed sectors. (Again the order of numbers while apparently random is consistent for all games of Roulette but is not important to the current explication). The wheel is spun by a casino employee ('croupier') by twisting a handle extending above the housing at the hub of the wheel. For each selection the croupier sets a small white ball in motion around the upper rim of the housing in a direction opposite to the motion of the wheel. Friction will slow the ball and it will eventually fall from the rim and come to rest in one of the sectors. The coloured number in this sector is the winning number and, at this point, losing bets are collected and winning bets paid (usually by another croupier).

Bets have been placed upon a green baize cloth covering the table which extends several feet beyond the wheel. Special sections have been marked off on this baize and labeled red, black, odd, even, high, low, first third, second third, and third third. Bets are made by placing chips within these sections. In addition, the center of the baize is divided into a grid consisting of twelve rows and three columns numbered consecutively by row from 1 to 36 in a color corresponding to the color assigned each number on the wheel. One (or two) sections labeled with the zero (and double zero) are placed in a special row above the row containing the numbers 1,2 and 3. Bets on a single number are placed completely within the section corresponding to that number. Bets on combinations are placed such that they straddle lines dividing the sections of the grid. Thus a combination bet on numbers 1 and 2 would be placed straddling the line between these two sections. Similarly, a bet straddling the cross formed at the intersection of the numbers 1,2,4, and 5 on the baize is a bet on this four number combination. A three number combination is bet by placing the chip at the edge of a row of numbers partially inside the first (or last) number in that row and partially outside the grid. Similarly, a bet on 6 numbers (those in two adjacent rows) will sit partially upon the intersection between the first (or last) numbers in these rows and partially outside the grid. Thus to bet the combination of numbers 1,2,3,4,5, and 6; the chip is placed on the intersection between 1 and 4 (or 3 and 6) while insuring that the chip also sits partially outside the grid. It is this grid structure upon the baize which determines which combination bets are allowable, although if a player is interested in betting for example the number 1, 2, and 3 and the numbers 10,11, and 12 he can place two bets each on a combination of three numbers, or he can place six bets, each on a single number, but he cannot place a single bet upon this combination of six numbers.

Seating/standing space around the table is limited to a maximum of about 10 players, each of whom control chips of a single bright colour. These chips are generally stacked on the edge of the baize in front of the player to whom they belong. Bets are placed with these chips and the bets of each player can be recognized by the croupiers since each player's stack of chips has a distinct colour. Each chip will have an established value (which may even differ amongst betters at a single table in some casinos). Chips may be purchased from the croupier (though often a minimum value of chips must be purchased). All winning bets are paid by distributing a stack of chips equal in number to the odds appropriate to the bet multiplied by the number of chips bet. As a result, the stack of chips in front of a player may become enormous.

Once the ball has fallen into the wheel one croupier (using a small rake [the original 'croupier']) collects all losing bets and begins to separate them into stacks of the same colour while a second croupier distributes stacks of chips to the winners. Depending upon the facility of the croupiers and the number and amount of the bets, each roll of the wheel will take 2 to 3 minutes (allowing 20 to 30 rolls per hour).

This description constitutes an explication of the internal horizons of the game of Roulette, and all of this typification can be reasonably asserted to be part of the implicit meaning of the anecdote. The immediate external horizon of the game of Roulette will require an analysis of the people who typically play it.

An analysis of Roulette using elementary probability theory will show that the player will lose in the long run regardless of the way in which he bets since the presence of the zero (and double zero) tips the odds in favour of the house **provided that the manner in which each selection of a winning number occurs is effectively random and is independent of the result of any other selection**. This means that each possibility should be equally probable in the long run and that the occurrence of a given possibility is unpredictable, unknowable, and uninfluencable in the short run (beyond the information given by its long run probability of occurrence).

Gamblers can be categorized by whether this is known to them. Those who do not know will be novices who do not yet understand the nature of gambling or perhaps players who are indulging in a casual pastime with motives other than those of winning. Serious gamblers, however, must rationalize their playing in relation to this knowledge. This rationalization is often based upon a belief that the selection process is not effectively random or that selections are not independent and that these factors once known can overcome the house advantage in the long run and allow the player to win.

In general terms, there are two forms of this belief. The first is based upon ordinary (but sometimes mistaken) assumptions about the manner in which events in the world are caused. The second is based upon some (often implicit) belief in extraordinary causal powers.

Under the first type of belief are to be found notions such as that the possibilities are not in the long run equiprobable (that is, that certain numbers come up more often than others due for example to imperfections in the wheel), that the conditional probabilities for the occurrence of a number differ from the long run probabilities according to a variety of possible predictive factors (including most prominently which number came up previously), or that the selection process is knowably predictable from real causal factors rather than being effectively random.[5] Among the mistaken beliefs of this type are those which misconstrue the nature of independence of events. The most wide-spread is that the unusual repeated occurrence of an event combined with its tendency in the long run to have a constant frequency of occurrence imply that it will occur with a lower probability in the short run. For example, since 2 has come up three times in ten rolls and since in 100 rolls it will on average come up only about 3 times, it is less likely to come up again in the next 90 rolls. Or conversely since 2 hasn't come up at all in 90 rolls, it must be due to come up in the short run. This particular belief is widely known among the statistically trained as the 'Gambler's Fallacy'. It is also worthy of note that someone with this belief will tend to make bets of precisely the type that the person who believes that the wheel is biased will eschew and vice versa. In these cases, there will be a tendency for the player to **record the sequence of rolls in order to better plan the next bet**. In gambler's parlance such a player is 'playing a system'.

The second type of belief in nonrandomness is a belief in extra-causal powers and is often signified by the attribution of a winning run at the tables to 'Lady Luck's smile'. In its boldest form this belief is a belief in an agentive force (fate or luck) which can choose or mark a man and his actions as 'in tune' (synchronous) or 'out of tune' with the universe. Variations can include a belief in precognition or psychokinesis either as natural or bestowed abilities. A gambler with a belief of this type is less likely to 'play a system' (although of course if a set of beliefs is sufficiently complex as to resemble a full blown paranoia, a system can be believed to have been bestowed by a supernatural agentive force). He may however be more likely to engage in ritualized behaviors in an attempt to communicate with his agent of luck.

Players of these two general categories will also tend to play the game with different betting styles. The system player is around for the duration; any tendencies which the pattern of rolls will reveal to him can only become apparent over a long series of rolls. As a result, he will tend to bet small amounts relative to his resources at each spin of the wheel. In addition, he will tend to place fewer bets on a smaller number of combinations both to minimize the investment and to allow him to keep track of the results of his investments. On the other hand, the lucky player will tend to bet more variably; larger amounts in relation to his resources if he is winning or has won, smaller amounts if he is losing. Either luck is with him and he will win and so should win big, or luck is not yet with him and he must bet conservatively until luck does notice him.

Gamblers of these two types may be disdainful of each other even though they are united by their passion for gambling since for the system player, winning would be the outcome of rational analysis while for the lucky gambler winning would be the outcome of a fated bestowal process. Neither type will have much in common with the novice or dilettante.

Roulette attracts both types of gamblers because it is rapid, because it offers virtually unlimited possibilities for the placing of bets, and because it offers the longest odds (35:1) of any of the traditional casino games. The system player is drawn by its rapidity since he will need a relatively long run in order to discern trends, by its large scope since a wide variety of types of trends may exist to be discerned, and by its large payoff if a trend can be accurately diagnosed. The lucky player is drawn by the rapidity by which his current relationship to luck may be diagnosed, by the very large amount of money that can be wagered in the event that luck is smiling, and by the very large potential payoff in that event. In fact, Roulette is the game around which an ultimate gambler's fantasy, that of 'breaking the bank' by taking all of the casino's money, has arisen. Finally, as a secondary gain, Roulette is a game in which 'action is generated', there is the potential for infinite variety and for the rapid exchange of large numbers of chips, the high of winning can be replaced by the low of losing in a matter of seconds and then again replaced by the high of winning a few more seconds later; until luck has definitively retreated or arrived, playing the game can simulate a roller coaster ride.

There is much in R's anecdote which is consistent with the claim that this explication of the external horizons of Roulette is also implicitly present in the anecdote. Thus R presents much evidence to the effect that he is at this time but a casual gambler and certainly not a system player (and hence not of the first type of gambler). First, the anecdote is presented as exemplifying gambling of the casual type engaged in as a pastime (Verse II presents the motivation for the visit as an attempt to relax after continuing intensive work) and as a new one ('I'd never really experienced anything like this', line 8). As well, all of his bets are single bets for one dollar (verse IV and lines 16 and 20), the price for the fun could not presumably have been very high had he lost, and he is not yet placing a large number of chips or bets on a single roll (to 'generate action' or the movement of large numbers of chips which is a characteristic of many confirmed gamblers and presumably part of the short term pleasure). Further, his bets are spontaneous ('I just threw one [chip] here and one there', line 10) and the sequence of bets appears random (verse IV).

But neither is R completely naive. He knows the game well enough to place bets (even complex ones on combinations of numbers (line 16). Perhaps more tellingly, his sequence of bets 'tests his luck'. That is, he progresses from bets which return small payoffs progressively to bets which return large payoffs (although he does not increase the magnitude of his bets). From gamblers who hold beliefs in streaks of luck, a consistent piece of advice has always been to maximize the wins when on a lucky streak and minimize the losses when on an unlucky streak. And of course he has chosen a game with the maximum of 'action'. Roulette offers the longest odds of any traditional casino game, and also offers the chance for moving a large number of chips back and forth across the table in a short time.

What progressively happens (in lines 18 and 20) is that the gamblers at the table recognize that R is 'on a lucky streak' and match his bets with apparently increasing scope and confidence. The fabula image of a rain of chips on and around the number 29 (line 20) suggesting that everyone is betting (perhaps the maximum) not only on the number 29, but also on every combination involving the number 29 signifies that R's streak has made him appear fated and omnipotent.

And every gambler's ultimate fantasy is realized for R (lines 21 and 22): here then is the man who 'broke the bank' (in the terms of the most frequent typification of this fantasy). He is surely chosen by the gods, his kingship (line 26) is manifest destiny. For a gambler (or soon-to-be-gambler) of the second type, 'that is not a very good cure' (line 27). Furthermore, 'breaking the bank' is almost always associated with roulette since its maximum payoff (35:1) is greater than that available for any other traditional casino game: it can happen suddenly.

R has asserted himself by entering a casino and has truly entered-a-magic-world, one in which he has been presented with a special destiny (to-be-a-winner), which gives him standing in the community of gamblers. In this anecdote, a large number of themes discussed previously converge. As well, an additional theme surrounding bestowal seems present. First, R himself has had good fortune bestowed upon him by 'fate' (as indeed he previously had in surviving a motor accident [Unit 2: Hospital Times] and which R cites as the beginning of his belief in a special destiny). Second, R has in turn bestowed upon the members of the community the bounty of this good 'fate'. He has 'done good.' He compares himself to a benevolent king. The final line of the anecdote ('that is not a very good cure for a gambler') seems telling in relation to R's career: this occurrence reinforces a number of R's conviction and the urge to gamble becomes difficult to conquer.

Aspects of the bestowal theme are present in the horizons of many of R's experiences. For example, this anecdote has striking parallels with the first unit of R's discourse (Unit 1: Queen Mother previously analyzed in Chapter VIII). This can be seen most clearly if the core narrative (and pivotal orientation and evaluation clauses) are jointly summarized (that is, in a way that can be applied to both):

  After work
  with a buddy
  appreciating the risk
I enter a place
  usually barred to members of my class.
I act as others there act.
I am **bestowed** singular honour
  which makes me feel special (like a king).

The other anecdote presented in Unit 13: Gambling: Drinks on the House also deals directly with the bestowal of the fruits of good fortune, and implies that being in a position to bestow is in fact part of the motivation to gamble:

9. a-n-d I got to about the seventh race
10. and I'd won every race=
11. I had TWELVE hundred dollars in my pocket
12. and I had to go to WORK
13. so I just bought a TEN dollar ticket for the next race
14. went to work early
15. walked into the bar
16. said DRINKS ON THE HOUSE (.)
17. gamblers do very silly things
18. and-ah that's one of the HIGHS that they GET / that's one of the things that they DO
19. course while we were there/ we had to turn on the RADio /
and see who won the EIGHTH race / that I hadn't bothered to stay for
20. and () that was another hundred dollars / cause it won at () EIGHT to one
or something like this [laughs]
21. SO () there you go / gamblers sometimes DO have / ah [laughs] / good stories
22. and I guess that's why they go on gambling /
cause they hope it'll happen every DAY

Bestowal is, for R, a very special experience as he relates in Unit 12 e: Coming to Edmonton:

2. and I'll- I diVERT from ++ / for the moment
3. and GIVE you another s- memory and a story / which is
VERY VERY crucial and important to me [choking back tears]
4. because it had a GREAT BEARing on () / my life since
...
24. and I () SPENT my last forty-three dollars on a BUS fare to get OUT here (..)
25. that's when-ah (.) th- / the thing HAPpened
26. I came OUT here
27. I arrived at six o'clock / on a () SATurday morning
28. and after a bit of a kafuffle about trying to get into the apartment building /
my OLDest friend HELD me / and GREETed me / and SAID
you're HERE=
here's your aPARTment=
I've got a two room apartment=
I've=had=it=for SIX months
29. I KNEW you were coming=
I KNEW you were coming=
you didn't say in=so=many=words=but
I KNEW you were coming
30. so I GOT this aPARTment

and THAT's YOUR ROOM (.)
31. and this is MY room=
and this is the BATHroom=
and there's the kitchen=
and there's the fridge
32. by=the=way () the laundry's THIS way
the food- the freezer is HERE
HERE are the KEYS to my CAR
ah we- you're gonna meet a lit- a BUNCH of people
tomorrow / and on MONday you have FOUR job interviews (..)
33. well=the=end=of THAT little story was that
I h-a-d a JOB on the TUESday / which was the VERY NEXT day (.) /
after my interviews
34. I had a BANK loan on () FRIday
35. and I bought a car on () SATurday
36. and Edmonton / and everyone in it / has been very GOOD to
me ever since ()

Being in a position to bestow, and failing to do so is also something to be despised, as R relates in Unit 21: Roman Catholic:

17. and I said to HIM (.)
if YOU () can HONestly () look ME in the EYE
and TELL me () that it is RIGHT (.)
for PEOple () to LIVE () in GOLD palaces () with
GO-LD () LACE ro-bes
and EAT and DRINK like K-KINGS (.)
and be surROUNDed by THOUSands of FILTH-y STARVing PEOple
who are GIVing (.) MOST of what they HAVE () to the CHURCH (..)
if YOU can SAY () that THAT is JUST
and THAT is IN the NAME of GOD (..)
I WON't beLIEVE you

Even in R's explicit discussion of gambling (in Unit 13: Gambling: Willful Absence), the discussion of seeking additional money can be understood as trying to place oneself in a position to better bestow or care for others:

35. but the REA-son- /
there's always a- a motivAting force / beHIND (..) /
ah that kind=of a / a WANTing
36. and in my case / I () can honestly say that I- I was- /
I was a bit of a GAMbler
quite BAD before I even MET ++
and I resolved NOT to be / when I MARried her

I really did
and I () kept aWAY from () a LOT of it
37. um but what happened was (.)
that the PRESsure of NOT HAVing ENOUGH MONey
well that in itSELF wasn't TOO bad /
because if I had had a not- / NOT HAD enough money /
and I was living with my MOTHer / or I was living
with my SISter
I would not have HAD the problems that I HAD
38. but because I had a responsiBILity
and I had taken it upon mySELF / to take CARE of this little fragile FLOWer
and I didn't have the where-with-all to
keep ++ in the STYLE to which she would like to be acCUstomed
and the style to which I would LIKE her to be accustomed
and I myself TOO would like to be accustomed (..)
motivated me to / may-be-e bet a pound or two / in the hopes of winning
ten=or=twen-ty
or a HUNdred
or a THOUSand
or whatever it MIGHT BE

At the outer horizons of this theme of bestowal are also to be found R's mother at the centre of Christmas (Unit 9b: Christmas).

Christmas Aporia. The distinction between fulfilling a just sufficient world in an analysis of meaning and explaining the personal world in an analysis of significance is nowhere so evident as in the unraveling of the mysterious. It is the mysterious which most strongly challenges the psychological-phenomenological reduction. For it is here that the pull towards coherence is most strongly felt. In Dilthey's analysis, understanding itself is automatic and thus uninteresting until confronted by the apparently incoherent.

I have used the term aporia to mean a felt incoherence. An aporia may present itself as a categorical object (fact or fabula) simply not yet coherently fulfillable, that is, as a set of intended objects jointly presenting an indeterminate horizon; or, it may present itself as an apparent or real paradox, as a set of intended objects which together are 'unthinkable' or apparently so.

An aporia may be intended by an author as aporia. A conventional expression of an intended textual aporia is the detective or mystery genre. Here a textual world is explicitly presented as containing a hidden story (Porter, 1976). This can be seen most clearly in a murder mystery. In a typical case (as represented, for example, in the genre-creating early stories of Poe and Conan Doyle), the reader enters a world in which a story's 'end' (at least for the character who was murdered) is presented. The narrative is itself a story based upon the progressive fulfillment of the indeterminate horizon of this initial event, the murder which ends the embedded story. At the conclusion of a reading of the narrative a fulfillment of the embedded story is available as a fabula in which determinate events are grasped as a succession, and most importantly, this fabula can be grasped as coherent story.

Without examining the full range of motivations which readers might have for approaching any such story (except to note in passing the psychoanalytic thesis of Pederson-Krag (1949/1976) that the fascination of the mystery story is an exemplification of the fascination previously directed by the child to the mysteries of the primal scene), we can acknowledge the pull towards coherence that is typically present in any reading of a mystery story. The mystery will be solved ultimately by presenting such a coherence, if not as accurately reconstructed by the reader along the way (as would no doubt be one way in which to become engaged in the actual reading of such a story), then at least by the detective or author at the end.

In a mystery story, the textual world has been created precisely to make evident the aporia as aporia. This is to suggest that there is a pact (in its way parallel to the autobiographical pact) in which both reader and author are aware that the story has been created explicitly to present a puzzle or aporia and its unraveling, and a consequent assurance that the puzzling will in fact be coherently unraveled. There is a protection for the reader who would test out his or her own provisional fulfillments of the not-yet determinate, an assurance that the textual world will reveal an ultimately determinate fulfillment against which his acumen can be definitively tested.

In an autobiography, however, there is no such pact, no assurances of fulfillment are present, and the aporia may be the reader's alone. It may be just the particular reader who fails to understand, who fails to make coherent as story or as world some event, memory, or conviction of the narrator/author's. In a phenomenological reading of an autobiography, it is important not to prematurely solve a puzzle.

In reading an autobiography, there is already a mystery, then, even in constituting an aporia as aporia. Does this aporia stem out of my own understanding alone, does its existence to me as aporia already signal a violation of my attempt at a phenomenological analysis of meaning? Is it aporia only because it violates a natural expectation that I might hold, or is it mysterious in its very fulfillment? Or: is the author aware of the mystery? Will the textual world unfold to allow the horizons of this aporia to become distinct, either because, on the one hand, the aporia is intended as such by the author, or because as unintended (or nonexistent) aporia, sufficient horizonal information will naturally come to light to unravel it? Finally: if the aporia remains, is it an aporia simply of the textual world and not the personal world, a manifestation of the inability of the world of the text to truly be the personal world or is it an aporia of the personal world as well, perhaps not even recognized as such by the author? In order to approach aporia, a strong effort is required to suspend the tendency to immediately resolve the aporia under an understanding imported to the text as a part of the empirical understanding of the reader. The reader must maintain vigilance in order to allow the mysterious its continued existence.

How, then, should an aporia be examined? What follows is a provisional method, and an exemplification of this method as applied to R's discourse.

Aporia first becomes evident as a felt incoherence in the reader's experience of the text. The first task is to determine whether the aporia results from an error in fulfillment or whether it is an aporia of the text itself. This in turn requires that an attempt be made to determinately fulfill the text (or text fragment). If pursued analytically, with a suspension or bracketing of a natural fulfillment in imagination, this will allow an examination of the elemental meanings of the text. If these elemental meanings can be coherently fulfilled in combination, as a categorical object, the sense of aporia may dissipate. If however, the categorical object that these meanings jointly intend is an unfulfillable combination, a contradiction in the text, the sense of aporia will remain. It cannot then be resolved without making particular empirical claims, subject to external evidence, about, for example, errors the author might have made in constituting the textual world, or about the aporiac nature of the personal world in which he lives.

There is a third, and more complex, possibility. Despite being thinkable in itself, the categorical object may retain its character of aporia in context; that is, it may still present an apparent contradiction to parts of the current categorical object which have been meant elsewhere. Something within typifications developed in reading continues to lend a sense of aporia to the fulfillment of the text. Pursuing this aporia consists in making determinate, to the extent possible, the horizons of the apparently contradictory objects, attempting to place them together in a larger whole which is fulfillable without aporia, attempting to form a typification in which they can coexist. This may require ranging over the full text to bring together the determinate elements included through typification as parts of the categorical object intended. It should not be thought that the parts of the categorical objects subjected to such a search must themselves be (subordinate) objects intended as natural, though this may form a convenient point of departure for a search. Categorical objects include elements determinately intended (though often with indeterminate internal horizons) that are experienced as attached not to objects as determinate natural properties of that object but rather as attached to the experience considered as a whole. These prominently include phenomena which attach to the noetic pole, which are our personal convictions, qualities that in the natural attitude we naturally attribute to ourselves as the noetic constituting pole of the experience, in short our themes. Thus while another person may be determinately intended as female, and will retain this determinate natural property in further intendings (to the extent that we can include this property as part of what is determinate about that object as intended and always a part of the internal horizon of that object when meant); this whole experience (involving another person and fulfilled from their discourse) may be a happy one, where there is an awareness that the happiness in the experience is not determinately attached to this person as an invariant property of theirs, as part of the internal horizon of them. Rather happiness becomes another 'object' which we intend, with its own mode of being, one which has as part of its external horizon, this categorical object within which it was intended. This 'object' too must be part of the search for a determinate typification.

There is finally a fourth type of aporia, one in which the fulfillment of the categorical object, while not impossible, creates a felt incoherence with additional empirical knowledge brought by the investigator to the task. Rather, however, than succumbing too early to the urge to reconstitute the object or objects in an empirically coherent manner, for example, by offering an explanation, curtailing the search for meaning immediately and fulfilling the search for significance; one should pay heed to the pronouncements of the great detectives by suspending this action until all possibilities for dissipation of the aporia through phenomenological fulfillment have been exhausted.

> I will give my process of thought... That process... starts upon the supposition that when you have eliminated all which is impossible, that whatever remains, however improbable must be the truth (Arthur Conan Doyle, quoted in Truzzi, 1973/1988).

The discourse unit **Christmas** (Unit 9b) presents me with an aporia. I have repeated this unit below:

UNIT 9 b: CHRISTMAS

Orientation

I. 1. course you must also KNOW / that to FEEL this way (.) /
there are a THOUS-and hap-py MEMories () with my MOTHer
2. ah (.) sure I was a little BUG-GER
sure=she=got=after=me
sure=we=had=problems
huh (..)
but I remember things like CHRIST-mas (...)

Section I

Segment I

II. 3. I KI- Christmas is for CHILDren / an' I was a kid=just=like=everybody ELSE (.)
4. and when you come DOWN-N in the morning (.) / and the LIVING room is
fesTO-O-ONed with
little / 'n [laughs] LARGE () / WRAPped () parcels /
all in coloured PAper / 'n RIBbons /
and everything ELSE
OH

III. 5. an'=how=m'ch- / my=goodness=me there must be fif-ty or six-ty packages here
6. and there's- / w'll=there's on-ly FOUR of us in the HOUSE
7. I=mean W-O-W
8. B-O-Y you=know I=mean (..)

IV. 9. ahh I can't remember any parTICular Christmas more=than=any=OTHer
10. because every Christmas was just as WONderful (..)

Segment II

V. 11. just as won- and d'j'know SOME-THING?
12. it got BET-ter (..)

VI. 13. you=know it's FUN for little kids of ()
four=five=six ()
'n then it gets FUN- more FUN when you're ()
maybe eight=nine=ten
and you- you start () thinking about
SKAtes
'n BIcycles
and matERial things
more than () little TOYS 'n stuff
14. but you=know when you get to be-e
say seven-teen or eighteen
and then you get to be
twenty or twenty-TWO
or TWEnty-FIVE
it gets more=and=more=and=more WONderful (..)

VII. 15. but STILL as the CHILD
16. because your mother is there
17. and your mother's love
and your mother's care
and your FAM-i-ly
are all aROUND you
18. an' everything- everything is bet- always=better=than=it=was LAST year /
for some reason

Segment III

VIII. 19. an' you- you become an ADult and
20. well you don't just PLAY=
and have a choc'late bar=
and play with TOYS
21. I=mean you- you SOC-ial-ize
you have a GIN=and=tonic
ah y- you have a BRANDY
or a glass of SHErry 'n
22. and you apPREC-i-ate the DINner more

IX. 23. 'n you=know / and you're growing up 'n / and th- then you
RE-al-ize that life is SO-O worth living
and SO-O worth saving for
and SO worth (..) everything [laughs]
24. because () on Christmas day / there's the PROOF that /
LIFE is / TRU-ly / ah bountiful (...)

Section II

Segment I

X. 25. until you leave the family nest
26. and YOU bring up your OWN children
27. an THEN things are very different
28. because you see () you're not () living (..)
the life that YOU remember
and the memories that YOU had
of the way YOU thought
things OUGHT to BE

XI. 29. it's a very (.) large SHOCK / when YOU decide () /
or you THINK () that
OK well we wrap all our things up on () such=and=such
and we ALL do this
and we ALL do that
and we all do the other
(30.) and then you get married / and your- and your () new wife says
well we go to MASS on ah ah Christmas EVE
and we-e (.) DON'T have our-r CHRISTmas dinner until
() EIGHT o'clock at NIGHT
or um WE ALL open our presents in BED
or (..) we can't wait to rip the PAper off and its
all ov-

XII. 31. ah anyway everything's DIFFERENT
32. s'-s'-you=know THINGS AREN'T JUST THE SAME
33. and (..) then they can't be any DAMN GOOD can they
34. and (..) they're not (..) / in a way (..)

Segment II

XIII. 35. ah-'ntil eventually you bring up your OWN children
36. and what=you=hav'ta do-o / is to MAKE a CHRISTmas for
them / [through tears] like ya had yourself
37. but you=know you can't
38. you can TRY () / but you can't

XIV. 39. you see
you're not your FAther
you're not your MOther
and YOUR children aren't YOU

40. and it's not the SAME generation
41. and everyone you=know / the whole collection of people is () NOT the same
42. so those early memories of how WONderful everything WAS-S () are GONE (..)

XV. 43. except that they're still memories
44. so=that in THAT respect they're not gone
45. but the TIMES are gone (.)
46. the EVENTS are gone

XVI. 47. and I don't know how many adults I-I've talked to who- /
who REALly (.) DON'T (.) give a lot of STO-ry about CHRISTmas
48. and I'm ONE=of='em () for the reasons I've just described
49. because it WAS so wonderful (.)
50. and it was so hap-py (.)

Coda

XVII. 51. but somehow-
maybe it's just because it's become more comMERcial these days
I=don't=know (..)
but it's imPORtant to me to remember () Christmas and my mother being the
CEN-tre of Christmas
52. not me / my mother

The aporia, however, seems to be available initially only as a generalized feeling of incoherence or incompleteness at the conclusion of the piece, a felt inability to fulfill the piece as a coherent unity. Is this aporia of the text, or simply of my experience, perhaps as an improper fulfillment of the text?

The first moment in attempting to answer this question is to locate the aporia as felt, and attempt to fulfill it distinctly as paradoxical. I begin with a structural description of the piece and then return to flesh it out in an attempt to reveal the aporia.

Christmas is the central episode in a trilogy which is initiated and concluded with accounts in which the theme is specifically mother. It is divided into two contrasting sections (lines 3 to 24, lines 25 to 50) with a short introduction or orientation (lines 1,2) and a short conclusion or coda (lines 51,52). The first section is divided into three segments (lines 3 to 10, lines 11 to 18, lines 19 to 24) each centred around a different image of Christmas within the natal family, and each organized around a central conviction presented in commentary. The second section is structured less distinctly into two segments (lines 25 to 34, lines 35 to 50) around images of Christmas within the acquired family. In the first an image is presented, in the second it is only emptily intended or implied. In this section, the convictions underlying these images do not seem to be distinct. The section moves though alternate expressions of this (these) conviction(s). The two sections present a stark contrast in mood and conviction. The aporia of the piece arises in the second section and is related to the indistinctness with which the convictions of the second section are rendered. The piece as a whole is introduced by a single segment (lines 1, 2) which connects the piece to the previous one, and is concluded by a verse (51, 52) which re-invokes the dominant convictions of the first section.

With more detail now: **Christmas** begins as a continuation of the theme of Mother, following an emotion-filled reliving of Mother's death, specifically as an exemplification of the conviction 'there are a thousand happy memories with my mother' (line 1) which is itself meant initially to justify the intense feeling present in the previous piece.

The first section is an extended reminiscence of Christmases with the natal family which unfolds in a temporal sequence from early childhood to young adulthood. The first segment begins with the statement in commentary of the conviction that 'Christmas is for kids' (line 3), exemplifies this conviction with an exemplar of a generalized memory (constituted as such in line 9), and concludes with the conviction 'every Christmas was just as wonderful' (line 10). The particularized memory (lines 4 to 8) begins with a generalized image (constituted as such by the word 'you' in line 4) of a child encountering the living room on Christmas morning and then gradually shades, through visual imagery, into a specific focalization (lines 5 to 8) in which the narrator speaks the thoughts of the child and expresses a selfish wonderment at the array of gifts that will be his.

The second segment begins with the statement of the conviction 'it got better' (line 12) which is extended and amplified with the empty intending of a rapidly progressing sequence of Christmases (thus with indeterminate horizons) sequentially across the years from childhood to young adulthood ('a rapid time lapse' in cinematic terms, evoked through a specific counting: 'four five six', 'eight nine ten' in line 13, and 'seventeen or eighteen', twenty or twenty-two or twenty-five' in line 14). The sequence is interrupted to particularize a shift in the content of anticipations in the preteen years from toys to more functional material items such as bicycles (although again as a generalized image marked by the repeated use of the second person pronoun). There is also a transformation in the nature of the good feeling from 'fun' (line 13) in the early years to 'wonderful' in the later (line 14), along with a specific emphasis upon the progressive growth of this feeling ('more and more and more wonderful' in line 14). This concept of a growing and transforming good feeling intends for R that which remains the same though amplified in a succession of Christmases. It is specifically attached (lines 15 to 18) to the natal family, to being the child of a loving mother. This feeling exists 'because your mother is there, and your mother's care and your family are all around you' (lines 16, 17), even if this fact, though recognized, has not yet become part of the essence of the good feeling, and hence Christmas itself, in awareness ('always better than it was last year *for some reason*' in line 18) as it ultimately does ('my mother being the centre of Christmas; not me, my mother' in lines 51, 52).

The third segment presents the culmination of this progression as a generalized image of young adulthood (again marked by the repeated use of the second person), in which the focus of Christmas has shifted from the joy of play (line 20) to an appreciation of social activities such as drinks and dinner (lines 21 to 22). The conviction has become realized in awareness 'that life is so worth living and so worth saving for and so worth everything' (line 23), a conviction that is available because it is exemplified in pure form by

Christmas day, 'because on Christmas day there's the proof that life is truly bountiful' (line 24).

There is in this section, then, a model of human growth and development (and as such it also reveals convictions relevant to parenting) which is expressed through the convictions of these three segments (and the concluding couplet). It might be paraphrased as:

1. The child is continually nurtured and cared for by the mother.
2. The child initially experiences Christmas as positive.
3. The child gradually develops his understanding of Christmas and the positive feelings which surround it
    a. from an initial constitution in childhood as a time of fun and joy centred upon receiving
    b. to a constitution in teenage and early adulthood which includes in addition an awareness of being enveloped by the love directed towards him by mother and family
    c. to a constitution in adulthood in which the positive values inherent in living are both celebrated and exemplified.
4. This unfolding understanding has made available to that understanding the centrality of mother's agency in the development of the child and its unselfish motivation.
5. Christmas ultimately becomes constituted as a celebration of the gift of life and its positive values as bestowed originally, continually, and symbolically at Christmas, by mother.

This model is presented through convictions expressed in commentary, and is intended as a generalization with nomothetic application as indicated by the use of the second person pronoun. Despite the distancing from personal experience achieved by this device, and despite the paucity of fully realized intended particularities, this model is also intended as a description of R's childhood Christmases as experienced, as is indicated by the specificity of the focalizations, especially in the first segment.

In this first section, then, R constitutes his Christmas as symbolizing the gift of bountiful life unselfishly given to children by parents, given and received again at Christmas in a ritual celebration. It attains its full value in experience when the developing child becomes an adult, fully participates in the ritual, and understands this as its essence. This personal sequence is posited as having general significance extending beyond his own personal world.

The second section continues the temporal unfolding both in personal and in general experience by presenting the fate of the individual when he leaves the natal family and creates a family of his own. But where the first section seems to warrant description as worship, the second section appears as an extended lament.

The first segment begins by presenting the conviction that things are very different when you leave 'the family nest' (lines 25 to 26). This is attributed to the inability to constitute the unfolding of Christmas (again in second person) in the way you think it ought to be unfolded (line 28). This is illustrated and explained by presenting a clash of specific ritual components between husband and new wife (lines 29 to 30) presented as separate focalizations in which first the husband and then the wife 'speak'. The detailing of particulars is foreshortened by a restatement of the initial conviction that everything is different (lines 31 to 32) which is then specifically constituted as a negative change (lines 33 to 34) (This negative attitude towards a new Christmas has been foreshadowed by the progressively more condescending tone in which the wife's rituals are presented in line 30: at the end of the wife's focalization, the husband's voice is heard again specifically at the point (in line 30) where the clauses become separated by 'or' rather than 'and'. At this point, a multitude of subjectivities can be separated: the wife's voice as focalized by the husband who disapproves, who is in turn the narrator and the author, although not necessarily so solely by the logic of discourse, and, through the overarching use of the second person pronoun, also the intended reader).

The second segment begins with the faint suggestion (evoked through the word 'until') that things will change again when 'eventually you bring up your own children' (line 35) and strive to 'make a Christmas for them like you had yourself' (line 36). This proves, however, to be impossible (line 37) even though you try (line 38). The segment then continues by lamenting this failure (lines 39 to 42) by inventorying the differences between the generations, you and your parents, and your children and you, and concludes with a lament over the loss of the objects and events of the Christmases in memory (lines 42 to 46). Another conviction is introduced to the effect that Christmas has lost its importance (lines 47 to 48) putatively for this reason (line 48); that is, because the present is missing the objects of the past (lines 49 to 50). Finally, another reason for this loss of personal importance is half-heartedly offered as the commercialization of Christmas (line 51) and the central feature of the memories of Christmas in the natal home, mother, is again invoked as a conclusion of the piece.

Several features of this section make it difficult to fulfill distinctly on first hearing. Thus the first segment begins by suggesting that Christmas changes when 'you bring up your own children' (line 26) although the segment continues by particularizing as illustration a time after leaving the natal family and before having children, the period in which husband and wife realize that their rituals are different. The first reference to 'having children' has not been successfully articulated. The period of childrearing is then intended again as the beginning of the second segment.

There is also a confusion about what has been lost in the failure to provide for your children a Christmas like you had. It is first constituted as the loss of wonderful memories (line 42) and then immediately corrected to become the loss of the objects of those memories, the times and events (line 43).

Finally, there is the conviction that Christmas has lost its importance (lines 47 to 48) and the suggestion that the reasons for this loss of importance have already been described (line 48) in relation to the great wonder and happiness of the times past (lines 49 to 50). R then both suggests that he does not know why this has happened and offers a tentative reason ('but somehow' as well as 'I don't know' which bracket the offering of commercialism as a reason ['maybe...'] in line 51). The segment ends in indistinctness.

A comment on the narrative structure of the piece as a whole is warranted. This piece would not be classified as narrative by Labov, for example, because it lacks a particulate event structure consisting of a sequence of definite actions appearing in independent clauses. Nevertheless it has a definite narrative movement, and can be easily reconstituted as a meant sequence of events of R's experience even if the events themselves are not distinctly and particulately intended as events. Let us call this an experiential metanarrative and paraphrase it as follows:

Section 1:

Verse 1: I experience Christmas as a child as a time of wonder.
Verse 2: I experience an increase in, and deepening of the significance of, this
wonder as I grow up.
Verse 3: I come as an adult to appreciate the wonder of Christmas with my family
as a time of celebration of the bountiful nature of life.

Section 2:

Verse 1: I clash with my new wife over specific rituals in constituting our
Christmas together and thereafter experience Christmases differently.
Verse 2: I cannot reconstitute Christmas for my children as I experienced it, and
experience grief, but I become resigned to the decreased significance
that actual Christmases, present and future, deliver.

Clearly there is something of a tragic flavour to this narrative, a loss, a fall from grace, but as a narrative of events, there does not appear to be an aporia here, at least in the sense of an unthinkable combination of intended objects. Where then is the aporia? The aporia is constituted in fulfilling the statements of commentary as commentary, particularly in the second section, as convictions held by R now.

I feel incoherence most strongly at the point at which R indicates that 'the reasons I've just described' (line 48) are sufficient to account for his changed attitude towards Christmas. The source of the aporia is that what immediately precedes this statement was not experienced first as a list of reasons, but as a set of facts and/or convictions, and reconstituting them as reasons proves difficult. They did not seem to be intended as reasons. Ultimately a sense of mystery becomes attached to 'things aren't just the same and then they can't be any damn good can they? and they're not' (lines 31 to 34) and 'what you have to do is to make a Christmas for them like you had yourself but, you know, you can't' (lines 36 to 38) when it has become apparent that these convictions have not themselves been and will not be exemplified or explained.

To precisely what is the reader being referred (in line 48)? Although in a rereading, the immediately preceding two verses (lines 39 to 46) can be fulfilled as a statement of fact involving the inability to be someone other than yourself and the inevitability of the (perceptual) loss of events of the past, it is first experienced as essentially connected to the verse which precedes it (lines 35 to 38) which presents R's (and 'your', the reader/auditor's) inability to constitute a Christmas for own children like the ones experienced as a child. In this context, these verses are first experienced as a lament, as a railing against a fate which is *eidetically impossible to alter*, which prevents you from being your parent and your child from being you, which prevents the past from being recovered, and which thus contributes to the inability to constitute for your children a Christmas like you had yourself. As a lament, it is coherent, but as a reason it is not.

This is important in two ways. These verses cannot present a reason for a changed attitude towards Christmas. Nor can they present a reason for the inability to constitute a Christmas for the children like you had yourself to which they are organically connected, though the possibility that they attempt to provide such a reason might not even have been experienced except for, on the one hand, the reference to reasons (in line 48) which have forced a reexamining of the piece in that light, and on the other hand, the premature closure of the topic *without* presenting any reason for this inability to reconstitute Christmas.

What is inadequate about these verses as reasons? Consider first the possibility of understanding these verses as a reason for the inability to reconstitute Christmas. How is this inability expressed and experienced? The sense of 'a Christmas for them like you had yourself' (line 36) is experienced initially in typification as a Christmas which presents the same essence as the Christmas which R experienced as a child; that is, as an exemplification of the essence meant in the first section and previously explicated. This is recognized in the use of the word 'like' (in line 36), the failure is not a failure to constitute **the** Christmas you had yourself. Further, this essence has not been meant as in any way necessarily tied to the same natural objects as R experienced. It seems not impossible that a Christmas *like* you had yourself could be constituted for your children even though you can't (best understood as 'have not been able to') succeed in doing so.

While it is obviously true that the specific times and the specific events of R's childhood Christmases are gone and cannot themselves be naturally reconstituted and that this perhaps provides the occasion for a lamentation, it is obvious that the attempt to reconstitute Christmas for one's children in this way would not ever have involved such an attempt at natural reconstitution. If, notwithstanding, this loss were to be offered as a reason for the failure, it could not be coherently fulfilled in its aspect as a reason; that is, as an explanation of a contingent possibility realized by choice and action or empirical circumstance (or unrealized through inaction or contingent empirical events). If it is here actually offered as a reason, then, this must be accomplished through an equivocation on the word 'can't' (lines 37,38). This equivocation would introduce an aporia as a contradiction. Inability to overcome an eidetic impossibility can be meant, as in: I eidetically can not. But if even in the face of this eidetic impossibility my intention is only to reconstitute a Christmas 'like' I had, and 'I can try' to do so, this eidetic impossibility cannot be a *reason* why I 'personally am unable to' (can't). There must be one or more actual reasons for this (now understood as empirical) inability.

On similar grounds, the eidetic impossibility of naturally reconstituting Christmas cannot in itself be an explanation of R's changed attitude towards Christmas.

Thus, in order to retain coherence, it must be the inability to constitute a Christmas for the children like you had yourself which is one of the reasons that is being referenced (in line 48). And this makes it very clear that this inability is not itself explained

Is there another reason? Consider the verse which precedes (lines 31 to 34). On the surface this verse (rearranged) expresses a syllogism:

a. If things aren't just the same, then they aren't any damn good.
b. Everything's different.
c. Therefore things aren't any damn good.

This would be a contradiction to the essence of Christmas previously expressed (as not necessarily tied to particulars) and as such it might point to a missing particular natural element in the essence of Christmas as R constitutes it. It would also make the possibility that the lamentation verses were actually being offered as a reason for the inability to reconstitute Christmas a more plausible one (i.e. that the contradiction that this implies is a contradiction in R's personal world).

However, a qualification, 'in a way' (line 34), was immediately added. This suggests that the syllogism is to be understood to have been imprecisely rendered. This imprecision may extend as well to word order which is quite critical here. Thus there is a difference in meaning between 'things aren't JUST the same' (line 32) and 'things JUST aren't the same'. If the word 'just' is understood as qualifying in the second sense (not impossible depending perhaps on inflection), then the verse may be taken to express the conviction that it is the essence of Christmas which is now missing in experience. Premise 'a' of the syllogism would become 'If the essence is missing, then Christmas cannot be any damn good', and premise 'b' would become 'Since everything is different, the essence is missing'.

The word 'until' which introduces the next verse (lines 35 to 38) contributes to the difficulty in fulfilling the syllogism and its convictions determinately. This word suggests that the situation expressed by the syllogism, that things are no damn good, will change when Christmas again includes children. Making a Christmas for your children 'like' (in essence the same as) you had yourself is something that 'you hafta do' (line 36) as a moral obligation. At this point, (were it not for the tears) the forward progression of the piece is coherently understandable: first, in the marriage before children, the essence of Christmas is lost, and second, when children arrive, you are under an obligation to insure that the essence of Christmas is again present. Perhaps the presence of children is a part of the essence of Christmas ('Christmas is for children' in line 3). But the tears, and the statement that you cannot successfully do so, must be understood to leave in force the conviction, even through the raising of children, that 'things aren't any damn good' since the essence of Christmas is (still) lost. This forms the second (first in temporal ordering as read) reason that R's attitude towards Christmas is changed.

The organization of the section is therefore:

1. Christmas isn't any damn good since I left home.
2. I am unable to make Christmas any damn good for my children.
3. For these reasons Christmas is now less important to me.

What then is missing from Christmas that its essence is lost? A clue is given (lines

49 to 50) in the re-emphasis given to the wonderfulness and happiness of the early Christmases. 'No damn good' means then without as much happiness, without as much wonder. But this only contributes to the understanding of what the essence is that is lost, but not to an understanding of why it is lost. R, himself, remains puzzled as indicated by his awareness that no adequate explanation has been given when he continues by offering another explanation for this lost essence, that Christmas has 'become more commercial' (line 51), but finally abandons the aporia by finishing with an expression of his puzzlement, 'I don't know' (line 51).

Something is still missing. If the essence of Christmas as presented in the first section has been typified accurately, then *there is a reason for the loss of the essence of Christmas and there is a reason for the failure to retrieve this essence, and these reasons have only been emptily or inaccurately intended.* The reason for these failures is present, but as an empty or indistinct intention with an indeterminate horizon.

To summarize, if the loss of wonderful times past is a reason for an inability to reconstitute it for the children and these together are reasons for a changed attitude towards Christmas, then the essence of Christmas has been inaccurately meant in the first section, and the obligation to try to reconstitute this essence in the face of this knowledge is irrational. This would be an aporia which presents a contradiction. If it is that the essence of Christmas has been lost then why isn't it possible to retrieve it, and why has the lamentation about the impossibility of retrieving the past been expressed? This would be an aporia that invites further analysis.

At this stage, my own initial sense of the mystery of the piece has been largely, although not completely, dissipated. The piece can fairly be seen as a tragic narrative in which the meaning of Christmas gradually found in his childhood becomes irretrievably lost to R despite his efforts to retrieve it for his own children. It can also be seen as set of convictions about Christmas as it was, should be, and is. Any remaining sense of aporia is empirical, in the specific sense that its dissipation depends upon fulfilling a more complete story either by retrieving additional information which might make indeterminate horizons determinate (the third type of aporia identified earlier) or by making judgements based upon imported empirical knowledge (the fourth type of aporia). While I do not feel favorably disposed to the possibility that R's world contains a paradox surrounding his abilities, this judgement will be held in abeyance, pending the attempt to determinately fulfill the horizons of Christmas.

What, then, beyond the boundaries of this particular piece as fulfilled in isolation might contribute to a more complete story? How should these horizons be searched? The basic elements intended as natural in this narrative are clearly: mother, members of the natal family, wife, and children. Is there anything determinately intended elsewhere about these figures which has a bearing upon this piece? That is, what, if imported into this piece through typification, might make it more coherent, especially with regard to R's inability to constitute a Christmas for his children? There are in addition other 'objects' intended in this piece which also have horizons. Prominent are: Christmas and its essence, love, caring, and loss. The horizons of these too might be made determinate to the extent possible.

To avoid being accused of being obtuse, consider mother first. The immediate textual horizons of this piece as heard clearly concern the relationship between R and his mother. The piece follows R's relating of his memories of his mother's death, an occasion which has reduced him to tears and lead him to suspend his recounting for a brief time to regain his composure (Unit 9a: My Mother's Death, lines 44 to 48). The piece Christmas itself begins by being intended as one of 'a thousand happy memories with my mother', and mother is therefore present in the horizon of the piece as it unfolds temporally even if only briefly and abstractly explicitly meant again (in lines 15,16 and 39 in the second person) until the very conclusion of the piece ('my mother being the centre of Christmas, not me, my mother' in lines 51,52). If R's mother is a ghostly presence in his thoughts even as he is unfolding this piece, can this account for some of its aporia?

It might make the lamentation verses (lines 39 to 45) more coherent if they were understood as referring not only to the loss of Christmas, but also, and perhaps centrally, to the loss of mother. Certainly the mother is meant to be included as part of the generation lost, the 'collection of people' lost (lines 40, 41). To put it another way, the aporia of the piece might itself be due in part to a specific association that R has developed between Christmas and mother. Without there being a logical inconsistency in R's personal world or in his attempts to constitute a Christmas, it may still be a part of his psycho-logic that this association, as a matter of fact, intrudes upon those attempts, and makes it more difficult to recapture what he (properly) understands the essence of Christmas to be.

Let us not, as a result of the felt coherence of this idea, embark upon an explication of the now-horizonal (for us) psychoanalytic proto-narrative (for which, perhaps inevitably, evidence of fit abounds), but rather let us again bring to mind that this would be a strictly empirical endeavour, and one which would require that we bring to the piece our knowledge of a specific external narrative not here determinately intended. Let us instead further query the discourse before us and list, from both preceding and following pieces, potentially relevant determinate information about the elements meant in **Christmas** (some involving repetition from the earlier discussion of the implicit life story).

1. R is currently separated from his children.

This is revealed in the course of the discussion of R's current living arrangements (in Unit 28: Something Very Important, line 7).

2. Childhood Christmases for R involved mother, but no father.

That this may be so we discover first in Unit 4a Little Wanderer: Bus Ride (line 5), but it is an inference from what is made explicit in Unit 9c Mother: Epilogue (line 3, and lines 5,6).

3. R's wife '++' miscarried twins on Christmas day.

This is the extendure of the narrative in Unit 12g: Losing the twins, the critical statements being 'but on Christmas Day in the hospital she lost the twins, guess Christmas isn't too special to ++ either since that year' (lines 7,8). Perhaps surprising though, this loss is never meant as a reason for R's sense of loss of Christmas; he constitutes it only as a (probable) cause of ++'s own less than positive attitude towards Christmas. This seems mysterious, and yet is carried through the entire piece: the loss of the twins is '++'s' loss, and not his. The answer is indeterminately intended earlier in the piece, 'she was expecting twins and I won't go into the whys and wheres or wherefors of how THAT came about' (line 2), which in conjunction with the knowledge that R had left '++' in England when he came to Canada (Unit 12d: Leaving for Canada) and the statement 'but her ties to me brought her over here some MANY months later' (Unit 12f: My Wife comes to Canada, line 5) make the natural inference quite irresistible that the twins were not R's. Or, at very least, he did not yet fully constitute them as his (as echoing within 'or at least I wasn't too prepared for it but sure I was gonna, you know, make the GOOD life and so forth' (Unit 12g: Losing the twins, line 6).

4. R does not constitute his children fully or as fully his.

Despite the fact that R does here and elsewhere constitute the children as his by virtue of being in his family, he also constitutes them as being primarily or entirely his wife's. He never seems to take possession of them. The evidence for this is circumstantial: the children are never meant distinctly, we are never able to determine how many there are, their names, ages, or even genders; they are meant only in passing, never as an articulated theme (or extendure) of this textual world. Two (not necessarily mutually exclusive) hypotheses are available that would offer some coherence to this characteristic of the discourse. One is that children were never part of R's goals; they were his wife's idea, and are his wife's possession (as he was perhaps his mother's). The second hypothesis is that the children are not R's.

This analysis and its horizons provide a number of possibilities for a description of the thematic element which makes the Christmas episode so poignant and aporiac. Briefly consider the following two candidate pervasive themes which might lend coherence: R fears impotence and the awareness of impotence, and R cannot gain intimacy.

While impotence in this context may extend to physical impotence, it is sufficient to understand it as impotence in relation to R's sense of personal specialness and the various candidates by which he has attempted to realize it. There are many exemplars within R's discourse in which this sense of impotence can be sensed in the horizon (once, of course, it has been fulfilled in this way). Clearly, R's loss of Christmas can be readily understood as related to a feeling of impotence in relation to his family to 'make a Christmas for them like you had yourself'. The following excerpt from Unit 12g Married Life: Losing the twins seems to express this theme quite explicitly:

15. um it just SEEMED that there was nothing I COULD DO / about ANYthing
16. perhaps now I'm older I REalize that / yes / there probably WAS something I could do=
17. just BEING there was I=suppose DOING something
18. maybe I- she didn't EVER get the support () from ME / in the way () that she NEED-ED
19. um (.) be-cause () I couldn't ACTively actually DO () ANYthing /

in terms of an ACtion
a gesture maybe but not an ACtion=
20. I=couldn't=actually DO anything aBOUT anything
21. so I just () TOOK OFF
22. and got on with something that I COULD do / like go and play CARDS [laughs]
or () go to the RAces
or () go and have a PIZza
or () get in the CAR
or drive aROUND
or go HOME
or () do the washing=
but DO-O someth- DO something ()

In the context of the supposition that these twins weren't R's natural children, one might suppose that the theme of impotence might have been doubly present for R at this time.

More generally, the difficulties involved for R in sustaining his marriage seem related to this theme. Consider the following from Unit 12c Married Life: Not Once but Several Times:

14. I also feel SOMEhow that like (.) / the most IMportant thing
well maybe it isn't the most important thing
IS to GO out and WORK
and make a living
and and and t-to pro-VIDE the very things that I
married her for () in the first place
to take CARE of her
and look AFTER her (.)
15. but the difference is you=see / is that I can't go out and DO it (.)

A feeling of impotence seems not to be far from the surface when R describes the failure of his restaurant business in Unit 19 h: *English Restaurateur: If You'd Come* (between units in which he expresses his pride in serving an old friend and in serving the wife of a celebrity both of whom respond with accolades):

15. 'n they said / what are we going to DO WITH-OUT you
16. [laughs] and I said / well you'll have to get on with the guys that BOUGHT it
17. well they're a bunch of () ah () INDians aren't they?
18. they-I guess we're going=to=be a CURry house or something
19. so I said / well that's THEIR problem=
20. that's YOUR problem=
21. it's not MY problem anymore
22. if you'd come to my restaurant [laughs] you=know
when I was THERE
and I had DOUGHnuts to sell

and STEAKS to cook
then I wouldn't be IN this predicament
and I'd still BE here
and you'd still have your- / your restaurant that you LIKE so much
that you never bothered to show up-
23. well actually of course I didn't SAY all that
24. but THAT was what was going through my mind
25. and b-o-y did I ever fe-el it

Nor does it seem very far away when R endeavours to tell his story through a dog's eyes in Unit 16 Family Holiday:

28. and the way I thought of DOing it / was to write it through the eyes of my () DOG
I=mean not through MY perspective / through HIS perspective
29. so actually WHAT it beCAME was / the story of-ah / my DOG's life ()
as seen through HUman eyes in in-in his poor=little body
an'an' so forth
and having all the KIND=of emotions that I HAVE
30. so I'm able to sort=of say what () I () think about everything /
and really () it looks as though it's the dog's um story

The theme's horizonal presence is consistent as well with R's actions in suddenly giving up his job (Unit 17: The Day I was Forty) and suddenly leaving the party (Unit 14: Will anyone ever thank you?). Gambling (Unit 13a: Gambling: Willful Absence) also seems related to the impotence theme, although here it may be difficult to disentangle the horizonal presence of the theme from the interpretations of gambling which derive from psychoanalysis.

The other candidate theme that seems to lend coherence is the inability to establish intimacy. R describes his intimacy with his mother while growing up (especially in Unit 9: Mother but also in Unit 10: Back to England) and alludes in various places in Unit 12 Married Life to his inability to establish intimacy with his wife. For example (from Unit 12 c: Married Life: Not once but several times):

11. ++ and I DO hold () SEVeral things () dear
12. um but we also have VERY different perspectives on MOST of them (.)
13. so that when I feel that I- I that I'm BEing () SUFfocated/
um I CAN'T SHARE that with ++

R seems unable to share his negative feelings (as he reveals in Unit 26: Pat on the Back/ Hi R):

7. ah (.) / BASically I remember- (..) / I remember a lot of LOWS
8. but I don't remember them THAT well
or I'm not able to focus on them

9. they're sort of innermost and they're private
   and they'll never be forGOTten
   um and you=know I can shed TEARS on them
   and so forth
10. but-ah there's not much we can DO about it

He almost seems to mistake sexuality for intimacy on occasion (Unit 3: A Little Naughty I suppose):

34. but that WAS-
(35.) that MORNing was-s (..) / stirred FEELings that I'd never
   felt before (.) / and ah / and VERY MIXED feelings (.) /
   in MANY ways / as you can iMAgine being rather a
   comp-romising situation in some ways
36. so / aside from all of the- sort=of the guilt and / perHAPS
   the- the NAUGHTIness of it all / looking at the POSitive
   side / it was- () HAHA /
37. well=I=would=have=been DOWN the AISLE probably in about /
   oh th- three HOURS / from THAT moment / if I hadn't ()
   alREADY [laughs] been ah / TIED UP shall we say

And in stating his conviction that he likes to dine intimately with good friends and share with them (Unit 3: Swiss Dinner Party), he presents as exemplary a dinner party in which:

19. there we were / in this great=big=place
20. and six people came to b-toGETHer / on ONE evening / and
   had a WONderful TIME
21. and we NEver MET AGAIN

Perhaps the place in which the two candidate themes seem most closely associated is in Unit 15: Poignant Meetings;

1. um / anoth- a- a- another () evening that remember- /
   there was a SER-IES of evenings
2. and this was another ah PERiod in my life / where I had ACTually LEFT ++
3. and I was-ah inVOLVed with another woman
4. but on Sunday eve- one eve- one or another evening / now and again /
   I used to meet ++ / at the HILton hotel (.)
      for COFFee
      and DANish
      or () gateau
      or something
5. and (..) / the grand piano would () play (.)
6. and everything was washed a-way (..)

7. and the two of us TCHA / just sat there crying [cries]
8. and I remember that FAR more viVIDly than the girl I LEFT her for
9. HUH (.)
10. but they were wonderful evenings / in=as=much=as they were very very sad (..)
11. but they were wonderful / because I- I- /
    MAYbe I felt that I was getting THROUGH to her
12. and- and [trailing off] that's another little thing

It should be noted that the themes of feared impotence and lost intimacy are nowhere stated as convictions by R, and must therefore be understood as interpretations, to be evaluated in terms of the coherence which they lend to R's story.

Conclusion. The thematic analyses of the current chapter have been exemplary, and have illustrated an approach to the discourse which proceeds constructively, that is, by entering the text from an understanding constructed in the initial encounter with that text, and proceeding by querying that text. To result in a complete analysis (which along the way relates the analyst's extendure in analyzing), this process must be lengthier than has been related here.

Nevertheless, as a summary (and possible preliminary to numerical analysis) a table of themes and their moments can be presented. Pervasive themes are presented in capital letters, while moments are presented in lower-case letters. I have inserted pervasive themes in the table below moments of other themes where it seemed appropriate. This is meant to improve readability, and to indicate possible relationships; it is not meant to suggest hierarchicality. The presence/absence of these themes in particular discourse units is considered in the next chapter.

R's themes

BEING-AN-INDIVIDUALIST

- 'follows own path'
- capricious, 'as the spirit moves'
- reckless
- inconsiderate, 'to hell with others'
- adventure, exploration
  - enriched personal experience
    - AWED-BY-A-MAGIC-WORLD
      - seek overcoming risk
      - see
      - enter
- confident
- resourceful
- rebels against constraint

        anger
        escape

        FEAR OF IMPOTENCE

PERSONAL SPECIALNESS

    chosen, blessed
        stand out
    obligated
        accomplish
            through personal abilities
            in competition
        belong to community
        care for / provide

            BESTOWAL

            MISSING INTIMACY

Notes

1. This description also activates as external horizons uses in literary criticism (e.g. Chatman, 1990) and in the cognitive psychology of language (e.g. Singer, 1990).

2. This goal is shared with others who have focused upon the lives of individuals, notably Allport (1937, 1961) who expressed it as the search for cardinal traits; and Murray (1938) who expressed it as the search for the unity-thema which render coherent the largest number of episodes in a life.

3. In some situations, though not one which involves a discourse alone, an analyst may present his expression of a theme of the personal world to the producer of the discourse himself or herself for consideration of its fidelity. To the extent that this theme *is a theme of the personal world of the teller*, this procedure represents a refinement of the method of paraphrase pioneered by Rogers (1951). To the extent that it embodies the natural attitude, and presents itself as an explanation, it may more closely represent a psychoanalytic interpretation (e.g. Freud, 1940/1962).

4. The analysis being (as yet indistinctly) suggested here should be sharply contrasted with the procedures previously proposed under the title of numerical phenomenology (Schopflocher, 1981; Kuiken, Schopflocher, & Wild, 1989). Most centrally, the entries in the horizontal dimension of an enumeration matrix in

the current procedure are very complexly structured already as the the result of intensive imaginal variation and abduction. This is perceived as a virtue. In contrast, the elements in the horizontal dimension of the prior procedure were intentionally as atomic as possible, and rated (solely) for presence or absence in discourse units, with a fair degree of conservatism. This may reflect, within the conceptual horizons surrounding their formulation, a differing perspective upon the ability of strictly numerical procedures to perform (or aid in the performance of) 'useful' abductive generalization. I now regard this earlier perspective as having been superseded by the current one. It should be noted that this shift in perspective does not in any way change the actual procedures applied to an enumeration matrix, or to the procedures advocated for interpreting the outcome.

5. There is a wonderful book by Thomas Bass called *The Eudaemonic Pie* which asserts as true the story of some high-tech gamblers who use a computer hidden in a shoe to effectively discern conditional probabilities by using predictive variables such as the speed of rotation of the wheel, the velocity of the ball as it is released, and the section of the wheel over which the ball is released. The implicit challenge of the book, of course, is to assess its truth claim in relation to an assessment of its plausibility. It has also been shown that another traditional casino game, Blackjack, at least as it used to be played, was not effectively random since it depended upon the distribution of cards remaining to be played which could become known on the basis of the cards which had been played to that point. It remains unknown whether innovations in the rules such as increasing the number of cards in the game can restore effective randomness.

CHAPTER X

USING NUMERICAL PROCEDURES

In a previous chapter, it was proposed that a particular formal structure, a set of objects manifesting a set of attributes, can form the basis of an idiographic analysis to the extent that the objects and attributes are moments of the personal world of an individual. In addition, to the extent that a matrix can be formed with these objects and their attributes as separate facets, and a numerical scaling can be assigned as the entries in this matrix, numerical analyses of the matrix can be performed which will associate both the objects and the attributes into relatively homogenous groups. If the objects and the attributes which are represented by the facets of this matrix are themselves each complex and meaningful, then a re-examination of these grouped objects in their most complex form might make salient the bases of the meaningfulness of these groupings. Though it may be of limited utility to form groupings from a matrix of objects and their salient attributes if little can become known of these objects and attributes (beyond, for example, the abbreviated labels that might be used in assembling or soliciting such a matrix); when much can be, or has previously been, discovered about these objects and/or attributes, a numerical analysis can provide a convenient basis for an examination of the full horizon of meanings within which the objects and attributes are conceived, and within which they are conjoined.

In the current inquiry, a set of personal memories were solicited from a single individual, faithfully transcribed, and divided into units, as described in previous chapters. In the current phase of the inquiry, a global set of personal themes and cardinal traits were solicited from the same individual, and the individual was then asked to rate each of the units in his oral autobiography for the salience of each of these cardinal themes and traits. A numerical matrix could thus be formed by assembling the salience ratings of all of these cardinal themes and traits on all of these autobiographical units, and this matrix could be numerically analyzed to reveal groupings of both personal memories and cardinal themes and traits. The interpretation of these groupings should be enriched by the availability of the full transcript and of the previous assessment of themes using only the discourse.

Method. At the conclusion of the sessions in which R related the personal memories that he believed might find a place in his autobiography, I asked him to consider the major themes in his life. In a further session (scheduled some weeks later after R had returned from a business trip), I requested that he provide a list of these themes.

I then presented him with a list which presented very brief paraphrases of the 62 units into which I had divided his oral autobiography, and offered to make available to him the full transcripts. After examining this list, R told me that it was sufficient to remind him of the episodes which he had previously related, and declined the offer to examine the full transcripts (as they existed at that time).

While R was examining the list of narrative units, I examined the list of themes that he had provided, and determined that there were 6. I then provided R with a piece of graph paper on which a matrix was drawn containing 62 rows and 6 columns. I labeled the columns with the short titles of the themes that R himself had provided, and labeled the rows numerically. I then requested that R consider each narrative unit in turn, and each theme successively, placing a check mark in the appropriate cell when a particular narrative unit exemplified a particular theme.

At the conclusion of this task, I requested R to consider his most important personality traits. In a further session, the same procedure was followed, and R indicated in a similar fashion the extent to which each narrative unit exemplified each of the 14 central personality trait descriptors that he provided.

Detailed scripts for the sessions in which themes, central traits, and ratings of narratives were obtained, as presented to R are presented in Appendix 1.

Results. The list of abstracts of narrative units presented to R to facilitate the rating task is presented below as Table I:

TABLE I : Abstracts of 62 Narrative Units

1. I crash a formal affair and meet the Queen Mother.
2. I spend my 21st birthday in hospital.
3. My sister and I dine at a Swiss Baronial Mansion.
4. My friends and I ride the bus to the end of the line.
5. I go looking for Mother in Eaton's.
6. I spend a naughty night and a blissful morning away from home.
7. I eulogize the English Pub experience.
8. We almost beat a team of British International Bridge Players.
9. After a bridge loss a friend and I wander the streets.
10. We win a Regional Bridge Championship in style.
11. My sister and I holiday in Austria.
12. I spend a day alone in Paris, see the Mona Lisa, and run down the stairs of the Eiffel Tower.
13. I rent a scooter on our holiday to Majorca.
14. My sister doesn't want to leave Majorca.
15. I learn of my Mother's death on the telephone.
16. I reminisce about Christmas as I was growing up.
17. I punch out a kid on my first day in school in England.
18. I go to the bakery for my mother.
19. I become an expert at buying meat for the family.
20. I am moved by the panorama of the Eiger in the Swiss Alps.
21. I am impressed by the engineering feats of Syncrude Canada Ltd.
22. I believe I am here on earth for a reason.
23. I meet and marry a dainty little English rose.
24. I contemplate my marriage and my decisions to leave my wife 'not once but several

times'.
25. I depart for Canada.
26. A dear friend persuades me to come to Edmonton.
27. My wife comes to Canada.
28. My wife loses twins.
29. I contemplate the role of gambling in my life.
30. I have a lucky Roulette streak early in my gambling career
31. I treat the house to drinks after a 'perfect' day at the track.
32. I meet a girl at a party who questions my efforts asking 'Will anyone ever thank you?'
33. I meet my wife Sunday Evenings at the Hilton.
34. I take my family on a disaster filled holiday.
35. The day I turned forty, I try to make dramatic changes.
36. I order an olive and anchovy pizza when a group goes to dinner.
37. I establish my own little piece of the world by buying a restaurant.
38. I enjoy the prestige of being a businessman.
39. A customer complains about the tough lamb.
40. I receive a nice tip.
41. A couple comes on Saturday Evening, we're empty; returns next week, we're full.
42. I earn my keep when I serve eighteen all by myself.
43. A friend visits my restaurant from Canada.
44. I am forced to sell, and I resent the townsfolk.
45. Lou Ayers' wife comes to the restaurant.
46. I muse that chefs enjoy the simplest fare.
47. I successfully defend myself in court after a minor accident.
48. I sue the crown after an R.C.M.P. vehicle sideswipes me.
49. I am arrested after stealing some railway ties.
50. I debate religion with my wife's Roman Catholic godfather.
51. A friend and I get fed up at a Calgary bridge tournament.
52. A bank manager labels me a violent thinker.
53. My wife and I have a wonderful (and miserable) time camping.
54. My wife decides to 'Beware of Snakes'.
55. My wife impales herself.
56. I am persuaded to become a bridge teacher.
57. I am gratified by the trust and recognition shown me at my work.
58. I am greeted on the street after a five year absence.
59. I try a different approach to get a job as a waiter.
60. I warn a patron away from the Back Forest Cake.
61. I establish a relationship that importantly includes a different and easygoing attitude towards money.
62. I reflect on my goals over my life and contemplate my lack of current plans.

Presented below are transcriptions of the written expressions produced by R in response to the requests for listings of themes, and of enduring personal characteristics. Apart from the substitution of R to maintain confidentiality, these are presented as much as is possible as they were written in longhand (including spacing and emphasis). Table II presents R's self-generated themes, while Table III presents R's self-generated traits.

TABLE II: Transcription of Themes

THEMES OF R'S LIFE

1. RISK-TAKING

As evidenced by a life of gambling since I was about 18 or 20, I have a history of taking risks in the larger theatre of life itself:-

My decision to leave school;
    leave England to start a new life in Canada;
        Tax evasion - live now/pay later;
    buying a restaurant against all advice;
    living something of a "double life";

When I turned 40, I turned my whole life upside down - or tried to.

Gambling with everything on a wing and a prayer, in the hope that things will work out. If I don't win (or succeed) today - tomorrow is another day.

The underlying force is to try for a better (richer) tomorrow - being dissatisfied with "WHAT IS".

And - as with all gamblers - most of the risks were impulsive (maybe compulsive) - An overwhelming urge to shoot for the moon.

2. INDEPENDENCE

I love travel - to be free to choose my fork in the road. If I'm not actually "free" to live my life as I choose, then I react, rebel and also do what I choose anyway.

In many instances I have (subconsciously) shirked the shackles of responsibility - viewing then as "boring - routine" and little more than fulfilling others' expectations.

That is not to say I like to be alone, or that I don't love to please others and "be there" when I'm needed. It's that I want to make the choice and do things largely on my own terms.

Compromise is OK - but not all the time.

And yet - sometimes it's great to just stop for awhile and observe. To get out of the spotlight / hot seat and enjoy a little peace.

3. I'm a Dreamer - Aren't we all?

Certainly ++ is too. And a lot of my problems/mistakes and actions have been in the misguided objective of fulfilling ++'s dreams as I perceived them. Make more money, get more, be more, have more.

And at the same time, fulfill my own dreams (wanting more).

I have wasted more time than is healthy - in WISHING.

Though I do not dwell on lost causes, or harbour regrets. (I do have regrets from time to time, but recognize that they don't help anyone or anything).

But I am a dreamer in wanting the best for everyone, and life ain't that simple.

4. Work = Pride, achievement, substance and security

I love it, thrive on it. Yet I am a procrastinator, preferring to think about it, and delay action until the last minute. And it's always the final results that count. Whether I invest more, cut corners or impose on others along the way, I'll do (almost) anything to get that pat on the back and little bit of glory or limelight.

The same applies to Tennis, Bridge, cooking, or painting the house - going that extra bit so someone (everyone) might notice.

And if they don't - then I make sure they do!

5. CREATIVE

Photography/writing/Haute cuisine - discovering short cuts or alternative methods - never taking the same route twice if I can help it - always looking for a quicker, cheaper or better way.

I am an individualist! I don't work by committee - live a personal life where others make most of the decisions - and I don't follow prescribed plans. Nor do I use recipes of textbook procedures.

I do it MY WAY - which I have to admit is often an imitation of someone else's way that I thought I could improve.

6. IN SUMMARY

I am a Maverick. All the above are interrelated, and govern everything I do, say and think - past, present and future.

Being different - wanting ideals, wishing for more - willing to stake all to turn things around

but NEVER accepting anyone else's dictums or advice. I always know best - even when I'm wrong.

TABLE III: Transcription of Traits

R - PERSONALITY TRAITS

1. Opinionated
2. Seeker of High Standards (almost a perfectionist - but not quite)
3. Procrastinator - slow to decide best course
4. Appreciative - of good works, good things, favours
5. Impulsive - quick to make mistakes
6. Attitude of "Live and Let Live"
7. Generous (love to be able to afford much more for others)
8. Undisciplined - tend not to conform
9. Guilty - aware of personal shortcomings
10. Happy/Optimistic - most of the time enthusiastic
11. Indignant - sometimes feel ripped off and angry
12. Fair Minded - believe in just deserts
13. Logical - Analytic and Progressive
14. Considerate - try never to offend others

Table IV below presents the labels utilized in the rating task. Since analysis of the data from the rating of all 6 themes and all 14 traits was combined, the themes and traits are numbered as they appear in data matrices.

TABLE IV: Labels for Themes/Traits

THEMES

1. I am a risk taker / gambler.
2. I strongly value my freedom of choice / independence.
3. I am a dreamer / wisher for the good life.
4. I am motivated by achievement and the recognition it brings.
5. I value creative individual solutions.
6. I am a maverick.

TRAITS

7. Opinionated
8. Seeker of High Standards
9. Procrastinator
10. Appreciative
11. Impulsive
12. Attitude of "Live and Let Live"
13. Generous
14. Undisciplined
15. Guilty
16. Happy/Optimistic
17. Indignant
18. Fair Minded
19. Logical - Analytic and Progressive
20. Considerate

Appendix 2 presents numerical data for the 62 narrative unit by 20 theme/trait rating task; in that matrix a 1 indicates that R believed that unit to exemplify that theme/trait while a 0 indicates that he did not.

Data Analysis. The full data matrix presented in Appendix 2 clearly cannot be understood as a whole, (although it might not prove to be impossible as a close reader of R's transcripts and his thematic statements to closely replicate it). Therefore, a reduction in the complexity of the data is indicated.

Multivariate Data Reduction Techniques. The basic goal of data reduction techniques is to accurately express a data matrix X consisting of the scores for *p* objects on *t* attributes as a function of a small number of replicable, readily understandable parameters (The indices *p* and *t* are used here by convention because in psychometrics the objects measured are so often *p*ersons and the attributes on which persons are scored are so often *t*ests). The primary approaches have been to combine the *t* attributes into a smaller number of attributes *r* by methods generically called factor analysis, and to represent the *p* objects as belonging to a smaller number of groupings of similar objects *q* by methods generically called cluster analysis.

The reduction of both attribute and object facets of a data matrix in a single analysis has received limited attention, in part because data reductions along a single facet are most replicable (i.e. statistically justifiable) when the cardinality of the other facet is considerably *larger* than the facet under consideration. That is, a reduction from *t* to *r* attributes will be stable to the extent that *p* is larger than *t* in a particular analysis. In factor analysis, a *p* to *t* ratio of 10 or 15 to 1 is usually recommended as necessary to provide a high probability of replication. As a result, studies have generally been designed to answer questions specific to the reduction of one facet of the data matrix, and occasions on which there is a theoretical gain from reducing both facets simultaneously have been limited. This is especially true when attributes have been measured across different persons, and the concern has been with the covariation between attributes. Moreover, the traditional methods of solution for data reduction have operated upon a transformed matrix (typically the t by t correlation matrix of attributes R = Xc'Xc, where Xc is X standardized by columns) rather than upon X (or Xc) itself.

Other types of studies are possible, for example, where a data matrix X is considered the result of the acts of judgement of a single individual about the attributes of objects (or as an aggregation of the acts of judgement of many individuals about the attributes of objects). In this case, the number of objects and the number of attributes would typically be within a single order of magnitude. This describes the basic structure of a scaling study except that it is not typical of such studies that the matrix X is in fact available. More frequently, analysis begins from a p by p matrix of object similarities which has been generated directly (for example, through sorting tasks or through pairwise similarity ratings), and the purpose has been to identify a plausible set of attributes (i.e. a matrix X) by which the pattern of similarities might have been generated, or alternatively to reduce the object facet by creating clusters of like objects.

It is in the specific case in which a number of known objects have been rated on a number of known attributes by one or more individuals, such as in a Repertoire Grid or related procedure, in which a simultaneous reduction of both object and attribute facets might prove to be most useful. In order to examine how this might be accomplished, I will briefly consider forms of data analysis which are characteristic of reduction techniques which have been employed on a single facet.

Principal Components Analysis. The basic equation of Principal Component analysis is

$$Xc = Z F' \qquad (1)$$

where Xc is a data matrix expressing the standard scores of p objects on t attributes, F is a component loading matrix expressing the relationships between the t attributes and r components, and Z is a matrix of the p object scores on the r components.

The equality in equation 1 can be exact when $t = r$ and $p > t$ (or more precisely when r is the rank of Xc' Xc), but is only approximate if components are eliminated from consideration (i.e. when $r < t$). In general, components are extracted and ordered such that successive components of F (i.e. successive columns) account for the largest possible proportion of the variation in X (or remaining in X after the previous components have been formed). In this way, the error of approximation in equation 1 for a particular chosen number of components r will be minimized. Typically as well, only those components are retained which individually and jointly account for a substantial portion of the variability in X (and simultaneously offer a substantial reduction in the number of attributes to consider during interpretation i.e. from t attributes to a much reduced r components each of which is a linear combination of the t attributes). The number of components to retain and the criteria by which the decision can be made are the topics of a vast research literature (for a comprehensive review see Reddon, 1982).

The traditional method of solution seeks the component loading matrix from a covariance or correlation matrix

$$R = Xc'\,Xc = F\,F' \qquad (2)$$

by a variety of methods (see e.g. Harris, 1975; Green & Carroll, 1976) which insure that components are orthogonal and maximum variance.

An indeterminacy is introduced into the interpretation of the results of this form of analysis by the fact that F can be transformed by an arbitrary orthonormal matrix of order r by r without altering the approximation (or equality when $t = r$) expressed in equations 1 and 2. This gives rise to the so-called rotation problem in component and factor analysis. Thus, given any J where $J'\,J = J'\,J = I$ and $F^* = F\,J$ and $Z^* = Z\,J$:

$$R = F\,F' = F\,J\,J'\,F' = F^*\,F^{*\prime} \qquad (3)$$

and

$$Xc = Z\,F' = Z\,J\,J'\,F' = Z^*\,F^{*\prime} \qquad (4)$$

and the problem becomes one of choosing a J with 'optimal' properties prior to interpreting the nature of the rotated components $F^* = F\,J$. The criterion that has been employed almost exclusively is that of 'simple structure', the choice of a J which gives an appealingly simple (and hence interpretable) form to F^*. It is generally described as a structure containing a maximum number of near zero entries in both the rows and columns of F^*. Again there is an enormous literature on simple structure and methods for determining J (see e.g. Harris, 1975).

It should also be noted that an analysis could also be conducted which reduces the object facet of X. Rather than operate with $R = Xc'\,Xc$, an analysis could proceed with $R = Xr\,Xr'$ where Xr is the row standardization of X (or the column standardization of X') and R is now the p by p correlation matrix between objects. This form of analysis has been developed under the description Q type factor analysis, where once again the object facet has predominantly consisted of persons (Stephanson, 1953).

The Basic Structure of a Matrix. The relationships between the components of X' X and the components of X X' can be made evident by examining the 'basic structure' of a matrix (a term introduced by Horst, 1963 to describe the early work of Eckhart and Young, 1936 and developed by Carroll e.g. Green and Carroll, 1976). It can be shown that

$$X = P\,D\,Q' \qquad (5)$$

where P is of order p by r and orthonormal by columns, Q is of order t by r and orthonormal by columns, and D is a diagonal matrix of order r by r. (Again if r equals the minimum of p and t then equation 5 will be an equality, if r is smaller it expresses an approximation).

Let us assume that X is both row and column standardized (sometimes referred to as double-centred, and actualized with real data by an iterative procedure). If we set F = Q D then it is evident from equation 5 that X = P F' and therefore from equation 1 that P = Z. Similarly, using equation 5,

$$\begin{aligned} X'\,X &= (P\,D\,Q')'\,P\,D\,Q' \\ &= Q\,D\,P'\,P\,D\,Q' \\ &= Q\,D\,D\,Q' \\ &= F\,F' \end{aligned}$$

Thus the principal components F are equal to Q D in the basic structure decomposition of data matrix X.

In addition, let us set G = P D. Now X = G Q' from equation 5 and therefore X' = Q G'. Similarly, using equation 5,

$$\begin{aligned} X\,X' &= P\,D\,Q'\,(P\,D\,Q')' \\ &= P\,D\,Q'\,Q\,D\,P' \\ &= P\,D\,D\,P' \\ &= G\,G' \end{aligned}$$

Thus the principal components G of X' (the components of the object facet, or the Q factors) are equal to P D in the basic structure decomposition of data matrix X.

In the special case of a double centred data matrix X, the principal components of both facets are given by the same basic structure decomposition, and the scores for the components of one facet are intimately related to the components of the other facet. This relationship typically remains close even when X is column standardized only. An efficient algorithm for the basic structure decomposition has been developed (under the title of the singular value decomposition) by Golub (see Golub & Van Loan, 1983). Since it does not require any matrix inversions it presents advantages in the analyses of linearly dependent systems for both principal component analyses and regression analyses.

Projector Analysis. Mann and McAuley (1982) introduce an extension of the basic structure decomposition which they call projector analysis. Again assuming that the data matrix X is double centred, the basic equation of projector analysis is given as

$$X = G\,H\,F' \qquad (6)$$

where G is a p by r component loading matrix for the object facet, F is a t by r component loading matrix for the attribute facet, and H is an r by r matrix which maps the components of the object facet onto the components of the attribute facet. (If r is less than the minimum of p and t, then the equality in equation 6 will again be approximate but, as noted previously, can be arranged to be the best possible approximation for the particular choice of r).

The basic structure decomposition of a matrix can be expressed as a projector analysis as follows. Using equation 5, let $G = P\,D$ and let $F = Q\,D$. By substitution into equation 6,

$$X = P\,D\,H\,D\,Q' \qquad (7)$$

By setting $H = D^{-1}$, equation 7 reduces to equation 5.

In addition, the components G and F can be separately rotated, and a transformation of H can be made to preserve the approximation (or equality) of equation 6. Let $G^* = G\,J$ and $F^* = F\,K$ where J and K are separate r by r orthonormal transformation matrices. If $H^* = J'\,H\,K = J'\,D^{-1}\,K$, then

$$\begin{aligned} X &= G^*\,H^*\,F^* \qquad (8)\\ &= G\,J\,J'\,D^{-1}\,K\,K'\,F' \\ &= G\,I\,D^{-1}\,I\,F' \\ &= P\,D\,D^{-1}\,D\,Q' \\ &= P\,D\,Q' \end{aligned}$$

The matrix H^* can be interpreted as containing the scores of the retained object facet components on the retained attribute facet components, and consequently represents the simultaneous reduction of both the object and attribute facets (as represented by G^* and F^* respectively).

Joint Clustering of Objects and Attributes. Consider the following equality (exemplified below with real data):

$$X = U \quad E \quad V' \qquad (9)$$

$$\begin{matrix} 11000000 \\ 11000000 \\ 11000000 \\ 11000000 \\ 00110011 \\ 00110011 \\ 00111100 \\ 00111100 \end{matrix} = \begin{matrix} 100 \\ 100 \\ 100 \\ 100 \\ 010 \\ 010 \\ 001 \\ 001 \end{matrix} \times \begin{matrix} 1000 \\ 0101 \\ 0110 \end{matrix} \times \begin{matrix} 11000000 \\ 00110000 \\ 00001100 \\ 00000011 \end{matrix}$$

Solving for the basic structure for this particular X from equation 5 using the singular value decomposition yields $X = P D Q'$ where

$$P = \begin{matrix} 0.00 & -0.50 & 0.00 \\ 0.00 & -0.50 & 0.00 \\ 0.50 & 0.00 & 0.50 \\ 0.50 & 0.00 & 0.50 \\ 0.50 & 0.00 & -0.50 \\ 0.50 & 0.00 & -0.50 \end{matrix}$$

$$D = \begin{matrix} 3.46 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ 0.00 & 2.83 & 0.00 \\ 0.00 & 0.00 & 2.00 \end{matrix}$$

$$Q = \begin{matrix} 0.00 & -0.71 & 0.00 \\ 0.00 & -0.71 & 0.00 \\ 0.58 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ 0.58 & 0.00 & 0.00 \\ 0.29 & 0.00 & -0.50 \\ 0.29 & 0.00 & -0.50 \\ 0.29 & 0.00 & 0.50 \\ 0.29 & 0.00 & 0.50 \end{matrix}$$

Since both of the equalities (of equations 5 and 9) hold, it should be possible to express one as a transformation of the other; in this case, $U = f(P)$, $E = f(D)$, and $V = f(Q)$.

We can easily solve for $H = D^{-1}$ in equation 7. Then if we allow $U = P D J$ and $V = Q D K$ where J and K are arbitrary transformations, a transformation of H must be performed to maintain the equality. That such a transformation exists can be demonstrated by setting $H^* = J' (J J')^{-1} H (K K')^{-1} K$ and solving for $X = U H^* V'$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} X &= U H^* V \\ &= P D J J' (J J')^{-1} D^{-1} (K K')^{-1} K K' D Q' \\ &= P D Q' \end{aligned}$$

and the necessary transformation has been demonstrated to exist.

Several features of this transformation and the example should be noted. First, neither J nor K are required to be square matrices, since a generalized inverse can be formed which reverses the effect of the transformations of P and Q when applied to H and maintains the equality. Second, in the particular example, each of the matrices U, E, and V has a strikingly simple structure. In fact, both U and V are cluster membership matrices allocating particular objects and particular attributes to a single grouping. Third, the E matrix has a strikingly simple interpretation; each entry represents the score for a group of objects on a group of attributes. While in the particular example this score is equal to the score obtained by each object in the group of objects on each attribute in the group of attributes, in general it will be interpretable as the average score obtained by each member of the group of objects on each attribute of the group of attributes.

The exact equality $X = U E V'$ in this example where U, E, and V are binary matrices is an unusual situation which requires that the example be carefully created. However, the example does suggest a variety of transformations and transformation types which might be investigated as alternatives to and extensions of factor rotation by orthonormal transformation, particularly for data matrices in which the cardinalities of facets are within an order of magnitude, and in which a simultaneous reduction of both facets is theoretically appealing.

For most of these transformation options, the challenge is to provide a solution which maintains the optimal properties of the basic structure or projector analysis solutions, (most especially the ability to maximize degree of approximation with a minimum number of components) while enhancing the properties of simple structure evident in the U, V and E matrices.

I have investigated a family of such transformations which forms vectors U and V as cluster membership vectors using existing and new techniques of cluster analysis and then solves for the E matrix as

$$E = (U' U)^{-1} U' X V (V' V)^{-1} \qquad (10)$$

It is these techniques which were utilized in the analysis of the 62 by 20 binary matrix, the soliciting of which was described above.

Numerical Results. The steps in the data analysis consisted of the following. First, the data matrix X was column standardized. Second, a singular value decomposition was performed upon Xc. Third, the solution was transformed into a principal component analysis. The first four components and a varimax rotation of these components is presented in Table V. The scores on these components are presented in Table VI. As is now accepted as standard within principal component analysis (Reddon, 1984), the number of components retained for further analysis was determined by examining the magnitude of the eigenvalues. Since there was a substantial decrease in the eigenvalue of the fifth component (to 1.04) and since the first 4 components account for a substantial portion of the variation within Xc (56.8%), four components were retained.

TABLE V: Principal Component Analysis

	Principal Components				Varimax Rotation			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Attributes								
1	**.76**	.13	-.02	.15	.77	.11	-.11	-.03
2	**.60**	.18	-.13	.07	**.58**	.20	-.17	-.07
11	**.76**	.17	.19	.17	**.81**	.09	.05	.10
14	**.82**	.02	.25	.13	**.86**	-.01	.14	.01
6	**.78**	-.30	-.02	-.12	**.71**	-.10	.09	-.44
4	20	.33	**-.52**	-.07	.12	**.42**	**-.45**	-.17
5	**.38**	-.03	**-.49**	-.19	.25	.20	**-.31**	**-.47**
7	**.52**	.02	**-.49**	.23	**.48**	.03	**-.53**	-.21
17	.20	**-.51**	**-.36**	-.04	.11	-.31	-.21	**-.53**
3	**.44**	**.48**	.29	**-.33**	**.42**	**.57**	**.34**	.08
8	.12	**.69**	-.22	-.25	.07	**.75**	-.16	.08
16	.16	**.55**	-.11	-.33	.09	**.66**	-.01	.00
10	-.20	.59	.25	-.29	-.19	**.58**	.27	**.31**
9	-.10	-.02	**.46**	**.58**	.10	**-.42**	.09	**.61**
12	.18	-.10	**.59**	.01	.25	-.17	**.51**	.19
15	**.50**	-.28	**.38**	**.32**	**.59**	**-.42**	.20	.11
13	.04	**.64**	.24	**.41**	.20	.27	-.10	**.72**
20	-.28	**.50**	.13	**.57**	-.10	.06	-.26	**.77**
18	-.28	.26	**-.51**	**.57**	-.20	-.03	**-.76**	**.33**
19	.04	.02	**-.52**	**.57**	.09	-.19	**-.73**	.11
EIGENVALUES								
	4.01	2.73	2.51	2.11	3.88	2.53	2.43	2.53

TABLE VI : Principal Component Scores

		Principal Components				Group Centroid			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Narrative	1	.08	.55	.54	-.94	-.43	.08	.04	-1.02
Units	12	.08	.78	.23	-1.10	+/-			
	34	-.93	1.33	.07	-.55	.49	.66	.59	.45
	20	-.70	.78	.46	-1.72				
	53	-.70	.00	.70	-1.64				
	45	-.23	.63	-.40	-2.03				
	38	-.31	-.08	-.87	-1.02				
	43	.23	.24	-.79	-.71				
	59	-.31	.39	-.79	-.63				
	2	-1.09	-.31	.85	-1.10				
	26	-1.25	-.15	.46	-.55				
	9	-.86	-.70	-.32	-1.33				
	44	.31	-.70	-.40	-1.49				
	40	-.23	-.94	.46	-.78				
	58	-.47	-.55	.46	-1.02				
	3	-.78	1.09	1.17	-1.25	-.55	1.46	1.23	-.71
	11	-.62	1.56	1.17	-.63	+/-			
	23	-.62	1.64	.93	-.55	.27	.25	.30	.38
	16	-.16	1.56	1.64	-.39				
	4	1.09	.00	-.16	.31	1.60	.35	.24	-.13
	30	1.17	.00	-.47	-.16	+/-			
	13	1.87	.86	.54	-.16	.32	.79	.66	.52
	29	1.71	.08	.46	.07				
	35	2.02	.31	-.32	-.16				
	6	1.32	.00	1.64	-.71				
	25	1.87	-.47	.70	-.39				
	51	1.63	-.55	.23	-.78				
	31	1.55	1.88	.31	-.32				
	37	1.79	1.41	-.55	1.01				

		Principal Components				Group Centroid			
		1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
Narrative	5	1.40	-.86	.46	.23	1.00	-1.23	.09	.04
Units	49	1.24	-1.40	.62	.23	+/-			
	17	.85	-1.87	-.16	.00	.33	.36	.45	.20
	52	1.09	-1.09	-.63	.07				
	24	.93	-1.01	.15	.00				
	36	.47	-1.17	.07	-.32				
	7	-.31	1.80	-1.10	.00	-.30	.64	-1.43	.54
	42	-.86	1.64	-1.49	.70	+/-			
	19	-1.09	.39	-1.10	.39	.73	.86	.46	.72
	57	-.78	1.02	-1.26	.23				
	21	-.93	.70	-1.41	-.55				
	32	-.55	-.31	-1.02	1.64				
	5[illegible]	.08	1.17	-1.18	1.87				
	60	.08	1.56	-.94	.93				
	8	.31	-.23	-2.43	-.08				
	10	-.62	-.23	-1.80	.23				
	47	1.40	-.47	-1.96	.54				
	14	-1.09	-.23	-.40	.62	-.79	-1.12	-.24	.27
	46	-1.32	-.55	.15	.31	+/-			
	54	-.93	-.70	.39	.62	.38	.58	.77	.37
	55	-1.25	-.86	.85	.07				
	15	-.39	-1.95	-.16	.15				
	28	-.70	-1.79	.39	.31				
	39	-.62	-1.56	-.79	-.55				
	48	-.47	-1.09	-1.33	.31				
	50	-.31	-1.33	-1.26	.62				
	18	-1.40	-.23	1.25	1.40	-.44	-.03	1.34	1.74
	33	-1.17	.16	.78	1.64	+/-			
	41	-1.40	-.62	.70	2.03	1.02	.77	.60	.73
	27	-.55	.00	2.11	1.56				
	62	.15	-1.25	2.18	.46				
	22	-.08	.70	1.32	2.73				
	61	1.40	1.02	1.01	2.34				

The third stage of data analysis consisted of performing cluster analyses in order to form the matrices U and V of equation 9. Separate Ward's method hierarchical cluster analyses were performed on the 62 by 4 P matrix of component scores for objects on attribute components and on the 20 by 4 Q matrix of component scores for attributes on object components. In both cases, the dendrogram was examined and the number of clusters chosen for further analysis was established by seeking a distinct increase in the squared euclidean distance at which clusters were further united. In both cases, such a break was readily apparent. Consequently 6 groups of attributes and 7 groups of objects were chosen for further analysis.

Table V above is organized such that the attributes which were clustered together are presented together, and Table VI is organized such that the objects which were clustered together are also presented together. Table VI also presents the cluster centroids of the seven object groups. Examination of these tables is sufficient to give a sense of the general similarity of attributes and objects clustered together, as well as an intuitive sense of where previous groupings remain apparent within the groupings chosen for further analysis.

Tables V and VI therefore present the basis upon which the cluster membership matrices U and V were constructed. Table VII presents the central E matrix derived from equation 10 as well as a binarized version. Table VII also presents measures of degree of fit between the original data matrix X and the reconstructed matrix U E V'. The first such measure is the mean squared error between the original matrix and the matrix reconstructed using the real valued version of E. The second and third are the Jaccard index and the Association index between the original matrix and the matrix reconstructed using the binary version of E. In all cases, these indices are very substantially larger than were produced with random data matrices containing the same proportion of 0 and 1 entries. Appendix 3 presents the original data reordered by both row and column in the orders presented in Tables V and VI. An examination of this reordered data allows an intuitive appreciation of the degree of structure in the data.

TABLE VII: E Matrix

Real-Valued Matrix:

.20	.33	.66	.20	.07	.13
.20	.00	1.00	.25	.88	.00
.96	.55	.70	.50	.30	.30
.73	.54	.17	.50	.00	.25
.25	.64	.52	.06	.45	1.00
.09	.31	.08	.30	.17	.61
.29	.11	.29	.81	.79	.57

Mean Squared Error = .080

Binary Matrix:

$$\begin{matrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{matrix}$$

Degree of Fit (Jaccard's Coefficient) = .527
Degree of Fit (Association Index) = .754

Alternate forms of solution of equation 9 are possible, particularly with binary data, but when applied to this matrix these resulted in minor changes.

Additional analysis can be performed upon the E matrix should it be deemed desirable. An example of such an analysis is presented in Appendix 4.

Interpretation. The interpretation of the analysis will depend upon the examination of the complex objects and attributes which the matrix represents. It will also depend upon the accuracy with which the grouping has been performed. In order to facilitate this interpretation, the groupings of attributes and objects will be presented again below. In addition, a numerical index of the 'prototypicality' of the attribute or object to the group to which it was assigned by the analysis will also be presented. This index is a weighted Euclidean distance which will approach 0 if a particular object obtained all and only the scores that would have been predicted for it by the appropriate row of the matrix regenerated from the U E V' approximation using a binary E matrix. The weighting simply makes each group of attributes identical in contribution to the final index independent of differences in the number of attributes actually in the group. The index is formed in an analogous manner for attributes. It should be noted that some objects presented within a grouping have a relatively high index. This simply indicates that they are largely outside the scope of the current representation and have been assigned in the current analysis to the grouping to which they are closest. In addition, some objects which have been assigned to a particular grouping are also close to another grouping as measured by the index. These cases are included in the tables below, where they are indicated by an asterisk.

TABLE VIII: Object Groupings

Group A (Attribute Group 3)

20	0.17	I am moved by the panorama of the Eiger in the Swiss Alps.
53	0.23	My wife and I have a wonderful (and miserable) time camping.
45	0.29	Lou Ayers' wife comes to the restaurant.
2	0.36	I spend my 21st birthday in hospital.
*3	0.36	My sister and I dine at a Swiss Baronial Mansion.
1	0.42	I crash a formal affair and meet the Queen Mother.
58	0.46	I am greeted on the street after a five year absence.
9	0.50	After a bridge loss a friend and I wander the streets.
34	0.54	I take my family on a disaster filled holiday.
38	0.54	I enjoy the prestige of being a businessman.
12	0.58	I spend a day alone in Paris.
59	0.60	I try a different approach to get a job as a waiter.
26	0.61	A dear friend persuades me to come to Edmonton.
*23	1.04	I meet and marry a dainty little English rose.
44	1.08	I am forced to sell, and I resent the townsfolk.
*11	1.15	My sister and I holiday in Austria.
43	1.22	A friend visits my restaurant from Canada.
*16	1.27	I reminisce about Christmas as I was growing up.
40	1.29	I receive a nice tip.

Group B (Attribute Groups 3 and 5)

23	0.04	I meet and marry a dainty little English rose.
11	0.15	My sister and I holiday in Austria.
16	0.27	I reminisce about Christmas as I was growing up.
3	0.36	My sister and I dine at a Swiss Baronial Mansion.
*34	0.54	I take my family on a disaster filled holiday.
*18	1.11	I go to the bakery for my mother.

Group C (Attribute Groups 1 2 3 and 4)

51	0.27	A friend and I get fed up at a Calgary bridge tournament.
13	0.48	I rent a scooter on our holiday to Majorca.
35	0.48	The day I turned forty, I try to make dramatic changes.
25	0.61	I depart for Canada.
29	0.98	I contemplate the role of gambling in my life.
*24	1.02	I contemplate my (several) decisions to leave my wife.
*44	1.11	I am forced to sell, and I resent the townsfolk.

6	1.17	I spend a naughty night away from home.
*52	1.35	A bank manager labels me a violent thinker.
30	1.39	I have a lucky Roulette streak early in my gambling career.
*49	1.40	I am arrested after stealing some railway ties.
* 5	1.48	I go looking for Mother in Eaton's
31	1.50	I treat the house to drinks after a perfect day at the track.
37	2.11	I buy a restaurant.
4	2.12	My friends and I ride the bus to the end of the line.

Group D (Attribute Groups 1 2 and 4)

49	0.40	I am arrested after stealing some railway ties.
*25	0.61	I depart for Canada.
17	0.66	I punch out a kid on my first day in school in England.
*51	0.77	A friend and I get fed up at a Calgary bridge tournament.
36	0.85	I order olive and anchovy pizza when a group goes to dinner.
52	0.85	A bank manager labels me a violent thinker.
5	0.98	I go looking for Mother in Eaton's
*13	0.98	I rent a scooter on our holiday to Majorca.
*35	0.98	The day I turned forty, I try to make dramatic changes.
24	1.02	I contemplate my (several) decisions to leave my wife.
*40	1.06	I receive a nice tip.
*44	1.11	I am forced to sell, and I resent the townsfolk.

Group E (Attribute Groups 2 3 and 6)

21	0.31	I am impressed by the engineering feats of Syncrude Canada.
8	0.41	We almost beat a team of famous British bridge players.
57	0.48	I am gratified by trust and recognition shown me at my work.
7	0.54	I eulogize the English Pub experience.
*59	0.60	I try a different approach to get a job as a waiter.
10	0.62	We win a Regional Bridge Championship in style.
*48	0.85	I sue the crown after an R.C.M.P. vehicle sideswipes me.
19	1.06	I become an expert at buying meat for the family.
*12	1.08	I spend a day alone in Paris.
42	1.12	I earn my keep when I serve eighteen all by myself.
*50	1.21	I debate religion with my wife's Roman Catholic godfather.
*45	1.29	Lou Ayers' wife comes to the restaurant.
*30	1.39	I have a lucky Roulette streak early in my gambling career.
60	1.47	I warn a patron away from the Back Forest Cake.
47	1.56	I successfully defend myself in court after a minor accident.
32	1.65	I meet a girl at a party who asks 'Will anyone ever thank you?'
56	2.17	I am persuaded to become a bridge teacher.

Group F (Attribute Group 6)

46	0.17	I muse that chefs enjoy the simplest fare.
48	0.35	I sue the crown after an R.C.M.P. vehicle sideswipes me.
15	0.46	I learn of my Mother's death on the telephone.
14	0.48	My sister doesn't want to leave Majorca.
*19	0.56	I become an expert at buying meat for the family.
*26	0.61	A dear friend persuades me to come to Edmonton.
*10	0.62	We win a Regional Bridge Championship in style.
*32	0.65	I meet a girl at a party who asks 'Will anyone thank you?'
54	0.65	My wife decides to 'Beware of Snakes'
*41	0.69	A couple comes, we're empty; next week, we're full.
50	0.71	I debate religion with my wife's Roman Catholic godfather.
28	0.75	My wife loses twins.
*21	0.81	I am impressed by the engineering feats of Syncrude Canada.
*59	1.10	I try a different approach to get a job as a waiter.
* 2	1.36	I spend my 21st birthday in hospital.
55	1.36	My wife impales herself.
39	1.56	A customer complains about the tough lamb.

Group G (Attribute Groups 4 5 and 6)

33	0.17	I meet my wife Sunday Evenings at the Hilton.
41	0.36	A couple comes, we're empty; next week, we're full.
22	0.47	I believe I am here on earth for a reason.
*14	0.81	My sister doesn't want to leave Majorca.
*32	0.98	I meet a girl at a party who asks 'Will anyone ever thank you?
*54	0.98	My wife decides to 'Beware of Snakes'
27	1.10	My wife comes to Canada.
*28	1.42	My wife loses twins.
18	1.44	I go to the bakery for my mother.
61	1.81	I establish a relationship with an easygoing attitude to money.
62	2.22	I reflect on my life and my lack of current plans.

TABLE IX: Attribute Groupings

Group 1 (Object groups C D)

6	027	I am a maverick.
14	037	Undisciplined
11	054	Impulsive
1	055	I am a risk taker / gambler.
2	057	I strongly value my freedom of choice / independence.
*15	077	Guilty

Group 2 (Object Groups C D E)

7	036	Opinionated
*2	066	I strongly value my freedom of choice / independence.
5	068	I value creative individual solutions.
4	1.39	I am motivated by achievement and the recognition it brings.
17	1.88	Indignant

Group 3 (Object Groups A B C E)

16	0.39	Happy / Optimistic
8	0.54	Seeker of High Standards
10	1.00	Appreciative
3	1.07	I am a dreamer / wisher for the good life.

Group 4 (Object Groups C D G)

15	0.34	Guilty
12	1.38	Attitude of "Live and Let Live"
9	2.02	Procrastinator

Group 5 (Object Groups B G)

13	0.37	Generous
*14	0.51	Undisciplined
20	0.54	Considerate
*11	0.69	Impulsive
* 6	0.70	I am a maverick
* 9	1.02	Procrastinator

Group 6 (Object Groups E F G)

18	0.52	Fair Minded
19	0.75	Logical - Analytic and Progressive

If the discourse from which the rated units were abstracted were unavailable, these tables would, with very little amplification, provide virtually all that could be made available from the analysis. Because the discourse *is* available, interpretation could now proceed to examine in greater detail each individual unit in an attempt to fulfill the nature of each group in greater detail. In fact, such a procedure might provide an alternative starting point for the type of analysis provided in the previous chapter.

However, since that analysis is available, it can be used to provide an amplification for the current analysis. (Alternatively the procedure which follows can be regarded as a means of providing a validation of the procedure presented in the previous chapter).

This was the procedure. First, themes and partial themes isolated in the previous chapter were examined in relation to each isolated discourse unit and presence or absence from that unit judged. The precise themes employed are reported in Table XI below.
The data matrix is presented in Appendix 5.

TABLE X: Rated Themes

BEING-AN-INDIVIDUALIST

1. 'follows own path'
2. capricious, 'as the spirit moves'
3. reckless
4. inconsiderate, 'to hell with others'
5. adventurer, explorer
6. spurred by the prospect of enriched personal experience
7. AWED-BY-A-MAGIC-WORLD
8. seek at some risk
9. see with awe
10. enter 'magical' world
11. confident
12. resourceful
13. rebels against constraint
14. angry at constraint
15. escapes from constraint
16. FEAR OF IMPOTENCE

PERSONAL SPECIALNESS

17. chosen, blessed
18. desires to stand out
19. obligated to be somebody and do good
20. seeks to accomplish through personal abilities
21. seeks to accomplish in competition
22. aspires to belong to community
23. responsible to care for / provide

24. BESTOWAL

25. MISSING INTIMACY

This represents, at best, an approximate procedure for several reasons. Most notably there are a variety of degrees of 'presence' of themes in discourse units including 'being stated as a conviction', 'being exemplified in the narrative', being judged to be horizonally present', etc. Furthermore the division into discourse units itself does not clearly indicate the nature of the presence or absence of the theme (especially e.g. where the discourse unit is an extendure consisting of multiple episodes and/or multiple convictions are stated in relation to a single narrative).

Next the same type of weighted distance metric was calculated for each theme in this new matrix to each group of themes in the isolated in the analysis reported in this chapter.

The analysis for trait and theme groups is presented in Table XII below in the same style as Table X and with Table X embedded in it for ease of reference.

TABLE XI: Combined Groupings

Group 1

6	0.27	I am a maverick.
14	0.37	Undisciplined
11	0.54	Impulsive
1	0.55	I am a risk taker / gambler.
2	0.57	I strongly value my freedom of choice / independence.
*15	0.77	Guilty
1	***0.15***	***'follows own path'***

2	***0.19***	***capricious, 'as the spirit moves'***
13	***0.24***	***rebels against constraint***
3	***0.32***	***reckless***
4	***0.73***	***inconsiderate, 'to hell with others'***
5	***0.98***	***adventurer, explorer***
15	***0.98***	***escapes from constraint***
16	***1.01***	***fear of impotence***
18	***1.28***	***desires to stand out***
6	***1.32***	***spurred by enriched personal experience***
14	***1.33***	***angry at constraint***
17	***1.44***	***chosen, blessed***

Group 2

7	0.36	Opinionated
*2	0.66	I strongly value my freedom of choice / independence.
5	0.68	I value creative individual solutions.
4	1.39	I am motivated by achievement and the recognition it brings.
17	1.88	Indignant

****1***	***0.79***	***'follows own path'***
11	***0.95***	***confident***
12	***1.18***	***resourceful***
****2***	***1.19***	***capricious, 'as the spirit moves'***
****3***	***1.32***	***reckless***
****18***	***1.37***	***desires to stand out***
****22***	***1.85***	***aspires to belong to community***
****20***	***1.92***	***seeks to accomplish through abilities***

Group 3

16	0.39	Happy / Optimistic
8	0.54	Seeker of High Standards
10	1.00	Appreciative
3	1.07	I am a dreamer / wisher for the good life.

****11***	***1.38***	***confident***
****16***	***1.44***	***fear of impotence***
****24***	***1.62***	***bestowal***

Group 4

15	0.34	Guilty
12	1.38	Attitude of "Live and Let Live"

9	2.02	Procrastinator

*1	***0.87***	***'follows own path'***
*2	***0.90***	***capricious, 'as the spirit moves'***
*13	***0.95***	***rebels against constraint***
*3	***1.03***	***reckless***
7	***1.18***	***awed-by-a-magic-world***
9	***1.18***	***see with awe***
*6	***1.37***	***spurred by enriched personal experience***
*16	***1.41***	***fear of impotence***
10	***1.64***	***enter 'magical' world***

Group 5

13	0.37	Generous
*14	0.51	Undisciplined
20	0.54	Considerate
*11	0.69	Impulsive
* 6	0.70	I am a maverick
* 9	1.02	Procrastinator

23	***0.49***	***responsible to care for / provide***
25	***0.53***	***missing intimacy***
19	***0.71***	***obligated to be somebody and do good***
24	***0.89***	***bestowal***
*5	***1.56***	***adventurer, explorer***
22	***1.60***	***aspires to belong to community***
21	***1.79***	***seeks to accomplish in competition***

Group 6

18	0.52	Fair Minded
19	0.75	Logical - Analytic and Progressive

20	***1.73***	***seeks to accomplish through abilities***
*12	***1.78***	***resourceful***

The results of this analysis are both gratifying and informative because they demonstrate a strong consistency between the numerical and nonnumerical derivation of themes and also present confirmatory evidence for the thematic coherence of groupings that would be puzzling from an examination of table X alone.

With few exceptions the rated nonnumerical fall where they would be expected to fall on a priori grounds, that is by a simple examination of Table X and the analyses of chapter 9. Thus attribute group 1 strongly conforms to the general characteristics of the theme of Being-an-Individualist posited independently by the analysis of the previous chapter and discovered in the analysis in which R generated his own themes and then rated their presence in his discourse. Groups 2 and 6 are also strongly consistent across the two analyses.

Group 3 is less consistent, but also less well represented. Nevertheless, the characteristics from the first analysis seem to represent aspects of theme of bestowal. Thus being appreciative and happy are coherent with having been bestowed with grace. Being optimistic, seeking the best, and wishing for the good life are coherent with the seeking a place from which to bestow graces. The group is strongly reminiscent of the various justifications which R presents for his gambling (in Unit 13a: Gambling: Willful Absence).

The joint analysis clarifies the nature of Group 5 by including the theme of 'missing intimacy' close to the centroid. This makes the conjunction of generous and considerate (from the first analysis), responsible for care and provision, obligation, bestowal (from the second analysis) with undisciplined, impulsive, maverick, procrastinator (from the first analysis), adventurer (from the second analysis) easier to understand. It is consistent to interpret this conjunction as underscoring the horizonal presence of missing intimacy whenever considerateness, responsibility, and obligation are salient to R. In this discourse, these themes are all associated with his wife and family, and it is clear that R's wife regards his being-an-individualist as impulsive and undisciplined.

Group 4 remains mysterious. Certainly the prominent guilt is duly associated with capriciousness, rebellion against constraint, recklessness, and following ones own path in this way. Less clear is the association with the theme of being awed by a magic world and its associated moments (unless of course one wishes to embrace a psychoanalytic primal scene narrative). From the relatively high values for the association index, it seems most likely that these two themes (guilt and awe) are in fact relatively distinct, although 'closer' to each other than to other groupings.

Conclusion. The current analysis returns full circle to the form of analysis critiqued in chapter 1. The detailed technique has its own charms, and offers relative precision at least in numerical aspects. It is important to note however that its use in the current context is predicated upon the intention to 'closely read' the discourse on which it is based precisely in search of the fulfilled meaning that would not be available in the absence of this close reading. In fact, the very task presupposes a parsing of the discourse.

Thus the current analysis presents two important conclusions. First, an analysis which does intend to fulfill meaning by close reading can be well directed by beginning with a numerical analysis of the type exemplified here. Second, beginning with a close reading and deriving themes directly, as was the procedure here, is reliable in the sense that it can locate themes and thematic moments which are consistent with the themes and thematic moments constituted by the participant himself, both under instructions to freely constitute them and under relatively unusual and artificial instructions such as rating narrative elements of one's life story for their presence.

Clearly more could be done. Starting from the discourse alone, a more exhaustive analysis of themes could be performed in which the restriction on pervasiveness and abstractness is removed. Thus an examination of the contexts in which particular persons, objects, or activities are constituted could be performed (as was pioneered by Baldwin, 1942). Starting from the numerical analysis, the groupings of discourse units could be examined directly for the bases of the participants judgements, and for other strands which might tie them together thematically. Although in a couple of cases the succession relationships between themes and narratives were examined (e.g. being pulled by the prospect of rich personal experience as a motivational element in being an adventurer-explorer), there is certainly room for further analysis.

Finally, an entire domain is opened if analyses of these types are regarded simply as the initial moves in a dialogic relationship between researcher and participant in which further interaction is directed in part on a sharing of results.

APPENDIX 1: Detailed Instructions

Detailed scripts for the sessions in which themes, central traits, and ratings of narratives were obtained, as presented to R are presented below. (Those labeled Session 2 were presented at the conclusion of the recording of autobiographical narratives, as previously detailed).

Session 2

Now that we have finished this phase of the investigation, I am going to ask you to consider the major themes of your life. Next time we meet I will ask you to tell me what these themes are for you.

But now I want to describe in more detail what I mean by a theme. A theme is something that ties your life together and is important to you - a theme might be an interest, a goal, a quest, an accomplishment, a disappointment or failure, a dominant trait or characteristic, a certain recurrent feeling like fear or excitement. It might be a certain way of understanding yourself or your experience, like a theory, a belief, an attitude, or a value. Or a theme can be a combination of these or other things.

Often a theme is a meaningful way to understand who you are. Often it is something about you that you think is crucial for somebody else to understand in order to understand you well or at all. Themes often carry through your life or significant portions of it and may organize how you think, feel, or behave; how you understand yourself and others, even how and what you remember. They may be part of what occupies your thoughts often, or something about which you are usually only dimly aware.

People have varying numbers of important themes, but usually there are several.

Have I given you a sufficient idea of what I mean by a theme for you to consider what the themes of your life might be?

[Questions answered].

Session 3

The last time we met I asked you to consider the major themes of your life, those things that you consider important in tying together your life.

At that time I indicated that a theme could be virtually anything, like a goal or an interest, a feeling, a success or failure, a characteristic, a belief, or a value; that it might be something that you thought about often or were only dimly aware of; that it might be something that someone should know about you to know you well.

Were you able to reflect upon the themes of your life?

[Answer noted].

Now I am going to give you several pieces of paper and I want you to write out for me the major themes of your life and a brief explanation of each.

[Task completed].

Now: I have prepared transcripts of the memories which you related to me in our previous meetings. In my analysis, the transcript separates into 62 distinct segments or sections, each of which seems to be relatively self-contained, and relates a single episode or image. Here is a list of these 62 segments, each with a short title which tries to capture enough about the segment to bring it back to memory. I also have this full transcript to which you can refer, both to refresh your memory and to verify that I have accurately indicated your memories.

[Participant examines materials].

While you were examining these transcripts, I was examining your themes, and I have prepared a piece of graph paper with rows labeled 1 to 62 to represent the segments of the transcript of your personal memories, and with columns bearing the titles of your 6 central themes. What I would like you to do is to reflect successively upon each of these segments of your autobiography and upon each of these themes. Then place a 1 at the row and column intersection representing a particular segment and a particular theme *if you feel that this segment illustrates or exemplifies this theme*. Otherwise, leave it blank. You may of course refer to both the short list of segments I prepared, and the longer transcript if you wish, as well as the themes you have written out here. Do you have any questions about this task?

[Questions answered.]

[Task completed.]

Next time I am going to ask you to provide for me a brief description of your most important personal characteristics or traits, those personal qualities that describe most accurately who you are or how you approach things, those ways of doing things that have always been a part of you and that are important to any description of you.

Some examples for someone might be 'inquisitive' or 'always frightened' or 'disorganized' or 'helpful to other people'. But these traits don't have to be simple or easily described. For example, someone might describe themselves as 'perpetually torn between a desire to take risks for thrills and a concern that such actions might cause guilt because they mean an evasion of responsibilities'. The most important thing is to consider the enduring aspects or characteristics that are most accurate in describing you.

Then we will repeat this rating task using your traits rather than your themes.

Session 4.

This time I am going to ask you for your most important personal characteristics or traits.

Last time I indicated that those characteristics or traits should be the personal qualities that you feel describe most accurately who you are or how you approach things, those ways of doing things that have always been a part of you and that are important to any description of you.

Were you able to reflect upon your most dominant characteristics?

[Answer noted.]

I am going to give you several pieces of paper and I want you to write out for me your most dominant enduring characteristics and, perhaps, a brief explanation of each.

[Task completed].

Now, using your 14 characteristics, I would like you to complete on this graph paper the same task as last time; that is, placing a 1 at the row and column intersection representing a particular personal memory from the transcript and a particular enduring characteristic *if you feel that this segment illustrates or exemplifies this characteristic*, and otherwise, leaving it blank. Do you have any questions?

[Questions answered and Task Completed].

APPENDIX 2: Raw Data from Rating Tasks

		Themes/Traits 12345678911111111112 01234567890
Narrative Units	1	10000001011001010000
	2	00000000010100010000
	3	00100001010110010000
	4	11001100001011010010
	5	11001100001101110010
	6	11100100011101110000
	7	01110011010010010110
	8	10011111000000011110
	9	00001000010000011000
	10	00011010000000010110
	11	01100001010110010001
	12	01101001011100010010
	13	11111111011111100000
	14	00001000000100010111
	15	00000100000000101010
	16	00100001011111010001
	17	00001110001001101000
	18	00000000100010000001
	19	00001001000000010111
	20	00110001010100010000
	21	00011001010000010110
	22	00000010111111110111
	23	00100001011010010001
	24	01100110001100111010
	25	11101110001101110000
	26	00000000010100010100
	27	00000000101110110001
	28	00000000000100101010
	29	11100111001101110010
	30	10110110001001010010
	31	11111111011111010001
	32	01010010000000100111
	33	00000000010110100111
	34	01100001010000010101
	35	11111111001101110010
	36	01001110001100000000
	37	11111111011111111111
	38	01001011000000010000

```
                          Themes/Traits
                        12345678911111111112
                                 01234567890

                  39    00001010000000001000
                  40    00011100010100100000
Narrative         41    00000000100100000111
Units             42    00011011010010010111
                  43    01111110000000010001
                  44    01111100000100011000
                  45    00111101010000010000
                  46    00000000010100000110
                  47    11011110001001011110
                  48    00000110000000011110
                  49    10001110001101100000
                  50    01001010000100001110
                  51    01101111001101111000
                  52    01001111001101001010
                  53    00101000010100010000
                  54    01000000000100000011
                  55    00000000000100000001
                  56    11010011001010000111
                  57    00011011010100010111
                  58    00000110010100010000
                  59    00001011011000010010
                  60    01101011001010010111
                  61    11101110111111110111
                  62    00100100100101100000
```

APPENDIX 3: Reordered Data from Rating Tasks

		Attributes					
		12116	4571	3811	911	12	11
		14	7	60	25	30	89
Narrative Units	1	10110	0000	0111	000	00	00
	12	01100	0100	1111	010	00	01
	34	01000	0000	1111	000	01	10
	20	00000	1000	1111	010	00	00
	53	00000	0100	1011	010	00	00
	45	00001	1100	1111	000	00	00
	38	01000	0110	0110	000	00	00
	43	01001	1110	1010	000	01	00
	59	00100	0110	0111	000	00	01
	2	00000	0000	0011	010	00	00
	26	00000	0000	0011	010	00	10
	9	00000	0101	0011	000	00	00
	44	01001	1101	1010	010	00	00
	40	00001	1100	0001	011	00	00
	58	00001	0010	0011	010	00	00
	3	00000	0000	1111	010	10	00
	11	01000	0000	1111	010	11	00
	23	00100	0000	1111	000	11	00
	16	00110	0000	1111	010	11	00
	4	11111	0100	0010	000	10	01
	30	10111	1010	1010	000	00	01
	13	11111	1110	1101	011	10	00
	29	11111	0010	1110	011	00	01
	35	11111	1110	1110	011	00	01
	6	11111	0000	1011	011	00	00
	25	11111	0110	1010	011	00	00
	51	01111	0111	1110	011	00	00
	31	11111	1110	1111	010	11	00
	37	11111	1111	1111	011	11	11
	5	11111	0100	0010	011	00	01
	49	10111	0110	0000	011	00	00
	17	00111	0111	0000	001	00	00
	52	01111	0111	0100	010	00	01
	24	01101	0011	1010	011	00	01
	36	01101	0110	0000	010	00	00

		Attributes					
		12116	4571	3811	911	12	11
		14	7	60	25	30	89
Narrative Units	7	01000	1010	1111	000	10	11
	42	00000	1110	0111	000	11	11
	19	00000	0100	0110	000	01	11
	57	00000	1110	0111	010	01	11
	21	00000	1100	0111	000	00	11
	32	01000	1010	0000	001	01	11
	56	11100	1010	0100	000	11	11
	60	01100	0110	1110	000	11	11
	8	10001	1111	0110	000	00	11
	10	00000	1110	0010	000	00	11
	47	11111	1111	0010	000	00	11
	14	00000	0100	0010	010	01	11
	46	00000	0000	0001	010	00	11
	54	01000	0000	0000	010	01	01
	55	00000	0000	0000	010	01	00
	15	00001	0001	0000	001	00	01
	28	00000	0001	0000	011	00	01
	39	00000	0111	0000	000	00	00
	48	00001	0011	0010	000	00	11
	50	01000	0111	0000	010	00	11
	18	00000	0000	0000	100	11	00
	33	00000	0000	0001	011	11	11
	41	00000	0000	0000	110	01	11
	27	00100	0000	0010	111	11	00
	62	00011	0000	1000	111	00	00
	22	00110	0010	0011	111	11	11
	61	11111	0110	1011	111	11	11

APPENDIX 4: Analysis of the E Matrix

A multidimensional metric scaling (see e.g. Weller & Romney, 1990) was performed to generate a visual representation of the E matrix. This consists of a principal component analysis performed upon a double-centred transformation of the E matrix (rotated to the varimax criterion), and a transformation of the component scores to allow them to be informatively placed within the same multidimensional space. The numerical results are presented in Table VIII and a visual representation is presented in Figures I and II. (In these figures, numbers place attribute groups while letters place object groups). The coordinates of attribute groups are interpreted as they would be in a component or factor analysis. In addition, the Euclidean distance between a position in the multidimensional space occupied by an object group and a position occupied by an attribute group is inversely proportional to the score obtained on that attribute group by the object group (to the degree of approximation allowed by the dimensionality of the space). This allows an interpretation of the spatial relationships not only between attribute groups or between object groups, but also an interpretation of the spatial relationships between object groups and attribute groups.

TABLE I: Multidimensional Preference Scaling of E Matrix

		Principal Components Rotated by Varimax		
		I	II	III
Attribute Group	1	.86	.31	-.16
	2	-.05	.97	.16
	3	.26	-.17	.91
	4	.31	-.37	-.81
	5	-.45	-.83	.13
	6	-.95	.10	-.23
Eigenvalues		2.01	1.90	1.60
		Object Vector Coordinates		
Narrative Group	1	.29	.41	.86
	2	-.09	-.94	.33
	3	.91	.41	.00
	4	.61	.61	-.51
	5	-.80	.38	.47
	6	-.86	.02	-.50
	7	-.17	-.85	-.50

FIGURE I: Multidimensional Metric Scaling Factors I vs. II



FIGURE II: Multidimensional Metric Scaling Factors I vs. III



APPENDIX 5: Discourse Unit By Derived Theme Ratings

	Themes/Traits 1234567891111111111222222 0123456789012345
1	1110111111100000110001010
2	0000000000000000111001110
3	0000111011100000000001011
4	1111110000111000000000000
5	1111000000111000000000000
6	1011111111101011000000001
7	0000111011000001000001011
8	0000000000110000110011000
9	0000000000000001000011000
10	0000000000110000110011010
11	0000111010110000000000000
12	1100111110110000000000000
13	1110110000110000000000000
14	0000000000000000000000000
15	0000000000000000000000001
16	0000001010000001001000111
17	1111000000101101000000000
18	0000000000110000011000000
19	0000000000110000011001000
20	0000111010000000000000000
21	0000001011000000000000000
22	0000000000000000101111110
23	0000000000100000001000111
24	1100110000001011001000111
25	1000100000110010000100100
26	0000000000000000000000010
27	0000000000000000000000100
28	1001000000001011000000001
29	1111000000001011110100010
30	1100111111010000110000010
31	0110000000000000110001010
32	0000000000110001001101101
33	0000000000000001001000101
34	0000000000010100001000101
35	1111000000101011111000000
36	1000000000001000010001000
37	1110110000111001110101100
38	0000000000000000010011000

	Themes/Traits 1234567891111111111222222 0123456789012345
39	0000000000110000000100100
40	0000000000000000100101000
41	0000000000000000000000000
42	0000000000110000000100000
43	0000000000000000000100110
44	0000000000000011000000000
45	0000000000010000110100010
46	0000000000000000000000000
47	1000000000110000010100000
48	0000000000000100000000000
49	1110100000101000000000010
50	1000000000111100000000010
51	1111000000101110000000000
52	1000000000101100000000000
53	0000110000000000000000101
54	0000000000000000000000000
55	0000000000000000000000000
56	0000110000110000001100010
57	1000000000011000010101010
58	0000000000000000010001010
59	1000000000110000000000000
60	0000000000110000000100000
61	0000000000000000000000111
62	1111110000001111100101111

CHAPTER XI

RETROSPECTIONS

The most fundamental beliefs on which this thesis was grounded were a conviction that a major route to psychological insight, the meanings of life expressions, had not been sufficiently explored; and a conviction that a level of rigour acceptable to, and recognizable by, contemporary naturalistic psychologists could be harnessed in the attempt to explore such meanings. These convictions predated my exposure to the specific projects of Dilthey and Husserl, though they were no doubt shaped indirectly by them through the Zeitgeist of my milieu.

These convictions are also separate from my pre-existing interests in personality, and especially personality assessment, which became the specific context for the exploration of these convictions. In reviewing the project after some time has passed, I now see my successes as clearest within this specific context of personality.

Thus I believe that I have discovered in Husserl's concept of conviction an important bridge between a phenomenological view of individuality and a naturalistic concept of trait. 'Consistency with conviction' serves both as a characterization of personal habitualities and as an ideal towards which to strive in the personal constitution of self. Locating convictions in the expressed meanings of an individual telling the story of his or her life may also be a way to realize the search for consistency in personality which has occupied naturalistic psychology for so many years .

A second accomplishment is a precise conception of theme which should aid the location of themes in discourse. This conception allows gradations of explicitness in the presence of a theme. Though convictions may be directly expressed (as themes) and expounded within a discourse unit, a theme may also be present implicitly without a direct expression of an underlying conviction. The search for similarity in the thematic presences of discourse becomes the search for the underlying constancies of the personal world. I am satisfied that the analyses in Chapter 9 demonstrate how this search may be initiated.

I am also pleased with the analyses (found primarily in Chapter 8) of the linguistic structure of oral discourse in which self-referent speech is parsed into units which can be subjected to further examination. I also believe that these analyses provide a grounding of the concept of theme, most particularly in the differences between static descriptions, iterative sequences, and chronological unfoldings which I see as essential aspects of a well-formed narrative.

On the other hand I can also see more clearly where I have incompletely fulfilled the two fundamental convictions with which I began, and consequently where further work is necessary. For example, I am unhappy with the degree of fulfillment of the phenomenological arguments presented primarily in Chapters 2 and 3. I now see that the driving force behind the creation of these chapters was to supply an *argument* that could bridge the gap between phenomenology and naturalistic psychology on the one hand, and nomothetic and idiographic research on the other. Husserl's project was always a project of description, and my use of phenomenological descriptions in argumentation may at some points have degenerated into 'mere word play' without fulfillment. This seems especially true to me now in Chapter 3 in the incompletely rendered concepts of apophantic and ontological domains. I am not now repudiating these concepts or the use to which I put them, but I am calling attention to a felt need to look again, and perhaps re-describe. When I re-read these chapters, I can no longer see the 'certainties' which I thought I saw as I wrote them.

I am also aware that I remain a student of phenomenology, and not (yet) a phenomenologist, one who can dispense with the books and practice phenomenology in full conviction that the lived experience of phenomenology is true to its meaning. Is a personality psychology which is true to *that* phenomenology possible? An answer may also come by looking again.

Second, I am unsettled by the strong presence of linguistics in this work. I began with the conviction that the psychological object (in this case the personal world) is available because constituted in expression, and that locating the psychological object is thus a matter of discerning the structure of the linguistic. But the psychological is not solely the linguistic; there is a multirealizable relationship between psychological objects and linguistic ones. In the current project, however, precision with the linguistic dominates, perhaps at the cost of precision with that aspect of the psychological which is not in full correspondence to the linguistic.

Even within the primarily linguistic, of course, there remain uncertainties. For example, I am not completely pleased with the transcription because I sense that there is a level of structuring not adequately captured by the structure of the transcript. I believe that this structuring is at approximately the level of the line and the verse, and I know that I am destined to return to attempt to hear it more clearly. But in line with the reservations I have just expressed, I cannot clearly see such activity as psychological in the spirit of the main line of argumentation of the thesis. I rather feel that I can become easily 'sidetracked' by this form of analysis (as I think I might feel by exploring 'stylistics' which as a well-developed linguistic activity no doubt has much to offer an attempt to describe the linguistic structure of R's text). Whether this is so may rest upon a clearer understanding of the autonomy of various disciplines, such as linguistics and psychology, and the phenomena with which they deal.

It also seems clear that I have rather too easily appropriated structuralist descriptions of narrative to the tasks of my phenomenologically oriented psychology (despite finding a like mind in Ricouer). Certainly, structuralists are not phenomenologists and would all too likely disagree with my descriptions of their work, even if I remain confident that some of their descriptions capture essences of narrative. Knowing for sure will involve a more complete examination of structuralist thought.

Third, there are issues which surround the status of the analyses presented in Chapter 10. These analyses were originally conceived to be integral to the project. As numerical procedures, they were intended to introduce a rigour recognizable by (and hence communicable to) a naturalistic psychology into a meaning oriented psychology. They fail, however, to be a moment of that meaning oriented psychology; that is, they appear unintegrated with the analyses (in particular) of the previous two chapters. Instead, they return to the naturalistic conception of construct validation critiqued in Chapter 1. The difficulty is, I believe, that I originally held a naive conception of the place of numerical procedures, derived in part from the naturalistic perspective that often view such procedures as the endpoint, the summary description of the activity of research. Under such a conception Chapter 10 must fail. The reason is that under a phenomenological regard, numbers remain unfulfilled and can never be regarded as the *endpoint* of a phenomenologically informed process.

The proper use of numerical procedures is the one sketched in Chapter 9; they are an ancillary method, tools which aid view, rather than ends. The analyst may, as an adjunct to memory and sight, use numerical procedures *provided only that he or she remains committed to fulfilling that to which the numbers refer*; but the analyst must never lose sight. I was unable to use numerical procedures in this project at that stage, however, because I was not able to yet see clearly what I was seeking. By the time I had developed such a vision, the numerical procedures seemed unnecessary and redundant. In any further analyses that I might perform, I do expect numerical procedures to be helpful.

This is also to suggest that connoisseurship once developed has no *essential* need of such procedures because an ability to see has been developed. Prior to this connoisseurship, such procedures may be helpful *provided that sufficient is known about what is to be sought with them.*

Finally, of course, I am disappointed when I examine the limited extent to which my analyses capture R's personal world. I feel this disappointment both in what I feel I *do* know of R's world, and also in the extent to which I have been able to communicate what I feel I know of it. This is not unexpected and should be viewed as inevitable within the research process. It should also serve as inspiration. R lives a world which is yet unfulfilled to me, and I will continue to treasure him, and hope to understand him better.

I apologize to the reader that the project remains unfulfilled, and that he or she has not achieved the clear and complete picture that was initially promised. I too feel this way. But this thesis is a preliminary report on tasks which will remain alive for me, and perhaps for others.

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